Perspectives in event semantics by Academisch Proefschrift et al.
Its a Process and an EventILLC Dissertation Series DS-2007-03
For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Plantage Muidergracht 24
1018 TV Amsterdam
phone: +31-20-525 6051
fax: +31-20-525 5206
e-mail: illc@science.uva.nl
homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/Its a Process and an Event
Perspectives in event semantics
Academisch Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magniﬁcus
prof.dr. J.W. Zwemmer
ten overstaan van een door het college voor
promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar
te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit
op woensdag 28 februari 2007, te 14.00 uur
door
Darrin Louis Hindsill
geboren te Los Angeles, Verenigde Staten van Amerika.Promotiecommissie
Promotor: Prof. dr. Michiel van Lambalgen
Overige leden:
prof. dr. A.E. Baker
dr. M. van Staden
prof. dr. M.J.B. Stokhof
prof. dr. F.J.M.M. Veltman
prof. dr. A. Verhagen
Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen
Copyright c   2007 by Darrin L. Hindsill
Cover design by Joes Koppers.
Cover picture: “Children’s Games” (detail) by Pieter Brueghel, the Elder.
Printed and bound by PrintPartners Ipskamp, Enschede.Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Preamble 1
1 . 1 W h a td ow er e a l l y‘ k n o w ’ ?...................... 1
1 . 2 T h eP l a n ................................ 5
2 Lexical Aspect 9
2 . 1 E v e n tT y p o l o g y............................ 9
2 . 2 E v e n tS t r u c t u r ea n dC o e r c i o n.................... 3 3
3 The Psycholinguistic Turn 45
3 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n.............................. 4 5
3.2 Preliminaries: Analogy between objects and events . . . . . . . . 49
3 . 3 I n t e n t i o n sa n dG o a l s ......................... 5 3
3.4 Event Segmentation and the Hierarchical Bias Hypothesis . . . . 55
3.5 Acquisition of Tense, Aspect and Aktionsart . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3 . 6 P r e l i m i n a r yC o n c l u s i o n........................ 8 6
3 . 7 E v e n ta n dO b j e c tI n d i v i d u a t i o n................... 9 1
3 . 8 C o n c l u s i o n............................... 9 7
Interlude 103
3.9 Language and ontology of the Event Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3 . 1 0A k t i o n s a r t e na n dS c e n a r i o s ..................... 1 0 7
3.11 An informal sketch of the computational machinery . . . . . . . . 114
4 Perception Verbs 119
4 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n.............................. 1 1 9
4.2 Logical and psychological properties of perception verbs . . . . . . 120
4 . 3 P e r c e p t i o nr e p o r t so fe v e n t u a l i t i e s.................. 1 3 3
4 . 4 P r e f o r m a lm a t t e r s ........................... 1 5 0
v4.5 Formalisation of see and watch ................... 1 5 7
4.6 Coda – Prepositions vs. ing ..................... 1 7 0
5 Causatives 175
5 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n.............................. 1 7 5
5 . 2 C a u s a t i v e s............................... 1 7 8
5.3 Coda: Diachronic development of causal level . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5 . 4 R e s u l t a t i v e s.............................. 2 2 1
6 Nominalization 231
6 . 1 T h eS t a n d a r dS t o r y.......................... 2 3 1
6 . 2 O r i g i n s( a n dp r e s e n t - d a yc o n s e q u e n c e s )............... 2 4 4
6.3 A second look: The semantics and mappings of verbal Ing forms . 266
6 . 4 F o r m a l i s a t i o n ............................. 2 7 5
7 Endnote 281
7 . 1 C o n c l u s i o ns of a r ........................... 2 8 1
7 . 2 F o u n di nt h es t a r s ........................... 2 8 4
Appendix 293
Bibliography 299
R e f e r e n c e s.................................. 2 9 9
Samenvatting 307
viAcknowledgments
The process of ﬁnishing a PhD thesis was expected to be diﬃcult, but through
a variety a factors, it has been not only that, but multiplied by ten. Indeed, at
certain points I never thought that I would be writing these lines. That they are
written owes a great deal of gratitude to my supervisor, Michiel van Lambalgen,
who convinced me in the midst of illness that I did have it in me to complete
the work. Of course, he also deserves the more ordinary thanks (in his ordinary
role as supervisor), for guiding me through the procedure, slowly forming what
became a manuscript before my scarcely believing eyes.
I am also grateful to the ILLC administration for making my (extended) stay
possible, again, without which I wouldn’t have been able to reach this moment.
Though I have been unable to show my face much in the last two years, I would
also I like to thank everybody on the second ﬂoor of the Philosophy department.
Even if I could not be a regular attendant, the talks I attended and discussions
I had with my colleagues were certainly fruitful. It is also most appreciated that
fellow AIO’s would keep me informed as to happenings, even if I was notable by
my absence. Special thanks is owed to Fabrice Nauze for Samenvatting assistance.
A similar gratitude is owed to my friends and ﬂat-mates for support and help
any time I needed it. So this is also for Karin, Cecilia, Maarten, and Sanne. The
same applies to Joes as well, not only for the former, but also for descending from
the airy realm of virtual design to the corporeal world of print.
Finally, I would also like to thank my family and friends in Los Angeles,
especially my parents, who never wavered in their conﬁdence, even if I did.
It is likely that I have left one or more people out. If so, and you are reading
this, please accept that this is only my ignorance and faulty memory.
viiChapter 1
Preamble
1.1 What do we really ‘know’?
It is perhaps best to begin with a simple, but surprising, example that serves
to illustrate a main theme of this thesis. It is generally held that certain types
of statives resist the English progressive. The most typical of theses statives is
know. A browse through the literature and a query of a the class of native English
speakers involved in semantics or linguistics would certainly hold the following:
(1) *I am knowing the answer.
The * should be read here as not merely semantically anomalous, but down-
right ungrammatical. But why should this be so? Certainly, the progressive
construction is morpho-syntactically grammatical, so the deciding factor here is
that something like knowledge in the philosophical sense cannot be seen as an
activity,1 but rather the state of an individual. Moreover, in the above example,2
the object of knowledge is most likely a universal truth, and there is no context
given, other than an ‘out of the blue’ statement of a piece of someone’s knowledge.
This view in the semantics literature goes back at least to (Vendler, 1967) in his
classiﬁcation of English verbs into four discrete aspectual classes. Since that time,
while many so-called stative verbs have been shown to appear quite commonly
in the progressive (such as sit, live, resemble, etc.), the view that know cannot
appear in the progressive has held fast. Nevertheless, there are some attested
uses extant in the literature. (Huddleston, 2002b) states that progressive know
“is just about restricted to waxing/waning case (He claims that fewer and fewer
students are knowing how to write English when they come up to university.)” (p.
170). (Baker, 1995) has a waxing version:
1For now the reader can rely on their intuition for the meaning of states and activities. They
will be deﬁned in the next chapter.
2Which should certainly be said to be infelicitous or very anomalous to say the least.
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(2) Dana is knowing more and more of the answers as the course progresses.
This is about as far the acknowledgement of exceptions goes, but in neither
example is it a progressive where someone knows a particular fact. In the ﬁrst
case it is a description of a series of students capacities, and the second the
growth of knowledge about a speciﬁc subject. Keeping matters intuitive, both of
the examples present something dynamic and activity-like, making them a prime
candidate for the progressive. But (1) is knowledge of a single fact, and while
one can, unfortunately, forget what one knows,3 the knowledge of a fact during a
particular moment in time hardly seems dynamic. Perhaps, then, this restriction
on progressive know is correct after all.
But what if in discourse, the notion of knowledge plays a slightly diﬀerent
role? That is, aside from quizzes and nerdish braggadocio, people very rarely list
the facts they know. Rather, if they make a point of knowledge of a particular
fact, it is usually for a reason relevant to the current situation. This last point is
the beginning of an insight that can then make predictions about more contingent
variants of sentences such as (1).
(Goldsmith & Woisetschlaeger, 1982) modiﬁes the notion of state as something
that can be viewed in either a structural or phenomenal way. Some states can
be seen as an inherent part of what they are predicated of, while some happen
to be merely temporary states that are subject to change. Their famous example
is that of the verb stand, and how the speaker construes it. Imagine that the
statue’s placement in both sentences has the same spatio-temporal duration.
(3) a. The statue of Tom Paine is standing at the corner of Kirkland and
College (but everybody expects the new Administration to move it).
b. The statue of Tom Paine stands at the corner of Kirkland and College
(and nobody thinks the deadlocked City Council will ever ﬁnd a proper
place for it.)
In the ﬁrst case the statue’s position is seen as temporary and the use of the
progressive is allowed. In (3-b), the statue is, apparently, never going to move
again, and its position is construed as more permanent, making the use of the
simple form of stand much more felicitous.4
Back to the matter at hand, could we not then predict that when the import of
the knowledge is relevant to a speciﬁc situation that is temporary, the progressive
of know could be used? The answer, contrary to many native English speakers of
a certain social class and background5 is a resounding ‘Yes’. Conventional biases
aside, this isn’t exactly the case. The following is taken from an interview with
3Again bringing a ‘dynamics’ of knowledge up.
4(Comrie, 1976a) contrasts The Sphinx stands by the Nile with Mr. Smith is standing by
the Nile. Presumably a tourist on a package holiday, here it is quite obligatory to use the
progressive form of stand (aside from a narrative context).
5Including my own.1.1. What do we really ‘know’? 3
a comic book writer who wants to turn his creation into a screenplay and also
direct the movie. This is his recollection going into a meeting with the producers.
There is a plan to turn the comic book into a movie, but his role is still uncertain.
(4) I said, ‘let me write it and I’ll prove that I’m the guy who can direct it.’
Meanwhile, I’m knowing they’re probably going to bump me and go get
Ridley Scott.6
In this context, the use of progressive know doesn’t sound ungrammatical at all.
Importantly, it is the impact of the knowledge of a certain fact7 that will have
little relevance once the producers decide on personnel. In a sense, it can be said
that his ‘knowledge’ is temporary and therefore there is no reason not to use the
progressive (aside from conventional proscriptions, of course).
Stative verbs are also used in the progressive to express a degree change in the
state or a series of entries into the state, or construing the state in an ‘activity’
perspective.8 This will remain unexplained for now, but the reader is invited to
make their own judgement on the acceptability of the following examples. These
examples are much more similar in spirit to the examples of (Huddleston, 2002b)
and (Baker, 1995). Importantly, however, they are actual examples by native
English speakers who most likely could not care less as to whether cognitive
stative verbs can be used in the progressive.9
(5) a. “How could you not get on a roll with the way we started?” The
conﬁdence was up, and when I was taking the shots, I was knowing they
were going in, not hoping they were going in.10
b. In the face of all that, I knew I could no longer embrace what Iw a s
knowing more and more to be a ﬁction.
c. One moment I could concentrate on any topic, and the information was
coming to me, through my whole being. I was knowing things directly
and at the same time I was very aware of everything around. I thought,
this is silent knowledge.
For me these are all a bit less felicitous than the ﬁrst example, but as descriptions
of changes in one’s knowledge, whether through a mystical experience, the sport-
ing equivalent or confrontation with new facts that leads to a gradual reassess-
ment, they ﬁt in with the structural/phenomenal distinction and the application
of the progressive.
6From a 13 Feb. 2003 interview with director/writer Mark Steven Johnson taken from
joblo.com.
7The producers plan to hire another, much more famous director.
8See Chapter 2 for an explanation of these.
9These are message board postings and transcripts of interviews.
10This is a quote taken from an interview with a basketball player who was ‘in the zone’,
the state of altered consciousness that athletes sometimes have, where everything they do is
successful.4 Chapter 1. Preamble
In fact, in some dialects and uses, progressive know has become something
rather standard. A cursory glance at Hip-Hop sites (including song lyrics and
messageboards) shows that am knowing is fairly standard and not conﬁned to
such specialised contexts as seen in the above. While this is not meant to be
a scientiﬁc survey of the usage in various dialects, my impression is that the
‘discourse-relevance’ use of progressive know is quite common in certain varieties
of African American English, Southern American English (a close relation of
African American English) and Indian English. Moreover, it is certainly not a
new phenomenon. In a novel of colonial Australia,11 a character utters
(6) I just cudn’t be going, that do be all, me jewels. I was knowing it in me
heart as soon as I lift. Poor Alec hadn’t a word to throw to a dog.12
Certainly, it is most likely standard English that will rule such uses out.
1.1.1 What can we know from know?
There is a lesson to be learned from this. In semantics, the practise of putting stars
before supposedly ungrammatical sentences needs to be given less prominence.
Instead, the viewpoint should be reversed. The semanticist should formulate the
theory and constraints in such a way that there are still predictions, but predic-
tions of a diﬀerent kind. If an example of a construction is indeed felicitous,13 it
might be better to then have the theory predict what kind of meaning it should
have, rather than hastily predict them ungrammatical. In the case of know,u s -
ing (Goldsmith & Woisetschlaeger, 1982)’s insight, it is a simple matter to then
wonder that if know could be used in the progressive then it will have properties
that are generally associated with using a stative verb in the progressive. One
then needs to imagine cases where knowledge can be temporary or changing, and
the felicitous examples follow.
Of course, this should not be taken to mean that anything goes. For example,
any random string of phonemes will not be a sentence of English, and even a
random string of conventional English words do not a sentence make. The point
is rather that where a semantic distinction is at issue, it is better to think not in
terms of grammaticality but in terms of context and possibilities of interpreta-
tion. The notion of the ‘star’ came out of theories of grammar that attempted to
describe a syntax that14 would only produce grammatical sentences, with ‘stars’
indicating sentences that the grammar would not produce. With semantics in-
volved, an ungrammatical sentence could merely be a sentence out of context
11Mistress Pat: A Novel of the Silver Bush by Lucy Maud, 1935.
12This may need translating – I just couldn’t go. That’s all it is, me jewels (term of endear-
ment). I knew it in my heart as soon as I left. Poor Alec couldn’t talk me out of it.
13At least used by some sub-group a language’s speakers.
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that, once imagined in alternate construal, is perfectly felicitous and an example
of a construction that is often used.
1.2 The Plan
In this new light, it is now time to discuss the body of the thesis. The semantics
focussed upon is conﬁned to that of events and their reporting. This includes
the notion of eventuality types and their expression in tense and aspect. The
next chapter is indeed such an introduction, and looks cross-linguistically at the
various ways events are reported and construed, as well as making comparisons
and connections between the sundry languages in a search for what can be seen
as a ground for the disparate phenomena.
As already brieﬂy demonstrated in the previous section, what emerges is a
tension between a default way of lexicalising certain situations and concepts and
what happens when a perspective shift or unorthodox construal has an impact
on interpretation. It turns out that the interpretative process can be seen not as
random and anarchic, but the eﬀect of a particular construction (tense/aspect or
adverbial) that shifts the meaning of event-type in a patterned and predictable
way.
Having established eventuality types and the both the similarities and diﬀer-
ences across languages in their construal and reporting, the question then arises
as to what lies behind this. This question is looked at from the domain of psycho-
linguistics, both in the way diﬀerent kind of events are constructed psychologi-
cally. Then we see how children learn to both construct event-types, notions of
time, as well as eventually learn how to properly use the tense and aspect mech-
anisms in their languages. While no grand conclusions are drawn, combining the
following two chapters together builds a picture of how humans psychologically
view events and tense, how it develops, and a partial picture of how this appears
in (a small subset) of the world’s languages.
These two chapters also have a more (benignly) sinister motive, on top of
general elucidation. They are also the prelude to the more formal chapters that
use the formalism of the Event Calculus to formalise nominal, causal and percep-
tion constructions. More broadly, this typology of events and their psychological
grounding is to show that this speciﬁc formalism (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005),
is motivated to take these notions seriously. Both the construction of events as
well as tense and aspect constructions use formal concepts and mechanisms that
can be seen as analogues as to what goes on psychologically, that is the building
blocks of what is needed to conceive of, and talk about events in all of their tem-
poral guises. Secondly, it takes the notion of construal and perspective seriously,
and thus rather than a theory that sets out to limit the use of language, it allows
predictions in a principled way, to show what happens when a given event-type6 Chapter 1. Preamble
is construed diﬀerently.15
The latter three chapters focus on speciﬁc semantic topics. Two of them are
about speciﬁc construction families in English of nominalisation and perception-
verb complements, while the third a more universal exploration of the notion of
cause16 in the worlds languages. A basic goal of this is to extend the coverage of
the event calculus to complements and various types of causal constructions. The
chapter on nominalisation is a reworking (and much shorter version) of (Hindsill,
2001) with a more nuanced (and somewhat surprising) look at various nominal
distinctions in English. All three have in common a look at ing in its various
manifestations in English and its impact on tense and aspect.
While it could be considered a truism that one receives a certain delight in
(eventually) coming up with a proper formalisation, it has more important uses. A
closer look at the English perception verbs see and watch sheds light on the notion
of event as well as demonstrates some rather fascinating interactions between
matrix, complement and aspect. The chapter on causatives and resultatives shows
how using the EC formalism, along with the interpretative principle sketched
above, predicts how certain sentences, typically considered in the literature as
ungrammatical17 can have an interpretation renders them perfectly felicitous.
More importantly, there are attested examples of exactly these interpretations.
The constraint is then on the family of causative and resultative constructions
that are formalised. One can then take the presumed ‘ungrammatical’ sentences,
slot them in the construction and see what interpretation comes out.
The Interlude section, a semi-formal introduction to the Event Calculus demon-
strates examples of how this ‘slotting-in’ can be accomplished in a systematic way,
via a inferential process that uniﬁes ‘anomalous’ lexical material with parts of the
event structure. Thus, the meaning of coerced utterances can be predicted in a
principled way.
1.2.1 How to read
The intended audience of this thesis is for those with a philosophy of language
and semantics background. It is for this audience that the following ‘guide to
reading’ is given. Chapters 2 and 3 are primarily foundational. The former is a
discussion of event-types, their interaction with aspectual constructions as well
as coercion and event structure. The topic of the ﬁrst section – Aktionsart –
will mostly be familiar to the reader. But as it discusses the topic with a wide
variety of languages, it may still be of interest to those who are only familiar with
the concepts as they apply to English or other European languages. The second
section is an exploration to the many exceptions to the defaults given in the ﬁrst
15Later to be called ‘coercion’.
16Though again, certain English-speciﬁc causative and resultative constructions are given a
special examination.
17These predictions are for English constructions only.1.2. The Plan 7
section, as well as the ﬁrst foray into the semantic structure of events. Again, this
may be redundant for some readers, but for those for whom it is not, it provides
a critical background of the later chapters, both theoretically and formally.
Chapter 3 is a exploration of the psychological parallels of the material in
the chapter previous to it. It is important to note that this is background and
elucidation for those of a semantics background, and in no way intended to be
original work in the ﬁeld of psycholinguistics. Thus the reader should not expect
the methods or organisational principles of this ﬁeld to be used. The ﬁrst four
sections are an examination of the psychological grounding of event structure
and play a signiﬁcant role in the three chapters that follow, especially in the way
events are interpreted and expressed. The ﬁnal sections of the chapter look at
diﬀering views on the acquisition of tense and aspect. While this and the sections
on the psychology of event structure can be seen as a grounding for the formalism,
the acquisition sections can remain unread as they have but a small impact on
the comprehension of the later chapters. However, aside from being of interest to
the reader who knows little about the topic, it has its own payoﬀ in serving as
background to a discussion of (Wagner & Carey, 2003) (Section 7 of the chapter).
These experiments go beyond the topic of tense and aspect acquisition, and return
to the question of event interpretation from a rather interesting angle.
Following this comes the Interlude, which (along with the Appendix) provides
the reader with an introduction to the Event Calculus, with the Interlude meant
to be understandable to those unfamiliar with the formalism. The hope is that,
even if the gritty details of the formal sections of the later chapters cannot be
grasped, the reader will now have enough of a background to follow the general
outline of them.
The next two chapters – 4 and 5 – can be considered the core of the thesis.
Both begin with a good deal of background material, building up what is neces-
sary for the various formalisations. Note that observations due to other authors
are signalled by references, and that original contributions, even if not explicitly
stated, are to be found where references stop. While the ﬁnal sections of both
chapters contain the bulk of the contributions, scattered throughout the earlier
sections is commentary and critique of other authors’ work, both from a theoret-
ical and empirical perspective. Finally, while Chapter 5 does explore a good deal
of linguistic typology in order to understand the linguistic notion of a causative
construction, the same caveat applied to Chapter 3 applies.
Chapter 6 on English ing nominalisation is a slightly looser ﬁt, but has con-
nections with Chapter 4 in its examination of the varied uses of ing in English,
as well as providing yet more insight into perspectives on events. Here, the major
contributions are primarily empirical questioning of standard notions, as well as
speculation as how these empirical phenomena can ﬁt into the notion of event
semantics advocated. The brief formal sections at the end of the chapter provide
hope that indeed this can be done.Chapter 2
Lexical Aspect
2.1 Event Typology
2.1.1 Introduction
The language, Kalam, spoken in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, has but
ninety verbs, only thirty of which are used with any regularity. According to (Paw-
ley, 1987) these are verbs in the usual sense in the term, in that only they may
morphologically mark tense (both relative and absolute), aspect, mood, number,
etc. (via suﬃxes).1
But despite the apparent paucity of verbs, a Kalam speaker is able to express
virtually any action or situation compositionally by combining verbs in serial con-
structions (see footnote) or in combination with the wider class of nouns. For
example, the verb n
￿- can express sensing, seeing, hearing, thinking, remember-
ing, being intelligent, etc. Though Pawley does not translate this verb with one,
more general gloss, it seems reasonable to make the connection. (Frawley, 1992)
notices that this particular verb is closely related to the notion of an internal
state.2 A particular internal state is expressed as in the following examples:
(1) wdn
eye
n
￿-
Internal state
see
(2) gos
mind
n
￿-
Internal state
think
1Verbs can occur in serial verb constructions, with all but the ﬁnal verb occurring in the
bare form, and the ﬁnal verb receiving inﬂection. Interestingly, the ﬁnal verb can also mark
relative or absolute reference of subject, i.e. whether or not the subject of the ﬁnal verb is
the same as the non-ﬁnal. Also note that these serial verb constructions are to be regarded as
strings of separate verbs, rather than idiomatic constructions.
2The notion of ’internal state’ and state more broadly conceived will be elaborated shortly.
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(3) wsn
sleep
n
￿-
Internal state
dream
(4) d
touch
n
￿-
Internal state
feel (by touching)
Note that (1) - (3) are nouns combined with the internal state verb (or as Pawley
translates it, ‘Perceive’), while (4) is an example of a serial verb construction,
with another ‘general’ verb, translated in this context as ‘touch’, combined with
the internal state verb to derive feel.
Nor is
￿- the only Kalam verb with such a general meaning. The verb d-
(seen translated as ‘touch’ in (4)), has translations by Pawley for such verbs as
get, hold, handle, grasp, capture, possess, ﬁnish. For example, when combined
with the verbs for go and come, we obtain the serial verb construction for the
English verb fetch.3
As with
￿-, Pawley would like to give a general gloss to d- that can didactically
be used to make a point about the close relationship between verbs and events.
In this case d- is a verb denoting ‘resulting events’.4 And indeed, the various
translations given to d- do involve results of an action (e.g. get, take, bring,
ﬁnish). That d- is also translated as hold or possess, may be due to the fact that
the result of the above sorts of actions often involves possession or holding. The
next example serves to illustrate this:
(5) B
man
tw
axe
dp
he-took
The man took hold of an axe.
For actions themselves, a diﬀerent verb is used – g-. Pawley translates this verb
with such glosses as do, act, make work, create, function and cause. For example,
the English VP build a house would be translated as:
(6) kotp
house
g-
create
while ‘feeling hungry’ also uses the same verb.
(7) yp
me
ywan
hunger
gp
it-acts
I feel hungry
3As another nice example of Kalam compositionality, if the come(back) component of the
construction is removed, the result is da m(get go), which is translated as ‘take’, while da p
(get come) is translated as bring.
4As this introduction is used only to set up a conceptual event typology later in the chapter,
any terminology used here is for didactic purposes only.2.1. Event Typology 11
(Frawley, 1992) simpliﬁes matters a bit by claiming Kalam verbs denote only
“states, processes, or actions”, denoted by ng-, g- and d- respectively. His aim
is to ﬁnd a limiting case for the claim that verbs are semantically motivated by
events. This corresponds with the pre-theoretical notion that verbs are ‘action’
words and therefore denote some kind of event. For example, the English verb
build can be seen as an event which involves some sort of process over time that,
if successful, creates an object. In this case, there are some ‘event’ notions of a
process, and something changing (an object coming into existence) along with
the speciﬁc lexical material and concepts associated with building. But what
Frawley means by a ‘limiting case’ is that the above Kalam verbs not only denote
events, but denote undecomposable events. That is g denotes only action, and
needs to be incorporated with some other verb or noun to give it lexical content.
The claim is that what has been found is the Holy Grail of primitive, universal
semantic event types existing in a remote New Guinea language.
Indeed this claim is rather robust, and can be seen in the formal semantic
literature in the use of a Davidsonian Event Variable e as an additional argument
of verbal predicates.5 With Kalam, there is a rather discrete division of the
‘event space’ that gives actual content to the oft used term verbal aspect. Indeed,
the point of bringing up this particular language is that the conceptual event
distinctions made by typologists seem directly encoded in Kalam syntax.
My reading of Pawley’s paper leads me to think that the claim that these
three verbs perfectly divide the event space is too strong. Note that there are
also ‘general’ verbs to cover transfer of possession, location, stabilization and
destabilization as well as speciﬁc verbs such as come, cut, bake, eat,e t c . N e v -
ertheless, there is an uncanny resemblance between Kalam verbs and standard
event typology, as will be seen in the following sections.
But ﬁrst, there is one more example from Kalam that bears looking at. In
Kalam, should there be a beneﬁciary of a certain action, it cannot be encoded in
the same clause as the action. For example, in English, one could use a for clause
to encode the beneﬁciary of an action, such as in the sentence, I am building a
house for you. Kalam requires at least two clauses to express the same relation
– one for the action (the creation of an object, or bringing it, etc.), and one for
the actual transfer of possession. Furthermore (and more interestingly for our
purposes), in a situation such as a house built for someone else, three clauses are
needed:6
5This idea originating in (Davidson, 1967). The Davidsonian event variable does not, how-
ever, distinguish between diﬀerent types of events. Alternatively, one could argue that time is
an inherent part of the verb and derive events from this – this is much more preferable in the
author’s view. This is not to deny the close connection, of course, between verbs and events.
6In the gloss below, SS merely means that the two clauses have the same subject. In this
case the person who has built the house is the same as the person who intends to give it to the
beneﬁciary.12 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
(8) kotp
house
gy,
having-built-SS
np
you
˜ nnp
intending-to-give-SS
gspyn
I-am-doing
I am building a house for you
Aside from the separate clause for the beneﬁciary, there are two separate clauses
to encode the speaker’s building of the house. There is both the (soon to be)
resulting state of having built the house, along with the current action. This is
also the case for instrumental clauses. For example, The man split the wood with
an axe (which can also be split up in English, e.g. The man used an axe to split
the wood) would be translated as
(9) b
man
tw
axe
dyt,
having-taken-SS
mon
wood
tb
cut
lak-p
he-split
Toward the end of this chapter, it will be shown that this is strikingly similar to
a standard event structure and typology.
As noted brieﬂy above, there is a standard notion that verbs are inherently
tied to events in some way, and that diﬀerent verbs may denote diﬀerent types
of events. This idea seems to have a high correlation in Kalam, where the kind
of event denoted can be read oﬀ from the serial verb construction. For example,
as we saw above, any verbal construction with
￿- will be some sort of ‘internal
state’. More generally, it is quite common to see the literature full of reference
to ‘stative verbs’, ‘activity verbs’, etc.7 This is what is known as Lexical Aspect
or Aktionsart. In the next section we will look at the standard event typology, as
well as what an event (more generally) consists in. However, it will also be seen
that a general notion of a strict mapping from verbs (or VP’s) to event types is
not tenable, certainly for languages such as English. Instead, event types should
be seen as a conceptual typology that may be represented in language rather
closely (as in Kalam) or less so (as in English).8
2.1.2 Aktionsart
In the last section it was claimed that verbs can be directly associated with
diﬀerent sorts of situations. That is, certain verbs may describe situations where a
subject has a certain property (e.g. She is beautiful), or describe situations where
an action take places (e.g. John is running or John is building a house), or even a
situation that describes an ‘instant’ transition (e.g. The window shattered). Each
one of these situations can be seen as events, and moreover as being instances of
certain types of events. It is the various types of events that will be looked at in
7For example, think would be considered ‘stative’, while run would be an ‘activity’.
8(Freed, 1979) notes that for English, the event-type can not be read oﬀ VP’s per se, but is
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this section. As previously mentioned, this is often called Aktionsart9 or verbal
aspect.
In contrast to grammatical aspect, the typology in Aktionsart should be seen
as a non-linguistic conceptual typology. Though it is often called lexical or verbal
aspect, the categories cannot be systematically mapped to lexical items in a
language such as English.10 Instead, I tend to see a language such as Kalam,
not as evidence for verbal aspect per se, but instead as linguistic evidence for a
non-speciﬁcally linguistic conceptual system.
This conceptual system can be traced as far back as Aristotle (e.g. categories
in the Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics of en´ ergeiai, prˆ aksis (doing)a n d
po´ ı¯ esis (making)).11 These conceptual distinctions were then taken up in the 20th
Century (in a more linguistic vein) starting with Ryle, Vendler, and Kenny.12 In
what follows I will give the basic Aktionsart distinctions with some modiﬁcations,
discuss their ‘default’ representation in language, as well as a rather basic idea
of event structure taken from the work of (Moens & Steedman, 1988), and the
similar ideas of Freed. It should be noted that in deﬁning and contrasting the
basic event types, various linguistic ‘tests’ will be used. These are meant to be
diagnostics and thus cannot be seen to be without exception, and are intended
mainly to highlight the conceptual distinctions. Moreover, the fallibility of the
tests does serve to expose the default mapping from lexical item to event type,
and thus even the exceptions are illustrative. With that in mind, we will now
look at some basic event distinctions starting with state vs. non-state.
Stative vs. Non-Stative
It may seem rather strange at ﬁrst (in common sense terms) to include the notion
of a ‘state’ in a broader notion of event. Certainly, we typically think of events as
ranging from World War II, a wedding, or even a sneeze.13 The common notion
behind these things is that something actually happens – which is exactly what
is not the case with a ‘state’. Nevertheless, the notion of state is integral to a
9Confusingly, aktionsart is also used in a wider sense encompassing much of ‘grammatical’
aspect including resultative, ingressive, continuative aspect. We leave the examination of these
to another section.
10Though arguably most VP’s of English can be said to have a ‘default’ event-type meaning
– more on this later.
11(Binnick, 1991) also notes that there seems to be much Indian work on aspect as far back
as the 5th century B.C.E. However, this probably had less inﬂuence on western linguists and
philosophers than did Aristotle.
12(Vendler, 1967), (Ryle, 1949), (Kenny, 1963).
13It is for this reason that the term ‘eventualities’ is often used as a technical term. In
common parlance there is a notion that certain types of eventualties to be called ‘events’ must
also happen rather compactly. There is a fairly common saying – ‘This is a process, not an event’
meaning that the desired outcome will take some time rather than a day or two. Politicians
will often use such an expression when their beloved programs are not yet having the desired
eﬀect.14 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
more ‘extended’ notion of event. Furthermore, the same situation ontologically
may be viewed as ‘stative’ or ‘eventive’ (in the sense of something happening),
and therefore it is imperative to include states in a typology of events.
States are typically denoted by so-called ‘stative verbs’ such as love, live, be X,
resemble and know. They are conceived as a homogeneous and durative situation.
Moreover, the internal temporal nature of a state is undiﬀerentiated. That is, all
stages of a state can be said to be the same, and have a certain inertia about
them. A now rather standard description comes from (Comrie, 1976a) (p. 49):
With a state, unless something happens to change that state, then
the state will continue...With a dynamic situation, on the other hand,
the situation will only continue if it is continually subject to a new
input of energy...To remain in a state requires no eﬀort, whereas to
remain in a dynamic situation does require eﬀort.
At this point, and in everything that follows, it needs to be emphasised that
any claims made about states or any other sorts of events are not to be taken
as claims about reality, but rather our way of organising reality. For example,
a prototypical state might be Mary is beautiful or Mary resembles her mother.
If we apply reality to some of the criteria for states listed above, then these are
not states at all. For example, appearance does change slowly over time, and one
might want to make the rather sexist observation that being beautiful takes a lot
work (i.e. input of energy). Furthermore, it is arguable that there are no actual
spatial or temporal boundaries in nature (aside from cognitive perspective). That
is, is there always to be a certain point where Mary is beautiful and another one
where she stops being so? Probably not, but as we shall see in this section as
well as those on coercion and aspectualizers, linguistic evidence does show that
we can conceive of the world being this way.
That said, we can now go on to a more detailed description of states. As
mentioned above, they are conceived of as unchanging over time as well as ex-
tended in time, and persistent (i.e. do not need to be actively continued). One
test for them is that when used (in English) in the present tense, they tend to be
incongruous with the progressive aspect. Thus:
(10) a. John is tall.
b. Mary knows the answer.
c. #John is being tall.
d. # Mary is knowing the answer.14
The ‘#’ before (10-c) and (d) is not an indication of their ungrammaticality
per se, but rather their infelicity in the an ordinary context, where the copula and
know are typically stative. Certainly (10-c) is imaginable in a situation where
14But see the introduction to this thesis.2.1. Event Typology 15
John is standing on tip-toe or wearing shoes with extremely high heels; however,
a vital statehood criterion would then be lost– the ‘tallness’ would no longer be
seen as inherent and persistent. Instead he would be doing something to make
himself tall, and continue in this action in order to keep himself tall.
Sentence (10-d) is a more interesting case. Know15 is considered almost a
paradigm stative verb, and seen to be more resistant than most to progressiviza-
tion. Nevertheless, I have found many examples that indicate that it occurs in
both Indian English and some Southern and African American dialects. It is
usually used to indicate the importance of the particular piece of knowledge at
t h et i m e( e . g .I was knowing at the time that X, but ...). This is most likely due
to general expansion of progressive marking across many English dialects.
Indeed this sort of extended use of the progressive has been described by
(Goldsmith & Woisetschlaeger, 1982) as capturing a structural/phenomenal dis-
tinction grammatically marked in English by simple versus progressive marking.
This is a kind of metaphysical perspective that treats a situation as either an
inherent, permanent part of the world, or a transitory phenomenon (or at least
the property’s holding is important for a particular time rather than holding more
generally). As an illustration, compare the two sentences:
(11) a. This engine is running well.
b. This engine runs well.
(11-a) is compatible with the engine having been ill-tempered for a while
and only recently tuned up, whilst (11-b) generally means that it is an inherent
property of the engine that it runs well.16 However, the implicature in (11-a) that
the engine had not been running well is easily cancelable. Imagine a situation
w h e r es o m e o n ei st r y i n gt os e l lau s e dc a r .
(12) How’s she running? Oh, the car’s running perfectly – always has done.
In this case, there is no change in the engine’s (or car’s) mechanical properties,
but rather the speaker wishes to emphasise that this property especially holds
at the moment. This is most likely what is going on with the progressive use
of knowing, and as Comrie notes, for English, many stative verbs such as live
and stand that may not occur in most languages with progressive marking (for
languages that have such a grammatical distinction), occur regularly in English
with progressive marking, when these are ‘temporary’ states.
A little speculation would see the extension of the progressive as developing
from the stative/dynamic distinction. Unlike Spanish, where the progressive is
15This is know in the weten sense. As acquaintance, using progressive marking is perfectly
ordinary. I’m knowing you less and less the longer we are married.
16In general, English simple tense will have this sort of meaning, along with generics (Cows
eat grass) and habituals(John smokes), all of which are ‘structural’ perspectives. Compare with
Cows are eating grass, John is smoking – it’s a beautiful day!.16 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
not obligatory for dynamic situations (Juan cant´ a can mean John is singing),17 it
is for English. Moreover, stative verbs have their default expression in the simple
forms. Now, the conceptual distinctions between stative and dynamic invite the
inference to states (as persistent and often involuntary properties that are features
of the world) being permanent, while a dynamic situation that is not persistent
and needs constant energy to keep it going as being temporary. It then seems
possible that the grammatical marking itself then is picked up this distinction.
Of course not all states are even conceived of as permanent – along with
the temporary sitting and standing examples, there are states such as being sick,
which hopefully are quite temporary. Furthermore, in these cases one can only re-
ally say Ia ms i c kand not *Ia mb e i n gs i c k . But, these can always be paraphrased
with a dynamic progressive periphrasis such as Ia mf e e l i n gi l lor something sim-
ilar. In a language such as Spanish with two forms of be that roughly delineate a
temporary/permanent distinction, the form of copula greatly aﬀects the meaning.
There is both Soy enfermo (I am a sickly person) and Estoy enfermo (I am feeling
ill). Using data similar to the above along with data regarding social roles and
temporary physical states (She is the mayor of San Rafael, The clothes are dry
now), (Croft, 2000b) modiﬁes Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger’s construal of the
simple present/progressive dichotomy to capture only the inherent/generic and
habitual senses of the simple present.
Excursion – activities vs. states
Some languages will go so far as to morphologically mark the diﬀerence between
temporary and inherent states. Kobon18 is the closest relative to Kalam and
shares about half of its vocabulary with it. The two languages, however, are
mutually unintelligible. For the purposes of this section, the way the language
handles ‘stative’ predication is at issue.
For standard adjectival complementation the adjective can either be incorpo-
rated into the noun or verb phrase or a clitic (-b¨ o) which is copular) or a particle
r¨ o (meaning like). This can be seen in the following examples (Davies, 1981)(p.
42-43).
(13) Nipe
3s
bi ¯
man
kub
big
He is a big man
(14) Nipe
3s
kub
big
r¨ o
like
He is quite big.
17The progressive version would be Juan est´ a cantando.
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(15) *Nipe
*3s
kub
big
*He big.
(16) Kumi
cloud
kab¨ o
stone
a˜ li
red
g-¨ o*p
do-perf3s
The sky is red.
(17) Kumi
cloud
kab¨ o
stone
a˜ li-b¨ o
red-ADJR
The sky is red.
(18) *Kumi
*cloud
kab¨ o
stone
a˜ li
red
*The sky red
These are all fairly standard ways for languages to express predication, but what
is interesting is what happens when present-perfect marking is used with nominal
predication. Unlike adjectival predication, there is no required copular element.
Thus ‘He is a man’ is merely Nipe bi ¯ (he man). This is analogous to sentence
(14), where the adjective is incorporated into the noun, thus making a new noun
phrase.
But, there is a verbal copula mi ¯d that is then inﬂected with the perfect tense-
aspect marking. If the predication is seen by the speaker as only of a temporary
nature then the present perfect copular coding may be used (but is optional), but
if it is seen as inherent, then it is not allowed.19 20 So (p.42):
(19) Nipe
3s
kaunsol
councillor
(mi ¯d-¨ op)
be-perf3s
He is the councillor
(20) Nipe
3s
bi ¯
man
maj¨ o
mature
(*mi ¯d-¨ op)
*be-perf3s
He is a mature man
19All examples of Kobon sentences are from (Davies, 1981) and the page numbers given refer
to this reference grammar.
20As statives are not allowed with present tense morphology (Davies, 1981) (p.171), present
perfect marking must be used if the sentence is to have tense at all, which explains the trans-
lations. Present tense seems only used for actions which, like Kalam use the verb g.T h u s
(i) Nipe
3s
w¨ og
work
g-ab
do-pres3s18 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
It becomes a bit more complicated if the situation is in the past. Suppose that
in (20) the speaker believes that the addressee knows that the subject has died.
If so, then (20) may be used (the present perfect marking is often used for simple
past except in the case of durative but temporary situations (p.167)). But if the
addressee is not aware of the death, then habitual marking must be added along
with the copula:
(21) Nipe
3s
bi ¯
man
maj¨ o
mature
mi ¯d-mi ¯d-¨ op
be-habit-perf3s
He was a mature man
At ﬁrst glance, this patterning may seem a bit odd,21 but the important thing
to see is not that there is a grammatically realised distinction between temporary
and inherent states (which is a common feature in many languages), but rather
it is the way it is accomplished.
The use of present perfect marking to express a temporary state is conceptu-
ally quite reasonable. A state that is conceived as temporary, presumably begins
at some point in time and is caused by an event. For example, in English, one
could say for the same unfortunate situation
(22) a. I am ill.
b. I have got the ﬂu.
where the ﬁrst example is (hopefully) a temporary state, and the second a for-
mulation in the present perfect.22 In other words, as the state is construed as
temporary, it is natural that the preceding, causal event would also be proﬁled.
One could also construe the situation as an activity, and use the progressive to
express, I am feeling ill., which is exactly how it is done in Kobon (p. 179)
(23) Yad
1s
nan
thing
g-¨ op
do-perf3s
I am ill
21Furthermore, I think it indicates that (Frawley, 1992) may have been a little to enthusias-
tic in trying to establish for the related Kalam that all verbs correspond to undecomposable
primitives of Vendlerian event types. Certainly, stative predication is probably a little too com-
plicated to warrant such a conclusion. Should Kalam stative making work more or less in a
similar way, the ‘stative primitive’ verb only applies to a select number of internal states. More
generally, it is possible that stative marking could be rather similar to what is described above.
However, in favour of Frawley’s claim, inherent stative marking in the relative, Kobon, involves
no verbal usage (even copular), whatsoever.
22(Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005) (p. 151) formalises the latter as a state that holds at speech
time along with a call to the database to derive a causal event that initiated the state. See the
Interlude following Chapter 3.2.1. Event Typology 19
Weather states to work in the same way. Thus:
(24) Ig¨ on
cold
g-¨ op
do-perf3s
It is cold.
Where ‘cold’ is a temporary state for the weather to be in, certainly in New
Guinea. An interesting weather-related distinction between states and activities,
cited by (Foley, 2005), occurs in the Maluku language of Taba. In Taba, there is
the unaccusative kabus meaning wet and the unergative, -mang meaning dry.23
As Foley notes (p.410) 24
Being wet is taken as the state an object is in, but being dry is the
result of an unfolding change in state, i.e. drying out (remember that
the language is spoke in a hot humid tropical area with high annual
rainfalls!)
The above shows that there what one language grammatically deﬁnes to be
a state, may be a process in other languages, often for the simple reason of
cultural and environmental factors. But there are also deeper conceptual reasons
in the demarcation between stative situations and dynamic situations – commonly
referred to as processes and events.25 We will look brieﬂy at some more diﬀerences
between stative and dynamic situations as well as certain pitfalls that come from
trying to make too ﬁne a distinction.
Conceptual diﬀerences between stative and dynamic ‘events’
We have seen so far that some languages will make a lexical or morpho-syntactic
distinction in treating temporary vs. inherent states, and also that some verbs
can be marked as states in some languages and as activities (or the results of
activities) in others. But the question then rises as to how far this process can
go. Can any state be conceived of as an activity and vice versa?
First oﬀ, it is commonly assumed that a prototypical state is non-volitional,
while the opposite is true for a dynamic situation. For example, one usually does
23The terms ‘unnaccusative’ and ‘unergative’ are not to be mistaken with their uses in the
semantic literature to do with types of causatives. Here it means that the language has two sets
of intransitive verbs that grammatically marks the subject as either an actor (unergative) or as
undergoer (unaccusative). The former are taken to be action verbs and the latter, statives.
24Taba is spoken in East Timor and Indonesia.
25Here a bit of terminological confusion arises. On the one hand it is quite necessary to
include all the Vendlerian types under the rubric ‘Event’, but there is also a speciﬁc type of
event, that is also properly called an ‘event’ in contrast to a state or process. There certainly
is wisdom in Bach’s use of the term eventuality to cover all the Vendlerian types. I ﬁnd this
term rather cumbersome, and will be careful to make the two notions of ‘event’ distinguishable
by context.20 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
not choose to be tall, and nor is an individual free to choose to stop being tall.
In contrast, if one is running, then this is normally by the volition of the subject,
and they are free to stop running at any time. However, Binnick points out that
there are a number of ‘volitional’ states, such as being a patriot or being a believer
in God. In these cases, Binnick believes that ‘volitional’ states share a property
with prototypical dynamic situations – that of being possibly ‘gappy’. That is, it
is conceivable that I could say I have been a patriot my whole life even if I have
had a few dark moments of doubt. But it is rather strange to say I have been
tall my whole life, if I mysterious shrank for a month. With a dynamic situation
such as running, there is also a possibility of gappiness. Certainly it is true that
I ran for two hours, even if twice I had to stop and tie my shoes.
Ultimately the conceptual distinction between states and dynamic situations
is less clear-cut than it would seem at ﬁrst. As noted in (Comrie, 1976a) (p.35),
if the progressivizing test for stative situations is used to diﬀer the static and
dynamic, there must be awareness that not all languages with the progressive
mark the same lexical items. For example in English and Spanish, one must
put rain in the progressive (It is raining, est´ a lluviendo), while the opposite
is true for Icelandic. He also notes that while using see in the progressive is
rather marked in English (I’m seeing you there under the table), it is perfectly
acceptable in Portuguese. Again, the deciding factor is one of perspective. For
a rather large range of situations, it is perfectly possible to view them as either
stative or dynamic, and languages are free to choose how they classify them.
Recall that in Kalam (ex. 8), hunger is a dynamic situation (using the verb
g-), as it is hunger that is acting on the subject.26 However, this ﬂexibility is
not open-ended; Comrie notes in a footnote that the whole classiﬁcation (and
certainly the progressive test) would fall apart if some languages classiﬁed such
verbs die, hit and kill as default statives.
Comrie does attempt to get at the distinction via a notion of homogeneity
of phase – that all phases of John knows the answer are identical to each other,
whereas John is running will diﬀer at various phases of the situation (for example
having diﬀerent feet on the ground, etc.) However, he then notes that a dynamic
process like an oscilloscope emitting a pure tone at a certain frequency would
be homogeneous in this sense. Thus, he reverts back to the quote above, and
diﬀerentiates statives and dynamics based on energy input.
(Binnick, 1991) attempts a similar diﬀerentiation, by bringing in notions of
both stage and phase. The claim is that states have no phasic structure. The
diﬀerence between stage and phase (for dynamic events) can be seen as follows.
In an accomplishment like running a kilometre race, two stages (which could be
diﬀerent parts of running in running a race) can be identical in just being run-
ning.27 These stages can be gathered up into one phase that is the activity phase
26Of course, English can view this situation either as a stative or dynamic – Ia mh u n g r yvs.
I am feeling hungry, and it is perfectly natural to think of hunger growing over time.
27Generally, simple activities such as running are arbitrarily divisible. For example, take 102.1. Event Typology 21
of the accomplishment.28 There is then a point at which the accomplishment
is achieved, that is diﬀerent in the sense that it represents a boundary ‘beyond
which the boundary qua accomplishment’ cannot continue. For example, upon
ﬁnishing a race, the runner can continue running for a bit (to cool oﬀ and also
not let their muscles atrophy), but they are no longer running the race. While a
state may have stages, there is no analogue to this notion of phase.
He also uses (Freed, 1979)’s aspectualising tests to distinguish activities from
states. For example, one can stop being ill, but generally not ﬁnish being ill.
But this sort of test also separates out telic from non-telic activities.29 One can
ﬁnish running a race, but generally not ﬁnish running, unless there was some telic
endpoint presupposed of time or distance involved.30
So, I still don’t see how this helps with distinguishing simple, non-telic ac-
tivities from states. Comrie’s examples of verbs that he couldn’t imagine being
classiﬁed as states are all telic (die, kill) or of the more instantaneous variety
(hit). As he notes, he’s ill cannot be taken as either he’s starting to be ill or he’s
about to be ill, but he’s running (the race) can be used even as the runner enters
the stadium. Where it is only an atelic running activity, I am not sure which side
the progressive takes. Certainly, He’s running in a minute is ﬁne as futurate,
if someone is tying their shoes, and has yet to start running. But I would say
that the running the race example is more of a true present progressive where the
athlete has entered the stadium or just emerging from the starting blocks.
Regardless, this gets us no closer to conceptually dividing states and atelic
activities. Both are uniform and both can be trivially gappy. This is a more
general tendency for any atelic activity to allow gaps, but certain states allow
this as well. Paraphrasing an example from Binnick, there is a diﬀerence in
being in pain for a week and in constant pain for a week. It seems then, to use
Binnick’s terminology, both states and simple activities have no phasic structure
(just stages), leading one to think that states and simple activities can be the
most interchangeable of Aktionsart.
Thus far, we have seen linguistic and conceptual diﬀerences between stative
and dynamic situations (and certain pitfalls in distinguishing them as well). Next
we will move on to processes – dynamic situations that are extended in time, and
then ﬁnally to what are often considered ‘events’ proper, achievements and points.
minutes of running. Any portion of that (ignoring rests from exhaustion) can also be running.
But a random two minutes of running a kilometre is not running a kilometre.
28This will be explained in more detail in the Event Structure section. But for now, imagine
that something like run a mile consists of both a running activity and the punctual event of
reaching the mile boundary. The phase is then the entire running activity. The running activity
itself can be construed as having stages.
29Telic ones are those with an inherent goal.
30Or as with states, if the running in question is a habitual activity that one has had enough
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Processes: Activities and Accomplishments
Along with what may be seen as a primary conceptual opposition between static
and dynamic situations, there is also a primary opposition within dynamic situ-
ations; this is commonly known as the diﬀerence between activities and accom-
plishments. As is the custom, we will ﬁrst look at some linguistic data to illustrate
the diﬀerence:
(25) a. John ran a mile in under four minutes.
b. Sheila wrote three letters in an hour.
c. #John ran a mile for six minutes.
d. #Sheila ate an apple for ten minutes.
(26) a. John ran for twenty minutes.
b. Sheila ate apples for two days straight.
c. #John ran in twenty minutes.
d. #Sheila ate apples in two days.
Note the contrast between the (a), (b) and (c), (d) sentences in (25) and (26).
All of the above situations are dynamic (note that they all are felicitous in the
progressive if they are in the simple past as well). But there is a crucial diﬀerence
that is elicited by the use of the two diﬀerent time adverbials – the notion of a
goal. First coined by (Garey, 1957), this is the telic/atelic distinction (the telic
situations being the ones that have an inherent goal or endpoint).
For example, merely running or running in the park has no inherent goal
associated with it. Thus it is measurable (for X amount of time), but reaches no
speciﬁc endpoint (i.e. one generally stops running but does not ﬁnish running).
In contrast, with run a mile there is a predeﬁned distance that was completed in
a certain amount of time.
One can then diﬀerentiate two types of dynamic situations – most commonly
called activities and accomplishments. Activities are the atelic, dynamic situ-
ations and include such things as running, pushing a cart, reading, playing the
piano, etc. Accomplishments are dynamic, telic situations such as building a
house, crossing the street, ﬂying to London, playing a sonata,e t c .
The idea of a goal can then show us why the temporal adverbial tests above
can actually distinguish between the two event types. Of course, both container
(in x time)a n ddurative (for x time) adverbials measure out the time of the
situation.31 The diﬀerence is that two diﬀerent type of situations are measured.
With activities, the durative adverbial is used to measure the total time of said
activity, whereas with a container adverbial (for accomplishments) the time mea-
sured is the time until the goal is reached. As activities have no inherent goal, an
in adverbial will naturally be incompatible. Likewise there is a mismatch with
an accomplishment and a durative adverbial. The durative adverbial picks out
31Originally coined in (Bennett & Partee, 1978).2.1. Event Typology 23
an arbitrary endpoint of an activity, whereas an accomplishment has, built in, an
actual endpoint that needs to be picked out in some other manner. More will be
said of this in the following sections on event structure and coercion.
Again, the linguistic tests used do have some problems. First of all, there
are the actual exceptions. For example, it is perfectly possible to use a for x
time adverbial to indicate an accomplishment – I ran for two hours – exactly
as I intended. This is a case where there is a natural, non-arbitrary endpoint
associated with something that is normally considered an activity (i.e. running),
but is treated as a situation with an inherent goal (i.e. an accomplishment).
(Dahl, 1981) points out that English is not the best language for these types of
tests:
Some languages are more systematic than English in distinguishing
indicators of actual and potential terminal points. Thus Swedish use
diﬀerent prepositions...
(27) Jeg
I(’m)
reser
going
till
to
Frankrike
France
p˚ a
for
tv˚ a
two
m˚ anader.
months.
(28) Jeg
I
reste
travelled
i
in
Frankrike
France
i
for
tv˚ a
two
m˚ anader.
months.
it is even possible to construct a sentence that contains both kinds of
terminal point indicators...
(29) Han
He(’s)
har
been
suttit
sitting
inne
inside
p˚ a
for
tv˚ a
two
˚ ar
years
i
for
sex
six
veckor.
weeks.
‘He’s been serving a two-year sentence for six weeks.’32
Another way to illustrate the telic/atelic distinction for dynamic situations is
the entailment from the progressive. Commonly called the ‘imperfective’ paradox,
it is a well known fact that the implications of a process-type aktionsart in the
progressive diﬀer profoundly depending on whether the aktionsart is an activity
or an accomplishment. For example, compare the following two sentences:
(30) a. John is pushing a cart.
b. John is building a house.
If (30-a) is true, then the sentence John pushed a cart must also be true. This
is not the case with (30-b), however. While it is certainly the case that (30-b)
implies that John has been building a house, there is no guarantee that John
32The examples numbers have been modiﬁed from the originals. Also, the word-for-word
gloss on (29) was added by this author for clarity.24 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
actually ﬁnishes. Thus, another way to detect whether a process VP is either an
activity or an accomplishment is to determine whether or not Xi sφ-ing entails
that X φ-ed. If so, then the VP has, as default lexical entry, activity status.
Again, the notion of a goal reached, or object completed is crucial for under-
standing the diﬀerence between activities and accomplishments. As we shall see
in more detail in the next section, an activity just consists of a ‘uniform’, durative,
process. An accomplishment, on the other hand, consists of this as well, plus a
‘goal’ to be reached. The entailments from the progressive of the two aktionsarten
seem less ‘paradoxical’ with this in mind. Roughly, if we take (Comrie, 1985b)’s
view that the present tense merely says that a situation is true at the moment
of speech (for non-narrative present), then the diﬀering entailments fall out quite
easily (informally at least).
If an accomplishment is viewed, broadly, as an activity plus a goal then it
can readily be seen that, ﬁrst, the present progressive picks out the ‘activity’
bit and says that it holds now.33 Thus, the simple past rendition of the same
activity would then hold as well. Observe that if (30-b) is true, then so is John
was building a house. The diﬀerence, however, is that as of the time of speech
of (30-b), the house (by deﬁnition, assuming that reaching the goal stops the
activity) is not built. In fact a direct entailment of (30-b) (said more or less
contemporaneously) is indeed
(31) John has yet to build a house.
Recall that the present tense merely says that a situation holds at the moment
of speech. Therefore, when it is applied to an accomplishment, we only are
sure that the activity portion is true (and in process now). Certainly, there is
a default inference to the eﬀect that if John is building a house then eventually
(barring catastrophe or ineptitude) a house will be built. But this is diﬀerent
from (classical) logical entailment.
The standard formulation of the progressive or imperfective ‘paradox’ is the
diﬀerent entailments that arise with past progressive instances of sentences with
activities and accomplishments:
(32) a. John was pushing a cart entails that John pushed a cart.
b. John was building a house does not entail that John built a house.
Parallel to the present tense, the simple past tense merely requires that the
situation hold at the event time (either overtly stated or contextual). Again,
nothing in the tense coding says about what goes on before or after the event
time, although certain aspectual markings such as the habitual would require this.
33The idea of the progressive placing the temporal perspective in the middle of an activity is
more than a handy metaphor. (Bybee, Perkins, & Pagliuca, 1994, p. 127-130) has a survey of
sources of the progressive, many of which are grammaticalised from words for stay, sit, lie, be
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Moreover, the progressive can only apply to an activity. Recall the infelicity of
states with the progressive unless they are reinterpreted as activities. Likewise,
the more punctual events discussed in the next section are also incompatible with
the progressive unless suitably reinterpreted (compare #The window is shattering
to The windows are shattering).
Comparing the two examples in (32), we know that the activity of pushing
a cart only consists of one event-type – namely an activity. On the other hand,
(32-b) consists of a building activity plus a goal of a ﬁnished house (which can be
seen as a resulting state followed preceded by an instantaneous change – more on
this later). But the progressive, then, must apply only to the building activity,
which necessarily temporally precedes the goal being reached. So, the past pro-
gressive was building a house only asserts that the building activity occurred at a
certain point in the past. Therefore the ﬁnished house is indeed not entailed. As
with the present progressive formulation, this is not to say that there is no entail-
ment whatsoever from the ﬁrst part of (32-b).34 Indeed we have the awkwardly
formulated
(33) John was building a house entails John was engaged in (house)-building
activity.
that parallels the entailment of a past progressive activity. Moreover, we also
know that John built at least part of a house. This can be seen by comparing
the following:
(34) a. John was building a house, but never ﬁnished it.
b. ??John was building a house, but never even started on the foundation
(i.e. didn’t even build a bit of a house).
There is also, certainly, a default entailment that (unless told otherwise) the
house is actually ﬁnished, but it should be noted that the other entailments
(building activity engaged in, partial house built) are strict. It seems then that
the ‘paradox’ really does not lie in the imperfective at all, and I would argue that
the progressive treats activities and accomplishments uniformly. This is not to
say that one can make the entire problem disappear, only that it lies elsewhere.
I would say that this ‘elsewhere’ is in a proper treatment of telicity i.e. how to
formally construct the telic goal so as to predict the correct strict and default
entailments.
34A major diﬀerence between the present and past progressive forms is that the present form
c a nb eu s e dw h e r en obuilding activity is taking place. With John is building a fort, tomorrow,
his intention (or someone else’s who can make him) is enough. This intention or plan leading up
to an activity can in turn be seen as a preparation activity that is the case now thus justifying
the use of the present progressive. From the past viewpoint, if no building activity ever occurred,
one would much more likely say, John was going to build a fort, but then thought better of it.26 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
Before moving on to the ﬁnal major distinction, it is helpful to step back
a bit and examine what these diﬀerences actually are. So far, we have seen the
distinction between stative and dynamic situations as well as two distinct types of
dynamic situations. At the end of the last sections we saw Comrie’s view that the
dividing line between what is a stative situation and what is a dynamic situations
is to a certain extent rather slippery. While not totally arbitrary (e.g. one would
not expect to see a language classifying hit as stative), there is a fair amount
of ‘wriggle room’ in the way reality is partitioned. Again, the point needs to be
made that the typology of event-types is not ontology. That is, it does not seek
to ﬁnd out the diﬀerent kinds of events there are directly in the world. Rather,
it is a typology of the diﬀerent ways humans deal with things that happen in the
world – the diﬀerent way events are conceptualised.
Just as it may indeed be a matter of perspective whether or not a given
situation is classiﬁed as stative or dynamic, it is also often the case whether
or not something is classiﬁed as either an activity or an accomplishment. For
example, the same bit of running can be seen merely as an activity or (if there
is a speciﬁed distance or goal in mind) as an accomplishment. Thus both Ir a n
in the park today or I ran ﬁve kilometres in the park today may describe exactly
the same situation. A ship sailing on a certain trajectory may said either to be
sailing toward the North Pole or sailing to the North Pole. It is easy to see from
the progressive entailment test that the former is an activity while the latter is
an accomplishment.35
As should be clear, it is often the case that way a particular situation is looked
at is a matter of perspective and the speakers goals. States can be conceived as
inherent or only temporary, in a more activity like way, or focus on the entry
into the state rather than the state itself. Further examples of coercion and event
reporting will be seen in this chapter and in a more psycholinguistic light in
the next. In all cases, the deciding factor is how the speaker either perceives or
wishes to present the event. This ﬂexibility in conceiving and reporting events
depending on what perspective the speaker is taking is only a symptom of the
centrality of perspective taking in general. (Tomasello, 1999) amongst others
stress the importance of perspective taking as part of a general cultural process
that facilitates both the use and acquisition of language.
Instead it is the grammatical form that will often trigger the aktionsart into
being either an activity or an accomplishment. This can be done with the count
features on the object of the verb (ate apples vs. ate two apples), particles (ate
the apple vs. ate at the apple), or even special types of quasi-auxiliaries called
‘aspectualizers’ – if John ﬁnished running rather than stopped running then he
must have had some goal in mind (one hour, or running until the shoe leather
35It should be noted that in all the above cases, it is not the case that the two forms are
semantically equivalent (in general the accomplishment implies the activity but not vice versa)
only that these are two possible perspectives for describing the same bit of ‘reality’.2.1. Event Typology 27
falls oﬀ).
Sometimes, however, only context can determine the event-type. Notoriously,
VP’s such as reading a book or writing an essay can be used to describe either
activities or accomplishments. Unfortunately, in this case, even the stop vs. ﬁnish
test is unable to diﬀerentiate:
(35) a. John stopped reading the book.
b. John ﬁnished reading the book.
c. John ﬁnished running a mile.
d. ?John stopped running a mile.
Sentence (35-b) is an unequivocal accomplishment, where there is a clear goal
that has been ﬁnished. (35-a) remains ambiguous – John could have given up the
goal of reading the book (leaving the goal unrealised), or merely stopped reading
the book for the evening, having no particular goal in mind with the reading.36
With running a mile, it is much clearer – (35-c) entails that the goal was reached,
while (35-d) is rather strange. The aspectualizer stop most usually applies to
activities – hence the infelicity with run a mile. The best that can be done to get
at the intended meaning of (35-d) is to say something like John stopped running
before he even ran the required mile.
Achievements and Points
The two dynamic eventualities discussed thus far have been activities and ac-
complishments. Activities, which are extended in time, dynamic, but have no
inherent endpoint. Accomplishments, which share both temporal extension and
dynamism with their fellow processes have an additional feature of telicity – that
is, a natural endpoint (i.e. a goal reached, something created, something de-
stroyed, etc.) At a certain point in the unfolding of the accomplishment there is
a sort of ‘abrupt’ change that contrasts with the ‘gradual’ change of activities.
One moment (conceptually, at least), a builder is busily constructing a house and
the next moment there is a house completed. It seems that (in ordinary English,
at least), this sort of scenario is what people commonly mean when they use the
term event. Something happens (unlike with states) rather quickly, leading to
some sort of change.
For more concrete examples, observe the following data:37
36It is probably the case that Dahl has a valid point in noting that English is not the best
language to test terminal points. As already mentioned, the various tests are not infallible.
Indeed, when examining various experiments on children regarding event completion and telicity
in the following chapter, it turns out that intuitions on the telicity of eating and drinking
predicates are the among the least consistent.
37Examples adapted from (Croft, 1998).28 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
(36) a. John shattered the window.
b. #John shatters the window.
c. #John is shattering the window.38
d. John is shattering windows.
(36-a) can be considered an archetypal achievement, in that a change occurs
instantaneously. For this reason it is then straightforward that (36-b) and (c)
would be rather odd. Assuming (36-b) is used in the standard (not narrative)
present tense, there just isn’t enough time to report the act as it is happening.
Rather, one must say that John just shattered the window, or that he is about to
do so. Similarly, the progressive use in (36-c) is anomalous due to the ‘durative’
(in progress) nature of the progressive. But then, why is there no # by (36-d)?
As seen before, the object of the VP makes all the diﬀerence. Here, John is
shattering a number of windows, and what is being ‘progressivized’ is precisely
this ongoing activity.
As noted by Comrie, another punctual verb, cough has but one interpretation
in the progressive (He was coughing) – a number of coughs in a row. In fact,
when a verb such as cough is used in a language with morphological imperfective
marking (e.g. French) the interpretation of a sentence like il toussait cannot mean
that only one cough happened.
Of course, it can be argued that virtually nothing happens strictly instanta-
neously – a cough takes time and can probably be broken down into various phases
by a respiratory specialist. Likewise, the shattering of a window is probably quite
a complex event when viewed at 1/1000 time. And again, the answer is that
linguistic distinctions and conceptions need not strictly correspond to ‘objective’
reality. From (Comrie, 1976a) (p.43):
F o ra sl o n ga sw ea r ei nr e a lt i m e ,i ti su n l i k e l yt h a ta n y o n ew o u l d
want to refer to the duration or successive phases that make up this
situation
Comrie then goes on to develop a scenario where, with slow motion ﬁlm, a
lecturer in anatomy can felicitously utter and now the subject is coughing,w h e r e
only one cough is ever coughed. Despite this contrived example, there is good
reason to think that this sort of ‘punctuality’ is a good candidate for an linguis-
tic/aspectual category. Both Russian and Hungarian have classes of verbs with
particular suﬃxes that can only be viewed as either punctual or iterative. Indeed
the Russian verbs for ‘cough’ kaˇ sljanut and ‘ﬂash’ blesnut only appear in the
perfective aspect.
So far, all of the examples we have seen of achievements are those such as
cough, ﬂash, shatter, etc. that while indeed perceived as punctual can be, with
38There is a futurate progressive reading that is perfectly felicitous, i.e. John ripped up the
ﬂoor today and he is shattering the window tomorrow, where what is in progress is the plan to
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some context-stretching, made to seem more ‘durative’. The question then raises
itself as to whether there are actually any situations that might be strictly punc-
tual. And in fact there are. Consider win a race or reach the summit. These can,
in a sense, be considered more as conceptual situations than the quite physical
(but very short in duration) ones listed above. Conceptually at least, it is easy
to imagine that there is a moment before the subject wins the race or reaches
the top and another moment when they have with no intervening time. That is,
unlike a cough,o raﬂash, there is no way to further break the situation down
into phases.
But with these truly punctual types of situations, an interesting thing hap-
pens when they are put into the progressive.39
(37) a. Shari is winning the race.
b. Bill is reaching the top.
In both cases, there is no iterative interpretation as with coughing, but rather a
reference to the time just before the achievement is reached.40 That is, it becomes
something akin to an accomplishment, where the progressive picks out the run-up
activity that will (if everything goes well) lead to the goal being reached. For this
reason, VP’s such as win the race and reach the top are often considered to be
‘gradual’ achievements, while VP’s such as ﬂash and cough are ‘points’.
Another way to see the diﬀerence is to go back to the container/durative
adverbial tests:
(38) a. John reached the summit in just two days.
b. It took Marcia ten minutes to ﬁnd her keys.
c. #John reached the summit for two days.
d. #Marcia found her keys for ten minutes.
(39) a. The light ﬂashed for ﬁve minutes.
b. Billy coughed for three minutes straight.
c. ?The light ﬂashed in ﬁve minutes.
d. ?Billy coughed in three minutes.
With the gradual achievements, the container adverbial serves to proﬁle the time
leading up to the achievement. And while it was noted earlier that there is a
similarity to accomplishments, there is, however, one major diﬀerence. With
a prototypical accomplishment such as ‘build a house’, the associated activity
leading to a built-house goal is, indeed, building. This is diﬀerent for the gradual
achievements. Even though it is ﬁne for many English speakers to say that some is
39This might be seen as a contentious bit of English data, but it is ﬁne for myself and many
other speakers. Comrie begs to diﬀer.
40Ignoring the other use of is winning that could be used for a runner who is leading even if
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reaching the summit, the associated activity is not reaching, but rather something
like climbing or hiking. And in fact, it is absurd to say that Marcia is ﬁnding her
keys. Rather, she is looking for them.
Combining durative adverbials with ‘points’, what is proﬁled is the time that
the iteration punctual events lasts. Container adverbials are not quite as felici-
tous. I have put ‘?’s next to (39-c) and (d), as enough contextual ﬂexibility does
make them interpretable. Imagine Billy being examined by a doctor and told to
cough, but Billy is rather shy. In this case one could imagine (39-d) or at least
the sentence It took Billy three minutes to cough.
Binnick uses a few tests to distinguish between accomplishments and achieve-
ments. (Binnick, 1991, p.177) gives both adverbial and entailment tests, some of
which are unfortunately not infallible. The ﬁrst claim is that achievements are
felicitous with container adverbials (in x time), but not compatible with durative
adverbials (for x time), which is shown in (38). He gives the infelicitous example
(40) #John noticed the painting for a few minutes.
But with the achievement win the race this is perfectly acceptable.
(41) John was winning the race for a few minutes, but then fell behind.41
His second distinction is that achievements are generally not compatible as com-
plements of ﬁnish. His examples are
(42) a. *John ﬁnished noticing the picture.
b. John ﬁnished painting the picture.
As noticing is generally conceived as punctual, it is rather hard to conceive of
it being begun or ﬁnished.42 Moreover, even with an achievement that can be
conceived as being more drawn out like win a race, John ﬁnished winning the race
is certainly anomalous.
Finally, there is an ambiguity with almost used with accomplishments that
doesn’t occur with achievements. Take the following two sentences.
(43) a. John almost noticed the painting.
b. John almost painted the picture.
Sentence (43-a) entails that John did not notice the painting, while (43-b) can
mean that John never even engaged in picture-painting activity or just that he
didn’t ﬁnish. However, this seems to elicit more the diﬃculty in assigning a
41A partial reason for this discrepancy is given in the section on Event Structure. For now,
it is enough to say that win the race in the last example is used as an accomplishment, not
an achievement. The ostensibly similar reach the top patterns with notice in being normally
unacceptable with durative adverbials.
42He notes that John stopped noticing the picture has a habitual reading. For example, once
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strict telicity to what are normally considered accomplishment VP’s. The ﬁrst
interpretation of (43-b) construes the VP only in its activity phase, while the
latter interpretation takes the goal into account as well.
At least, even the less well behaved achievements such as John almost won the
race needn’t even entail that at any point John was winning the race.I tm i g h t
have been the case that John ran the entire race as a very close second, but could
never pull ahead.
The major point to keep in mind regarding the fallibility of the various tests
and the slight variance between diﬀerence concrete examples of a certain Aktion-
sart (e.g notice a painting vs. win a race) is that the event typology attempts
to hang a variety of situations on a simple four or ﬁve part distinction. But
all is not lost. In Section 2 we will see a general notion of event structure that
the aktionsarten can be seen as participating in. Secondly, this notion of a gen-
eral event structure allows for the possibility of various construals that defy the
default mapping, but provide a principled reason to account for the what have
appeared to be failures of the various tests. Before this, we shall examine a ﬁnal
reﬁnement of aktionsarten.
Series
So far we have seen what may be called the standard ‘Vendlerian’ event types
(States, Activities, Accomplishments and Achievements) plus an extra reﬁne-
ment, the splitting of Achievements into gradual achievements and points. Before
moving on to the section on event structure and coercion, it is useful to look at
one more proposed event type – Series, ﬁrst discussed by (Freed, 1979).
(44) a. John kept being ill. (series)
b. John was ill. (state)
c. John understood French (state)
d. ?John kept understanding French. (attempted series)
e. John loved Mary. (state)
f. ?John kept loving Mary. (attempted series)
Ostensibly these seem to be akin to iteration, but there are some signiﬁcant
diﬀerences. Moreover, it also may be seen as a sort of ‘meta’ event-type, with
a rather close relation to genericity. I ﬁnd this a rather diﬃcult category to get
a ﬁrm grasp upon as, unlike the Vendlerian types, there seems to be no default
relation between a VP and a series. Rather the tests for a series rely on both
compatibility with certain aspectualizing verbs as well as the presupposition and
entailment properties of individual sentences. It might help to see some of the data
that Freed uses. For example, series, in contrast to states, allow the aspectualizer
keep with the gerund (i.e. keep VERB-ing).32 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
To me, (44-a)’s most natural interpretation is not that John was ill for ﬁve
days straight and just couldn’t get better (this seems better expressed by the
stative John continued to be ill) but rather that John was ill on a number of
successive occasions over an extended period of time that also consists of many
intervals where John was not ill at all. This diﬀers from the iteration seen in
the last section (with points) in that an iteration of coughs, while consisting of a
number of coughs is intuitively seen as a single event.
In contrast, a series of illness states seems less of a unitary event, but rather
a number of ‘separate’ events bundled up together into a new one. I have la-
belled the examples with ‘?’s as attempted series in that with a little context they
are interpretable – but then, as a series of understanding or loving events. For
example, imagine that John is unconﬁdent about his French language skills and
convinces himself that he does not understand French. Nevertheless, every time
a Parisian speaks to him, he understands.
With the concatenation stopped VERB-ing, we can see a contrast between
series built upon activities or achievements and activities and achievements proper
based on presupposition and entailment relations. (Freed, 1979)(p.59):
Series: John stopped driving to work presupposes John used to drive
to work and entails that John does not (is not) drive (driving) to work
now.
Activity: John stopped running (on one occasion) does not presup-
pose that John used to run, nor does it entail that John does not run
(is not running) now.
Achievement: John stopped noticing the lint on his suit (on one oc-
casion) does not presuppose that John used to notice the lint on his
suit, nor does it entail that John does not notice (is not noticing) the
lint on his suit now.
Note that both sentences in the activity and achievement parts of the above
quote indeed do have interpretations as series (in this case taking on a rather
habitual reading), and it is generally the case that only context (or something
explicit like her use of ‘on one occasion’) makes the interpretation clear. For
example, John’s noticing lint on his suit may have been a debilitating compulsive
behaviour that is ﬁnally stopped after years of therapy. This can be viewed as a
sort of generic series, as there is no reference to any individual noticing event per
se. The example where John keeps being ill, can, as a series, have either a generic
or serial (these are the two types of Freed’s series) interpretation. The serial one
can best be summed up as John keeps being ill. It’s getting rather annoying –
at least once every two weeks there’s something amiss... Another example from
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noon to 3:00 p.m. and she slept in hotel rooms from May to August,w h i c hi sa
series of individual events gathered together.
Based on some of the tests (especially the presupposition and entailment),
there is certainly an argument to allow for yet another event-type (though deriva-
tive on the basic ones). What makes the series is a diﬀerent sort of operation
than, say, the iterativity on points or achievements. It may even may it easier to
incorporate the notion of genericity or habituality into the framework in a nice
way. Nevertheless, I think it safe to rule Series out of a notion of ‘primitive’
event-type, which I would restrict to the classic Vendlerian four and the points.
With these types in mind, the next section will look at a notion of event struc-
ture (taken mainly from (Moens & Steedman, 1988) and (Freed, 1979)), which
will attempt to put together the various types into a uniﬁed whole. Intimately
related to this is the notion of aspectual coercion which has been mentioned a few
times earlier. And with a notion of event structure and coercion, we will wrap
the section up with a look at how combined they give a window into the relation
between linguistic meaning, context, and event interpretation.
2.2 Event Structure and Coercion
2.2.1 Introduction
Recall an example from Kalam in (9), repeated here for convenience:
(45) kotp
house
gy,
having-built-SS
np
you
˜ nnp
intending-to-give-SS
gspyn
I-am-doing
I am building a house for you
Here is an example of an accomplishment event type, put in the progressive. For
our purposes, the interesting bit here is that the accomplishment is spread over
separate clauses. One clause is the indication (or speculation at this point) of a
house having been built. This is the clause with gy (‘having built’), which is the
generic activity/doing verb g- concatenated with a perfect-marker (y).That is, the
building activity (which is linguistically represented by g- and the house (kotp)
as object) has led to a state – that of a house having been built. Furthermore, a
separate clause is used to indicate that the activity associated with the building
of a house (i.e building) is going on now – seen in the sentence as gspyn (‘I am
doing’).
That this is so explicitly spelled out in the language is rather uncanny as it
strongly echoes the received wisdom on the temporal contour of events. In com-
paring the diﬀerent event types, the connection between accomplishments with
activities and achievements has been hinted at. They seem to share something in
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between activities and accomplishments could be merely that of perspective (e.g.
the same situation could be described as either running or running a mile). An
accomplishment, in a sense, could be seen as an activity leading to an inherent
end-point, or goal. However one wants to characterise it, there is an activity at
the heart of an accomplishment.
But then what of the goal aspect? Again, the similarity between accomplish-
ments and gradual achievements (such as reach the summit) was noted. With
both, a goal is reached (which we may think of as the ‘event’) leading to a con-
sequent state (having built a house or having reached the summit). So, we can
think of accomplishments as, in fact, something akin to an activity with a punc-
tual achievement added in for good measure. And while Kalam speakers seem
to have been rather advanced event semanticists, it took the primitive western
semanticists until the 1970’s and 80’s to ﬁgure this out. Nevertheless, there are
a number of similarly oriented notion of a general event structure that can be
used both to unify the basic event typology, but also shed light into the various
coercion phenomena.
2.2.2 Event Structure
In this chapter we have seen a more or less standard typology for diﬀerent types
of events. This phenomena is traditionally referred to as lexical aspect,a sl e x i c a l
VP’s are commonly seen to denote one of the event types. However, one could
take a more holistic view of event representation and meaning in general. On
this view, there is no strict separation of the diﬀerent event types. Rather, given
the proper perspective one could view something conventionally thought of as an
achievement as, say, an activity. Moreover, the lexical VP’s that are associated
with a default event type are allowed to shift to another given the right context
or grammatical construction. But to do this, a notion of event structure that can
subsume all the ‘primitive’ event types to allow such shift is needed.
Luckily we do have all the necessary ingredients.43 At the end of the preced-
ing section we saw how one could look at an accomplishment as a telic activity
along with an achievement-like event that ends the activity and a consequent
state. That is, there does seem to be a way to relate the various event types
with one another. Though deceptively simple, the ‘model’ proposed by (Moens &
Steedman, 1988) is quite a good start at this sort of uniﬁcation. Their structure
is called an event nucleus, and is rather closely related to an accomplishment. It
can be visualised in the following:
43As with the rest of this chapter, I do not mean any speciﬁc formal machinery, but rather
am sticking to the somewhat hazy realm of intuitive notions and pictures. Formalities will come
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==============|///////////////////////////
preparation | consequent
event
Keeping the stock ‘building a house’ example in mind, the preparation part
of the event structure corresponds to the activity part of the accomplishment (or
in (45) ‘I am doing’). The event (proper) can be seen as the achievement part
where the house goes from unﬁnished to ﬁnished. The part labelled ‘consequent’
can be seen as the other clause of (45), namely expressed in the English perfect
as ‘having built a house’. More generally, we can view the accomplishment as the
most complex event type, with the others partaking of one or more parts of it.
Thus, in general, the preparation of the nucleus can be seen to correspond to an
activity. Recall that while atelic by default, any activity can in principle be made
telic (even if the goal is merely doing the activity for a given amount of time).
Similarly, we can take an achievement as the event part plus the consequent (for
example, if I have reached the top, then I am in a state of having reached the top).
Recall that the preparatory part of an achievement can also be focussed upon,
if desired. Points can be seen as the punctual middle without the surrounding
preparation or consequent.
One may want to make slight modiﬁcations, however. First, it is convenient
also to take the telic goal directly into account. Note on this structure that
there is only a preparation leading toward a goal, the event of the goal being
reached and the consequent state. The addition of the reiﬁed object (not merely
the intended end-state) is useful for dealing with the problems of telicity such as
the imperfective paradox discussed earlier.44 Also, in order to handle ingressive
aspect for activities and accomplishments, it is important to realise that we can
also look to what happens before the preparatory activity starts. Imagine, for
example
(46) John started building the house.
The complement is an ordinary accomplishment that has the structure sketched
above. But the aspectual verb start is an event that triggers the preparation.
However, this deceptively simple concept does account for many complex, hier-
archical event structures.
This is because the above picture is meant to be skeletal. In fact, each of the
parts can be iterated, depending on what level of granularity a particular event
is viewed at. For example, this simple structure is perfectly ﬁne for capturing
the rather high-level notion of ‘building a house’. But, of course, the preparatory
building activity is not one activity, but rather many activities, accomplishments,
44The interlude sketches how to do this.36 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
etc. that are conceptually thought of as activity leading to a house being created.
Thus, the preparation bit can be seen as (amongst others) laying a foundation,
putting up walls, laying plumbing, electrical wiring, etc. And each of these can
be further divided hierarchically into more ﬁne-grained descriptions. To quote
Moens (2000) about the components:
Each of them may itself be compound. For example, the prepa-
ration may be an iteration of some kind, the consequent state may
identify a chain of consequences, and the core event may itself be a
complex event, such as an accomplishment.
For example, the futurate progressive, John is ﬂying to London tomorrow
demonstrates how the core event may be complex. The preparation is not ﬂying
activity as it would be in a present progressive, but rather John’s plan to go. The
event that is then triggered by the preparation is not a punctual event of arriving
in London, but the temporally more complex (and extended) accomplishment.
But couched in the event structure as perfectively viewed, with the imperfective
indicated by the progressive marking denoting the planning preparation.
In fact, but there is both linguistic and psycho-linguistic evidence for this
sort of hierarchical event segmentation. In the next chapter we will discuss ex-
periments by Zacks and Tversky45 that indicate that certain event-types such as
‘building a house’ or ‘going to a restaurant’ are stored in the mind in such a
segmented and hierarchical fashion. Going back once again to Kalam, this seg-
mented, hierarchical structure is often encoded directly into the grammar. We
have already seen in (45) that (at least with a beneﬁciary) the accomplishment of
‘building a house’ must be spread across multiple clauses that roughly correspond
to the above event structure. But the connections go deeper than this.
(Pawley, 1987) shows in great detail how Kalam speakers rely on a schematic
event sequence to describe complex events. For example, in reporting intentional
actions, the schema is as follows:
1: Movement to Scene of First Action
2: Action (iter.)
3: Movement from Scene of 2 to Present or Final Scene
4: Action(s) at Present or Final Scene (iter.)
Each part of the sequence may be internally complex, and 2 and 4 may even
contain an event-sequence themselves. But the typical use is a serial verb sequence
with no nesting. This can be seen with a Kalam report of a typical and simple
‘complex’ event such as gathering ﬁrewood:46
45See (Zacks & Tversky, 2001) for a summary of a variety of related experiments.
46The use of the ‘/’ in the Kalam text is only to delineate the separate scenes and is not part
of the language.2.2. Event Structure and Coercion 37
(47) am/
go
mon
wood
pk/
strike
d
get
ap/
come
ay-
put
So, what would normally be expressed in English as a simple verb phrase (gather
ﬁrewood) is instead expressed as a sequence of simple events – the ﬁrst scene has
the actor moving to the wood location, in the second scene the cutting is done,
the third scene has the cutter bringing the cut wood home, with the ﬁnal scene
being the action of putting the wood in its proper place. In terms of event struc-
ture, we can envisage the ‘go’ to lead to the inceptive event, the ‘wood, strike,
get’ as the preparatory activity (iterated, of course) and the ﬁnal action of ‘put’
to be the terminating event.
This hierarchical goal/plan/event structure will come back in more detail in
the chapter about psycho-linguistics, but it is useful to make a few, general com-
ments here. To quote Zacks and Tversky’s plausible speculation:
The most important legacy of the evolutionary forces shaping hu-
mans’ cognitive architecture is probably a general mechanism or set
of mechanisms for inferring and reasoning about causes and goals.
The upshot of this is that production and comprehension of language about
events draws on these very mechanisms. More importantly for the purposes of
the interaction of aspect and tense is the claim ((Steedman, n.d.), (Lambalgen &
Hamm, 2005)) that the cognition of time itself may be parasitic upon goal/plan
mechanisms. More concretely, for Moens and Steedman, in a tensed accomplish-
ment like ‘Harry climbed to the top’ the temporal reference can actually be used
to refer to a default relation between an antecedent (climbing) and goal (reaching
the top). Also, the temporal proﬁle comes along with the notion of a plan/goal
relationship (as executing a plan toward a goal takes time). Similarly, many other
aspectual and temporal phenomena can be see as the cognitive representation of
goals and sub-goals.
Moving back to the matters at hand in this chapter, an integrated part-whole
event structure can also have something rather important to say about coercion
phenomena, and more importantly, meaning in general. We shall see this in the
next section.
2.2.3 Coercion
Until now (though with the proper caveat), the talk has been of, e.g., stative or
accomplishment VP’s. The standard diagnostic tests have been given to illustrate,
for example, why a particular VP should be considered stative rather than as an
achievement or an accomplishment. Some authors (e.g. (Olsen & Weinberg,
1999)) even put the lexical aspectual type of the V or VP as lexical features38 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
of said V or VP in a generative framework.47 However, matters are slightly
more complex. It is important to diﬀerent aspectual classes of predicates in a
particular language from the aspectual types which can be seen as representations
of semantic structures. One of the reasons is that there is not a simple (1-1)
mapping from predicates to event-types. Instead, one should think of ‘stative
VP’s’ or ‘achievement VP’s’ rather as a default as to how a situation is generally
construed. But, being a default, context, or a particular linguistic construction
can change the default event-type associated with a given VP to a diﬀerent event-
t y p e .T h i si sw h a ti sc a l l e dc o e r c i o n .
Achievements and Points
We have already seen an example of coercion before, when comparing the diﬀer-
ences between Achievements and Points. When put in the progressive, they may
behave diﬀerently.48
(48) a. John is reaching the top.
b. John is coughing.
(48-a) exhibits the change from an Achievement to an Accomplishment, or what
have been termed as ‘run-up’-Achievements. As the name alludes to, there is a
shift in focus from event and post-state part of the event nucleus (typical of an
achievement) to the activity that is leading up to the achievement. Essentially,
this is the addition of the preparatory activity to the given event structure of the
achievement.
(48-b) is slightly more complicated. Recall that a point is merely the instanta-
neous event part of the event nucleus. The application of the present iterates the
coughing into an activity. Just as the preparation of the ‘house-building’ could
be seen to be a hierarchical structure of various other events, the activity here
will consist of an iterated series of coughs, taken to be a uniform activity.
The classical entailment test also show that the (48-a) is a progressivized
accomplishment, and the latter a progressivized activity. Notice that if a climber
is reaching the top, there is no strict entailment to the fact that the climber will
actually reach the top.49 In contrast, if John was coughing then there is certainly
the entailment that John coughed.
Both examples can be viewed as the progressive construction systematically
changing the default aspectual type of the VP it applies to in order to remain
interpretable. As the progressive needs to apply to an activity, an activity is
47Verbs are not marked state or accomplishment as such but reduced to features such as
+dynamic, +telic, which are somehow innate.
48That is, if they are grammatically acceptable. This will in some more marginal cases vary
among speakers.
49Or to put in terms of the progressive paradox. John was reaching the top does not imply
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added in the ﬁrst case to yield an accomplishment, and the progressive proceeds
as normal. In the second, the simple addition of an activity would yield an event
structure with an activity and culminating event, but no end-state. In English
at least, this type of event does not seem to exist.50 So instead, there is move to
iterate the instantaneous event and construe it as an activity to then apply to.
Note that a point with progressive marking does seem to entail such an iteration.
If John was coughing, or a light was ﬂashing, then both of these events must have
occurred more than once.
Matters can be complicated a bit more by the addition of other constructions
to the given lexical material. For example, there is the (hopefully metaphorical)
VP cough up a lung, the coercion of a point to an achievement with the addition
of a rather painful and disgusting end-state. The addition of the progressive (He’s
coughing up a lung), yields an unpleasant run-up achievement.
Durative (as opposed to punctual) temporal adverbials force an iterative read-
ing with achievements. For example, observe the well-known following pair (from
(Moens & Steedman, 1988)):
(49) a. *John arrived all night.
b. Visitors arrived all night.
The adverbial all night forces a reading of multiple achievements over the spec-
iﬁed time. Sentence (49-a) is bad precisely because of the incongruity of the
situation. In contrast, visitors arriving separately over the period has no such
incongruity. Similarly, changing the object of the achievement to a plural, allows
for the iterated, activity reading in the progressive. For example, John is now
reaching the summit of every peak he attempts describes an ongoing activity (or
progressivised habitual).51
The above gives us a few ways that in the context of certain grammatical
constructions (progressive, adverbials, even change in the semantic status of the
argument) that VP’s that are associated with either achievements or points can,
in these particular contexts, undergo a shift to another. However, as can be
already seen by (49-a), not everything goes here, but perhaps more than is often
recognised in the literature. (Comrie, 1976a) rejects the use of ‘John is reaching
the top’ for a run-up achievement, although many speakers ﬁnd this form perfectly
acceptable and it is well-used. Aside from speaker variation, there are certain
achievements that do seem rather diﬃcult to turn into run-up achievements.
(50) a. *Mary is ﬁnding her keys.
b. *Julie is noticing the lint on her blouse.
c. Mary is ﬁnding a ﬂaw in everyone at the party.
50Similarly, the perfect (has coughed) yields just this end state.
51Notice that here we can replace the progressive with reaches felicitously. John reaches the
top, however is no longer a run-up achievement, but rather a completive, narrative present.40 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
d. My mom was noticing that my zits were freshly squeezed all the time.
She begged me to stop.52
e. Slean is ﬁnding her place among other great Canadian singer-songwriters.
There is no place, yet, where she ought to be – she’s on her way there,
wherever “there” is.53
Concrete uses of ﬁnd seem impossible as a run-up achievement (looking for would
be used), but are quite common in more metaphorical uses such as (50-e). The
way construction (see (Goldberg, 1995)) is also quite commonly used with ﬁnd.
The interesting bit about the last example is that it shows that even in this more
metaphorical use, it deﬁnitely has the entailment properties associated with run-
up achievements and accomplishments. Of course, (50-c) is the expected iterative
reading with a plural object.54
Sentence (50-d) is a typical example of notice in the progressive. For the most
part, these types do not seem to be run-up achievements or accomplishments but
an extended use of the progressive (perhaps for politeness), such as an applicant
for a job saying “I was just noticing your advert and...” But, the above do have
a gradual, process ﬂavour. However, they too, have a strict implication to the
goal.55
Finally, it should be pointed out that even points, given correct context, can
have a run-up achievement reading, rather than the standard cyclical/iterative
one. (Croft, 1998) gives an example of the light is ﬂashing in the situation of an
observer viewing a lighthouse from a far distance and the light turning around
at a slow speed. Interestingly, the light is not really ﬂashing at all, but would
give the appearance of a process building up to a ﬂash when the light comes
round again. From the speaker/observer’s perspective, this is enough to justify
the reading.
States
In the earlier sections it was observed that often the boundary between a state
and an activity is a matter of perspective. Applying the progressive to states56
shows this in two slightly diﬀerent ways:
(51) a. Sylvia resembles her mother.
b. Sylvia is resembling her mother more and more everyday.
c. Jeﬀ is a jerk.
d. Jeﬀ is being a jerk again.
52This example is from facepick.tripod.com/confess.htm.
53www.rambles.net/slean universe.html.
54There may also be a run-up achievement reading for this as well.
55This is not unique – is dying and persuade, to cite just two, have similar properties. See
(Comrie, 1976a).
56Examples from (Croft, 1998).2.2. Event Structure and Coercion 41
(51-a) is a prototypical stative relation, but in a progressive construction as in
(51-b), this relation is looked at with more granularity. Instead it is an activity
that is seen to be increasing (in the strength of relation) over time. Nevertheless,
it is still an activity, as it certainly is the case that (b) does indeed imply (a). The
relation (of resemblance) is presupposed, and what is asserted is that the relation
is changing in a certain direction. Of course, this goes against the (prototypical)
notion that states are unchanging; however, as the we must coerce the state to
a gradable activity via the progressive construction, the initial intuition can be
maintained.
The contrast in (51-c) and (d) is a bit diﬀerent. Unlike (51-b), (d) is an
undirected, unmetered activity. It is not asserted that Jeﬀ is being more of a jerk
by the minute (metered by the consumption of Tequila), but rather his current
behaviour (actions) are typical of someone who is a jerk. This also contrasts with
(c), which asserts that ‘being a jerk’ is something inherent in John’s nature (a
prototypical stative reading).
Importantly, there is no implication from the disposition57(51-d) to (51-c).
While with the adverb, again, this may seem a reasonable conclusion, it would be
strange to conclude from the sarcastic, John is being smart, for once that John is
intelligent in a more general way. These sorts of dispositional constructions are an
example of the blurry boundaries between states and certain types of activities.
Ingressives and Inchoatives
As a ﬁnal set of coercion examples,58 ingressives and inchoatives proﬁle the part
of the event structure that leads into event-type of the VP in question.59 Often,
a container adverbial construction is enough to trigger this coercion:
(52) a. In two years, she was president of the company.
b. The horse was galloping in two minutes.
c. The light ﬂashed in a few seconds.
Recall that in the earlier sections on states, activities and points it was noted
that container adverbials are incompatible with such event types (being more
associated with either achievements or accomplishments). This is still the case
and precisely the point. While the VP’s above are states, activities, and points
respectively, the sentences they occur in are not, but rather resemble something
akin to an achievement (with the preparatory part also proﬁled).60
57This term for a coerced state to activity is from (Croft, 2000b).
58I mean ﬁnal for the purposes here. Various coercion phenomena both on the event-type
and temporal level are ubiquitous and too numerous to list.
59Inchoatives describe the entry point into a state, ingressives the beginning of an activity.
60These examples, along with earlier ones, support (Freed, 1979)’s claim that Aktionsart must
ultimately be determined not from the verb or even VP, but the entire sentence (in context).42 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
Keeping the event nucleus picture in mind, we can see the container adverbial
proﬁling the preparatory activity (whatever that may be) leading to a certain
event that causes a change of state (i.e. not president to president, etc.). Again,
having the entire event structure at our disposal (rather than only the bits stan-
dardly denoted by the VP’s), makes the interpretation quite easy to compute.
Before moving on to ingressives, it is helpful to see that this type of inchoative
coercion is not merely a quirk of English or other western languages (such as
the well-known French examples), but is rather a common phenomenon. Take
the Micronesian language, Palau.61 The verb for English go, mo, has a typical
use as a futurate marker,62 but in a certain inﬂectional construction, can also
coerce certain states into inchoative readings (semantically this is really not so
surprising):
(53) a. Ak mo me saab er a klukuk
I’m going to study tomorrow.
b. A Toki a smecher.
Toki is sick.
c. A Toki a mlo smecher.
Toki got sick.
Again, the entry into the state rather than the state is proﬁled in (53-c).
Ingressive aspect also proﬁles the beginning of or entry into a situation. In
English, this is done with the ‘aspectualizers’, such as begin, start, commence,
all with subtly diﬀerent properties (and dependant on whether an inﬁnitival or
gerund is used).
(54) a. Lillian started studying for exams last week.
b. Lillian started to study, but decided to go to a movie instead.
c. Lillian began to study, but decided to go to a movie instead.
(54-a) and (b) have subtly diﬀerent properties. Sentence (a) proﬁles the beginning
of the activity, but nevertheless implies that the activity has indeed occurred.
With start and the inﬁnitival, there is no such implication. Instead, we have a
more complicated coercion. What is proﬁled, instead, is the preparation that,
if successful, leads to the activity being initiated. (54-b) could be a situation
where Lillian didn’t get one bit of studying done, but merely cleaned the table,
sharpened her pencils and took her books out of the book bag. If we imagine
‘events’ as chains of initiating and terminating events, surrounded by states and
activities, this is easy to understand. The ‘started’ in (b) refers to the initiating
event that drives the preparation to the initiating of studying event, not the
studying event. Note that the periphrastic ‘about to’ accomplishes the same
61(Josephs, 1975).
62See (Bybee et al., 1994) and (Hopper & Traugott, 1993) for a comprehensive survey of this
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eﬀect. Palau has a similar phenomenon, but is again done by inﬂection on the
verb:63
(55) a. A Droteo a melekingu e rad e m a lat o k ie lk i r e lac h e b e c h i i e l i r .
Droteo is about to talk to Toki’s father about their marriage.
b. A Droteo a melekinga e rad e m a lat o k ie lk i r e lac h e b e c h i i e l i r .
Droteo has started talking to Toki’s father about their marriage.
(a) (at least the gloss) seems compatible with a situation where Droteo actually
is in front of the potential bride’s father, and open’s his mouth, but no words
manage to come out, which could easily be described by started to talk.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter, the standard event typology was reviewed, with
diﬀerent VP’s corresponding to types of events with very diﬀerent properties
(e.g. durativity vs. pointlike, telic vs. atelic, etc.). Standard contextual tests
were used to determine diﬀerent classes of VP’s on the basis of their grammat-
icality/acceptability in these tests. But by the last section, we have seen that
much more is acceptable than was initially thought. Indeed, there is no simple,
inﬂexible mapping from a given class of VP’s to a semantic event-type. Instead an
underlying event structure (such as the Moens and Steedman event nucleus) was
shown to serve as the foundation allowing for systematic changes in the default
meanings of a given aspectual class. This has been said in better form in (Croft,
1998)):
The observations...lead us to two conclusions. The ﬁrst is that
the semantic representation of an event denoted by a verb must be
complex, involving not only what we normally think of as “what the
verb means” but also the event leading up to it (the run-up process
or preceding state) and the event leading out of it (resulting state or,
in the case of cyclic achievements, the return to the original state).
Hence we must be able to specify what part of the event is actually
described in the sentence and what is in the background.
The second conclusion is that some adverbs and aspects (suddenly,
for a week, in two hours) like the simple present/progressive distinc-
tion involve a construal of the event, speciﬁcally some particular time
interval; but which time interval is proﬁled depends on the temporal
structure of the event. The container adverbial proﬁles the process
leading up to the last natural transition point in the event frame – the
endpoint for telic events and the inception for atelic events (includ-
ing states, inceptive states and achievements). the durative adverbial
63From (Josephs, 1975).44 Chapter 2. Lexical Aspect
proﬁles an event continuing beyond the ﬁrst transition point in the
event frame–that is, the inception for all event types, including telic
events.
Indeed, it is this background that allows diﬀerent lexical or grammatical con-
structions to shift the meaning in a way that is quite easy to interpret for the
hearer. This gives a picture of meaning that is not ﬁxed by features on a given
lexical entry and projected into the sentence upwards, but rather the combina-
tion and uniﬁcation of (ostensibly) conﬂicting constructions to give rise to shifted
meaning.64 Ultimately, nearly anything is possible as long as there is enough
context to allow for semantic agreement.65 Of course, speaker acceptance will
vary, but is certainly much wider than the standard literature would have us be-
lieve.66 The reader may have found some of the coercion examples to be rather
ordinary, and some rather strange. The more ordinary examples have acquired a
conventional status and may hardly ‘feel’ like coercion anymore, but most likely
began their existence as a novel example, that for one reason or another, became
a standard facet of the language.
In the next chapter, we shall look at a good deal of psycho-linguistic litera-
ture and experiments that seem to support this more broad approach to events
as evidenced by coercion phenomena and its interaction with event structure.
64The spirit of this approach to meaning (and also syntax) has been taking up recently in
various ﬂavours of construction grammars (Fillmore and Kay, Croft, Goldberg).
65Recall that it is rather hard to give a decent context to John arrived all night, but perhaps
it is possible.
66On a related note, the reader is referred to (Bresnan & Nikitina, 2003) for new data on
the dative alternation in English that confounds earlier approaches that relied on lexical class
membership. By examining a large number of corpora including ordinary peoples ‘fan ﬁction’
on Internet web-sites, they discovered numerous counter-examples to what was an accepted
data set.Chapter 3
The Psycholinguistic Turn
In the preceding chapter the notion of event was examined from a semantic point
of view. More speciﬁcally, we saw the standard event-typology, a structure on
which the diﬀerent event-types can be situated, as well as some ways language
can encode these various event types. We also saw the way diﬀerent grammatical
constructions or lexical items can change the semantics of a particular VP to a
diﬀerent event-type in regular ways.
In this chapter we shall look at events from a psychological perspective – that
is, how we cognitively represent events both in memory and as experienced, as
well as how this manifests itself in language (i.e. event reporting). It turns out
that many factors noted by psychologists as central to the conception of events
were already seen in the semantic descriptions of events in the last chapter. These
include notions such as intention, goal, and hierarchical representation.
3.1 Introduction
Take the following two sentence discourse
(1) Max fell. John pushed him.
The most prominent reading of this is that the pushing event is the reason that
Max fell.1 The reader of this example will undoubtedly come up with this reading
automatically. Indeed, as discourses go, this does seem to be a fairly uninteresting
one.
Yet, there is a good deal that must be done to reach the causal interpretation.
First, the reader/listener is presented with two events, both in the past (given
the verbal morphology). Moreover, there must be a way of relating them to each
1There is the other, linear order of events reading, but this would normally have some added
linguistic information, such as Then John pushed him.
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other temporally (and to possibly a more general context). The question then
arises as to how this is done.
Examining example (1), we can see that in the interpretation we are looking
at, the temporal order of the events is opposite to the way they are presented
– John pushed Max before he fell. In fact, the key to the interpretation of this
reading’s temporal ordering is that there is a causal relation between the events,
thus enforcing the temporal order where pushing precedes falling. (Lambalgen,
Baggio, & Hagoort, 2007) gives a more formal account of how this is done in
terms of the event calculus, which we will quickly summarise.
First, the bare linguistic material must be updated in the discourse. In this
case, there are two events, both in the past that must be ﬁtted into the context.
This is the ﬁrst goal in processing the discourse. In this case, there is both an e1
(fall(m))a n da ne2 (push(j,m)) that need to be added to the discourse model.
Imagine them as the following goals:
• update discourse with past event e1 = fall(m) and fit e1 in context
• update discourse with past event e2 = push(j,m) and fit e2 in context
This puts both events in the past, which is necessary given the morphology,
but says nothing about how the events are related to each other. The key then
is the second half each goal, which requires that the events be ﬁtted into the
context. Suppose the listener has no more information than what is given in (1).
How is the listener then supposed to interpret the prominent reading, where the
temporal sequence of events is contrary to the linear order of presentation?
For this we must draw upon both general planning knowledge, knowledge
of causality as well as stereotypes of particular events. We can start with an
ontology that distinguishes between events and processes. Keeping on an intuitive
level, both sentences in the above discourse can be said to be about events. For
example, the event fall, would be said to include the point where Max’s position
has changed from somewhat upright to lying on the ground. There is also a
process, falling, which corresponds to the motion and change in position of Max.
In plain English, we can say that events are things that occur or happen, while
process can be said to be going on for a particular amount of time. Processes
c a na l s ob es a i dt oo b e yt h eprinciple of inertia, which should be taken for its
Newtonian connotations. If a process is going on at time t and between t and a
later t nothing happens to change matters, then the process is still going on.
In general, there is a causal relation between events and processes. The ﬁrst
is that if a process is going on for a given period of time (and nothing intervenes
to stop the process), a culminating event may occur. In this case we can dis-
tinguish between a falling process and the culminating event fall. The former
would include the gradual change of angle, perhaps accompanied by curses, etc.
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illustrate the diﬀerence between the process and the event, it is quite easy to
picture the former with the latter never happening.
(2) Max began falling. He quickly regained his balance and punched John in
the face.
So far we are no closer to a link between the two events in the discourse; this
is where the second causal relation between events and processes plays a role.
Events can begin or end processes. In this case we have reasoned from a fall event
happening to there being a prior process of falling. Moving further backward in
time, the hearer can also reason that falling probably did not begin by itself, but
was caused by something. In general, the process can be initiated by such things
as slipping on a banana, losing one’s balance, or even being pushed.
The latter possibility is the most germane, given the lexical material, and the
hearer will then make the link between the process falling and being pushed and
know that generally the latter temporally precedes the former. This is almost
enough for the hearer to interpret the causal reading. Once the connection be-
tween the push event and the falling process is made, causality tells her that the
push event must precede the process falling, which precedes the event fall.
But there is one caveat. From sentence (2), we have seen that the falling
process does not necessarily lead to a fall event. Another event can intervene to
delay or prevent it from happening. In fact, it is possible to have a push event, a
falling process, and a fall event, but the causality not quite so straightforward.
Take this convoluted example2
(3) John pushed Max and he began falling. John then reached out an arm
stopping him, but yet again changed his mind and let him go.
Even if the hearer does build her discourse model in such a way that the push
event is temporally ﬁrst and triggers a falling process, a ﬁnal reasoning principle
needs to be brought into play. This is called closed world reasoning, which says,
‘assume all those propositions to be false which you have no reason to assume to
be true.’3 The hearer has a general causal connection between falling and fall as
well as general knowledge of the principle of inertia. The hearer can then almost
assume that once falling has started it will lead to fall, and that the falling was
initiated by the temporally prior push event.
But, as sentence (3) shows, it is possible that the falling process was ter-
minated prior to the fall event being culminated. This is where closed world
reasoning comes to the rescue. Given only sentence (1), there is no reason for the
hearer to infer that an extraneous event did occur.4 The hearer then has enough
in her armoury to interpret the mini-discourse in the non-linear, causal way.
2Perhaps imagining a good angel and bad angel both telling John what to do.
3Elegant formulation taken from (Lambalgen et al., 2007).
4In fact, it would take a fairly heavy construal to manage such a scenario with (2).48 Chapter 3. The Psycholinguistic Turn
This sort of interpretation procedure is quite automatic most of the time. We
do it multiple times a day without giving it a second thought. Nevertheless (as
can be seen in the above), it is not so easy to describe, and successfully formalising
such a thing is a no easy matter.5 A simple two sentence discourse with its default
interpretation is actually a rather complex entity, requiring the ability place events
in time, integrate them in the proper way, applying planning, causality, and
speciﬁc world knowledge that can connect the events. Now imagine the child
in the situation who must both have the conceptual ability and conventional
knowledge to perform the above operations, as well as connecting this to the way
her speciﬁc language works. This is a daunting task indeed, but one that most of
us manage to master. In the interlude following this chapter, the formalism of the
event calculus is detailed, as well as how a formalism that takes these cognitive
problems seriously can give a computational account for how they are done.
This chapter shall be an exploration into a variety of psycholinguistic exper-
iments into how children both develop the conceptual apparatus necessary for
tense and aspect comprehension and production as well as how these concepts
can be mapped to the language they are acquiring. The reader is to be forewarned
that they should expect no speciﬁc answer to language acquisition problem, but
nevertheless will emerge with a bit of illumination about how complex the process
is and the necessary ingredients involved.6
Before the language acquisition studies are examined, the preliminary sections
can be seen as the foundation. In the above, it is clear that the comprehension
of tense can be seen as having two primary goals: locating the event in time,
and integrating with other events, present either in the discourse or the general
context. This then raises the question as to what an event is – a question elegantly
answered by the work of Zacks and Tversky. Again, notions of planning, goal
and intention come into play as well. Finally, the reader is encouraged to note
the close relation between the concepts and process involved in speaking of and
understanding speech about events and the mechanisms of the event calculus,
though more shall be said in the conclusion.
5A formal analogue of the above convoluted description will be seen before moving to the
more formal chapters of the thesis.
6As mentioned in the How to read section of Chapter 1, the next two sections deal with the
psychological counterpart of constructing event types. The sections that come after deal with
acquisition of tense and aspect and are of less relevance to what comes in the latter chapters.
However, should the reader persevere, the section on event on object individuation (Section 7)
connects tense and aspect acquisition with event-type acquisition, and is a useful perspective
for viewing the scenarios discussed formally in the Interlude. Finally, the reader should also
be reminded of the caveat in the How to read section. This chapter is to give those of a
semantics background a knowledge of the parallels that exist between the conceptual typology
of Aktionsart and its psychological counterparts, as well as to provide a grounding for the
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3.2 Preliminaries: Analogy between objects and
events
(Zacks & Tversky, 2001) initially deﬁnes an event as “a segment of time at a given
location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and an end.” The
process by which observers identify the boundaries and their relationship is called
event structure perception. Of course, this deﬁnition does not conform to either
naive usage of the term ‘event’ or various semantic deﬁnitions. First, as it is tied
to perception, it can only apply to individual instances of event-types, i.e. event
tokens. Second, both naive and semantic conceptions of events allow for both
tokens and types with perhaps fuzzy spatial or temporal boundaries, temporal
discontinuity, and time spans that would be impossible for an observer to observe.
F o re x a m p l e ,t og ob a c kt ot h es t o c kbuilding a house example, one would not
expect the preparation-phase building activity to be continuous over time, but
stopped and started each weekday. Furthermore, a trip to local DIY store for
equipment could reasonably be considered part of the preparatory activity and
yet is not spatially connected to the building site. Also, the 100 Years war is
certainly an event, but even if it were spatially and temporally contiguous, it
went on for far too long for one observer to observe the relevant boundaries.
Nevertheless, there is something to be said for this deﬁnition as a starting
point, and perhaps as a basis for developing the more higher level or somewhat
abstract notions of event as seen above. Moreover, taking this as a starting point
we can more easily see some of the important parallels between the perception of
objects and the perception of events.
Treating events as somehow on a par with objects has a bit of a pedigree in
both the philosophic and psychological literature. (Quine, 1996) proposed to go
as far as simply treating events as objects, i.e. a bounded region of space time.
That is, what are thought of as ordinary objects such as cars, rocks and trees are
one type of bounded space-time region, and events another.7 (Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976) made a similar proposal by treating events as ‘dynamic’ objects and
‘objects’ (the naive world of rocks and trees) as concrete objects.
Objects are recognised by shape, texture, colour, etc. They also have bound-
aries in space, and one can (usually) quite easily identify what regions of space the
object occupies and what regions it doesn’t. Analogously events have boundaries
in time, that is they have a beginning and an end. Like objects, they are also
bounded in space. To use Zacks and Tversky’s examples, a coﬀee cup (object)
takes of a an amount of space of a particular shape. Picking up a coﬀee cup
(event) happens in a particular location in space, that is also spatially bounded.8
7Again, this notion only captures event-tokens. It also side-steps many thorny analytic
metaphysical problems with event identity if actions are brought into the picture. We shall
quite happily also side-step such metaphysical considerations.
8Simplistically one could imagine a ﬁlm of said event slow enough that each still still leaves50 Chapter 3. The Psycholinguistic Turn
Continuing the analogy, we shall look now look at how both objects and (simple)
events can be identiﬁed and categorised.
3.2.1 Taxonomies and Partonomies
There are two types of hierarchical structures that can be used to characterise
objects, and by extension also events – taxonomic and partonomic structures. A
taxonomy, well known from biological classiﬁcation, is a kind-of structure. For
example, a Smart Car is a kind of automobile, which in turn is a kind of vehicle.
On the event level, a game of ﬁve-a-side football is a kind of “football”, which
in turn is a kind of “sport”. Both objects and events can be referred to at these
various levels of abstraction. A common feature of this analysis is to take there
to be three levels of abstraction – subordinate, basic and superordinate. In the
examples above, the basic levels would be automobile and football, the subordi-
nate the more speciﬁc Smart car and ﬁve-a-side football, and superordinate the
more abstract “vehicle” and “sport”.
This division and categorisation may seem a bit trivial or obvious, but it does
have some psychological impact to it. Rosch et al9 have shown that the basic
level is the psychologically privileged level in that it is the easiest to access in
perception, action and language. It also conveys the most amount of information
(compare “table” to either “coﬀee-table” or “furniture”), and members of this
basic level category have more similarity (in shape for objects) to each other than
members of the other two levels. Experiments done by (Rosch, 1978) show that
name of objects is fastest at the basic level and that basic level concepts also tend
to be the earliest concepts children learn.
Note also that a taxonomic hierarchy can help in inferences and reasoning,
especially about intrinsic properties. For example, if one knows that a “salmon”
is a member of the category “ﬁsh”, then one can reasonably infer that a salmon
has gills and swims in the water. In this case, this is true, but these type of
category inferences are certainly defeasible. One need only look at the plethora
of non-monotonic logics designed to defeat the inference that Tweety can ﬂy if
Tweety happens to be an atypical bird like a penguin or ostrich. We shall soon
see as well on the event level that similar category related inferences can also
aid in reasoning. In experiments carried out by Zacks, Tversky and Iyer (Zacks,
Tversky, & Iyer, 2001) on event segmentation, there is an interaction between
taxonomic knowledge and the ability to segment an unfamiliar event.10
a ghost image tracing out a path of the movement of the coﬀee cup.
9See (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) and (Rosch, 1978).
10Subjects with no musical training fared about as well as Stanford band members when asked
to segment “putting a saxophone together” into component parts. Presumably, the ignorant
students at least were familiar with the process of putting something together, and could make
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The second type of hierarchical organisation is a partonomy. Objects can be
broken down into component parts. For example, a table has a top and four legs,
a car has doors, windows, wheels, seats, etc. In cases like the car, the main parts
just listed can be again broken down further into sub-parts, such as the seat,
which has a back, headrest, bench, etc. Observe, that all the parts and subparts
just listed have distinctive spatial conﬁgurations. In fact, shape plays a primary
role in object recognition. Furthermore, parts when joined together give rise to
discontinuities of contour, which may aid in object recognition. For example, it is
possible to imagine two diﬀerent objects consisting of the identical parts but put
together in a diﬀerent way (say a typical car and a rather odd conﬁguration of car
parts). These two objects would presumably be recognised (or not in the latter
case) as diﬀerent types of objects. In this case it would be a car, and a rather
ﬁne example of Art Brut, given the radically diﬀerent contour discontinuations.
Of course, further inspection would then yield the revelation that the art piece
is indeed made out of car parts (drawing on the knowledge of the partonomic
h i e r a r c h yo fac a r ) .
Just as a taxonomy can aid in inference, knowledge of partonymic hierarchies
can help in reasoning from physical structure to function. If we see an object with
legs, it seems reasonable to infer that the object can stand whether the object is
inanimate such as a chair or table, or animate like a zebra or human.
Breaking events down into component parts was already seen in the previous
chapter in the discussion of event structure. An accomplishment could be seen as
having parts such as a preparatory activity, an achievement, and resultant state,
all of which could also be broken down into component parts in a recursive man-
ner. Similarly, on the psychological side, events are broken down into hierarchical,
component subparts. For example, using a script level of story understanding,
the cognitively privileged partonomic level can be considered scenes in a script.
A simple illustration would be the script for dining in a restaurant. The scenes
would then be such things as “entering” “ordering”, “eating”, “paying the bill”,
etc. The subordinate level would consist of the various sub-events of the scenes
(i.e. “ordering” could be a series of conversation exchanges punctuated with some
menu-pointing).
Observe that the boundaries of the parts can also be identiﬁed with the loca-
tions of maximal perceptual change, in a way similar to parts of an object being
identiﬁed by discontinuous spatial contours. Similarly, the sub-events would also
be characterised by discrete perpetual changes. Keeping to the restaurant theme,
the “entering” scene could be subdivided into opening the door and stepping in,
being greeted by a host, then walking to a table, and ﬁnally sitting down. Should
these sub-events run smoothly, it would be rather strange to break them down
further, like the walking to the table consisting of two further sub-events. This is
conceivable, however, if the walking is interrupted by a streaker running across
the restaurant. Again, however, there would be a rather dramatic perceptual
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This kind of characterisation illuminates a subtle interaction among a num-
ber of factors. The ﬁrst is the cognitive-perceptual system which breaks down
the stream of perception into manageable bits. With this alone, there doesn’t
seem to be enough to determine if a given action is on the subordinate or scene
level – as both would be based around this ‘discretising’ of perception. Charac-
terising what is a sub-event and what is an event can be seen in broad terms as
‘cultural’ and based around knowledge of intentions (again another supposed cog-
nitive mechanism), causes, social convention and world knowledge. For example,
ordering and paying the bill could appear quite similar (purely perceptually) to
an observer with no acquaintance with ordinary human activity. The diﬀerence
lies in the goals and the ordering of the scenes within the entire script, which is
largely cultural knowledge. It is then no surprise that (Bower, Black, & Turner,
1979) experiments show that within ‘relatively homogeneous’ samples of people
share agreement about the typical parts of everyday activities.
3.2.2 Event Boundaries over time
Ultimately, whether people will primarily characterise an event on the basis of
perceptual features and discontinuities or in a more cultural or goal based manner
is largely based on time scale. Taking the example of a handshake from (Zacks &
Tversky, 2001) we can see how this fairly simple event can both be broken down
into component parts and be part of ever larger, more abstract or temporally
extended events. The smallest temporal scale that of a psychologically reiﬁed
event is of a very short time scale, and is primarily deﬁned in terms of simple
physical changes. In this case, the events could be the raising of the hand, grasping
of the other person’s, etc. On a slightly longer timescale (10 to 30 seconds), events
can be deﬁned in terms of a simple, intentional action, in this case, the handshake
as described above. Moving further to a time scale of minutes to hours, there
are events characterised by goals and plans and socially conventional forms of
activity. Here the handshake may now be a subpart of a treaty signing. Finally,
on an even larger scale there a events that are best characterised thematically –
the treaty-signing as a sub-event of a peace process.
Notice that by the time the top level of the time scale is reached, the link to
simple, physical changes is gone. It is best described by (Zacks & Tversky, 2001):
In general, it seems that as the time scale increases, events become
less physically characterised and more deﬁned by the goals, plans,
intentions and traits of their participants. (p.7) (emphasis added)
Of course, that is not to say that physical events have nothing to do with
events characterised at the thematic level. World War II for example, in part,
consists of innumerable events that could be characterised at the various levels
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sub-events of the war on the basis of simple physical changes,11 it would not be
a proper or satisfactory answer to the question of what World War II was. At a
minimum one would have to name the parties involved and their respective plans
and goals. Even a simple intentional act such as a handshake, while made up of
the smallest reiﬁed events such as described above cannot be explained merely by
these characterising events. The purpose (in a social context) of the handshake
must also be brought into the explanation. Intentions and goals, therefore must be
taken to be also intrinsic in people’s perception and conceptualisation of events.12
3.3 Intentions and Goals
In Chapter 2, the importance of the notion of goal to account for certain event-
types was shown. It is no less important in the psychological realm. This is
especially true if we take ‘psychological’ events to be a (temporal) partonomy as
described above. Goals can be recursively seen in terms of sub-goals, generating
a hierarchical partonomic structure. Using the example in the last section we can
see the now famous handshake as a sub-goal in the signing of the peace treaty,
and the peace treaty as a sub-goal in achieving the higher level goal of a successful
peace process.
Again, a nice feature of these sort of hierarchies is that the allow default
inferences based on knowledge of event scripts or schemata. Zacks and Tversky
give a cute example of the default inference of an observer in a bank who witnesses
someone enter carrying a gun and wearing a mask. The observer will most likely
infer that the intruder has a goal to rob the bank, and yet a higher goal of
acquiring money. Moreover, knowing the goal allows for both the prediction of
future behaviour and inference from incomplete information. For example, the
observer can predict the ‘robber’ will make a move for the safe or a bank window,
knowing the robber’s goal of money acquisition. She will also be able to infer that
if the robber is exiting the bank with a bulging sack, this sack contains money, gold
or some other valuable item, and probably not a pile of yesterdays newspapers.
Of course, like the inferences from the related hierarchies, it is defeasible. Our
robber may only be a performance artist, or perhaps an actor hired to test the
bank’s security procedures.
The importance of goals and intentions in both the linguistic and psychological
account of event structure is no accident. Some authors (e.g. (Tomasello, 2003))
take the ability of humans to understand the intentions and goals of others to
11How this could be done without reference to borders and other conventional concepts makes
this attempt rather doubtful.
12In this I am ignoring that fact that any voluntary bodily movement can be seen as an
intentional act. The diﬀerence seems to be that one can explain, say, what ‘grasping a hand’ is
in purely physical terms and no mention of any sort of higher level social intention or goal (of
course there is the goal of actually grasping the other hand). Answering the question of what
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be the primary human evolutionary leap from our fellow primates. This ability
allows for all kinds of cultural learning, including the acquisition of language.
From about 9-12 months of age infants can already understand the commu-
nicative intentions of others at least to some extent. (Meltzoﬀ, 1995) shows that
18 month-olds can already distinguish between manner and goal in human ac-
tivity. When shown adults attempting to achieve a goal (both successfully and
unsuccessfully) the children will only produce the action that lead to the achieve-
ment of the goal. When shown an inanimate object ‘performing’ an action, chil-
dren produced the action whether or not it lead to the successful achievement of
the goal.
(Tomasello, 1999) cites a fascinating experiment in (Gergely & Csibra, 1993)
that is a wonderful example of intention and plan reading and its impact on
imitation by 14 month old infants. The infants were shown an adult bending
over to push a button for a lamp with their head rather than in the ordinary
button-pushing way. In one condition, the adult acted as if the room was cold
and put on a shawl that was held by both hands.13 When the infants were asked
to turn the light on in this condition, they turned it on in the ordinary way (with
their hands). In a diﬀerent condition, infants saw the adult again turn the light
on with her head, but this time there was nothing impeding the use of her hands.
In this case, the infants imitated the adult’s odd way of turning on the light,
presumably, because they thought that this time there was a good reason to do
so that they wanted to ﬁnd out about. In other words, in the second condition,
the adult must have had a good reason for acting in such a way, and it was too
tempting to achieve only the goal, without also imitating the means.
Furthermore, experimental evidence from (Wagner, 2001) shows that when
under ﬁve years old, children are primarily using their knowledge of intentional
behaviour to compute the completion possibilities of telic predicates. This will be
described in more detail when looking at various theories of grammatical tense
and aspect acquisition in the context of the aspect-before-tense hypothesis.
Before moving on to the experimental evidence that humans really do encode
ongoing activity (and in memory) in the hierarchies proposed so far, it is useful to
sum up. First, there is the perceptual mechanism that segments both objects and
events (also seen as ‘objects’ in this view) in terms of discrete spatial (and tempo-
ral contours). This bottom level can be used as the basis for the development and
acquisition of event schemata in terms of goal, subgoal hierarchies. However, it
should be emphasised that these are to be seen as general cognitive mechanisms
that are neither unique to language or event perception and structuring. If these
two mechanisms have evolved by natural selection, the speciﬁcs have evolved by
cultural evolution.
It seems likely that over evolutionary time some goals have re-
mained salient, particularly the general goals that can be characterised
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as drives: to eat, to procreate, to avoid harm. However, for much
interesting behaviour, the relevant goals and plans are likely to be
almost entirely culturally transmitted. ((Zacks & Tversky, 2001), p.
15)
So, the only universality lies in the way we structure and represent events, not
any event schemata in particular. These will vary over time, cultures, diﬀerent
people in the same culture, and even in the same individual at diﬀering times in
their life. With that said, it is time to look at experimental evidence supporting
this notion of event segmentation and its possible ties to language.
3.4 Event Segmentation and the Hierarchical Bias
Hypothesis
Thus far we have seen certain notions such as taxonomic and partonomic hierar-
chies and event scripts or schemata as possible ways in which events are perceived
and organised psychologically. And while the notions do seem to have some in-
tuitive plausibility and would be a clever way to have a computer ‘understand’
narratives, we have yet to see any evidence of their psychological plausibility.
This section will remedy this situation. We will see numerous results from exper-
iments that indicate that, indeed, there is evidence that events are both perceived
and stored in memory in the aforementioned hierarchical structures. However,
questions remain as to how far this model can be taken, as well as the relation
to the proposals that events are organised on the semantic level in a strikingly
similar way. This section will culminate with experiments recently done by Za-
cks, Tverksy and Iyer14 on event segmentation by Stanford undergraduates, but
ﬁrst we shall see some results from previous experiments regarding events and
narrative interpretation and memory.
3.4.1 Plans, goals and subgoals
On the narrative comprehension and exposition side, there have been numerous
experiments that have shown that people will organise such narratives according
to a hierarchical goal, sub-goal structure. This tendency does take time (in devel-
opment) to come about, however. (Trabasso & Stein, 1994) looked at narratives
produced from a picture book about a child and his dog searching for a wayward
frog. The youngest subjects (from about three to ﬁve years old) kept their ‘nar-
ratives’ more or less restricted to descriptions of characters and relations in the
individual pictures. But, as the children approached nine, there was increasing
use of a goal-plan structure in the recounting of the picture book – the top goal
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being the child’s desire to get his frog back, with the various sub-goals being the
various attempts, searches, etc. By nine years old, children made as much use of
a goal/plan structure as did adults.
But, recall that children as young as one year are able to understand goals
and intentions as well as diﬀerentiate manner and goal. So perhaps, there is gap
between the understanding of basic goal, sub-goal relationships and the ability to
construction a conventional narrative.15 Nevertheless, children as young as two
have been shown to have the ability to manipulate and understand somewhat
complex goal, sub-goal structures.
(Travis, 1997) did experiments that do to show that such hierarchical rep-
resentations of events are used to guide perception and memory. The children
were shown brief sequences that contained two actions that would lead to a goal
action. To make matters more interesting, the two relevant precursor actions
were mixed with irrelevant actions. An sample sequence would be: “(1) hang up
a gong, (2) place feathers in a container, (3) make a clapper, (4) remove a plug
from a bellows”16 with the goal action being (5) banging the gong. When asked
to replicate the actions, the toddlers most often rearranged the actions so that
the relevant sequence (in this case, 1, 3, and 5) were performed sequentially. Also,
more of the goal-relevant actions were produced than goal-irrelevant actions.
Recall the link between a goal hierarchy and the notion of a partonomic event
structure. Both break down down into a iterated structure, with the schemata
encoding the relevant information about goals and sub-goals, and these breaks
aligning with the simple partonomic structure. For example, there is the toy
example of the script for eating in a restaurant. Broken down into scenes and
their subparts we obtain a simple partonomic hierarchy. But, also recall the
names of the various scenes – “entering”, “ordering”, “paying the bill”. These
scenes can all be seen as goals or subgoals a successful restaurant event. This
is precisely what is meant by the schemata aligning the goal information with
the part-whole structure. While the initial stages of such schemata are evident
in infants and toddlers, as can be seen by the Trabasso and Stein experiments,
full-blown event representations take some time to develop. Now the claim is that
these schemata inﬂuence both action and planning in that the schemata in that
the schemata play a role in how people think about their own actions in the past.
And indeed there is evidence that both memory of perceived events on video, as
well as autobiographical memory is indeed shaped by event schemata.
15There is a good possibility that the youngest children don’t quite understand the task at
hand, and are merely content to describe the individual pictures, not quite have grasped the
concept of a narrative. Parent/child interaction at this age may play a signiﬁcant role, as well.
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3.4.2 Event Schemata in Memory
Sticking with narrative for the time being, experiments by (Bower et al., 1979)
indicate that encoding events schematically can inﬂuence reconstruction in mem-
ory. In one experiment, subjects were give a script-based story. Afterwards, there
were given a memory recognition test, including descriptions of events that were
not in the story read. If these events were plausible parts of the script in the story,
there were high false recognition rates – that is, the participants thought they
had read a description of a particular event if it was plausibly a part of the script.
A second experiment was to present the event parts of a particular script in an a
typical order and then have the subjects recall what happened. Unsurprisingly,
participants tended to remember the events in the conventional order. This sort
of false reconstruction does seem to be hierarchical, though. In a similar study
by (Abbot, Black, & Smith, 1985), subjects were more likely to infer false actions
when presented with a description of a scene, than to falsely name a scene based
on an inference from give actions.
Moving closer to actual on-line perception, memory of videos of human activ-
ity also show similar eﬀects of a hierarchical structure. Recollections for actions
relevant to a particular event schema are more likely than those of irrelevant dis-
tractor actions. (Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980) show reordering of event parts
from atypical to typical order in a similar way to the (Bower et al., 1979) results
with a recollection of narrative. Conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Bower et al., sub-
jects also tended to falsely remember viewing actions that were not shown in the
videotape, but were nevertheless implied by the event schema represented.
Finally, even autobiographical memory shows evidence of hierarchical pat-
terns. (Anderson & Conway, 1993) have shown that when a certain episode has
been activated in memory, it subparts become more available for recollection.
Also, over time, speciﬁc information deteriorates, and memory of autobiographi-
cal events takes on an increasingly schematic nature. (Barsalou, 1988).
So, we now have compiled a good body of evidence that, at least in recall of
various mediums, there is a signiﬁcant bias of hierarchical structures in relation
to events. This is something that develops in children over time, starting with an
understanding and ability to manipulate simple goal, precursor action structures.
Over a period of a few years, full blown event schemata develop which combine
goal and causal information to align with the boundaries of a conventional part-
whole structure.17
But recall the ﬁrst stab at deﬁning an event psychologically – “a segment of
time at a given location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and
an end.” The most basic notion of event, then, involves on-line perception, thus
asking the question as to whether hierarchical patterning might not also aﬀect
the encoding of events while they are being perceived. Perhaps we do not encode
17Though, of course, the partonomic boundaries at higher levels of granularity (time scale)
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events hierarchically as they are observed, but because of conventional ways of
telling stories and communicative needs, a sort of hierarchy is activated at the
point of the recounting. For enlightenment on this questions we will look at the
experiments of Zacks, Tversky and Iyer designed to test the hierarchical bias hy-
pothesis.
3.4.3 On-line event segmentation and the Hierarchical Bias
Hypothesis
The Hierarchical Bias Hypothesis is simply the notion that people will sponta-
neously be disposed to actively encode ongoing activity in terms of a hierarchical
part structure. Testing this is the primary goal of experiments ﬁrst by (Newtson,
1973), and modiﬁed and extended by (Zacks et al., 2001). This is done by hav-
ing participants mark out “naturally occurring” event boundaries while watching
videotape of various activities. The extensions, however, are of particular interest
here, because they involve linguistic descriptions (by the subjects) as well. With
this they could test the extent to which linguistic represents may actually activate
perceptual representations. That is, in order to produce a adequate description
one may need to cross temporal granularity levels (say, describing actions in a
larger context to make sense of them), as well as activate representations of goals
and plans of the actor doing the activity. In other words, how well do the lin-
guistic descriptions reﬂect a hierarchical structure? Note that this assumes that
language and the cognitive representation of events are closely linked, and does
ﬁt in rather nicely with the semantic event structure given in Chapter 2.
The basic format of Newtson was to have subjects view a videotape and press
a key to mark when they observe “natural and meaningful” unit boundaries. One
group of participants is told to mark the largest natural and meaningful units,
the other group, the smallest units. The initial ﬁndings were that points marked
by the large unit condition group also tended to be boundaries for the small
unit group. Also, points not marked by the small unit group also tended not
to be marked by the large unit group. To make sense of this, let us once again
return to the restaurant script. The large unit boundaries would correspond to
the boundaries between the various scenes, while the small unit boundaries would
correspond to the next level down on the hierarchy – the various events that make
up a given scene. The alignment would then be where sub-events and scenes meet,
i.e. the inceptive or terminative events for a scene. This seems to be exactly the
hierarchical structure that was being looked for. At least, if there is a hierarchical
structure in the encoding of event perception, one would certainly expect such
strong alignment eﬀects.
Unfortunately, the initial experiments engendered a good deal of controversy,
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objections were both on the speciﬁcs of the tasks as well as more theoretical
grounds. For example, Newtson himself18 holds that even if the hierarchical
pattern found in the segmentation tasks is acceptable, there is no need to conclude
that there is any cognitive representation of events organised in such a hierarchy.
In other words, the alignment pattern is not enough, one also needs to investigate
the interactions with memory, language and prior experience.
Zacks, Tversky and Iyer conducted ﬁve diﬀerent experiments, designed not
only to test the online segmentation, but also the needed interactions with lan-
guage, memory, familiarity and communication.
Main Experiment
The ﬁrst experiment involved videotapes of four diﬀerent, single actor intentional
activities (each divided into a script of twelve steps): assembling a saxophone,
fertilising houseplants, doing the dishes and making the bed. The ﬁrst two were
ranked unfamiliar (by a survey process) and the latter two, familiar. Like Newt-
son’s experiments, subjects were asked to tap a keyboard when they encountered
a smallest or largest natural unit boundary (depending on which group they were
in).19 As an added twist, 32 of the forty participants were also equipped with a
tape recorder for which they should utter a short description of what was hap-
pening when they tapped out a breakpoint.
The analysis of the data indeed shows the presence of an alignment eﬀect.
That is, “unit boundaries under the coarse and ﬁne coding conditions were in
better alignment than would be predicted by chance.” (p. 34) Moreover, there
was some interaction with familiarity. The breakpoints for the coarse condition
(i.e. largest unit boundaries) were slightly more aligned with the breakpoints
for the ﬁne condition (smallest unit boundaries) on the familiar events.20 Given
that individual scripts must be learned, an interaction with familiarity is to be
expected.
Finally, there were the eﬀects of verbally describing the activity while do-
ing the segmentation. (Zacks et al., 2001) note that there are two possibilities
of what the eﬀect might be. One possibility could be that there is interference
between having to make a description and having to mark out the segments by
tapping. This would lead to a weakening of the alignment eﬀect between coarse
and ﬁne boundaries. On the other hand, if there is some validity to the hierarchi-
cal bias hypothesis (i.e. people ‘naturally’ encode activity in terms of schemata)
and if such schemata are somehow constituted by linguistic or semantic repre-
18(Newtson, 1993).
19Actually, subjects (after a distractor exercise) were asked to encode at the opposite level
unit boundaries in a second run through.
20The diﬀerence is a matter of milliseconds, however. And their analysis, admittedly, had
the disadvantage of not being able to rule out extraneous factors in the diﬀerent activities that
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sentations, then describing the activity may actually strengthen the alignment
eﬀect by increasing the inﬂuence of the hierarchical representations. Indeed this
is exactly what happened – describing the activity did correlate with an even
more pronounced alignment eﬀect, and the same hierarchical structure present in
the non-verbal segmentation, also shows itself in the verbal activity descriptions.
There were also some interesting results regarding the use of language. Rat-
ings were given to the various descriptions including verb generality and goal-
directedness, object generality, ellipsis, pronominalization, etc. Furthermore, the
ﬁne unit descriptions were divided into two subclasses – boundary units and inter-
nal units. The boundary units are the ﬁne unit boundaries that also corresponded
to coarse unit boundaries. Under the hypothesis that linguistic description of ac-
tivity is also subject to the hierarchical bias eﬀect one may expect some correlation
in description between the boundary units on the one hand, and the coarse unit
boundaries on the other. And, based on the rating system sketched above, when
calculating the diﬀerence between the coarse and ﬁne boundary descriptions, the
boundary unit descriptions were just as close to the coarse unit boundary descrip-
tions as the were to the internal units. This is taken to be evidence that even
when describing events at the lower level of description, a higher level (coarser
temporal grain) is also being accessed.
To give a simple example, the boundary units that corresponded to the coarse
unit boundary of “putting on the blanket” in the making-the-bed activity were
described as “spreading out the blanket” and “tucking in the blanket”. The
internal units that reference the blanket do so not with the full object noun, but
rather a pronoun – e.g. “straightening it”. Note that “putting on” is more general
than “straighten” or indeed than the verbs for the boundary units “spread” and
“tuck”. So, in this example, verbal usage in the boundary unit descriptions do
correlate with their fellow ﬁne unit descriptions. But on the other hand, they
are closer to the coarse unit descriptions in that they use full nouns rather than
pronouns.21
In general, the coarse-unit descriptions speciﬁed the objects much more, and
contrastly, the ﬁne unit descriptions put the speciﬁcity on the verbs, but there
seemed to be no eﬀect from verbal aspect (i.e. simple or progressive usage). Use
of polysemous verbs occurred more often in coarse unit descriptions and boundary
unit description (though less here). The opposite scale corresponds to polysemous
nouns, which occurred most with internal unit descriptions and least with coarse
unit descriptions, with boundary unit descriptions falling somewhere in between.
21Of course, one could object that once one starts the description of the “putting on the
blanket” scene in the ﬁne description condition, the full noun would naturally only be used
the ﬁrst time (in common linguistic usage), and the following internal unit descriptions would
naturally use a resumptive pronoun. The use of the full noun at the end might seem more
powerful evidence, but for the fact the description before the end-boundary referred to “lifting
the bed”. The speaker then wishing to refer to the blanket again would no longer have the
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However, there were some common linguistic features that cut across all classes
of unit description. In both cases the VP’s tended to refer to either accomplish-
ments or achievements (i.e. goal related), rather than simple, physically bounded
event descriptions. That is, when asked to segment and describe the events in
terms of the “smallest” natural units, the participants could have gone as far
down as such descriptions as “raising the arms” or “bending the waist”. Instead,
even the internal boundary descriptions were such things as “putting on top end”,
“picks up pot”, or “opening a drawer”.
The conclusions drawn by the experimenters are that having to actively de-
scribe each segment invokes hierarchical knowledge structures as well as “greater
awareness of causal, functional, and intentional relations.”, and that there is an
interaction between raw perceptual diﬀerences in activity as well as knowledge of
event structure. A question not addressed by this experiment would be whether
in the non-linguistic condition, do subjects exhibit even ﬁner grained boundaries
in the “smallest” condition that would correspond to the basic physical events?
Or does having language already condition the encoding to look a bit higher up
on the hierarchy? (Zacks & Tversky, 2001) do hint at an answer themselves.
“This in turn suggests that using language, and perhaps language itself, biases
away from raw perceptual statements and toward causal and intentional ones”
(p.41).
Interactions with familiarity
The second and third experiments were designed to take a look in greater detail at
the interaction of familiarity in event segmentation. Given that on the cognitive
model described above, even if the hierarchical structuring is universal, any spe-
ciﬁc schema would have to be learnt. Therefore, one would expect that familiarity
with a particular event sequence would strengthen the alignment eﬀect.
In Experiments 2 and 3 familiarity was made even more manifest. Taking “as-
sembling a saxophone” as an unfamiliar activity, in Experiment 2, the subjects
were ﬁrst taught how to assemble a saxophone and then made to do the event
segmentation task. In Experiment 3, there was no special master-class, but rather
two groups were compared – members of the Stanford Marching Band and saxo-
phone novices. So, the expected results would be an increased alignment eﬀect in
Experiment 2 as opposed to Experiment 1 (the recent teaching adding to knowl-
edge of the script), and the Stanford Band members have a greater alignment
eﬀect than the novices.
However, this did not turn out to be the case in either experiment. Now, this
could be interpreted to evidence against the Hierarchical Bias Hypothesis. But,
on the other hand, one also could interpret as the diﬃculty of doing experiments.
Recall the discussion earlier on Taxonomic Hierarchies and the ability to make
inferences from them. In this case it just may be that even to novices the event of
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be assumed to have some knowledge how objects are in general put together from
component parts. This knowledge, which would be a level up on a taxonomic
hierarchy from “assembling a saxophone” could then be applied to the event
segmentation task at hand, thus nullifying any eﬀect from the participant being
relatively unfamiliar with the speciﬁc activity.
Structure in Memory and Communication
The ﬁnal two experiments brought both memory and the comprehension of event
descriptions into the frame. The memory experiment involved the same video-
taped activities, but instead of online perceptual (and linguistic) segmentation,
the subjects were required to write down the event segments immediately after
watching the activity being performed. Again they were asked to write the events
down according to either the largest or smallest possible “natural” and “mean-
ingful” units. Note that a rather important diﬀerence from the ﬁrst experiment
is that temporal encoding no longer plays a role. Thus, there is no way to divide
the ﬁne unit descriptions into boundary and internal units, in that there is no
way to temporally align the coarse unit descriptions with the ﬁne ones.
Nevertheless, the descriptions given from memory were quite similar to those
produced in the on-line perceptual experiments, and the authors are able to come
to the conclusion that the general pattern of the descriptions from memory also
supports the hierarchical bias hypothesis.22 However, there were some linguis-
tic descriptive diﬀerences that could be the result of the experimental setup, i.e.
writing from memory as opposed to an impromptu utterance. Furthermore, there
was one marked diﬀerence in that the verbal descriptions in the coarse-level de-
scriptions were more speciﬁc than their ﬁne counterparts, the exact opposite of
Experiment 1. This may be as a result of the diﬀerent linguistic mediums or
perhaps that when divorced from the perception of immediate physical activity,
the schema take up more of a role and the description focusses more related to
the goals and plans of the agent, and the more speciﬁc verbs carry the speciﬁc
goal of the action along with it.
Finally, the last experiment involved giving subjects transcripts from the ﬁne
unit conditions of the ﬁrst experiment. The participants were then asked to
divide the individual items into larger, continuous groups. The prediction was
that even in the comprehension of event communication the hierarchical bias hy-
pothesis would play a role, and the groups identiﬁed would correspond at least
roughly to the course-unit segmentation from the ﬁrst experiment. In fact, this
is exactly what happened – the subjects of this ﬁnal experiment created bound-
aries very close to those of the participants in the ﬁrst experiment’s coarse coding
condition. Reasons for this may be that the participants do have the requisite
background knowledge of the tasks involved, and that even these sparse descrip-
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tions are structured in such a way that the syntactic and semantic cues in the
terse descriptions are enough to guide the reader to similar breakpoints. Remem-
ber that the analysis of linguistic descriptions from Experiment 1 showed that the
boundary units were linguistically described in a way that was half-course and
half-ﬁne. Again, the hierarchical bias may be used by readers to decode texts
as well, with the reader assuming that the writer has a similar, hierarchically
structured representation of events, and this guides interpretation.
3.5 Acquisition of Tense, Aspect and Aktionsart
3.5.1 Introduction
In the previous section we looked at experimental evidence regarding events in
perception, memory and communication. While language, especially event re-
porting, played a signiﬁcant role the focus was more on cognitive mechanisms
that play a role in the perception of events. These mechanisms included a per-
ceptual gestalt that leads to events being divided in a way analogical to objects
based on changes or in spatio-temporal experience, allowing events to be divided
into parts just as objects are. Secondly, a goal, sub-goal or planning mechanism
is theorised to be used to generate a hierarchy on the part-whole structure. The
connection with language then comes in when it is realised that this hierarchical
part-whole structure is remarkably similar to the semantic structure given in the
previous chapter. Ultimately, the claim is that language itself is eﬀected by the
above cognitive mechanisms in regard to the development of the semantic event
structure given in Chapter 2.23
However, nothing in the event segmentation experiments deals with the way
various linguistic systems are acquired. We have already seen some mention of
the development in children of intention recognition, and goal-plan understanding.
But what we yet to see is how this is put into action – i.e. how do children acquire
the correct use of tense, aspect and aktionsart constructions? This section will
attempt to remedy this. We will examine experiments by Weist, Wagner and
van der Feest and van Hout24 designed to test various hypotheses about how
children from a variety of linguistic backgrounds understand and acquire tense and
aspect morphology. While all addressing the same basic problem, the theoretical
assumptions and methodology to test them do vary quite a bit.
At ﬁrst glance, one may wonder exactly what tense morphology has to do
with either the experimental results on event segmentation, the development of
intention understanding by children, or the semantics of events. But, claims
have been made in both the generative and functional camps that aktionsart and
aspect plays a signiﬁcant role in children’s understanding of tense morphology.
23A similar claim can also be made for tense and aspect as well.
24(Wagner, 2001), (Wagner, 2002) and (Feest & Hout, 2002).64 Chapter 3. The Psycholinguistic Turn
This has generally been know as either the aspect (or lexical aspect) before tense
hypothesis. But before examining the experiments in detail, some background
regarding the acquisition of tense and aspectual systems is needed.
Articles by (Behrens, 2001) and (Wagner, 2001) cite numerous studies that
children’s early use of tense and aspect morphology, cross-linguistically, diﬀers
in patterning compared to that of adults or older children. Wagner gives the
example in English that children are more like to use simple past tense for telic
events and the imperfective ing form for atelic events. For instance, young English
speaking children are much likely to say things like broke and made and playing
and riding than breaking or played. Obviously, within a few years, these sorts
of restrictions are relaxed, and verbs with a telic end-point are used with the
progressive, and atelic verbs are used in the simple form, indicating perfectivity.25
One way of conceiving this is that, for English, children are using simple past tense
morphology to mean ‘this is a telic predicate’, and ing to mean, ‘this is an atelic
predicate’, with the morphemes at this point in the child’s development having
no tense or aspectual26 meaning whatsoever. Alternatively, as ing is purely a
grammatical aspect marker,27 and -ed carries tense information as well, it could
be that children are ignoring tense and using the morphology to encode aspect
only.
For a summary of possible explanations for the above phenomenon, including
semantic predisposition and language speciﬁc theories, and the reader is directed
to (Behrens, 2001) and (Wagner, 2001). Unable to cover everything here, we will
concentrate on three groups of experiments that concern this issue. The ﬁrst deals
with a nativist approach, where an innate learning principle along with features
of universal grammar are used to account for the trajectory and timing of the
development. The second set of experiments are those of Weist, whose scope is
broader than merely the above patterning, but presents a developmental account
of children’s development of temporal and aspectual concepts and how these are
utilised to learn the tense/aspect speciﬁcs of their language. Finally, experiments
by Wagner are discussed, the ﬁrst of which test the Aspect First hypothesis.28
Results from the ﬁrst experiments, however, caused her to broaden the factors in-
volved in morphology acquisition, including raising interesting questions relating
to the diﬀerences of how children and adults conceive events.
25This example is for English, but (Wagner, 2001) cites studies that show this same kind
of distribution of verbal morphology according to aspectual type in languages such as Italian,
French, Japanese, German, Turkish and numerous others.
26i.e. lexical aspect, but not grammatical aspect.
27With the copula is or was, etc. carrying the tense information.
28The hypothesis mentioned above that tense morphology is initially used to encode gram-
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3.5.2 A Generative Approach to Tense Morphology Ac-
quisition
Our ﬁrst look at children’s initial bias to use perfective marking (e.g. in English,
-ed) with telic verbs and imperfective marking -ing with atelic verbs falls in the
generative tradition. Using a variant of a learning principle detailed in (Olsen &
Weinberg, 1999), (Feest & Hout, 2002) use this principle for experiments with
Dutch children.
This is presented as the Syntactic Subset Principle. The crucial assumption
here is that the mechanisms underlying child’s grammar and adult grammar are
essentially the same (i.e. Universal Grammar). The diﬀerence, then, lies in
the exact settings of the innate grammar – that is, the child is scanning their
linguistic environment to get the settings of their grammar mechanism to match
that of their target language. Of course there are diﬀerences in a four year child’s
production and understanding of, e.g., tense and aspect. The diﬀerence arises
because the child begins ‘preset’ with the most restrictive grammar possible and
gradually relax their restrictions due to environmental input. Olsen and Weinberg
write that this is a superior learning strategy as with the opposite – selecting the
least restrictive hypothesis – the child “would overgenerate, producing examples
that were not restricted by the rules of the language, and would need correction
(negative evidence) to retreat from this overgeneralisation.” (p. 530)29
For example, in Mandarin Chinese, grammatical aspect marking is restricted
to certain lexical aspect classes, speciﬁcally, the imperfective only can be used for
durative and dynamic predicates, while in Korean, perfective marking is restricted
to telic predicates. These possibilities for marking are both far more restrictive
than for a language such as English, where (with some restrictions – see Chapter
2), any aspectual marking is available for any type of predicate. Thus, the child
starts out with the initial hypothesis to apply the imperfective to atelic predicates,
and to apply the perfective only to telic predicates. If the child happens to be
acquiring a language that has a broader aspectual marking pattern, the child will
hear examples that violate the initial hypothesis and will expand their grammar
accordingly. For example, an English speaking child will initially restrict the use
of -ed (or irregular past) to telic predicates only, and then, upon hearing adult
use of -ed with atelic verbs, will open up their hypothesis to allow for marking
any kind of predicate with -ed.
29The literature is full of papers documenting overgeneralisation in children (and eventual
retreat). This may be a less eﬃcient learning strategy, but it certainly to happens (Chapter 5 of
this thesis refers to an article by (Tomasello & Brooks, 1999) which looks at overgeneralisation
of lexical causatives.) While correction certainly has no eﬀect until the basics of the language
have been learnt (i.e. when older children or adults are subject to social pressures for a ‘correct’
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Aspectual Class Telic Dynamic Durative Examples
State + know, have
Activity + + march, paint
Accomplishment + + + destroy
Achievement + + notice, win
Semelfactive + jump, tap
Table 3.1: Lexical Aspect
Subset principle for lexical aspect
(Olsen & Weinberg, 1999) proposes that in the early stages of the child’s de-
velopment, it is features of lexical aspect30 that determine the distribution of
grammatical aspect morphemes. Contrary to the view of event-types developing
over time and inﬂuenced by perceptual, cognitive and social factors, both lexi-
cal and grammatical aspect categories are part of the innate Universal Grammar.
The most restrictive application of grammatical aspect to lexical aspect (e.g. only
-ed to telic, etc.) is justiﬁed by them as some languages do actually exhibit such a
contrast. The relaxation of the restriction only occurs in language environments
(such as English) where the patterning is not so restrictive.
However, while empirically there is a merit in the observation that children
do initially use such a patterning, there are some problems in the formulation of
lexical aspect, and more general questions as to what ‘restrictiveness’ is.31 This is
perhaps easiest to see if we look at their formulation of lexical aspect. It consists
of features, telic, dynamic and durative. They combine to give the ﬁve basic
event-types as can be seen on Table 1 (Olsen & Weinberg, 1999, p.531). The
constraint then can be formulated to say that children restrict their use of ed to
those categories marked +telic, and ing to those marked as dynamic and durative.
This means that accomplishments allow both marking possibilities,32 so the main
issue is testing whether -ed is used with activities, states and semelfactives. The
use of ing is always allowed as there are no verbs in their classiﬁcation that are
not marked for one of dynamic and durative.
An interesting case is the status of the semelfactive. The hypothesis is that
children will ﬁrst use, e.g. coughing only, and then relax their restrictions to use
coughed. I suppose this is a possible developmental pattern for English. However,
30What we have been calling event-types or Aktionsarten.
31The following critiques are speciﬁcally aimed at the deﬁnitions, and empirical adequacy
of their formulation of the subset principle, especially in regard to lexical aspect. As far as
the feasibility of these sort of language speciﬁc learning principles, I have very little sensible
to say. A question does occur, though. While the notion of innate semantic features may be
appealing, is not the general process of matching particular verbs of their language to feature
conﬁgurations still just as complicated with no such innate features and principles?
32Which they don’t seem to mention, and when counting tokens multiple times, e.g. any
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Chapter 2 notes that in Russian, certain semelfactives are only possible in the
perfective. This would then predict that Russian children would ﬁrst use the
ungrammatical imperfective with these verbs and then relax their restrictions and
acquire the proper marking. With no negative evidence allowed, it is a mystery
as to how the children then stop their ungrammatical imperfective utterances.33
Relatedly, I do ﬁnd the notion of restrictiveness a bit confusing. The justiﬁ-
cation for ‘most restrictive’ seems to derive from a notion of universal grammar,
meaning that if individual languages exist with a more restrictive grammar, then
all children start with this grammar. As the subset principle is not only applica-
ble to aspect marking, but much more general, I do not know of what to make of
a languages such as those of the Bantu family, which (Comrie, 1985b) notes have
multiple past tenses, e.g. for yesterday, remote past and some time in between.
This sort of tense system seems more restrictive, and would imply that English
speaking children start out with these same tense categories and then (via input)
realise that -ed applies to any point in the past.
Finally, Olsen and Weinberg analyse data from the CHILDES database to test
their theory. There are token counts,34 divided into developmental age stages,
divided by the existence or lack thereof of each of the three features. Thus, for
verbs with more than one positive feature, there must be double counting. In any
case, the aggregated data does show a bias in favour of the subset hypothesis,
but it is anything but categorical. For example, the ﬁrst stage (presumably the
youngest children) does have many more -ed’s for telics as compared to atelics but
the raw token count is 537 to 159. Is this evidence of even the youngest children
expanding their restrictions or the interaction of other factors? On a non-language
speciﬁc account of learning, the lack of categoricity does not present a problem,
but why are even the youngest children marking atelics with -ed if they are so
predisposed not to?
Anticipating the objections to using aggregated data, individuals results for six
children are given (but not their ages). Only one of the children shows categoricity
eﬀects (1 out of thirty uses of -ed used with atelics), while others go up to 30 per
cent of uses of -ed with atelics. Interestingly, the child that conformed most to
the subset principle also had the least number of tokens!
In this kind of tabulation there is also the methodological issue of going from
the idealised linguistic laboratory to the real world, so to speak. These tokens
came from real world speech, not experimental elicitation.35 And, of course,
33In general, their aspectual classiﬁcation leaves something to be desired. They allow for the
possibility of type-shifting, but as can be seen from the table, since there are only ‘plusses’,
coercion from an activity to an accomplishment is possible by adding a +telic feature, but what
about a point-state, such as It’s 10 o’clock which is derived by the subtraction of a durative
feature?
34They mention making type counts, but there are no tables for this.
35Thus the context that the events (and linguistic descriptions of them) occur in cannot be
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categorising verbs by Aktionsart is much easier in the idealised world of the
linguist, while determining whether a situation in context is telic or atelic is much
trickier. They used a survey method to rate verbs according to aspectual class
with minimal frames (i.e. singular subjects and no object, or singular object).
Again, it is no surprise that most verbs were rated the same (barring 7.2 percent),
but it is unlikely that the situations that the tokens came out of were all of such
minimal frames, and there is no indication that the context of each utterance was
taken into account to better determine the Aktionsart.
Criticisms aside, the Subset Principle does predict, at least, correctly the ten-
dency for the established marking pattern. However, semantic issues involving
both event type and (im)perfectivity are involved, it is perhaps better to test
the hypothesis using a framework where one can be sure that children are under-
standing the various tense and aspect markings, rather than possibly using them
in a parrot-like way. This challenge is taken up in the next section.
3.5.3 Van der Feest and van Hout
Van der Feest and van Hout are not testing for evidence of the aspectual sub-
set principle as seen above, but rather a variant that combines aspect and tense
and put forth an initial hypothesis as to how children acquire tense morphology.
The language to be tested is Dutch, which is proposed to have less restrictive
tense/aspect marking than the initial child state. Therefore it is predicted that
Dutch children will show evidence for the early restricted grammar by restrict-
ing their use of tense morphology in certain ways. But, before getting to what
the hypothesis is, we shall ﬁrst look at the tense/aspect facts about Dutch tense
morphology (according to (Feest & Hout, 2002)).
The Dutch present perfect functions as a pure past tense, not as a recent past
with present relevance as in English,36 and is compatible with “before today”
denoting temporal adverbials:
(4) a. I heb hem gisteren/net mijn artikel gegeven.
I have him yesterday/just my article given.
b. *I have given him my article yesterday.
c. I have just given him my article.
d. I gave him my article yesterday.
Notice that when the adverb gisteren (yesterday) is used, the only possible trans-
lation is with the English simple past. Dutch simple past tense carries no as-
pectual information, and in particular, contains no coding of completion, unlike
the English simple past, which carries completion information at least for some
event-types:
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(5) a. Toen Jan binnenkwam, dronk Marie een glas wijn.
b. When John entered, Mary drank a glass of wine.
c. When John entered, Mary was drinking a glass of wine.
Both (5-b) and (c) are possible translations of (5-a), showing that there is no nec-
essary completion information attached to Dutch simple past tense morphology,
whereas with the English (5-b), Mary must have ﬁnished the glass of wine. In
order to allow for the possibility that Mary never ﬁnished her wine, the past pro-
gressive as in (5-c) must be used. Therefore, Dutch past tense is less restrictive
in marking aspect than English.
To summarise, according to van der Feest and van Hout the basic three Dutch
tenses are as follows: Present Perfect is past and completion, simple past is just
that, and is compatible with both completion and ongoing, while simple present
is both now and ongoing. The relevant contrast (they claim) with English is
that English simple past is past and completion both.37 This contrast leads to
the tense subset principle hypothesis: “a past tense that carries both Past and
completion is more restricted than one that carries simply Past, so the former
must be hypothesised ﬁrst according to the Subset Principle.” (p.738)
Importantly, their prediction for the present tense initially indicates only Now
and Ongoing. Note that this discounts both the narrative, “hot news” and histor-
ical present in both languages, where present tense can be used for remote past
as well as having completion implications:
(6) a. In 1066 William the conqueror conquers England.
b. Henry gets the ball outside the box, he shoots...Oh what a goal!
As will be seen, not taking into account this rather common usage of present
tense has drastic consequences for the experiment.
The goal of the experiment is to test three competing theories of tense mor-
phology acquisition: The ﬁrst being their version of the subset principle, the
second, the temporality hypothesis that says simply that past tense form = Past
and the present tense form = Now, and ﬁnally the Grammatical Aspect ﬁrst hy-
pothesis which posits that children (learning English at least) take past tense to
mean completion and present tense to mean ongoing.38
Van der Feest and van Hout use an interactive paradigm pioneered initially
in (Wagner, 2001), that will combine completed, incompleted, and ongoing sit-
uations, linguistically requiring the children to match these situations to simple
present, simple past and present perfect sentences. There is a road that a puppet
37This isn’t strictly true. Past tense states are certainly temporally located in the past, but
necessarily ‘ﬁnished’ by speech time. (I was ill yesterday, and still am.). When activities and
events are used with a habitual meaning, the habit can easily be going on. W h e nIw a sal a dI
walked 10 km. a day, and I still do. How else would I keep my boyish ﬁgure?
38This hypothesis is examined in (Wagner, 2001) which we will see in more detail later in the
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plays along, doing the same (telic) activity at three diﬀerent locations. The pup-
pet is stopped in the middle of the third location, and another puppet (Cookie
Monster) is asked a question using one of the three tense types and must give an
answer of a location. The child is then asked if Cookie Monster gets it correct or
not.
To illustrate, suppose the puppet ﬁnishes a puzzle at the house (the second
location) and moves on to the car where she starts to do the puzzle but is stopped
in the middle of the activity. Cookie Monster is then asked, Cookie Monster, waar
maakt het meisje een puzzel?39 Cookie Monster could answer: “At the house,”
which is incorrect as the house is now part of a past situation. The child is then
asked if Cookie Monster answered correctly. In this case the child must say “no”
to get the trial correct. As there are three locations, the ﬁrst two are past, but
the puzzle is completed in one and not ﬁnished in the other. The third is ongoing
and incomplete.
While this experimental setup does combine tense and aspect information as
desired, it does have one rather strange consequence – there is no way to dif-
ferentiate the subset hypothesis from Wagner’s Aspect First hypothesis (which
seemed to be the main point in the ﬁrst place). While we saw that unlike English,
Dutch past can be used for ongoing situations, the structure of the experiment
has it that even if the activity is not completed at one the ﬁrst two locations it is
nevertheless not ongoing when the question is asked. So under these conditions,
both hypotheses come down to the same predictions: Children will be able to
diﬀerentiate past and present morphology only for completed and ongoing situ-
ations. For the incompleted situations (where the child gives up and moves on
to the next location), the child will not be able to diﬀerentiate between present
and past tense. They do note on p.744 that the experiment cannot distinguish
between the two, and so rely on the justiﬁcation that the subset principle is more
principled.40
In order to have a hypothesis that will have diﬀerent predictions, they have
also taken into account the Temporality hypothesis, which simply says that past
tense forms mean Past and present tense forms mean Now. Thus, whether or
not a situation in the past is incompleted should make no diﬀerence whatsoever.
Before moving on to an analysis of the results, one more comment does need to
be made. As the puppet is carrying out her activities, the experimenter describes
what is happening. To illustrate the point I will give the ﬁrst two sentences of
one of the protocols both in Dutch and English translation:
39This is present tense – Where is the child doing a puzzle? Strangely, there is no good simple
VP in English to make the activity telic. Doing a puzzle seems to allow pure (i.e. no goal)
activity readings.
40At the time, the authors would not have known, but experiments conducted more recently
by Wagner cast doubt on the Aspect-First hypothesis. However, the results are also of no
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Nu gaat het meisje een puzzel maken. Eerst gaat ze naar de boom.
Now the girl is going to do a puzzle. First she goes to the tree.
The second sentence is the most revealing as it is in Narrative Present – that is
(in this case) a description of something that just happened and completed. But if
the children who are being experimented on have their initial values set to Present
= Now and Ongoing, they should not be able to understand the protocol, and
therefore the experiment is rather ﬂawed. But if they do understand the protocol
then they can also understand a use of the present tense that is neither Now or
Ongoing. If this is the case then all three of the hypotheses tested are wrong.
Unsurprisingly then, the data elicited from the experiment prove more confus-
ing than illuminating. First oﬀ, the adult controls also hesitate to use the simple
past for the incompleted situation, but there are periphrastic ways of expressing
incompleted or ongoing situations in the past, and this may bias Dutch speakers
to using simple past mainly for completed situations (which they do here 100% of
the time both in simple past and perfect). Furthermore, they are willing to use
present tense half of the time for the completed, past situation. This is against
the predictions for van der Feest and van Hout, but we have seen that they do not
take narrative present tense into account. Certainly in English if I were asked,
“Where does the girl do a puzzle?”, I would happily say, “By the tree” even if it
was the ﬁrst of the three locations.41
The children exhibit the same behaviour in regard to the present tense, but
things get decidedly stranger when it comes to their uses of the two past tenses.
Simple past was accepted for 71% of completed situations against 40% incom-
pleted, while the present perfect was accepted for 60% of the completed situations
against 42% for incompleted situations. Recall that the prediction for both the
Aspect First and Subset hypotheses is that children cannot diﬀerentiate in re-
gards to the incompleted situation. However, they only use the present tense for
the incompleted situation 15% of the time, much less than either past tense (and
much more than the adults would use either past for incompleted situations).
The best that can be said is that some of the children follow the path predicted
by the subset principle and some do not.
This would seem to be evidence for the Temporality hypothesis in that chil-
dren seem more likely to use both past tense for a past situation regardless of
aspectual information. However, as we saw with the data above, the children are
still diﬀerentiating between complete and incomplete events in that they are still
happier with assenting to a past tense sentence for a completed event. This leads
to a picture that has the children using both completion information (the contrast
in past tense usage depending on completion status) and temporal information
(unwillingness to use present tense for a past incompleted situation) to get at an
41Again, with “do a puzzle” I would likely also apply it to the incomplete situation as well –
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understanding of the tense marking. But this is not in the categorical way that
any of the hypotheses would have us believe. But, we shall see in the Wagner
experiments the same sorts of interactions, and that Wagner herself could only
conclude that children are biased towards acquiring tense morphology in terms
of completion information, not that it is the only factor.
The authors take the fact that there is some diﬀerentiation (70% or 60% to
40%) in the usage of past tense relative to a completed or incompleted event to
be evidence for the Subset Hypothesis, which is rather strange. First oﬀ, with
the present perfect the results are 60% for completed and 42% for incompleted.
With 24 children and several trials, is this really enough of a statistical diﬀerence
to make such a claim? Furthermore, if the hypothesis is that the child starts
out with a more restricted grammar (for Dutch at least) and then broadens their
mapping after hearing counter-examples, then the exact opposite is born out of
the data. Ironically, the adult controls seem to have a much more restricted
grammar and were loathe to use the simple past for the incompleted situation,
while the children were much more likely to. One then wonders where the child
is hearing the purported counterexamples.42
There is one more quirk in the data that the authors don’t bother to mention.
The children said “yes” half of the time to the present perfect sentence matched to
the ongoing situation, and the same with the simple past in 31% of the trials. This
is rather strange as the semantics of the ongoing situation is Now and Ongoing,
while the children are predicted to have the same use of the present perfect as the
adults do – completed and past. Again, this violates all three hypotheses, but no
explanation as to what is going on is given.
Finally, the data would be easier to understand if it wasn’t present in aggregate
form, but rather divided by child. Perhaps some of the oddities would be clearer
if they occurred in only a subset of the children. However, I think it is rather the
complexity of the situation being studied that leads one into so many diﬃculties.
To acquire adult competence of tense morphology is not a simple matter as it
requires (depending on the language, of course) the combination of temporal,
aspectual and lexical concepts to be mapped onto the appropriate syntactic forms.
“Deviant” uses of tenses such as the Narrative or Historical present must also be
learnt. It is therefore no surprise that the results both here seem to show a variety
of factors interacting. Indeed, a more correct approach would be to examine the
process involved, and allow for a number of cognitive factors to be harnessed in
this process. In this spirit, the next work from Weist et al, which brings universal
cognitive development into the equation.
42The authors do acknowledge the oddity in the data and propose using a ‘when’ clause along
with explicitly saying that it wasn’t ﬁnished, in order to tease the aspectual neutrality into the
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3.5.4 Weist (1991)
In the last section we saw an attempt to justify experimentally a generative ap-
proach to language acquisition, speciﬁcally tense morphology. In this section, we
shall also look at experimental evidence to justify a certain hypothesis regard-
ing the acquisition of the same morphology, but from a diﬀerent point of view.
Rather than a single language speciﬁc learning mechanism such as the Subset
Hypothesis, (Weist, 1991) proposes a general cognitive development process, in
which children will universally develop the same temporal conceptual system in
a number of stages. With this system as a basis, the child is then able to learn
the target languages temporal system in a more piecemeal manner. Along with
the general and universal cognitive system, the fact that diﬀerent languages have
vastly diﬀerent temporal systems allows for many language speciﬁc variants to
also come into play. Thus, the predictions as to what children learn when will
also depend on the language they are acquiring. In a sense, this is a kind of bridge
between the more ‘universal’ approaches (be they generative or cognitively based)
and the language speciﬁc ones such as those of Bowerman and Tomasello.43
Background
Weist’s account of language learning ﬁts into a neo-piagetian paradigm, where
the gradual development (language independently) of ﬁrst spatial and then tem-
poral systems, allows the child enough foundation to then learn their language’s
respective space and temporal grammatical systems. We shall ignore the parallel
account of the development of spatial concepts here, and concentrate solely on
Weist’s account of the child’s development of temporal concepts. We shall look
brieﬂy at the 4 stages and for ease of the reader’s comprehension show their ana-
logue in language. After this will come an account of a cross-linguistic study to
test the ﬁnal three stages.
Weist proposes a developmental progression of four diﬀerent temporal systems,
the last of which corresponds to the adult temporal system. The process itself
involves the sequential emergence and then integration of the Reichenbachian
concepts of Speech Time (ST), Event Time (ET) and ﬁnally Reference Time
(RT).
The ﬁrst system that the child develops is called the Speech Time system, due
to the fact that child language at very early stages is limited to speech-time coding
only. Linguistically they do not code tense, aspect or modality. Nevertheless
they can make reference both to absent objects as well as prior experiences and
anticipated future situations.
From studies of a number of languages, between 1;6 and 2;0, children begin to
43Note that language speciﬁc does not mean Skinnerian Behaviourism, only that the universal
mechanisms (e.g. intention and goal recognition, pattern matching, general learning) are more
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express a deictic relationship between ET and ST, for example being capable of
making a past/non-past distinction, and in languages such as the Slavic languages,
make an imperfective/perfective aspectual distinction. This signals the entry into
the second stage, the Event Time system, where the conceptual analog is that
children have a grasp on the distinction between ST and ET, but keep their
temporal point of reference always at ST (i.e. no RT yet). Conceptually this
requires the child to be able to retrieve an episodic representation, and determine
its relationship to the moment of speech.
Around the age of 2;6 to 3;0 children begin to use temporal adverbials or
adverbial clauses to establish the temporal viewpoint, RT. In languages that
have it, children also will relate ET to RT with a relative-absolute tense such as
the English present perfect (where ET is before ST, but RT=ST). Notice that
while all three components of tense have now come into play (ST, ET and RT),
children are still limited to relationships between two temporal intervals only. For
example, while the English present perfect does have all three components the
‘present relevance’ meaning of it forces RT to be identical with speech time, and
the temporal distinction is between an event in the past and its relevance for now.
For this reason, the third stage is called the Restricted Reference Time system
(or RRT).
Finally (from around 4;0 to 4;5),44 children begin to develop more ﬂexibility
in constructing temporal conﬁgurations, and begin to use adverbs such as ‘before’
and ‘after’, and in languages such as Finnish begin to use the past perfect. Since
use of the past perfect presents ET, RT and ST as independent, the child must be
able to co-ordinate three separate temporal intervals (I had already made dinner
when Mary entered the house). For this reason, the ﬁnal temporal system is called
the Free Reference Time system (or FRT).
Conceptually, we can see a clear developmental path that the child must take.
After the ﬁrst stage, the child must be able to handle some event representation
and determine its relationship to the absolute time point of Now. Acquiring
RT requires the child to have the capacity to establish a referential context (or
temporal perspective). Initially, this viewpoint is tied to speech time, but is then
allowed to free itself, requiring the child to now put the location of some episodic
representation relative to this context and to Speech Time.
Armed with this conceptual foundation, on the linguistic side the child must
ﬁgure out how temporal information is coded in the target language, and then
construct a system of rules to form the basis of comprehension and production of
various temporal conﬁgurations. Moreover, the child must also develop (under-
stand) a lexicon of temporal words to deal with conventional time. In this paper,
this is really all Weist has to say regarding the linking of the conceptual develop-
ment to language acquisition, which does not seem to be enough to accomplish the
44This ‘ﬁnally’ seems to be the most language speciﬁc of all stages, with evidence that Bul-
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linking process. In (Weist, Lyytinen, Wysocka, & Atanassova, 1997) he appeals
to Slobin’s (self-refuted) Operating Principles (Slobin, 1985),45 but one wonders
if the more general, developmental learning accounts (Slobin, 2001) can’t handle
the linking problem if the conceptual apparatus is in place.
With this background in mind, we shall look at tests conducted by Weist and
associates on American, Polish and Finnish children aged from 2;6 to 6;6 designed
to test the existence and timing of the latter three stages, as well as account for
language speciﬁc interference in the move from conceptual stage to a learning a
languages speciﬁc temporal system.
The Experiments
(Weist, Wysocka, & Lyytinen, 1991) conducted six total comprehension experi-
ments, with two experiments meant to correspond to each of the last three devel-
opmental stages. All experiments involved a forced sentence to picture matching
task, where children were shown two pictures and are then given a minimal pair
of sentences and asked to choose which sentence matched which picture (only the
ﬁrst choice being scored, of course).
The tests corresponding to the Event Time system involved a test of Absolute
Tense (Past vs. Future) as well as comprehension of the distinction between
perfective and imperfective aspect. For example, in the Tense Tests, there would
be a pair of pictures such as two children in the snow. In the ﬁrst one, a child
is being hit by a snowball, with the other child is at the end of their throwing
motion (now sans snowball). In the second, a child is holding a snowball ready
to throw it at his concerned companion. The subjects would then be presented
with the pair of sentences The girl (threw/will throw) the snowball, where the ﬁrst
sentence matches the ﬁrst picture described, etc. Both the Polish and Finnish
minimal pairs involve a verbal Past/Non-past distinction, where in Polish the
verb is perfective in both sentences, and in Finnish the object (snowball)i si nt h e
accusative case in both sentences).
The aspect tests involved a pair of pictures such as a girl busily drawing a
ﬂower and the same girl smiling proudly over the picture of a ﬁnished ﬂower
drawing. The English minimal pair was The girl (drew/was drawing) a ﬂower.46
The Polish variant involved perfective and imperfective marking on the verb for
draw (rysowa), while the Finnish aspectual contrast was achieved by case-marking
on the object – drew corresponds to accusative case on the object, while drawing
corresponds to partitive case on the object.47
For these two experiments, they predicted that all children should be able to
45A kind of conceptual nativism.
46Note that while the ﬁrst could also be described as “The girl is drawing a ﬂower”, tense
needs to be kept constant and aspect allowed to vary in order to get a true minimal pair.
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handle the Absolute Tense test by age 2;6, and that both Polish and American
children should correctly do the Aspect Test. But since Finnish codes aspect in a
number of ways (verbal morphology, 3rd inﬁnitive and case-marking as used here)
and case-marking is used for many other functions that the Finnish child is also
learning, the authors expect a slight delay in competence for the Finnish children.
Furthermore, given the fact that aspect is such a fundamental component of
Polish verbal morphology, they predicted that Polish children would have a slight
advantage over the Americans, but this acquisition is, anyway, likely to have
occurred by the age of 2;6.
The second set of tests for the RRT system involve the contrast ﬁrst between
a remote and immediate adverb, as well as a contrast between the present perfect
(with just) and the simple past plus adverb. For example, the subject is presented
with two pictures of a girl thinking (her thoughts shown in a cartoon thought
bubble). In the ﬁrst she is at bed praying, and the thought bubble shows the
same girl dancing. The second picture shows the same girl eating an ice cream, but
also with a thought bubble of the girl dancing. The minimal pair is The girl will
dance (tomorrow/in a while). Thus RT is tied to ST and the child must be able to
somehow coordinate this with the context provided by the thought bubble. They
also must have a lexicon for time good enough to distinguish between the two
adverbs. The minimal pairs in Polish and Finnish are no diﬀerent linguistically.
The second contrast involves two pictures such as an excited family examining
a Christmas tree in their living room, and a picture of the same family eating
dinner with the Christmas tree oﬀ in the background. The English minimal
pair is Father (has just brought the Christmas tree/brought the Christmas tree
yesterday). Thus if the subjects have mastered the RRT system, they should
be able to diﬀerentiate the present perfect (or its equivalent) from the simple
past. Finnish has a present perfect similar to English, while Polish must make do
with the same perfective past verbal morphology plus the diﬀerentiating adverbs
(just and yesterday).48 The authors predict a slight advantage for the Finnish
speakers over the American speakers in this test as Finnish children do begin
using present and past perfect before American children. However, the addition
of adverbials along with the present perfect/simple past contrast may negate
this. Furthermore, this fact about Finnish children may be a sampling accident
anyway, as the comparison is with American children. Studies of Scottish children
show that they acquire the perfect more rapidly than their English or American
counterparts. (Gathercole, 1986) concludes that a contributing factor is that the
perfect is much more widely used in Scottish English,49 and hence the children
are much more exposed to it.
The ﬁnal tests (for the FRT system) consisted ﬁrst of a contrast between
48Which given the test in the paragraph above, seems to make this test rather redundant for
the Polish speakers.
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‘before’ and ‘after’ and also of a contrast between the simple past and the past
perfect (both of which require yet more sophisticated temporal co-ordination).
The pictures for ‘before’ and ‘after’ would have things like a woman in the bath-
room on the telephone. In the ﬁrst picture, a bathtub is ﬁlled and the ﬂoor is
clean and dry (and the woman is fully clothed). In the second picture, the woman
is wrapped in a towel, the bath empty, and the ﬂoor ﬁlled with puddles of water.
The minimal pair involved is Mother answered the phone (before/after) taking a
bath. There are no interesting linguistic distinctions for the Polish or Finnish
versions.
The simple past vs. past perfect distinction would have a pair of pictures such
as a boy lighting a ﬁre while another boy is walking into the picture. The second
picture has the ﬁre already lit when the second boy arrives. The English minimal
pair is then, The boy (started/had started) a ﬁre when his friend arrived. Finnish,
having its own past perfect, works analogously, but the Polish minimal pairs in-
stead has to substitute ‘before’ with the past perfective to get at the intended
meaning. Again for Polish, this boils down to something like a before/after prob-
lem, but given that the child has to co-ordinate two events relative to each other
and speech time, they would still need a ﬂexible temporal systems to handle the
complex conﬁguration. Again, the authors expect the Finnish children to do solve
the past perfect/simple past problem a little earlier than the others.
Results:
The results, as one might expect, were varied. As predicted both the Polish
and American children passed the ET system problems by age 2;6, but neither
group showed full mastery of the RRT and FRT systems until 5;6 or 6;6. In
fact neither the American or Polish children managed to show mastery of the
past-perfect/simple past distinction, even at age 6;6.50 Nevertheless, some of
the children from these groups managed to pass the more complicated tests by
3;6 or 4;6 (in fact, some 2;6 Polish children managed to do quite well on the
before/after test). Weist et al interpret these results as showing a transition period
at around 4;6 (which is consistent with their elicitation tests), which signiﬁes that
the process of what they call de-centration is well under way. However, mastery
of a languages temporal system does take a bit of time, which accounts for the
2-year lag. Moreover, while there is a signiﬁcant distinction between an ET an
RT system, they were unable to ﬁnd any way to distinguish between RRT and
FRT systems. Finally, this transition between ET and RT parallels a slightly
earlier transition in child’s spatial conceptualisation.
On the other hand, the Finnish data yielded some surprises. While there was
a prediction that the Finnish children would lag behind a bit on the aspect test,
there was no prediction that it wouldn’t be until 6;6 that children showed mastery
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of any of the tests, including both ET system problems. Ironically, they were the
only group of children to be successful with the past perfect problem. As brieﬂy
hinted at before, the use of object marking for aspect was expected to hinder the
children’s mastery of the ET system, but not so drastically.
Tense was not expected to be eﬀected and the authors proﬀer a variety of ex-
planations including the fact that unlike English and Polish there is no clear tri-
partite (i.e. Past, Present, Future) distinction in Finnish, but only past/nonpast.
Thus the sentence using non-past morphology could be ambiguous between mean-
ing now and some future time.51 But, there are some problems with this expla-
nation. First of all, English will is not simple future marking, but modal and can
include present time reference as well (That’ll be John ringing the bell). Further-
more, even if the sentence (with non-past morphology) is interpreted by children
as having present tense meaning, there is still only one correct match to the two
pictures (at least in the snowball case). There is one picture where the child is
already hit by the snowball – this matches neither present or future meaning. But
the picture of the child, holding a snowball in his hand and arm in a throwing
motion can be perfectly described in English present tense (at least) as the child
is throwing a snowball.52
With the remarkable failure of the Finnish children at the ET system, Weist
and colleagues ran a second test with the same pictures, but this time with
additional minimal pairs. For the past/future distinction, the non-past sentence
was changed to intends to,a si nthe boy intends to throw a snowball.F o r t h e
aspect test, a 3rd type of Finnish inﬁnitive is used to get the aspectual distinction
instead of partitive vs. accusative case marking.
Both revised tests had the Finnish children exhibiting some improvements –
mastery of both now dropped to 4;6. This still isn’t the 2;6 seen in both American
and Polish children, however. The authors attribute this to the complexity of the
verb forms. The addition of the 3rd inﬁnitive form may indeed add to the com-
plexity. But, this does seem rather dubious for the condition of the experiment
meant to get at tense, where the only change is a non-past form of an ordinary
verb.
But notice the common factor in both of the changes – children have direct
information regarding the subjects’ intentions. With the future tense sentence,
intends to X can only have a future reference for X – it is implied by what an
intention or plan is. Switching the aspectual coding from the object to the verb
51Other explanations include complications in morphology in spoken Finnish, but these are
rejected as English has the same issues (irregulars and slightly diﬀerent phonological endings
depending on the verb), and the possibility that Finnish children are developing a more complex
system more slowly.
52Recall the event schemata presented earlier in this chapter. Conceivably, the arm motion
with snowball in hand can be seen as one stage of the event, and thus present tense is appropri-
ate. On the other hand, one could also identify throw with just the last stage, bringing about
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may also allow children access to intentions by the connection of the verb to the
subject/agent.
A closer look at the experiments in general shows that the children need to
be able to recognise intentions, goals, and make inferences to succeed in the test
at all. For example, the adverbial test (yesterday vs. in a while)h a sag i r l
with a thought bubble imaging herself dancing. This has to be understood for
the minimal pair to make sense at all – the inference made of a girl about to
go to bed and a girl eating ice cream helps the child determine the appropriate
adverbial. Similarly, the past perfect test shows excitement of the family at the
Christmas tree versus the family eating dinner and ignoring it. Knowing that the
family is excited because of the Christmas tree allows the subject to infer present
relevance, and hence, appropriateness of the perfect.
In fact, every single pair of pictures shown to the subjects involve a human en-
gaged in, desiring to engage in, or having engaged in some activity or other. This
might lead one to think (along with the anomalous Finnish results) that Weist
et al may be overlooking an important cognitive factor – that even the youngest
of children are able to recognise intentions and goals of others with astonishing
accuracy. This point did indeed occur to Wagner, who looked at what happened
to English children’s acquisition of the event-time system (more speciﬁcally the
aspect part) when the subjects are deprived of agents or intentional information
in the experimental set-up. After examining Wagner’s basic modiﬁcation of Weist
and testing for the Grammatical Aspect First hypothesis, we will then see how
understanding of others’ intentions can eﬀect comprehension of tense and aspect.
3.5.5 The Wagner Experiments
(Wagner, 2001) is an account of two experiments designed to test what she calls
the Aspect First Hypothesis. It is yet another theory to account for children’s
acquisition of grammatical tense. Stated simply, it is the hypothesis that children
initially use verbal, tense morphology not to mark semantic tense, but rather
grammatical aspect. Of course, we have seen that in languages such as Spanish
and French that verbal morphology actually may mark both tense and aspect with
a single morpheme, or in the case of the English -ing, aspect alone. Given this
conﬂation, Wagner attempts to design the experiment to show that children (up
to age 4 or so) are sensitive only to the aspectual meanings of the morphology, and
though even children under two can productively use tense morphology, they are
not encoding tense information, but rather are taking it as encoding completion
information about the event.
One diﬃculty is that in English,53 there are often completion implications for
uses of the simple past. Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis that young
children are encoding only completion with past tense morphology, the linguistic
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tests must be carefully set up to rid the past tense of completion entailments.
Instead, if children will consistently associated completed events with was V-
ing, and incompleted54 events with is V-ing (regardless of temporal order), there
would indeed be evidence that children are indeed associating the irregular copula
morphology with completion information and not time. Indeed, Wagner tests
children with examples of past and present progressive sentences, both of which
carry no implications regarding completion.
3.5.6 Wagner Experiment 1
The ﬁrst experiment is a (fairly substantial) modiﬁcation of experiments done
by (Weist, 1991), which were claimed to provide support for the temporality
hypothesis. Children were shown two pictures, given two sentences and asked
to choose which picture matches which sentence.55 For example, a child would
be presented with a picture of a boy about to throw a snowball and a picture
of someone being hit by a snowball. The child would then have to match the
pictures to the sentences The boy will throw the snowball and The boy threw the
snowball. Children as young as 2;6 performed better than chance on the task,
thus apparently showing that young children do associate tense morphology with
temporality.
Wagner correctly points out that a major problem with the above study is
that it contrasts past and future, leaving the present tense untested. Analogically
to the above discussion regarding past tense and completion, the English ‘future
tense’ is much more than a temporal marker but also a modal one, in this case
a marker of irrealis. So, if children can understand the realis/irrealis distinction
they would perform better than chance on the task, even if they did not associate
temporal ordering with the tenses as of yet.
Therefore, Wagner includes all three tenses for the task, providing the proper
contrast in order to ﬁnd out the extent of completion inﬂuences on tense interpre-
tation (children need more than a realis/irrealis distinction to succeed). Moreover
the experiment includes both telic and atelic events in the example sentences to
serve as a test for the lexical aspect ﬁrst hypothesis56 and localist hypothesis.57 If
comprehension follows production (where children use -ing far more with atelic
events), then there should be some advantage to sentence to sentences with atelic
predicates. Finally, the test is done with an interactive paradigm, depicting
acted out events rather than static pictures. The purpose of this is to provide
children with an experimental environment closer to the way they actually expe-
54My apologies for this awkward word, but I am trying to contrast not-yet-complete (i.e.
ongoing) with events that stop before reaching the natural endpoint.
55Of course, only the ﬁrst choice can be scored, as the second choice is then trivial.
56This is the view that perfective and imperfective marking is used to mark telicity.
57This is a verb by verb learning hypothesis, such as the verb-island hypothesis of (Tomasello,
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rience events in time. With this in mind, it is probably easiest to understand the
changes made by describing the experiment.
The setup involves a picture of a road drawn on a piece of paper. The children
are then introduced to a toy kitty who has a penchant for performing various ac-
tivities on the road. With each trial, the kitty goes along the road performing
the same event three times (at the beginning, middle and end of the road). An
inky rubber stamp at the bottom of the kitty allowed the children to trace kitty’s
path, providing a cue to proper temporal ordering of the events. The trial con-
sisted of ﬁrst the child watching kitty performing the event at each location (to
completion), and then a second run. In this run, in the middle of the second event
the child is asked either Show me where the kitty was V’ing, Show me where the
kitty is V’ing or Show me where the kitty is gonna V – corresponding to past,
present and future respectively. Note that although the second location (being
still in progress) is compatible with all three sentences, a correct response to the
present tense query was considered to be the second location only. Furthermore,
there were control trials where the query was supplemented with the appropri-
ate temporal adverbial (e.g. ‘before’, ‘now’, ‘in a second’). Thus the past tense
query would then be Show me where the kitty was V’ing before. This control
condition serves as a reminder of exactly what is being tested. The aspect ﬁrst
hypothesis says nothing about children’s development of temporal notions per se,
only about their acquisition of temporal morphology. It is entirely compatible
linguistically for children to initially put all their temporal ordering information
in the aforementioned adverbials, reserving temporal morphology for completion
information.
There were a total of 12 distinct conditions for the test – the three tenses, telic
or atelic, and with or without temporal adverbials. There were three diﬀerent
telic and atelic events, including drawing a face and emptying out a cup (telic),
and playing with a toy and hopping about (atelic). For a concrete example of
a query, with the drawing a face event a sample of the queries would be Show
me where the kitty is drawing a face and the control, Show me where the kitty is
drawing a face right now. It should also be noted that children of age groups of
two and three years of age were compared.
The results do show that even two year olds perform better than chance
(though somewhat marginally) when asked to point out a location as an answer
to a given query. The ‘past’ location was chosen most often for the past tense
queries, etc. Three year olds did rather better than the two year olds and both
groups performed signiﬁcantly better on the control adverbial queries; however,
the diﬀerence between the test and control queries for the three year olds was
not nearly as prominent as it was with the two year old children. Also, there was
no diﬀerence in regard to lexical aspect, i.e. telicity did not seem to have any
interaction eﬀects.
On ﬁrst glance, the results seem to conﬁrm Weist’s original ﬁndings – children
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as conveying semantic tense. But, though linguistically care was taken to sep-
arate tense and completion implications (by use of is/was V’ing), the events as
presented did not mix things up enough. All of the telic events in the past sit-
uation were, in fact, completed, while the atelic events came to a natural end
(i.e. no sign of an interruption). So, it could actually be the case that children
were understanding the past progressive as indicating a completed event and the
present progressive as indicating an ongoing or incompleted event. Therefore, a
second experiment was done to test this possibility.
3.5.7 Wagner Experiment 2
The setup is the same as in the ﬁrst experiment, with a road drawn on a piece
of paper and an inky kitty performing various activities on it. In this case,
the kitty performs only telic events, and there are only two telic events per trial,
representing past and present. But the major diﬀerence is that in half of the trials,
kitty fails to complete the telic event at the ﬁrst location, giving a novel situation
of past and incompleted. This is important in diﬀerentiating Weist’s temporality
hypothesis and the aspect ﬁrst hypothesis. The temporality hypothesis predicts
that since children have an adult-like understanding of tense morphology, whether
or not the past event is complete is irrelevant to the child’s comprehension of the
queries. In fact, given the pragmatics of the use of a past progressive rather
than the simple past, one might argue that performance would improve with a
past, incompleted event. In contrast, the aspect ﬁrst hypothesis predicts that
since the child is using completion information to understand tense morphology,
they will run into problems if both the past and present event were incompleted
or ongoing. Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence from the ﬁrst experiment is that the
adverbial controls were omitted.
Here, the results (which now include a group of four year olds as well) are
rather interesting. The group of two year olds still managed to successfully dis-
tinguish between the past and present queries in the half of the trials that involved
completed past events. But when presented with the trials with the incompleted
past events, the two-years were completely lost. Not only did they fail as pre-
dicted when presented with the past-tense query, they also did signiﬁcantly worse
with the present tense query. The three and four year olds did better (both above
chance, with four year olds doing much better), but even the four year olds saw
a performance drop when presented with the incompleted past event.
3.5.8 Conclusion
Combining the results of the two experiments, Wagner concludes that there is
limited support for the aspect ﬁrst hypothesis. On the one hand, the two year olds
were completely lost when the completion information was switched about, which
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use completion information to interpret tense morphology. And if we look only at
the results of the second experiment, it seems that the two-year olds are not using
temporal ordering information at all.58 But, Wagner does acknowledge that the
results of the ﬁrst experiment are much too strong to take completion calculations
as the only factor in the initial stages of tense morphology acquisition.
She brings up two possibilities as to reconcile the apparently conﬂicting results
of the two experiments. First, it could be the case that children are conﬂating
tense and grammatical aspect on the same morphemes, and when (like in Exper-
iment 2) they are presented with a tension between the time and aspect, havoc
results. This is not altogether unreasonable, as we have seen that many lan-
guages do conﬂate tense and aspect on the same morpheme (e.g. many romance
languages), and even the language that was tested (English) has some conﬂa-
tion of simple past and completive aspect. Secondly, children may be using the
completion cues to help with temporal sequencing in a similar way that causal
information is used. (e.g. the classic Max fell. John pushed him.).
3.5.9 Wagner Mark II – Intentions into the Picture
Before examining another factor that can be a participant in the tense/aspect ac-
quisition process, a brief summing up is necessary. (Weist et al., 1991) conducted
a series of experiments to ﬁnd correlations between his neo-piagetian develop-
mental model and acquisition of spatial and temporal linguistic systems. The
stage that concerns us here is the second stage – the so-called event time stage.
This applies to children around 2;6 and holds that at this point in development,
children can distinguish between Speech Time and Event Time as well as com-
prehend the perfective/imperfective distinction. This requires that children can
both conceptually distinguish present time from past time, as well as events in
both the internal and external perspectives. Moreover, they have also mastered
enough of their language’s tense/aspect distinctions to express and understand
these distinctions linguistically.
Their tests for the perfective/imperfective distinction involved a forced choice
sentence-to-picture matching task. Children were shown two pictures – one a
picture of a completed event (e.g. a girl smiling next to a ﬁnished drawing of
a ﬂower) and the other a picture of a yet-to-be completed version (here a girl
busily drawing a ﬂower). The children were then given two sentences describing
the pictures, one each of a perfective/imperfective minimal pair (with tense held
constant). Here the sentences would be The girl was drawing a ﬂower and The
girl drew a ﬂower. Children were then asked to match the sentences to the picture.
It was found that children as young as 2;6 would reliably match the imperfective
sentence to the yet-to-be complete picture and the perfective sentence to the
ﬁnished picture, just as is predicted by the event-time developmental stage.59
58It’s a pity that Wagner omitted the adverbial controls for the second experiment.
59Of course, the imperfective sentence is compatible with both pictures, but hopefully the84 Chapter 3. The Psycholinguistic Turn
The experiment was translated and carried out as well in two languages very
diﬀerent from English – Polish and Finnish. The Polish children performed the
same as the English children, successfully matching the sentences to the pictures.
On the other hand, the Finnish children performed abysmally, not passing the
test until age 6.60 A reason for this (noted on by Weist) might be due to the
way Finnish marks aspect. Instead of verbal morphology (as in English and Pol-
ish), Finnish marks imperfective and perfective aspect (again, really completion
information to an extent) on the object:
(7) Maija
M.
luki
read
kirjaa
book-part.
Maija was reading a book.
(8) Maija
M.
luki
read
kirjan
book-acc.
Maija read (all) the book.
Thus an object marked with partitive case marking gets interpreted as imperfec-
tive and an object with accusative marking gets interpreted as perfective. This
suggests that it is the accident that aspectual marking comes on the object rather
than the verb in Finnish that makes it harder for Finnish children to acquire. For
example, a study by (Hout, 1998) suggests that children (English and Dutch)
have diﬃculties in the area of the count/mass noun distinction. Like the Finnish
case marking, the count/mass noun distinction can change the completion entail-
ments of a given predicate – compare John drank beer with John drank a glass
of beer, only the latter of which is telic. Therefore, if it is diﬃcult to connect the
object to lexical aspect, it is not so surprising that Finnish children ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to connect grammatical aspect to object marking. In fact, when Weist re-ran the
picture experiment with sentences containing another way to code aspect (via a
special verb form) the Finnish children did much better (though still not as good
as the English or Polish children).
Wagner sees the problem as perhaps more conceptual. Instead, it may be
diﬃcult for young children to get aspect information purely from the objects
themselves. That is, how well can children relate an event taken as a whole with its
completion entailment in the world? Finnish happens to mark the completion on
the object, making the child’s learning task comparatively diﬃcult. But English
and Polish children may be able to use the other facet of telicity to help them to
get the proper mapping – that of intention or goal. Recall that when the English
progressive when applied to accomplishments was discussed in Chapter 2, there
forced-choice nature of the task makes the distinction clear.
60In fact, they performed worse to some degree or other on 7 of the 8 tests in comparison to
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were two important elements – a partial object on its way to completion, and a
goal or plan to accomplish this. Having verbal morphology mark aspect (as in
Polish and English) provides a connection to the agent/subject which the children
then might use to infer a goal or intention to have the object completed. Earlier
in the chapter (when discussing the psychology of events) we already saw that
children as young as 1 year old are quite good at inferring intentions. Indeed,
understanding of intentions may be one of the ingredients used in the process of
tense/aspect acquisition.
What is then needed is to see is how the English children fare when given
only object information, and no way to discover intentions or goals. The pictures
used by Weist were intrinsically agent oriented – one showed a girl busy at work
drawing, the other showed her happy and holding a ﬁnished drawing. Perhaps the
little girl was enough for the children to infer the diﬀerent goals of the girl and link
the morphology to her goals. Instead, (Wagner, 2002) designed an experiment
with the aim of testing English children on the same sorts of sentences, but this
time with visuals that lacked any agent-oriented information.
Instead of pictures the children are presented with pairs of toys depicting
diﬀerent stages or versions of the same event(type). For example they would be
presented with two puzzles, one completed ﬁlled in and one half-ﬁlled in, or an
empty-cup and a half-empty cup. The twist here is that, unlike the previous
interactive experiments the puppets perform the activities behind a screen and
the children can only hear them talk about what they are doing (in order to
connect each puppet to the event they did). When ﬁnished, the screen is lifted
revealing two versions of the event, say a ﬁnished puzzle and a half ﬁnished puzzle.
The characters, now separated from the events, would utter an imperfective or
perfective sentence (depending on which event they did), such as I ﬁlled in a puzzle
or I was ﬁlling in a puzzle. After the sentences were repeated a few times, the
child then had to match each puppet with one of the objects. Naturally, only the
ﬁrst match was scored as the second is forced. A match was considered correct if
the imperfective sentence was matched to the incomplete object or the perfective
sentence was match to the completed object. There were also adverbial control
trials where the test sentences directly speciﬁed the aspectual information (e.g.
I’m partly/all done/in the middle of/completely. Finally, a tableaux test (object
picture and sentence matching) was done with adults as a further comparison.
In a reversal of Weist’s ﬁndings, the 2 and 4 year old children performed no
better than chance on both the perfective and imperfective sentences, and it isn’t
until 5 years old that children even perform above chance with the perfective
sentences. Five year olds perform as well on events with perfective sentences
(nearly 100% right), but are still at chance with the imperfective sentences. Both
results are rather interesting but for diﬀerent reasons. It does indeed seem that
when denied agent information that children under 5 are at sea in regard to how
to match the sentences to objects in varying stages of completion. This supports
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ﬁgure out the completion entailments.
The ﬁve year olds do show that they have mastered the art of linking object
information alone to aspect. They did perfectly on matching the perfective sen-
tences, but seemed to have no preference with the imperfective sentence. This
seems not to indicate so much that the 5 years do not understand the completion
entailments, but don’t understand the pragmatics of the task. The imperfective
sentence is semantically ﬁne with either the completed or incompleted object. It
is only the nature of the task itself that forces the match of the imperfective sen-
tence to the incomplete object. However, the ﬁve year olds may not be checking
the sentences against each other (and the objects), perhaps not having mastered
the adult discourse game.61
Wagner’s explanation of these results is that children’s starting strategy is to
start the mapping process with concepts they understand. Here there will focus on
intentional properties in the language, since they are well-equipped to deal with
this conceptually from quite an early age. Perhaps after hearing (for English)
progressive sentences that are devoid of an intentional component such as The
water is boiling or counter to intentions (Mommy was falling down), they slowly
expand their meaning of the progressive to include focus on object completion.62
Indeed, this kind of piecemeal learning of tense/aspect morphology presents a
diﬀerent kind process to the generative view presented earlier. Here the child
systematically builds up a grammar that is not yet based on adult principles; she
uses the tools she has available along with language speciﬁc environmental input
to slowly reach adult competence.
3.6 Preliminary Conclusion
Thus far, we have seen a number of experiments dealing both with the psychology
of events and event segmentation and then experiments regarding children’s ac-
quisition of tense and aspect morphology. It is quite a lot to digest, and, especially
in the case of the child experiments, it is reasonable to ask if anything can be
concluded from the apparently contradictory results of the various experiments.
First there is the obvious answer that learning tense/aspect morphology is
a lengthy process that only begins when the child begins to use it a productive
way. Furthermore, it also seems that trying to tie this aspect of language learning
to one simple principle (i.e. subset principle, aspect before tense, etc.) is more
than likely a futile eﬀort. Instead, it is far more likely that children are bringing
to bear all of the cognitive resources at their disposal to master these complex
systems. Given the complexity of the task, it should hardly be surprising that
the young learners will use everything from intention and goal recognition to
61In single sentence tests, adults perform identically with children on imperfective sentences.
62There is a hidden assumption that children do not have the conceptual capacity to connect
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pattern matching and statistical learning to basic spatio-temporal segmentation
to be able to both understand (conceptually) and communicate (linguistically)
time and events.
Indeed, it is really this last point that should be taken from the above dis-
cussion. Too often, though perfectly understandable as a starting point, the
mapping problem between form and meaning that the child has to tackle is far
too idealised. For example, in the acquisition experiments it was the child’s task
to match statements about events to experimental situations. This could be a
perspective on the event (aspect) or locating the event in time (tense). The dif-
ﬁculty in these experiments was thought to be the mapping from the linguistic
form to concept (temporal or aspectual).
If Chapter 2 detailed the enormous typological diversity and complexity of the
concept ‘event’, this was only reinforced by the discussion in the ﬁrst half of this
chapter, which detailed the psychological complexity of this same concept. But,
in the experiments seen thus far, no one asked the question as to whether the
children actually had the same concept of ‘event’ as their adult counterparts. If
the answer is no, then it would seem that this fact alone would profoundly eﬀect
any experiment, in the sense of what the children are mapping to with their
language may not be what is expected by the experimenter. Also, we begin to see
a picture of the child developing both its language and concepts simultaneously,
further compounding any eﬀort to ﬁnd a simple categorical principle that would
be the holy grail of language acquisition.
In fact, (Wagner & Carey, 2003)63 conducted just such an experiment as to
how children individuate both objects and events.64 It turns out that three to
ﬁve year old children do not segment events in precisely the same way as adults,
and rely more on spatio-temporal diﬀerentiation than intentions or goals. Again
this is not a categorical distinction – children as young as 3 have some grasp on
the telic/atelic distinction and the linguistic form presented (if goal-based) does
cause them to individuate the event on goal-based criteria. Nevertheless, they
are far more likely than adults to be biased toward a spatio-temporal method for
individuation (while adults are biased the other way round). What appears to
be happening is that the child is using the same basic cognitive ingredients that
the adult does in individuating events, but only in diﬀerent proportions. This
may seem an innocent distinction, but could have implications for ways in which
the children use and understand aspect as well as how well they can deal with
coercion eﬀects (that often crucially depend on how the event is segmented).
The notions of tense and aspect used in the experiments also suﬀer from an
idealisation that needs to be moved away from if we want to have a greater
understanding of the acquisition process. All of the experiments involved some
sort of variation on a minimal pair of single sentences that are to be matched to
63Which shall be examined in greater detail in the next section.
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situations created by the experiment. The only criteria for getting an imperfective
sentence correctly matched is to match it to an ongoing situation, and the criteria
for tense was to match the target sentence to the temporally appropriate situation.
However, both of these construals are only part of the story.
We have already seen criticism of some proposed mappings for being far too
narrow (e.g. van der Feest and van Hout ignoring that fact that present tense has
narrative uses and past time reference possibilities, but then using these in the
protocols read out to the children). But there is a larger issue here. While it is
now more or less widely accepted one cannot see the whole of syntax or semantics
by looking at sentences in isolation, this is especially true when looking at tense
and aspect. Only in the context of a wider discourse, does the full power and
complexity of these systems come into play.
For example, it is not just that imperfective morphology indicates something
ongoing or (potentially) incomplete, it also has discourse functions such as serv-
ing as a background or temporal anchor point for following (or perhaps preceding
discourse) – It was raining that spring morning. John dutifully took out his um-
brella. Tense, as is now well known, is not simply the location of a single event
on a timeline (relative to speech time), but also is strongly connected to an ongo-
ing discourse. Thus a simple past tense statement out of context, like Chapman
breathed a sigh of relief 65 is rather strange. Certainly the listener would put
this event before utterance time, but really not know what to do with it. Only
with preceding discourse, adverbials or given context does it make any sense, e.g.
When the doctor told him that the tests were negative,...66 Arguably, a child can-
not be said to have mastered her language’s tense/aspect system until she has
mastered not only the tasks we have seen thus far, but also the more involved
discourse uses of the system. Certainly, if we are interested in how a child learns
a particular language, these are just as much the ‘meaning’ of tense and aspect
as simple localisation in time or basic perspective taking.
With this in mind, it is a good idea to extend the experiments seen in this
chapter to a multi-sentence discourse, to see at what age they can use and under-
stand tense/aspect combinations as ways of temporally ordering a multi-faceted
discourse. Animations or puppet performances could be done regarding the stan-
dard situations (putting on clothes in cold weather, going upstairs to room and
closing door, driving, etc.) What would be needed are events that could be con-
ceived in either ordering (so driving too fast and getting a ticket would be out).
This could handle tense and causality ordering (i.e. forward or backward sequen-
tial or simultaneous) – the child would then be given a minimal pair of, say, two
perfective sentences and have to match them to the two situations (which would
be opposite temporal orders, of course). I think this could be diﬃcult since per-
65Example from (Steedman, n.d.).
66Note that the ﬁrst sentence would work rather well as the ﬁrst line of a story. Here the
reader would be disposed to ignore the lack of context for a bit, in fact adding to the tension
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fective temporal ordering is so dependent on world knowledge and context – great
care would be needed to come up with unambiguous situations.
For testing aspect (possibly a bit easier), two events are needed – both of
which could be used alternately as a background and a main event. The minimal
pair would then be to alternate perfective/imperfective marking and to see if the
child could correctly match the mini-discourses to the situations. For the older
children we could perhaps alternate between simple and absolute relative tense
over a two sentence discourse. Can children handle a discourse with a present
tense ﬁrst sentence and past-perfect follow-up and correctly order the events (and
vice-versa)?
Perhaps, instead of (or in addition to) two minimal discourse pairs the situ-
ation could be presented and the ﬁrst sentence given. The child would then be
given two sentences to choose from to continue the discourse (again minimally so
only either tense or aspect, but not both vary). There could also be a ‘produc-
tion’ exercise where children are given the mini-discourse and then either draw,
play-act, or play with toys to illustrate the situation.
3.6.1 Boland
There is one more set of experiments by Wagner to examine. But, ﬁrst there
will be some brief comments about a recent PhD thesis (Boland, 2006) that
has, unfortunately, has been published too recently to adequately do it justice.
Nevertheless, a few remarks will be given and the interested reader, especially as
far as it is germane to what has been explored in this chapter.
(Boland, 2006) is an astounding study about tense, modality and aspectual
systems (TMA systems). It investigates the connection between limits on the
variation of these systems cross-linguistically and stages of language acquisition.
Cross-linguistically, she proposes a typological hierarchy of three classes of op-
erators, whose communicative function and cognitive complexity correlates with
their scope.67 Ignoring modality (mostly) and keeping to English examples, the
ﬁrst class (π1) are aspectual markers, such as the progressive, continuative (keep
-ing), prospective (gonna, be about to), the perfect, and resultative (be -ed or
irregular form, i.e. it’s broke(n)). The second class (π1) consists of the tense sys-
tem and habitual/frequentive markers. The third, widest scope operators (π3),
are proposition oriented modality markers. The (π2) class contains event-oriented
modality operators, which may lexically be the same as some in (π3), but their
function is quite diﬀerent.
The Scope Hierarchy is then (π1)-operators ⊂ (π2)-operators ⊂ (π3)-operators,
where ⊂ means less marked. The implication then says that if a language has in-
stances of a more marked class, it also has instances of a lesser marked class. For
example there could be languages with only (π1)-operators, but not languages
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with only (π2)-operators (π3)-operators. This is conﬁrmed for a wide variety
of languages and also investigated in terms hypotheses about diachronic change,
usage frequency and other phenomena.
However, it is the acquisition predictions that are of most interest here. With-
out going into the various permutations of hypotheses, the main prediction is that
acquisition of TMA systems follows the above hierarchy in that at least some
(π1)-operators are acquired before (π2)-operators, etc. This is conﬁrmed in a
wide cross-linguistic survey – including a longitudinal CHILDES corpus study for
English. Notice that the (π1)-operators are exactly the early uses of -ing and -ed
discussed early in this chapter, using examples form (Behrens, 2001) and (Wag-
ner, 2001) (e.g. broke and playing rather than breaking and played). This gave
rise to various hypotheses such as Weist’s temporality theory, lexical Aspect ﬁrst,
Aspect before tense, and Prototype theory which are all examined and found to
be wanting.
While it may be prototypical to use the progressive with present and ongoing
activities, and the simple past (-ed) for past and telic events,68 none of the above
theories is seen as an adequate explanation. Instead, she proposes the Discourse
Topic Hypothesis (p. 357), which accounts for the initial exclusion of marked
combinations, not for grammatical reasons, but for developmental and discourse
reasons.
At ﬁrst, children live in, and only wish to communicate about the here-and-
now. Adult speech to children will then be tailored toward this communicative
need. For example, talk will be of activities going on in the present and that
are perceivable. Importantly, the notion of here-and-now does not apply just to
the present moment. Adapted from notions of (Christensen, 2003) and (Klein,
1994), the notion of Topic Time (TT) is utilised. This is like Reference Time,
but slightly broader. Applied to the present, TT would include the immediate
future and the immediate past. These two (via the prospective and resultative)
are included in the (π1)-operators, along with -ing.
For a concrete example, compare two situations – a parent doing the washing-
up with their child, or the same activity conducted by my ﬂatmate and I. In
the ﬁrst situation, the talk would be of what is happening (the water’s running,
now we’re putting them in the cupboard), discrete events that have just happened
(oops, a glass broke!), or what comes immediately after (we’re gonna have dessert,
next!). In contrast, my ﬂatmate and I would probably talk about what went
on that day, certainly anything not as mundane as dish-washing. Instead, the
imperfective past might be used, e.g. When I was walking in town, I met Mary
– she says, “Hi.” Discourse conﬁned to the extended here-and-now accounts for
a child’s initial restriction to the unmarked combinations. Gradually, as there
68Boland claims that the unmarked combinations, however, are just this – states and activities
in the imperfective, telic events in the perfective. There is no space to enter into a discussion
about this notion of markedness or the communicative functions and complexity of the various
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sense of time and memory develops, talk will no longer be conﬁned to extended
present, and the discourse topics with adults will extend to more remote tense
constructions and marked aspectual combinations.
In an echo of what was written in Section 1 of this chapter, Boland writes
(p.484) a summary of what a child needs to learn to enter the tense and aspectual
system, which is then accounted for by the Discourse Topic Hypothesis along with
other mechanisms.69
What is it, then, that children need to learn? They need to learn:
• that parts of event structures need to be selected for building up
an adequate description of the property or relation ascribed to
the arguments;
• that there are diﬀerent event structures;
• that TT may shift;
• that event time needs to be encoded; and
• that TT sometimes needs to be speciﬁed linguistically.
While the child begins with an extended present, slowly, broader notions,
working in tandem with the child’s development along with adult communication
about more distant time periods and more complex event combinations. However,
the ﬁnal section of this chapter will focus on the ﬁrst two bullet points, that of the
acquisition of event structure. It yields some rather surprising results, especially
the discussion of (Wagner & Carey, 2003).70
3.7 Event and Object Individuation
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, we examined the analogy between objects and
events in the areas of both their perception and individuation. The main factors
are spatio-temporal diﬀerentiation and conceptual hierarchy. With the former,
both events and objects can be individuated by discrete spatio-temporal changes
– i.e. the contours of an object (perhaps a rock lying on the ground) or sudden
changes in the perceptual stream of an event (say a quick handclap).
But we also saw that both objects and events can be conceptually organ-
ised and individuated based on partonomic and taxononomic hierarchies. Unlike
the spatio-temporal diﬀerentiation, which is largely automatically processed and
contains little in the way of conceptual information, these hierarchies are largely
69Including an appeal to (Slobin, 1985) for event structure acquisition.
70Unfortunately (Boland, 2006) only refers to Wagner’s early experiments, and none that
have to do with intention or what follows in the next section. It is a pity, as combining the
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conventional – at least particular instances of the hierarchies are.71 Moreover,
with events we saw the importance of goals and plans in determining and divid-
ing event schemata.
Finally, we looked at experiments conducted by (Zacks et al., 2001) that
demonstrated the connection between linguistic description, event individuation,
and the interplay between spatio-temporal diﬀerentiation (the ﬁne-grained condi-
tion) and goal-based diﬀerentiation (coarse-grained condition) of everyday, simple
events. But what we haven’t looked at is how these schemata and taxonomic and
partonomic hierarchies are developed – that is, how do young children perceive of
events and objects, and do they individuate them on the same criteria as adults?
Also, to what extent does language about objects and events eﬀect this individu-
ation? These questions have been studied by (Wagner & Carey, 2003), with some
surprising results that could ultimately also cause a rethink of the tense/aspect
acquisition studies as well.
3.7.1 Experiment 1 – Object and Event individuation
This ﬁrst experiment replicates previous work of (Shipley & Shepperson, 1990)
on children’s object individuation, and adds a parallel condition where children
are given the task of individuating events. For the object condition, the subjects
are presented with pictures on a computer screen of whole and split objects of the
same kind. For example, the screen could contain a picture of several cars divided
in half by a small horizontal gap. Other objects used were forks, cupcakes, donuts
and trees. Some of the pictures would have only split objects and some would be
a mixture of whole and split objects.
Children were then told that they were playing a counting game, and would
be shown a series of pictures (as described above) and then with each picture
were asked a question that linguistically would perhaps inﬂuence the counting
(object individuation). The options were the general, “How many things are
here?” or the kind term “How many X’s (e.g. forks or cars) are here?” The split
object pictures have the object split, but the two halves aligned and quite close
together. Thus, when presented with the kind term, the “correct” answer would
be to count the two halves of the fork or the car as one fork or car respectively.
That is, if children are indeed using their taxonomic knowledge to diﬀerentiate
objects. The amorphous “things” would allow for individuation based on spatio-
temporal criteria.
The event condition involved showing the children short animations of a va-
riety of simple events. There were events of creation such as building a house,
destruction such as a vase breaking, movement of location such as a bunny hop-
71Knowing that a car is a kind of transport vehicle, or ordering food is part of a restaurant
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ping into a hole, or change of state of an object, such as a door being closed. In
all cases the events could be conceived as goal based, and importantly they all
included spatio-temporally discrete instances of the activity portion. For exam-
ple, the bunny may take three hops to get into the hole, and the girl may lick the
ice-cream cone a few times (with a short break in between) before it is consumed.
Linguistically, both telic and atelic questions were asked in the experiment.
A telic question could be “How many times was the house built” with the corre-
sponding atelic question being “How many times did the girl work?”72 Again, if
the children are able to use goal-based individuation for events their responses to
the telic questions should be “one time”, while they should use spatio-temporal
diﬀerentiation to individuate the event when given an atelic question (say the
number of hops licks of the ice-cream cone). Finally, note that both the object
and event conditions were also conducted on adult controls.
Results
In line with the previous study by Shipley and Shepperson, children completely
ignored the linguistic descriptions in the object conditions and consistently in-
dividuated objects according to spatio-temporal criteria. Thus, when presented
a picture of a fork split in two and asked the kind question, “How many forks
are there?” the answer would overwhelmingly be “two” (only the ﬁve-year olds
showed any signs of kind-diﬀerentiation). Curiously (and contra the previous
study), adults performed exactly the opposite, and consistently refused to make
recourse of spatio-temporal diﬀerentiation whatsoever. So, when presented with
the same pictures and asked the question “How many things are there”, the
adults would still respond with “one”, even though, of course, two half forks may
certainly be seen as two diﬀerent things.73
The results of the event trials were a bit more mixed. The adults, as expected,
consistently use goal-based counting when presented with the telic questions and
spatio-temporal counting when given the atelic questions.74 But the aggregate
data for the 3 to 5 year olds, it is far more mixed. Overall, the children would use
goal based diﬀerentiation about half of the time when presented with the telic
72The questions on the atelic activities can be rather diﬃcult. Typically, activities can have
a gappy temporal proﬁle, that is, one could be said to have worked form nine to ﬁve thought
breaks were hopefully taken. A question such as, How many times did the girl work? could be
rather confusing with no single correct answer, unless the animations somehow non-linguistically
made clear that one episode of work was ﬁnished.
73This may be an eﬀect of the experimental setting. Give that the two half objects were
aligned and only separated by a small gap, adults may have mentally ﬁlled the gap in, so to
speak. Still, children got the “thing” condition correct and seem unaﬀected by the setup.
74Appropos of my concerns before, the eat and swim events were still goal based half of the
time when given the atelic question, i.e. the three licks of the ice-cream cone were considered
one activity of ‘eating’, while the hopping event was always spatio-temporally diﬀerentiated
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description, showing that while the children are still biased by spatio-temporal
criteria, their goal-based reasoning is beginning to develop as well. In fact, the
results seem strong enough to conclude that children, in contrast to experiments
by van Hout, do have a pretty good grasp on telicity.75
Looking at the data in more detail, a few anomalies do emerge. While the
aggregate ﬁgure for the children is ﬁfty percent, the results for the individual
descriptions used varied far more. For instance, with the example of “paint a
ﬂower”, children succeeded eighty percent of the time in using goal-based indi-
viduation. This contrasts with the swimming across the river and eating an ice
cream cone examples, where the success rates were 28 and 39 percent respectively.
Unfortunately, there is no great pattern to this, as the successes and failures do
not break down along semantic lines. That is, there was no correlation with the
event being a movement, creation, destruction or change of state event. All of
the four types showed up both as goal-based and spatio-temporal based diﬀer-
entiation.76 Instead, it seems to be much more idiosyncratic as to what type of
diﬀerentiation the children used.77
So, it seems that objects and events may not be so parallel after all – at least
as far as children’s individuation goes. With objects, children ignored linguistic
descriptions outright and consistently applied spatio-temporal criteria to diﬀeren-
tiate, while adults did the exact opposite. Contrastly, the event condition showed
that children could abandon the spatio-temporal strategy when confronted with
a telic linguistic description, and instead use a goal-based individuation strategy.
Now given these two results, Wagner and Carey wonder whether it is the object
test itself that is somehow causing the anomalies.
First of all, there is the diﬃculty of the ontological status of the split objects
– is half a fork still to be considered a fork? If not, then what is one supposed to
call it? It is a bit optimistic to expect three year old children to grasp these deep
matters, when they are still the matter of great debate in late night university
undergraduate drinking sessions. Moreover, there is also one rather signiﬁcant
dis-analogy between the object and event conditions. With the objects, the al-
ternative to the informative kind term was the fairly uninformative “thing” that
was used for all of the objects.
But for the event trials, the atelic description was still something more in-
formative like “work” or “hop”, that are commonly named and diﬀerent activ-
ities. Therefore, they conducted a second experiment on object individuation
that involved not just split objects, but also the contrast between collections and
individual objects (forest vs. tree) and part/whole (wheel on a car). This has
not only the advantage of making both descriptions contentful, but also brings
into play children’s knowledge of partonomic hierarchies, making the parallel to
75(Hout, 1998) only used examples with the notoriously diﬃcult eating and drinking predi-
cates, which even the adults in the current study had diﬃculty with.
76There was also no diﬀerence based on the syntactic form of the description.
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events much closer.
3.7.2 Experiment 2
Experiment two was conducted on (diﬀerent) sets of three and ﬁve year olds, and
consisted of three distinct conditions. The ﬁrst condition is merely the split object
test of the ﬁrst experiment, while the second two were designed to further test
the hypothesis of Shipley and Shepperson that young children only count spatio-
temporally determined objects, no matter how (linguistically) they are asked to
count.
The ﬁrst of these involved a contrast between collection and object. The col-
lective terms used were things likes “forest” and “family”. A picture might be two
separated forests consisting of four trees each (where the trees are grouped closely
together and are slightly overlapping). The desired answers to the questions “How
many forests?” and “How many trees?” would be “2” and “4” respectively. Note
that this experiment is slightly easier than a similar one done by Shipley and
Shepperson’s where children would be shown, say, a picture of three dogs and
three cats and asked to count both the animals and the kinds of animals. In both
cases children counted individuals, but this is attributed to the fact that under-
standing the logic of super-ordinate classiﬁcation is diﬃcult for young children.
Rather, in this condition, the contrast is a bit simpler – comparing individuals to
a collection – based on the linguistic description.
The second of the new conditions involves a part/whole contrast. The stimuli
were pictures of ordinary objects with their commonly named parts, e.g. a bike
and its wheels or a butterﬂy and its wings. Thankfully (especially in the butterﬂy
case) the parts were still attached to the objects and children would be asked
to count either the amount of butterﬂies or the amount of wings. If linguistic
description is ignored by children, then the answer to both queries would be to
count the whole objects. However, it is well known that young children learn
body parts amongst their earliest words and can readily learn novel part names,
provided they already know the name of the object. Moreover, while the parts
may indeed still be attached to the object, a case can be made that the parts
(wheels and wings) have a distinct spatial contour in relation to the rest of the
object, and that spatio-temporal diﬀerentiation would serve in this case as well.
Therefore, in this condition at least, it was predicted that even 3-year-olds would
be quite successful.
The results conﬁrmed exactly this – in the part/whole trial, 5-year-old chil-
dren performed at adult levels, while the 3-year-olds weren’t too far behind. The
results of the split-object condition were replicated from the ﬁrst experiment,
with children counting the half objects no matter what description they were
given. So far, this is just what was expected; however, the results for the individ-
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exact match of the event individuation condition in the ﬁrst experiment.78
So, it does seem that contra Shipley and Shepperson, linguistic descriptions
can indeed inﬂuence even 3-year-olds object individuation, and that counting for
them is not conﬁned to counting spatio-temporally deﬁned whole objects. If asked
to count wings, even the youngest children would rarely count the butterﬂies the
wings are attached to. Also, if asked to count families, at least half the time,
the youngest children did so, instead of counting the spatio-temporally distinct
family members.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that children behave in a completely adultlike
way in regard to both object and event individuation. The split-object condition
shows that in diﬃcult cases, both children and adults will pay less attention
to linguistic description and use their preferred individuation strategy – spatio-
temporal in the case of children, and kind-based in the case of adults. Indeed, the
results do indicate that while children do pay attention to linguistic descriptions,
there is still a rather robust spatio-temporal bias.
Building on work of (Carey & Xu, 2001), they propose the existence of an
object tracking system that appears quite early on in a child’s ontogeny – that is
objects are tracked and individuated on the basis of spatio-temporal information.
While infants also can infer goals when presented with individual events (we saw
this quite early in the chapter), it is probably the case that they have yet to fully
integrate this talent into developing the necessary hierarchies and schemata that
are coded by language. Thus we get the kind of mixed results seen in the event
individuation condition and the individual/collection condition.
Wagner and Carey take pains to point out that this tracking system is not to
be considered a step on the road to more complex kinds of individuation. For ex-
ample, kinds cannot be spatio-temporally deﬁned, so individuation in these cases
must come from knowledge of taxonomic hierarchies. Moreover, if adults were
presented with a picture of conceptually unrelated objects, their only recourse to
counting them would have to be done on spatio-temporal criteria.
However, in the context of language acquisition and learning in general, I
think a case can be made for a process happening. There are many ways to
diﬀerentiate objects, and these ways can be seen as diﬀerent perspectives – in
the same way that diﬀerent tense and aspect combinations can throw a diﬀerent
viewpoint on events. Here, Wagner’s results show the process involves beginning
with a default individuation strategy – spatio-temporal tracking. However, as the
child learns language and develops conceptually, other possibilities of perspective
arise. But while even the 3-year olds may be sensitive to linguistic cues, they
are not yet able to switch between diﬀerent individuation criteria at adult-like
levels. Learning the criteria requires a wealth of world knowledge and experience
and a linguistic sophistication to pick up subtle markings (count/mass, telicity).
78Although there is no mention as to whether the data breaks down on individual pictures
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It is then unsurprising that when confronted with a task that is a bit too hard,
children will revert to what they do best – spatio-temporal tracking.
3.8 Conclusion
We have travelled through a rather long journey through psycho-linguistics – ﬁrst
in cognitively grounding the concept of ‘event’, and then seeing how children learn
to understand them and talk about them in the context of tense and aspectual
uses. While no simple conclusion can be drawn from this excursion, there are
several lessons to be learned.
3.8.1 The learning process
First, however the mapping process works, whether it is more generative in na-
ture, usage based or something in between, both the acquisition of the necessary
concepts and applying these to a speciﬁc language is a lengthy developmental
process. Where, as (Weist et al., 1997) elegantly points out, the relation between
the acquisition of a speciﬁc language and the development of concepts most likely
have feedback eﬀects upon each other. For example, in comprehension, Polish
children had an advantage in the temporal dimension, while the Finnish children
had a head-start in the spatial dimension. These discrepancies are put down to
the relation between the languages’ systems for expressing spatial and temporal
concepts and there accessibility to information processing strategies.
More speciﬁcally, his neo-piagetian developmental timeline is a nice illustra-
tion of the foundations required for tense comprehension. The child begins with
a fairly impoverished notion of the relationship between events and time (speech
time only) and within a few years develops a full-blooded temporal conception,
where she can not only locate events in time, but can coordinate three separate
temporal intervals. As seen in the introduction, these two ingredients are exactly
what is used in the event calculus in order to interpret such tense constructions
as the past perfect, or deal with adverbials such as before and after.
Interestingly, the experiments in (Weist et al., 1991) highlight both an im-
portant methodological point. In the production tests Finnish children used the
perfect tenses earlier than their American or Polish counterparts. At ﬁrst glance
it may seem to be the case that they have developed the Free Reference Time
system earlier. However, the comprehension tests show that cross-linguistically
the transition to a Free Reference Time system begins around 4;6 and is not
mastered (on Weist’s tests) until 5;6 and 6;6. The explanation for the Finnish
children succeeding earlier on the production tests is that there linguistic envi-
ronment contains more instances of the perfect tenses than in the environments
of American or Polish children. This does tell us that mere use of a morphological
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be inﬂuences from language on thought and vice versa, in this case a child needs
to be able to have enough working memory to keep track of the various goals and
the computational power to co-ordinate them properly, before they can be said
to comprehend something like the past perfect.79
The experiments done by Wagner shed some interesting light and a critique of
Weist’s experiments. In (Wagner, 2001), she ﬁrst replicates results done by Weist,
that show that even 2 year olds can understand simple tense.80 But in a follow
up experiment, she varies the parameters enough to make an issue of whether an
event is completed or incomplete. The results show that the two-year-olds are
successful on the test only when the past tense scenario was a completed event
and the present tense event is (still) incomplete. This result is presumed to be a
qualiﬁed endorsement of the Aspect First hypothesis, that is children are using
tense morphology81 to initially be an indication of completion information (past
tense means complete, etc.), and is only later in the child’s development used to
mark actually temporal relations.
Caveats
But,82 there may be a diﬀerent explanation for the results in (Wagner, 2001).
(Wagner, 2002) shows that when deprived of agentive information in the scenarios
of the experiments, the children do not succeed on the aspect tests until the age of
ﬁve.83 From this experiment she concludes that possibly it isn’t until around age
5 that aspect’s completion entailments are understood. Prior to this, children are
relying on agentive information and intention to make their judgements. It may
then be the case that rather than the competing theories of Tense First or Aspect
First, it may really be Intention First that is the child’s initial strategy, with
a full understanding of the tense and aspectual distinctions in a given language
completing some years later.
Examine this in light of the work on events proper summarised in (Zacks
& Tversky, 2001). Even understanding what an event consists in requires on
levels of complexity more than a simple spatio-temporal change, it also requires
knowledge of intention or even conventional scripts that can only be learned by
living in a particular culture, and only made sense of if one understands the
incredibly complex web of shared intentionality that we are all part of. The
79Nevermind adding the causal dimension seen in the mini-discourse examined in the intro-
duction.
80Methodologically she makes an important reﬁnement by comparing all three tenses, rather
than a past/non-past distinction that could reduce to the ability to make a realis/irrealis dis-
tinction.
81As this experiment was conducted only on English speaking children and only with the
present/past progressive. So, tense morphology here boils down to is and was.
82This is not mentioned by Wagner herself.
83Note that this meaning of aspect is rather impoverished and conﬂates perfective and im-
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event calculus takes not only the complexity of integrating events for tense and
adverbial combinations rather serious, but also the notion of intention and goal.
At the heart of the representation of the accomplishment-style aktionsart in
the event calculus are these notions. An activity, can if successful, lead to a goal.84
There is the possibility of layers of hierarchical organisation where a sub-event is
a goal that looked at from a wider perspective, this goal can then be recruited to
be a sub-event of a larger event with a diﬀerent goal. This is a direct parallel to
the notion of script in (Zacks & Tversky, 2001) and its partonomic structure.85
Also, as seen earlier, computing tense structures also involves in having goals
of successfully locating the event and integrating the event in context. Here,
there is no real room for Aspect or Tense ﬁrst, but both are needed.86 This is
obvious when one needs to interpret, say, a past, progressive sentence, but even
to interpret a simple, past tense sentence is not merely locating an event in the
past, but also to embed it in the proper discourse context. That is, states or
processes (both of which are ﬂuents in the event calculus) are the bedrock upon
which events rests.
A broader outlook
To ﬁnally return to the acquisition experiments, (Wagner & Carey, 2003) throws
a spanner in the works. The lesson to be drawn is that children and adults do not
conceptualise events in quite the same way. Looking back at the psycho-linguistics
of events, this is really no surprise. While knowledge of intention, hierarchical
and taxonomic thinking are required,87 the various scripts for events are learnt,88
and even whether a break in an event is considered an actual termination or just
a pause to be ignored can depend upon the speciﬁc event or the context.
But, it does cast doubt on the previous tense and aspect experiments in gen-
eral. If children conceive of events slightly diﬀerently, interpreting their answers
according to an adult paradigm may perturb the statistical results. Getting an
answer or a picture match ‘wrong’ may not be a tense or aspect mapping imma-
turity, but merely a misunderstanding of what kind of event is talked about. As
an open question, I do wonder exactly how this conceptual diﬀerence cashes itself
out. Is the misconception a matter of cultural knowledge, or does hierarchical
84Often when there is a sentient agent performing such an activity, we can say that the goal
is there intention. By extension, a ball rolling inevitably of a cliﬀ, can also be see as an activity
leading to a ‘goal’, though without a human intentional element.
85It also sees favourable parallels in the notion of rational action in (Gergely & Csibra, 1993).
86Along with a proper conception of the various Aktionsart types.
87This can be seen as the building blocks of an event script. The speciﬁcs may be entirely
conventional.
88That is not to say that all people in a given culture will have precisely the same notions of
any given event script. I believe the diﬀerences are often at the heart of the common English
expression that comes out in an argument when both sides realise there’s no convincing the
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planning and the ability to have narrow or broad perspectives on a given situ-
ation also emerge slowly, causing further interactions with the learning of tense
and aspect, both conceptually and linguistically?
However, the problems brought up by (Wagner & Carey, 2003) should not
cause us to despair altogether. While it does have an important lesson to teach
us in how to properly conduct and evaluate acquisition experiments, the entire
view of the acquisition process and event conceptualisation need not be pushed
to one side. While the experiment points to the strong possibility that children’s
event scripts are not quite the same as those of adults. There is no reason to
things that the ‘building blocks’ of event conceptualisation are any diﬀerent.
This experiment ﬁnds children focussing primarily on the spatio-temporal view
of events, while (Wagner, 2002) shows the reliance of young children upon the
agent’s intention to determine whether or not an event has been completed.
Both of these are basic ingredients in (Zacks et al., 2001) deﬁnition of event as
well as how events are constructed in the event calculus. Any temporally extended
event includes a process that can be identiﬁed with a plan or intention that leads
toward the event’s goal.89 The event calculus has an ontology of events and
processes along with a general planning and causal mechanism that relates them
to each other. Wagner’s experiments only serve to show that this is exactly what
children are using in conceiving of events, determining completion conditions, and
eventually locating them in time and in respect to each other.
What children may not have is the adult’s event ‘lexicon’, i.e. the conventional
scripts for everyday events are not only not consistent across cultures, but as the
coercion phenomena shows, can even vary for a single speaker depending upon
context. Moreover, when dealing with events whose deﬁnition is quite dependant
upon cultural values, there is no reason to expect such things to be universal across
cultures or completely comprehended by three year olds, who still have many years
of living within a culture before becoming an ‘expert’ on it. Ultimately, we should
think of what is ‘universal’ as things such as basic cognitive mechanisms used
to structure time, create event schemata, and various temporal and intentional
perspectives.
For example, what is a ‘stealing’ event? While there may be stereotypical
connotations of a man in a mask with a gun and a swag bag, the push of a button
by a devious banker can be stealing all the same. Ultimately, for the more ‘higher
level’ events, the agent’s intention is not enough, but rather the intentions and
values of an entire society are needed to fully comprehend it.90 This takes time
89Intention should be taken here in the broadest sense. It can be applied to my intention
of walking to the store or a ball’s ‘intention’ of rolling into the street. In the latter case, the
spatio-temporal proﬁle, along with naive physics takes the place of agentive intention.
90A baby in their own baptism (pretend it happens at 18 months instead of in infancy), will
perceive a man in strange robes talking, another adult agreeing to renounce Satan and water
being poured on his head. These are (some of) the spatio-temporal parts of a baptism. But,
without an understanding of the role of religion in a culture, this particular acts are really quite3.8. Conclusion 101
and life experience, and aside from a move to innate concepts, there really is no
substitute.
3.8.2 Looking Forward
We will look forward by looking back at the introduction to this chapter. We
began by looking at, intuitively what it takes a hearer to interpret a simple two-
sentence discourse. Ostensibly simple, this process is actually incredibly complex.
This was then reinforced by looking at the work of Weist, who postulates a devel-
opment of temporal concepts and also gradually developing more sophisticated
ways of relating the events. In the interlude, we will see the event calculus for-
mally and how its formal mechanisms parallel the RRT stage of Weist, as well
as how the informally described discourse interpretation process can be stated
formally. In a sense this can be seen as the ‘universals’ involved in tense and
aspect production and comprehension. But, following the work of (Zacks et al.,
2001) (amongst others), the schemata developed, while utilising such generalities
as planning, intention, and spatio-temporal change are a default ‘lexicon’ that
can change in an ad hoc way (due to a speciﬁc contextual anomaly), but can vary
in more patterned ways within and across cultures.
The following interlude presents an informal introduction to the Event Calcu-
lus, with special emphasis on the way events and their mapping to verbs and VP’s
is modelled. It is no accident that the notion of event schemata and hierarchical
structure and the role of intention and goal play a prominent role. Moreover, the
results of the last experiment of Wagner should not be seen as a reason to despair.
Combining her results with the Zacks and Tversky notion of event structure in
mind, the event schemata in the Event Calculus use the universal building blocks
such as spatio-temporal change, object tracking, and goal directed orientation.
However, as the resulting schemata of any VP,91 is considered a default and often
contextually determined, the possibility that children do not have quite the same
speciﬁc conceptions as adults no problem, or surprise, whatsoever.
meaningless for him at the time.
91These are called scenarios in the Event Calculus.Interlude: An introduction to the Event
Calculus
In92 the previous two chapters, the notions of Aktionsarten, aspect and tense
were discussed, followed by the ways these are manifest psycholinguistically. For
the latter, the notions of event schema, goals, plans and intentions played a
paramount role in the construction of various events. Furthermore, it was also
seen that when one is relating multiple events to each other, viewing them through
various aspectual construals, or anchoring them in time relative to a discourse
context, these very same notions crop up again. Before moving on to the latter
three chapters that are studies of speciﬁc semantic and linguistic topics that will
involve formalisation, a brief introduction to the formalisation used is in order.
The Event Calculus (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005), is a formal semantics for
tense and aspect that takes inspiration form a planning formalism from robotics.
As human beings are not robots, this may sound a bit disconcerting at ﬁrst, but
as a formalism for computing tense and aspect, the ingredients of this sort of
planning ﬁt perfectly. For example, suppose a there is a goal speciﬁed for the
robot to pick up a package in a building. Starting from this goal, a plan is then
computed, which consists of a sequence of actions that will get the robot to the
package’s location. This sequence is obtained by backward chaining from the
initial goal through a sequence of sub-goals ending with the robot’s current state
and position.93
This sort of computation requires a model of the world, which is in this case a
map of the building, a causal theory of the robot’s actions, various variables like
‘door open/closed’, its initial position, and a record of its actions. Furthermore,
the robot will need a set of actions it can perform (walk down the corridor, turn
right, go through the door), as well as possible observations it can make, such
as whether the door it needs to go through is open or closed. With this, a plan
92Much of this exposition borrowed from (Hamm, Kamp, & Lambalgen, 2006).
93Recall the notion of goal, plan and subgoal in storytelling and comprehension from (Tra-
basso & Stein, 1994).
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to pick up the package can then be computed. While the robot is executing the
plan, its world model is updated with the various observations and actions it
makes, and the plan may need to be recomputed on the ﬂy, should something
about the world model diﬀer from the original plan. For example, a door could be
closed that was open in the original plan’s world model, or worse, the robot makes
the observation that a corridor on its original building map is now inaccessible.
Finally, the actions of the plan include can be either instantaneous or continuous
such that the former can take place during the latter. For example, there could
be the action of moving along the corridor at a certain speed, and during this
extended activity, there could be various instantaneous activities such as taking
a observational reading of the current distance between the robot and the wall.
These notions can be harnessed for the computation of tense and aspect.
Upon hearing a new sentence, a listener has an initial discourse model and must
integrate the sentence into the initial discourse model. If the sentence is a tensed
non-stative sentence, the actions and participants are unpacked and the discourse
model is updated with these. For example, if I hear John is running in the zoo,I
need to update my discourse model with the action and the agent of the action.94
It could be more complicated, however. For example, if I hear John is going to
feed himself to lions, it is not only an action like running that is expressed, but
also the existence of a plan directed toward the goal of non-existence. Should
the sentence be a simple stative, like John is suicidal, this is an analogue of the
robot’s more mundane observations about doors and distance, and my discourse
is updated with a property about John’s mental health.
The appendix contains a more formal description of how this works and the
reader is encouraged to see (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005) for a much more complete
and elegant formal picture. However, in the following sections of this interlude,
we shall give an informal introduction to the language and workings of the event
calculus, in order that the reader will be able, at least, to have a grasp of the
more formal sections of the later chapters.
3.9 Language and ontology of the Event Calcu-
lus
3.9.1 Basic Ontology
As the above discussion implies, the event calculus is planning formalism, whose
language talks about actions, goals and causal relations. Given a goal, initial state
and casual relations, it returns a plan to achieve this goal. It is a many sorted
logic, that has two basic sorts of events, for viewing events either perfectively
or imperfectively. The ﬁrst are event types, symbolised as e,e,...,e 0,....T h e
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second are called ﬂuents, symbolised as f,f,...,f 0,.... Event types are various
kinds of actions, such as fall or break. Fluents are time-dependent properties such
as being broken or walking. While the time parameter of ﬂuents is implicit, they
can have further parameters, e.g. for the subject of walking, which come into
play, especially when examining continuous change and incremental themes.95
As far as the ontology is concerned, there are also sorts for individuals (e.g.
‘John’), real numbers that can be interpreted as instants of time, or other quanti-
ties for position, velocity or the degree of a quality.96 Importantly, this sketch of
ontology is concerned with discourse models and not directly with the real world.
For example, as seen in Chapter 2, there are no perfective and imperfective events
in the world, but are rather diﬀerent ways of conceptualising the world.
3.9.2 Basic Predicates
Instantaneous Change
The event calculus has a set of predicates for handling two types of causality –
instantaneous and continuous change. We will ﬁrst explicate the predicates need
to describe the former, such as the classic example of two balls colliding.
- Initially(f) (‘ﬂuent f holds at the beginning of the discourse’)
- Happens(e,t)( ‘ e v e n tt y p ee has a token at t’)
- Initiates(e,f,t) (‘the causal eﬀect of event type e at time t is the ﬂuent f’)
- Terminates(e,f,t) (‘the causal eﬀect of event type e at time t is the negation
of the ﬂuent f’)
- Clipped(s,f,t) (roughly, ‘an event type terminating f has a token between
times s and t’)
- HoldsAt(f,t) (ﬂuent f is true at t)
95Speciﬁc events and ﬂuents are derived by reiﬁcation. For example, as in standard logic
translation, the verb walk is represented by a predicate Walk(x,t) (all free variables exhibited;
t is the temporal parameter). While we shan’t go into the details here (see (Lambalgen &
Hamm, 2005, Chapter 6)), the expression {t | Walk(x,t)} (with the x as free parameters)
may be formed, which we can think of as a ﬂuent walk(x) which contains an implicit temporal
parameter. In practise, we will usually leave out the free parameters where there is no possibility
of confusion, and refer to the ﬂuent as walk. In general, the ﬂuent f(x) can then be an
argument of the HoldsAt predicate (see next section), e.g. HoldsAt(f(x),s), intuitively meaning
s ∈{ t | A(x,t)}, i.e. A(x,s). Events types e(x) can be constructed from a (G¨ odel number of)
a formula ∃tA(x,t), which abstracts away from the temporal parameter.
96While real numbers are used to represent instants of time in the formalism, the actual
mental construction of time is much more complicated. Concepts of order duration and temporal
perspective involve a construction goals to be obtained, and plans to achieve them (e.g. for
future time). The past (or remembering it, at least) can be constructed analogically. For our
purposes, we will only concern ourselves with real numbers as instants of time, but the reader
is invited to see (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 2).106 Interlude
Imagine an example of Ball A lying motionless on a table and being collided
with by Ball B, causing Ball A to move. If Ball A then hits the edge of the
table, its motion is stopped.97 So, we then have Initially(still) to describe Ball
A’s initial lack of movement. The causal information can be described as Ini-
tiates(collision,move,t) which means that if Ball A is hit by Ball B at time t,
the causal eﬀect is the ﬂuent move for Ball A. The second causal eﬀect is Termi-
nates(hit-edge,move,t) which says that the event of hitting the edge of the table
negates the move ﬂuent.
The predicate Clipped can be used to describe that an event token terminating
the ball’s movement has happened between times s and t.98 For example, imagine
that our scenario begins at t=0, with the Ball B collision happening at t=2 and
the edge collision happening at t=6. Assume for now that the ball is moving
between times 2 and 6.99 For example, we would have HoldsAt(move,5). But
since our scenario contains Happens(hit-edge,6), we know from Terminates(hit-
edge,move,t), that movement is stopped. We can use the Clipped predicate to
express this, e.g. Clipped(3,move,8), which says that between times 3 and 8 a
token of an event-type terminating move happened, in this case hit-edge.
Continuous Change
The above predicates for instantaneous changes nicely describes what happens
when billiards balls hit each other,100 but is inadequate to describe say the pro-
cess of ﬁlling a bucket of water from a tap, exactly what we need to account for
activities or accomplishments. For continuous change, we need two more predi-
cates.
-Trajectory(f1,t,f 2,d)
-Releases(e,f,t)
To explain these, let us continue with our bucket-ﬁlling example. Let the
ﬂuent ﬁll be the activity of water ﬁlling the bucket, and the ﬂuent bucket(x)b e
the partial object that represents the height of the water in the bucket. Suppose
that we begin with an empty bucket (e.g Initially(bucket(0))).101 Imagine there
97This would make for a very boring game of pool, but it makes the explication of the
predicates much easier.
98It is a critical predicate for capturing the principle of inertia that will be seen in the next
section.
99Intuitively, this is the principle of inertia. We know that Happens(collision,2), which
initiates movement, and have no information that movement has been terminated, and thus
can assume that the ball is still moving.
100And in Aktionsart terms, is enough to account for achievements and other instantaneous
event semantic event types.
101This is an example of a parameterized ﬂuent hinted at above. Here the parameter in
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is an event turn-on which is the event of turning on the tap. This event initiates
fill which is the process of water ﬂowing out of the tap, and into the bucket.
Intuitively, as long as the water is ﬂowing, the bucket is being ﬁlled to a greater
degree.102 This is exactly what the Trajectory predicate is used for. For example,
the predicate
Trajectory(fill,t,bucket(x + d),d)
says that if fillis true between times t and t+d,t h e na tt i m et+d,103 the bucket
is ﬁlled to the degree x + d. We can also nominate a constant c to represent the
degree when the bucket is considered to be completely ﬁlled, and thus ending the
ﬁlling process.
The Releases predicate is necessary to bring together the two notions of
change. In this example, we have Initially(bucket(0)), which also is the same as
saying that HoldsAt(bucket(0),0).104 We have seen how events can trigger instan-
taneous change, e.g. Initiates(turn-on,fill,t), and that fillgradually changes the
state of the bucket, but not the relation between the turn − on event and the
degree change in the bucket. This is accomplished by
Releases(turn-on,bucket(x),t)
which ensures that once the tap is turned on, the state of the bucket is free to
change. This ties in with the Clipped predicate described above. As bucket(0) is a
ﬂuent, it needs to be terminated in order for the continuous change to take place.
One way of something being Clipped is for an event to happen that releases it.
3.10 Aktionsarten and Scenarios
In the previous section we discussed the predicates of the event calculus as well
as events and ﬂuents and how the predicates relate them to each other. The
examples given to illustrate them did look like examples of the various event
types discussed in Chapter 2. This section will make the basic Aktionsarten
more explicit, as well as introduce the notion of scenario.
First of all, we need to slightly diﬀerentiate the types of ﬂuents. In the last
section ﬂuents were used to represent both states such as the non-movement of a
ball, or the degree of fullness of a bucket. They were also associated with activities
such as the movement of the ball or water ﬁlling the bucket. While all ﬂuents are
102Until the bucket is completely ﬁlled. After this, the water may still be running, but we
would construe fill as having stopped.
103Using the predicates, this means that HoldsAt(fill,t)a n d¬Clipped(t,fill,t + d).
104This follows from an axiom (see Appendix) that says that if a ﬂuent is initially true in the
discourse model, then it holds at time 0.108 Interlude
constructed by the same reiﬁcation procedure, there can be diﬀerentiation via the
syntactic role they play in the scenario. This can be seen below with the general
notion of eventuality that the basic event-types are constructed from.105
An eventuality is a structure (f1,f 2,e,f 3), where
1. f1 is a ﬂuent which represents an activity, something which exerts
a force
2. f2 is a parametrized ﬂuent, representing a parametrized object
or state, which is driven by the force f1
3. e is the culminating event, representing a canonical goal
4. f3 is a ﬂuent which represents the state of having achieved the
goal
Accordingly, one may associate to each VP a quadruple, each ele-
ment of which is of the form ‘-’ (indicating that this slot may remain
empty), ‘e’ (third argument only) or ‘f’ (ﬁrst, second and fourth ar-
gument)
This is very similar to the ‘event nucleus’ of (Moens & Steedman, 1988) discussed
in Chapter 2. Here f1 corresponds to the preparation, f3 to the consequent state
and e to the actual event. However, there is also the parameterized object/state,
f2, which we used in the bucket-ﬁlling example, and in general is important for
the treatment of accomplishments and the progressive. These diﬀerences are
between state and activity ﬂuents (f2 and f3 vs. f1). The ﬁrst can appear as
the ﬂuent argument of the Releases predicate and the second ﬂuent argument
of the Trajectory predicate, but not the ﬁrst ﬂuent argument of the predicate.
In contrast, f1 appears as the ﬁrst argument of the Trajectory predicate. Recall
the bucket-ﬁlling example with Trajectory(fill,t,bucket(x+d),d), where the ﬁrst
ﬂuent is the activity of ﬁlling the bucket, while the second ﬂuent argument is the
state of the bucket’s fullness.
Aktionsarten can then be deﬁned as speciﬁc types of eventualities. Note that
the above deﬁnes an eventuality as having the form (f1,f 2,e,f 3), but not all
slots of the tuple need be ﬁlled. For example, the if the tuple is (-,-,-,f3), this
is an Aktionsart that contains only a stative ﬂuent. Unsurprisingly, this is the
eventuality for a state. We shall now examine the various types of eventualities
and the corresponding lexical and conceptual material, the scenario.
105Deﬁnition stolen from (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, p.84). This deﬁnition can be seen as
the ‘bare minimum’ to capture the basic types of eventualities. However, the aspectualisers
discussed in Chapter 2 require extra structure. For example, an ingressive event would have a
punctual event that is prior to the activity ﬂuent.3.10. Aktionsarten and Scenarios 109
3.10.1 Scenarios
While leaving the formal deﬁnition to the appendix, scenarios can be seen as
‘micro-theories’ that state speciﬁc causal relationships holding between predi-
cates, as well as events that have occurred in a given situation. For example,
‘ﬁll a bucket’ required a filling event and a partial object corresponding to the
bucket’s state, as well as the events and causal relationships (i.e. the turn − on
event and the Trajectory predicate) that are involved. In general a scenario is a
conjunction of statements, e.g. S(t) → Initiates(e,f,t),106 where for now, we can
think of a state as a positive or negative HoldsAt predicate.107 More importantly
for our purposes the scenarios express lexical meaning. To see how this works,
we shall see examples of achievements, activities and accomplishments.
Achievements
Achievements such as ‘reach the top’ consist of an instantaneous event followed
by a resulting state. Therefore, it will have a form (-,-,+,+) which is the tuple
version of the preceding predicate. The relevant ﬂuent and event are constructed
by reiﬁcation, with the lexical entry for ‘reach the top’ being
Initiates(reach,be-at-the-top,t)
which says the at time t the event reach initiates the state of being at the top.
Note that the terminating event terminates an activity that is not explicitly
mentioned in the scenario. But world knowledge and the context of the discourse
suﬃce to ﬁll this in.
The even simpler eventuality of a point (e.g. cough) is represented as (-,-,+,-),
meaning that it consists of an instantaneous event only.
Activities
The previous example was of eventualities regarding instantaneous change (achieve-
ments) or no change at all (points). In this section we will look at activities. Take
the example of ‘pushing a cart’. There is continuous change regarding the cart’s
position that is driven by the activity push. Moreover, there are punctual events
start and stop that can be said to initiate and terminate the pushing. With these
106The predicate Initiates is in the consequent, but it could be any of the other predicates of
the Event Calculus, barring HoldsAt. The antecedent may also be empty.
107But equalities between ﬂuent terms or between event terms or formulas of arithmetic are
also allowed. Secondly, the →’s should not be taken to be a material conditional, as the Event
Calculus is non-monotonic. However, we shall leave the meaning of the arrows to the ﬁnal
sections of this interlude that discuss the workings of the system. For now, however, keep in
mind the notion of backwards planning from a goal discussed at the beginning.110 Interlude
as well as a parameterized f2 ﬂuent position(x) to represent the cart’s positions
and a function g to help calculate it, we can get the appropriate scenario.
1. Initially(position(a))108
2. Initiates(start,push,t)
3. Terminates(stop,push,t)
4. Releases(start,position(x),t)
5. HoldsAt(position(x), t) →
Trajectory(push, t, position(x + g(d)), d)109
This scenario states that the cart has an initial position, and once the pushing
is started by a starting event, the cart’s position is allowed to vary, via Releases,
and the fact that the pushing causes the cart to vary in position. In general, we
will refer to statements of the form of the last two as ‘the dynamics’. Note that
once the stop event occurs,110 the pushing activity is terminated.
Accomplishments
An accomplishment is similar to an activity in that it involves continuous change,
but does diﬀer in the latter is atelic, while the former involves a goal. This can
be done by deﬁning a stage of the partial object where the telic goal is reached,
meaning that the eventuality is completed and ﬁnished. For example, in the
accomplishment ‘build a house’, we have a activity build that causes the partial
object house(x) to change. At some point, the house is completed, which triggers
a finish111 event that terminates the building process – call this constant c,w i t h
house(c) the ﬂuent representing the consequent state of the house being built. In
general, the eventuality corresponding to an accomplishment is (+,+,+,+), and
in the speciﬁc case we are looking at, it is (build,house(x),finish,house(c)). Its
scenario could be
1. Initially(house(a))
2. Initiates(start, build, t)
108a represents whatever the carts position is at the beginning of the scenario.
109The g in the Trajectory predicate is merely a function of time that is deﬁnable in the
language of the reals that satisﬁes g(0) = 0. This function means that (in this scenario) that
we needn’t assume uniform velocity for the pushing, which would be the case if the description
of position(x) in the third Trajectory place would have been merely x + d.
110This could be reaching a destination, or merely the pusher getting tired and stopping the
pointless exercise.
111For activities there is a stop event that is not dependent on any condition.3.10. Aktionsarten and Scenarios 111
3. Initiates(ﬁnish, house(c), t)
4. Terminates(ﬁnish, build, t)
5. HoldsAt(build, t) ∧ HoldsAt(house(c), t) → Happens(ﬁnish, t)
6. Releases(start, house(x), t)
7. HoldsAt(house(x), t) → Trajectory(build, t, house(x + g(d)), d)
Note that the only major diﬀerence between an accomplishment and activity
lies in statements 3 and 5 which involve the goal finish. The former says that
the finish event initiates the state of the house having been completed, and the
latter describes the conditions for reaching this goal.
Final Aktionsarten remarks
While we have spoken of the eventuality of a VP, or a scenario for a speciﬁc
VP like ‘build a house’, it should be noted that these need to be seen as default
correspondences. We can view scenarios as Zacks and Tversky’s event scripts
made ﬂesh. There it was shown that scripts are not set in stone, but can vary
due to context, culture, or even as seen in the ﬁnal experiment of Wagner, age.
For example, the results in (Wagner & Carey, 2003) strongly suggests that young
children are not using conventional event schema for events, or at least do not use
the same divisions. In the chapter on lexical aspect, we saw that certain verbs
were of diﬀerent aktionsarten in diﬀerent languages,112 and it was also noted
that such things can vary even between speakers of the same language. What is
important is that we have a set of ‘building blocks’ to create the various scripts
in a part-whole manner, that takes the notion of goal and intention seriously.113
There is also another reason to view scenarios as ﬂexible in their details.
In Chapter 2 numerous examples of ‘coercion’ were discussed, which means
that the mapping of the VP to an eventuality type is also a default at best. For
example, there were Comrie’s observations on the ﬁne conceptual line between
viewing something as a state or an activity (across languages), as well as how
some verbs in the same language can be viewed as either.114 Take the example
from (Croft, 1998)
(9) She is resembling her mother more and more every day.
112Especially those that can be seen as either states or activites, i.e. dry.
113In the next chapter, events (in speciﬁc contexts) will be seen that diﬀer only in intention
and social information.
114Recall also that in the event calculus, both states and activities are represented by ﬂuents.
It is only their syntactic role in the eventuality that diﬀerentiates them.112 Interlude
where the verb resemble, normally a state is used as an activity. In terms of the
Event Calculus we would need a way to ‘transform’ what is normally a mere f3
ﬂuent to an activity.115 Informally, we can see how this is done. The default
mapping yields a ﬂuent resemble. The extra lexical material, ‘more and more’
introduces a parameterized ﬂuent f(x)t h a td e n o t e sresemblance to degree x.
Finally, given that the sentence is in the progressive (and therefore an activity in
this context), we need to introduce our two dynamic statements
1. Releases(e,f2,t)
2. HoldsAt(f2(x),t) → Trajectory(f1, t, f2(x), d)
To begin with there is a bit of a mismatch. Normally, the ﬂuent resemble116
is represented by an f3 ﬂuent, but the additional lexical material of the sentence
demands a ﬂuent for continuous change as well as a dynamics. So in this case, the
ﬂuent resemble is ‘uniﬁed’117 with f1 of the above scenario, with f(x) unifying
with the f2 ﬂuent. Thus what is normally a stative eventuality becomes an
activity.
3.10.2 Hierarchical Planning
Thus far, the basic elements and predicates of the Event Calculus have been
introduced as well as a way of linking lexical and conceptual information to build
scenarios for discourse models. However, the reader may have noticed something
lacking in our discussion of events proper. Up to now, all the examples of e
are instantaneous, for example, points such as cough,o rstart and ﬁnish events
used in a scenario. However, something temporally extended, like ‘build a house’
is certainly an event as well, and we would like in the language of the event
calculus to say that it happens at a certain point in time.118 But, examining the
eventuality and scenario for it in the last section, there is no feasible candidate.
The only e-types are the start and finish events, which are punctual.
Moreover, there is no way to account for the perfective/imperfective distinc-
tion. Recall that for the English simple present tense, a sentence like John built
a house both implies that the goal had been reached and views the event as a
115This is done formally in (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 11). In fact most of the types
of coercion discussed in Chapter 2 are covered formally in this chapter.
116In such sentences as She resembles her mother.
117This concept will become a bit more clear when we discuss the computational machinery
in the later sections. For now, it is fuzzy and intuitive. Think of it as possible substitutions to
ﬁt the reiﬁed ﬂuents into a scenario. In this case only this possibility works, as is explained on
(Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, p. 174). The other, reverse substitution possibility fails because
of the tricky Releases predicate.
118i.e. We want the complete event of ‘build a house’ to be the subject of a Happens predicate.3.10. Aktionsarten and Scenarios 113
completed whole. In contrast, John was building a house implies no such com-
pletion of a goal, and views the event from an internal temporal perspective. The
latter is easily formalisable. For example, the scenario contains the activity ﬂuent
build, which holds as long as the event is ongoing. So, we could represent119 the
past progressive sentence as
HoldsAt(build,t), t<n o w
which says that building activity was going on sometime in the past. Importantly,
as the goal has not yet been reached at the time of the above statement, it is
possible that extraneous events happen that stop the building process and the
successful reaching of the goal.
For the perfective viewpoint, we need a way of utilising the scenario informa-
tion in such a way that this is possible. Such a feat is accomplished by recourse
to the hierarchical nature of events and levels of granularity discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. In this spirit what is needed is to fuse the various elements of the
scenario into a single event. This is accomplished by deﬁning a new event type.
Let f be a ﬂuent representing an activity, startf a starting event, and ﬁnishf the
canonical terminating event, representing achievement of the goal. Deﬁne a new
event type e by
Happens(startf,s)∧Happens(ﬁnishf,r)∧ s<t≤ r∧HoldsAt(f,t) → Happens(e,t).
Continuing with our concrete example, the perfective viewpoint of ‘build a house’
would then be
Happens(startbuild,s) ∧ Happens(ﬁnishbuild,r) ∧ s<t≤ r ∧ HoldsAt(build,t) →
Happens(e,t).
Should the start and finish events occur successfully, the temporal proﬁle of
the newly deﬁned e will be set to the period equal between these two punctual
events.
An activity such as ‘push a cart’ can be treated in the same way, but with
stopf instead of finishf, meaning that while there is no canonical goal to be
reached, the activity is still gathered up into a perfective whole.
119Please note that this is not the proper way to do tense. That will become clearer in the
upcoming sections. This example is for illustrative purposes only.114 Interlude
3.11 An informal sketch of the computational
machinery
Now that the predicates, scenarios and diﬀerent ways of constructing events has
been explained, it is now time to sketch how they work. This is important, as
while the predicates of the event calculus have intuitive plausibility, it is preferable
to be able to ﬁx their meaning more formally by relating them to each other via
axioms. Secondly, we have been informally discussing comprehension in terms of
discourse models. The use of axioms and a computational system allows one to
explain how during comprehension of a sentence in an extended discourse that
a discourse model is computed. The reader is directed to the appendix to see
the full, formal deﬁnitions of the axioms, but many of them rely on the principle
of inertia in slightly diﬀerent forms. For our purposes the following informal
formulation from (Hamm et al., 2006, p.15) is useful.
if a ﬂuent f holds initially or has been initiated by some event occur-
ring at time t and no event terminating f has occurred between t and
t >t ,t h e nf holds at t.
In even plainer English, this says that should a ﬂuent start to hold at t, it will
continue to hold until t unless an explicit cause terminates the ﬂuent before t.120
This can be demonstrated by a simple discourse.
(10) It was hot. John took oﬀ his sweater.121
The ﬁrst sentence serves as background, where ‘hot’ is true the whole time. It is
a simple past sentence that denotes an event (‘taking oﬀ a sweater’) that is then
inserted in the background state. This event structure interpretation is arrived
at by the following reasoning. Our knowledge of the world generally says nothing
about the eﬀect of taking oﬀ a sweater on the air temperature. By the linguistic
form (‘it was hot’), we know that the state hot holds at some time t before now.
By the predicates and axioms of the EC, it then follows that hot either holds
initially (in our discourse model) or is initiated by some event. But there is no
event speciﬁed in the discourse, and so hot holds initially. Importantly, since the
discourse mentions no terminating event to hot, the principle of inertia tells us
that it extends indeﬁnitely. Therefore, the event denoted by the second sentence
must be placed inside that of the ﬁrst.
Note that in the reasoning above it was implicitly assumed that as the dis-
course mentions only two eventualities, the event structure contains only these
120As can be seen by the above quote this principle of inertia also holds for those ﬂuents that
hold initially in the discourse model.
121The original example in (Hamm et al., 2006) is in French to demonstrate the discourse
combination of the imparfait and passe simple. As the aspectual combination is the same for
English in this sentence, there is no need to complicate matters any further.3.11. An informal sketch of the computational machinery 115
two events. But this needn’t be the case. For example, should the discourse
have been continued with Mary opened the window the event structure would be
diﬀerent. A sentence would then be added to the scenario stating that the event
of opening the window terminates the room temperature being hot.122 This does
not contradict the axioms, as they would only be violated if hot no longer held,
but no terminating event occurred.
Thus it is the case that the axiom sketched above has the desired inertial
eﬀect only in ‘minimal’ models of the discourse. Again, resorting to an informal
description in (Hamm et al., 2006, p. 15), ‘minimal’ refers to the requirements
that
i the model only contains those occurrences of events forced to be there by
the discourse and the axioms
ii the interpretation of the primitive predicates (Initiates etc.) is as small as
is consistent with the discourse and the axioms
This means that in a discourse model no unforeseen events are allowed to occur
and that the causal inﬂuences do not vary from what is expected. As hinted
at in the analysis of the above mini-discourse, choosing to work with minimal
models leads to non-monotonicity. In minimal models of the above discourse, the
heat continues unless an additional event happens. Similarly, this sort of non-
monotonicity is ideal for treating the English Progressive. Recall that a sentence
like
(11) John was building a house.
may have a default implication to successful completion of the house, but it is not
a strict implication. However, using the scenario from the previous section and
the axioms, in minimal models the house will be built. But, should the sentence
be
(12) John was building a house when a beam fell on his head.
an event is added to the discourse model that presumably terminates the building
ﬂuent and stops the canonical goal from being reached. Also, in our coercion
example of a state used as an activity, we saw how the default discourse model
is changed to yield a non-default interpretation.
3.11.1 Integrity Constraints
For the purposes of this interlude the ﬁnal piece of the puzzle in describing how
event structures are computed is to discuss integrity constraints. The relation
122This may seem like a common-sense bit of world knowledge, but even this notion is only a
default. During the European heat wave of July, 2006, opening a window did not eﬀect inertia
one bit. Only industrial strength air conditioning would do the trick.116 Interlude
between a sentence and a discourse model can be viewed as follows. We want to
view a sentence as a goal (‘make S true’) to be achieved by updating the discourse
model. We can see how this works by examining the English present perfect. Take
the following example
(13) I have caught the ﬂu.
where f is the ﬂuent expressing having the ﬂu and e is the event of infection.
These two can be related in the language of the event calculus by means of the
simple formula Initiates(e,f,t), which expresses the world knowledge that the
event of infection is a cause of the ﬂu. If we assume that this use of the perfect
has present relevance,123 then it is the case that I have the ﬂu now.G i v e n t h e
idea expressed in the previous paragraph, let us see what it means to view (13) as
a goal that says, ‘Make “I have caught the ﬂu” true in the given discourse model’.
Suppose we start with a pre-existent discourse model with facts about events
and ﬂuents. What is then needed is to construct a minimal adaptation of this
model in which HoldsAt(f,now) is true. This cannot be done by merely adding
this as a fact to the current discourse model,124 but instead the sentence Hold-
sAt(f,now) triggers a kind of backward reasoning using the axioms of the event
calculus, and scenario information (including basic world knowledge). In this case
we can use the axiom of inertia discussed in the previous section.
We know that if the ﬂuent f holds initially or has been initiated by an event
at time t and between time t and t no event occurs to terminate it, then it still
holds at time t.
Our conceptual information for this particular ﬂuent says that it is initiated
by an event e. In (13), no terminating event is mentioned, and so we can conclude
by closed world reasoning that no such event occurred. Given this, and the axiom
of inertia, there is only one fact to establish that I have the ﬂu now, namely that
the infection event e happened before now, i.e. Happens(e,t), t<n o w . This fact
(and the logical consequence that occurs with Initiates(e,f,t)) is then added to
the model. Nothing else need be added, but the result is that we end up with a
model in which HoldsAt(f,now) is true. This abductive reasoning is what allows
us to infer from (13) that there was an infection event in the past. This is the
analogue of backward reasoning from goal to plan in robot planning discussed in
the beginning of this interlude.
More generally in the event calculus, this sort of reasoning process is carried
by a derivation procedure that in logic programming is called resolution.T h e
derivation is started with a formula as a top query, which we want to make true
in a discourse model. In the above case the top query is HoldsAt(f,now). To
show that the purpose of a derivation is to test whether the query can be re-
123This is not always the case with the perfect. There is also the existential perfect as in, I
have caught the ﬂu before. It’s no fun at all.
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alised in a model, we write it as ?HoldsAt(f,now). The process then involves
matching the query to the consequent of an axiom suitable to the query.125 The
initial query is then replaced by the antecedent of the axiom, which then becomes
the new query to be resolved. As long as there are consequents of axioms to be
matched, the process continues. It stops when there is a query that cannot be
further resolved. In this case, it ends with Happens(e,t), t<n o w . In the Event
Calculus, this unresolvable query is interpreted as an instruction to update the
model with material to make the initial query true. We will call this top query
an integrity constraint, which is written as
?HoldsAt(f,now) succeeds
Thus, we can now see from the above that the update nature of tenses is formally
represented in the Event Calculus by means of integrity constraints.
Other types of Integrity Constraints
In the last section we saw an example of an integrity constraint that says that
the query must succeed. This is not always the case and can be exempliﬁed by
the simple past tense when applied to non-statives. In these cases the English
simple past is perfective and conﬁnes the event completely to the past. Compare
(14) a. #John ran and he still is.
b. John was running and he still is.
Taking the sentence John ran, the ﬁrst attempt at formalisation would be to con-
struct an event e via the coding methods and hierarchical planning (to capture
the perfective viewpoint of the simple past) and have the integrity constraint be
?Happens(e,t), t<n o wsucceeds126
This places a run event in the past, as desired, but does not rule out the event
continuing into the present in our model, in contradiction to the linguistic fact
seen in (14). In minimal models the set {t | Happens(e,t)} consists of a ﬁnite set
125In this case the axiom of inertia for instantaneous change will do. Formally, it looks like
Happens(e,t) ∧ Initiates(e,f,t) ∧ t<t

∧¬ Clipped(t,f,t

) → HoldsAt(f,t

). It is the HoldsAt
in the consequent of this formula that we match our query to.
126This is inaccurate for two reasons. The ﬁrst will be discussed below. The second is that
instead of anchoring the time to an instant t, it is actually anchored to a Reichenbachian
reference time R. For details, see (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 8).118 Interlude
of intervals. Each interval is an e token.127 We want to make sure that there is
one token that lies completely in the past. This is done by a negative integrity
constraint.
?Happens(e,now), fails
which says that any update resulting in ?Happens(e,now) is not allowed. The
simple past then has two integrity constraints, one positive and one negative
needed to capture its update properties. They can, however, be combined in to
one constraint128
?Happens(e,t) t<n o w , succeeds, Happens(e,now) fails
127This is a bit complicated. For the full explanation the reader is invited to see (Lambalgen
& Hamm, 2005, p. 41-43). But think of events in terms of ﬂuents. Interpret ﬂuents as the
sets of intervals (a,b], where a is the instant where an initiating event occurs and b the instant
where the next terminating event occurs. We can then deﬁne event-types in terms of the set of
intervals (for a given ﬂuent) where, speaking intuitively, this ﬂuent is intimated or terminated.
A given interval in this set is an event-token (i.e. an actual event occurrence.)
128And give us something that looks like the proper representation for the simple past.Chapter 4
Perception Verbs
Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes? – Chico Marx, pretending
to be Groucho
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is an examination of the logical, syntactic, and semantic properties of
English verbs of perception, such as see, hear, etc. For the present, two classes can
be diﬀerentiated – a more stative class and an activity class. In English, verbs for
visual and aural perception have the pairs see/watch and hear/listen that diﬀer
in their aspectual properties. Both types shall be explored, but emphasis is to
be on the former type. Aside from the aspectual diﬀerence between the see and
watch type, verbs of perception – primarily see and hear,h a v ean u m b e ro fo t h e r
senses that go beyond direct perception. The examples below illustrate this.
(1) a. I saw Mary leaving the room.
b. I saw that Mary had left the room (as her coat was gone).
c. I see now that global warming is not an anti-capitalist conspiracy cre-
ated by loony environmentalists.
d. I hear what you’re saying, but I don’t agree.
Sentence (1-a) is a direct perception sentence, that describes my perceptual ex-
perience of the event of Mary’s exit. (1-b), while perhaps involving direction
perception (seeing a closet without a coat) is nevertheless indirect perception as
the exit event is not seen, but inferred from the perception. Sentences (1-c) and
(d), show the use of perceptions verbs to express understanding or a realisation.
Only the direct perception type will be investigated, here.
Section 2 explores the logical and psychological properties of direct perception
reports – examining the issue of whether if something is seen is enough to then
infer that the event actually happened. That is, are direct perception reports
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information preserving? Section 3 examines the syntax of direct perception re-
ports as well as the non-logical semantic properties, especially the temporal and
aspectual interaction between the matrix verb and complement. A recent mini-
malist account (with a Kratzerian event semantics link) of (Felser, 1999) is then
examined. This account, however, in the author’s view fails in two main areas.
The ﬁrst is that the coordination of tense between matrix and complement (that,
e.g. the seeing of the matrix and the event happening in the complement must
be simultaneous) is treated syntactically. Doubts are cast upon this by an exam-
ination of other complement taking verbs where the simultaneity property does
not hold, leading toward a semantic treatment of tense coordination. Secondly,
the aktionsart of see is actually a rather complicated matter, and needs a more
detailed examination than given in Felser’s account (or any other that I am aware
of).
This is the subject of the fourth section, where the aktionsart of both see and
watch are worked out in great detail, as well as the rather complex interactions
that occur when varying tense and grammatical aspect are paid close attention
to. With the tense, aktionsart and aspectual phenomena accounted for, Section
5 is a formalisation of both see and watch that captures the varying tense and
aspect, as well as the logical properties taken as a strong default, rather than
strictly information preserving.
Finally, there is a brief look at the use of ing complements, and the rather
complex way they receive tense, depending on verb type and context. This both
reinforces the need for a semantic treatment of tense coordination in direct per-
ception reports, and leads into the study of ing-nominalisation that is the subject
of the following Chapter 6.
4.2 Logical and psychological properties of per-
ception verbs
Before examining the tense and aspectual properties of English perception verbs,
an excursion into the well-known logical properties is ﬁrst necessary. While both
the psychological and logical properties of these verbs are not the main focus
of this chapter, insights gained from these will inform the necessary modelling
in the event calculus. We shall ﬁrst brieﬂy look at the seemingly natural log-
ical characterisation of perception and its presumed implications. Next, some
objections from (Lambalgen, 2002) and (Jackendoﬀ, 1992), showing that a look
at the psychology of vision sheds light upon its supposed logical characteristics.
Finally, observations from (Gee, 1977) are used to show that both psychological
aspects of vision as well as cultural knowledge inﬂuences the use of perception
verbs. Indeed, it is the ordinary language use of verbs such as see that is at issue
here, not a (most likely hopeless) account of direct perception of the world that is
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for one whose intention is to study tense and aspect interactions in perception
reports, but it is needed as a starting point of the formalisation of see and related
perception verbs.
4.2.1 Logical properties
The three listed principles are the hallmark logical properties of perception re-
ports.1
1. Veridicality: For simple2 sentences, if a sees φ,t h e nφ
2. Substitution: If a sees φ(t1)a n dt 1 =t 2,t h e na sees φ(t2)
3. Exportability: If a sees some x such that φ(x), then three is an x such that
a sees φ(x)
For now, we shall focus only on the ﬁrst and then come back to some inter-
esting thought experiments by Gee that questions that viability of substitution.
The ﬁrst principle – veridicality – says that the complements of perception verbs
in a direct perception context (i.e. bare inﬁnitives and the corresponding -ing
version) are factive. If I saw Mary cross the street, then indeed Mary crossed the
street. Of course the converse also holds – that is, if Mary didn’t cross the street
after all, then I couldn’t possibly have seen it.
This view takes perceptual reports to be information preserving. What is
seen is the “objective” world3 and so a semantics of a verb like see should be
formulated in terms of this objective world.4 Therefore, the notion of veridicality
must go through. If I perceive Mary walk across the street, and perception is
that of the objective world then the utterance, “I saw Mary cross the street”
must indeed imply that Mary did such an act. Contrast the use of see,w i t ha
non information preserving verb such as believe. I can believe that the earth is
ﬂat, with no implication that it actually is. However, on the veridical view of see,
I could not have seen Mary cross the street if she actually didn’t.
1The below formulation is from (Higginbotham, 1983), but similar can be found in much of
the semantic literature.
2‘Simple’ is meant to exclude irrealis contexts.
3Or actually, bits of it at any one time.
4Substition allows for the replacement of diﬀerent names or descriptions of the same object
to be substituted salva veritae. For example if Mary is also my sister, then if I saw Mary
walking I also saw my sister walking. Were this a case of indirect perception, e.g. I saw that
Mary was walking, but didn’t know she was my sister the substitution would not go through.
Exportability means that if I see Mary where Mary is walking, then there is such a Mary such
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There is certainly reason to take such a view. In ordinary life, we are often
more convinced evidentially by a perception statement, providing the witness is
reliable. It is usually only in circumstances such as bad light, fog, a house of
illusions and the like that one is liable to question the content of the report. In
criminal law an eyewitness report of what happened is considered to be rather
strong evidence, often the strongest type.
However, there is a tension between “truth” of the complement and what is
seen. An attorney cross-examining an eyewitness report can attack its veracity
on two counts. The ﬁrst would be that the witness is a liar and cannot be trusted.
There is no issue of veridicality here, and (if a lie) the perception report can be
thrown out as unsafe evidence. The second method of attack is more interesting
for our purposes.
An attorney can cast doubts upon the content of the perception itself. If it was
a dark and foggy night, was the witness certain that it was Mr. X that she saw
robbing the house? Did she see anyone at all, or was it a trick of the light? This
case is more interesting than the ﬁrst because the witness is perfectly justiﬁed
in her perception report – she merely told the court what she saw. The defense
attorney would couch his language5 in such a way to deny that the witness saw
what she said she saw. Our esteemed witness claims she saw Mr. X robbing the
house, but this is plainly impossible...
Assuming the defense attorney is correct, what can we say happened? The
lawyer would say (using the principle of veridicality and modus tollens)t h a tt h e
witness did not and could not see Mr. X rob the house, because Mr. X did not
rob the house. But yet the witness is honest and when presented with Mr. X in a
line up picks him out as the culprit she saw. It turns out that the house was never
robbed to begin with and tricks of light, fog, and an over-active imagination led
the witness to her perceptual experience. Indeed, after argument and reﬂection,
the witness may indeed agree that she did not see what she thought she did. Yet,
at the time of the supposed crime she was perfectly justiﬁed in saying, “I see a
man robbing the house”, because this is exactly what she perceives at the time.
Moving away from courtroom drama and contrived stories, ordinary language
has a simple way of exhibiting the tension between perceptual reports as infor-
mation preserving and as a mere report of what the individual perceives.6 There
is the expression, “I was just seeing things” to describe the experience of “see-
ing” something that isn’t there. In this expression, not only is veridicality not
assumed, it is contradicted. The expression contains within it the denial that
anything was seen, but does not deny the seeing itself.
The above stories regarding witnesses and the supposed veridicality of what
they see, focusses on the power of reports of perception, not the act of perception
5All decent attorneys make the interpretation procedure as diﬃcult as possible.
6This is already assuming that one does not directly perceive the world, an inarguable point
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itself. In ordinary life, perception itself is of necessity ‘veridical’. That is, if I am
walking down the street and see a tree, I do not think about what I am seeing
and do not for one second doubt the existence of the tree. Certainly, I would
not purposefully walk into it, just to ﬁnd out if my perception is non-veridical.
Perception is just my way of being in and being able to interact with the world,7
and generally not something doubted, or even thought about. This certainly
supports a strong veridicality for perception.
That said, the examples above show that in ordinary life, we know that our
eyes can sometimes deceive us and even acknowledge this with such expressions as
the cliche in this sentence. Moreover, we learn through experience the (ordinary)
circumstances wherein our perception does fail, such as bad light, fog, bad vision,
or simple optical illusions. It seems that we move though the world as if our
perceptions were indeed veridical8 we are acutely aware that it is not always the
case, and this doubt does show up in perception reports.
We are left, then, in a bit of a quandary. On the one hand, the philosophers
and semanticists do not have a monopoly on the notion of truth preservation and
veridicality – there is a strong tendency in many cases to assume such principles
in ordinary life as well. However, the brief examples above show that ordinary
language recognises that not all seeing is veridical. It is perfectly reasonable to
say that I saw something that wasn’t there. Should a drunk come up to me and
exclaim over the wonder of the dancing pink elephants he saw, I would doubt
the existence of such fanciful elephants wandering the streets of Amsterdam, but
I would be inclined to believe that he saw such a thing. One way to dissolve
this tension is to assume that the relation between perception and the world is
mediated by psychology, as well as cultural practice and concepts. With these
interferences, it is quite plausible to imagine that people actually see9 things that
aren’t there.
4.2.2 Psychology and perception
One way to account for both the compelling veridicality of perception reports,
but still holding this to be a default is a move from direct perception of the world
to mediated perception via psychological modelling. This approach has been
taken in various forms in (Jackendoﬀ, 1992), (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976) and
(Lambalgen, 2002). For example, the ‘visual experience’ one has may change
given additional information, thus eﬀecting what one sees. For example, while
7I am concentrating on visual perception here, because at least for the sighted, this must be
the most ‘compelling’ sense.
8In fact, it would be rather diﬃcult to live in the world if we acted as if the world were
a funhouse or a mass hallucination. I believe that it was Hume who commenting on Berke-
ley’s arguments for scepticism noted something to the eﬀect that while they were rationally
unimpeachable, they were not so powerful that one would be compelled to walk of a cliﬀ.
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walking in the forest I can see a snake on the ground, but while carefully moving
closer, it is only an old rubber hose. There is no change in the object, of course,
but my visual information is reﬁned, changing what I see. While actual and more
sophisticated psychological accounts can be found in the above references, the
intuitive little story is to show that accounts of see have used a causal process
to mediate between the perception report and the world. When this mediation
happens to match what is in the world, verdicality follows.10
While in no way doubting that some variation of this causal story is what
actually goes on in perception, I have my doubts as to whether it captures the
meaning and usage of it.11 Instead, I have taken some inspiration from (Wittgen-
stein, 1953, p.193 - 214) for a way out.12 His remarks on see seem to be a reaction
to a sort of Russellian empiricism about vision. This view can be simplistically
characterised as follows: when I look at a box, I receive sense data that are then
put together in such a way that I interpret the image in my mind as a box.
Wittgenstein is sceptical both of a causal explanation of perception to account
for its meaning,13 as well as the role interpretation plays in perception. Unar-
guably, interpretation plays a role when critiquing abstract art, seeing ﬁgures in
clouds, or a children’s game where the child sees the box as a castle. But in what
we may call ‘ordinary’ perception this is not the case, rather the perception is
not interpreted, but just something that forces itself upon us. Wittgenstein gives
two examples, one with an optical illusion that changes aspects14 and that of an
ordinary object. On page 194-195, he illustrates a situation where someone is
shown the ﬁgure for the ﬁrst time and is unaware of the trick.
I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit
from the ﬁrst. That is to say, if asked “What’s that?” or “What do
you see here?” I should have replied: “A picture-rabbit”...I should not
10Thankfully, this often does seem to be the case.
11I should say here that I am not rejecting all use of psychology and cognition in relation to
semantics. The introduction, and ﬁrst two main chapters make much use of psychology and
general cognitive principles in regard to general event structure, the interpretation of tense and
aspect and the like. Moreover, I think that a certain folk psychology will certainly have an
impact on the usage of various lexical items, including verbs of perception. But, I don’t believe
that a causal account alone captures the meaning of a lexical item. Not that I am accusing any
of the above authors of going that far.
12The word inspiration should be duly noted. I am not going to (or am able to) give an
exegesis of these confounding, but beautiful remarks. I am still trying to grasp them fully and
would not want to claim Wittgenstein holds something that just happens to be a product of
my misunderstanding.
13Its causes are of interest to psychologists, he notes on p.193 in regard to noticing a new
aspect when looking at a face.
14The famous gestalt duck-rabbit picture that can appear as a picture of a rabbit or picture
of a duck, but not both at the same time. Once one is familiar with the trick and has a little
practise, they can then witch between the two images at will. This latter switching between
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have answered the question “What do you see here?” by saying: “Now
I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit”. I should simply have described
my perception: just as if I had said “I see a red circle over there”
Nevertheless someone else could have said of me: “He is seeing the
ﬁgure as a picture-rabbit.”
The last line is also quite important as it exhibits the diﬀerences that can
arise between ﬁrst and third person perception reports.15 It also shows that
when someone is aware of the trick, they can bring a notion of interpretation or
awareness in the perception report. This is, of course, not only possible in third
person reports. Once I am aware of the aspect-switching trick, I can have hours
of fun saying, “Now I see it as a rabbit, ooh now a duck, etc.” If I do not know
the trick and merely see one of the animals on a consistent basis, this makes no
sense.
Sometimes, this is not the case. In continuation of the quotation above,
Wittgenstein gives an example with a example of completely ordinary object
perception.
I tw o u l dh a v em a d ea sl i t t l es e n s ef o rm et os a y“ N oIa ms e e i n gi t
as...” as to say at the sight of a knife and fork “Now I am seeing this
as a knife and fork”. This expression would not be understood.–Any
more than: “Now it’s a fork” or “It can be a fork too”.
In this case, there is no room for thought or interpretation in the perception of
the cutlery. One simply sees it, and doesn’t interpret or take it to be something.16
Here, the third person observer would also not be able to say, “He is seeing it
as a fork.” There is just a fork and nothing else to be spoken of. However, we
can use the split between ﬁrst and third person reports to get a grip on a default
notion of veridicality with a simple illustration.
I see a monster
A child is sleeping in his room at night, wakes up and looks around. While the
light is still dim and his mind still leaden with sleep, his eyes turn to a coat on a
chair. He becomes terribly frightened, and screams out.
A monster. I see a monster in my room
15(Lambalgen, 2002) do note the diﬀerence between more epistemically neutral third person
perception reports and those in the ﬁrst person.
16It is the context, not the content of perception that seems the most important. The re-
sponses that make little sense at a dinner table would be perfectly acceptable at an exhibit of
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His parents rush in, turn on the light and explain to the child that the ‘mon-
ster’ was merely a coat hanging on the back of a chair. Assume that the child
realises this, and calms down. He could then say any of the following.
(2) a. I thought I saw a monster.
b. I saw the coat and thought it was a monster.
c. I saw a monster but it was really my coat.
and so on. His parents can also utter the equivalents of the above, but in the
third person. I would say both past tense versions (ﬁrst and third person) are
both a report about direct perception, that includes the result of a conscious
interpretative process.
The parents (suppose they were watching the action from a webcam), can
describe what happens in the present tense as well, but it is still an interpretative
process that is about their child’s perception, and not a report of what they are
perceiving directly. Having greater knowledge and observing their son’s behaviour
(looking at the coat and cowering in fright), they could say any of the following:
(3) a. He sees a monster.
b. He sees a monster, but it is really a coat.
c. He sees a coat and thinks it’s a monster.
d. He sees the coat as a monster.
Though in real present tense, these statements are again the result of an inter-
pretive process and not a perception report of what they are seeing. I would say
that the only true direct perception reports are those of ﬁrst person present tense.
All others will be an report of someone else’s experience (with or without an in-
terpretative leap) or a report of one’s own perception, but one that happened at
an earlier time.
With these less direct perception reports it is possible to both say what was
being seen (in the sense of the experience) and the facts of the matter, if they
should diﬀer. For both the third person or ﬁrst person past, either one of these
cases will be that of a report about a direct perception, that is mediated by an
interpretive process. Even in the present tense, when the parent says, ‘He sees a
monster’, this is because of their interpretation of their son’s behaviour. When
the son says, ‘I see a monster’ this is purely his experience.
Importantly, I would say that though there is no monster, both (2-a) and
(3-a) are true statements, though with slightly diﬀerent content. The child has an
experience of a monster, he does brieﬂy see one even though it doesn’t exist. The
parents are certain there is no monster, but they know the pitfalls of perception
and can adjust their perspective accordingly. They may have even had a similar
experience as a child. More generally, I think this sort of folk psychology can
colour our use of perception verbs and their logical properties without relying
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mistake, we are able to reconcile this with something in the world that was the
object of perception, as such a thing has happened to us many times. In the
most extreme case, we have all hallucinated17 and know that we can see things
that have no basis in reality whatsoever and this is also reﬂected in our language.
So, while see has a very strong notion of veridicality, there are cases that we are
aware of where it can be denied, and this does need to be taken in account in the
semantics. The question is to how this can be accomplished.
4.2.3 Preference Rules
Jackendoﬀ, assumes that visual perception consists of a sort of psychological
modelling process, and that while veridicality may not be an absolute implication
of any perception statement, there is a strong tendency to assume it is so. It is
usually unordinary circumstances or reports of strange objects or events that
cause one to wonder at a perception statement’s veridicality. Indeed, the truth
of the complement of a perception report should be assumed as a default.18
To account for both intuitions, (Jackendoﬀ, 1992) employs preferences rules
to account for what appear to be two diﬀerent notions of see. Take the following
examples from (Jackendoﬀ, 1992)
(4) a. Bill saw Harry.
b. Bill saw a vision of dancing devils.
c. Bill saw the tree, but he didn’t notice it at the time.19
d. #Bill saw a vision of dancing devils, but he didn’t notice it at the time.
(4-a) is a prototypical perception report where veridicality is a rather strong
default, whose veridicality is diﬃcult, if not impossible to cancel.20 Though we
know (or at least hope) there are no dancing devils, (4-b) is a perfectly reasonable
report as well. Jackendoﬀ modiﬁes matters somewhat by using ‘vision’ as a
mediator, but (b) and (d) without ‘a vision of’ are still felicitous and infelicitous
respectively.
Sentences (4-c) and (d) shows what happens when the default is cancelled.
But before explaining the diﬀerences between (c) and (d), as well as some sub-
tleties not noticed, the predictions in (4) are explained in (Jackendoﬀ, 1992) by
preferences conditions for xs e e sy .21
17Sometimes from illness, sleep deprivation or other reasons.
18We have already seen that the strength of this default can depend on both the tense of the
report and whether the report is in the 1st.,2 nd or 3rd person.
19I ﬁnd this rather odd. If Bill saw the tree he wouldn’t have run into it, which makes me
worry about the sentence’s felicity. Perhaps, he meant to say that Bill saw something, but
didn’t realise at the time that it was a tree.
20This assumes the statement is in a honest, omniscient third person. A narrative that
combines a ﬁrst person point of view told with the third person would be more doubtful.
Should someone like Alain Robbe-Grillet have written that line, I would assume the opposite.
21Preference rule systems in general are Jackendoﬀ’s way of capturing the default nature128 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
1. x’s gaze makes contact with y.
2. x has a visual experience of y.
A felicitous use of xs e e syneed only have one of the conditions satisﬁed. If
both are, as presumably is the case in (4-a), it is prototypical, veridical seeing.
There is presumably nothing to gaze at in (b), but Bill’s experience is enough to
justify its felicity. (4-c) only satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition as the second condition
is explicitly refuted, but is still passable. Only when neither condition is satisﬁed
is the use of see infelicitous – as happens with (4-d).22
However, there is a major problem here. We have all had the experience of
looking at something without seeing it. For some reason, simple items like keys
seem to disappear and then reappear in the same place after having looked there
for the ﬁfth time. Yet on these preference rules, I would have seen the keys just
by looking at them. This is similar to the example (4-c), which hides a good deal
of subtlety. Modiﬁcations need be made to Jackendoﬀ’s preference rules to ﬂesh
out the conditions necessary for perception reports.
4.2.4 Modiﬁcations
Complexities of object seeing
Imagine (4-c) uttered by Bill himself, in the present tense and past tense respec-
tively.
(5) a. ??I see the tree, but I don’t notice it.
b. I saw the tree, but didn’t notice it at the time.
The situation could be one where our evolutionary defects are exposed – being
absentmindedly lost in thought and walking into a tree while looking straight at
it.23 Certainly, if Bill was in a position (cognitively and conceptually) to utter,
“I see a tree in front of me”, it is doubtful whether Bill would have walked into
it.
of concepts and try to capture such notions as Wittgenstein’s family resemblance notion, and
avoid needless proliferation of senses.
22While the notion of ‘visual experience’ seems nicely intuitive, thinking about it deeper
leaves me confused. (Wittgenstein, 1953) has a cryptic (for me) passage diﬀerentiating between
seeing a rabbit sitting and having a rabbit suddenly run past. In the ﬁrst case, ‘I see a rabbit’
is a report of perception, in the second it is an expression of visual experience, something forced
from us like a cry is when we are in pain. I prefer his caveat, “Do not try to analyse your own
inner experience.” I attempted the opposite, which I would not recommend. I walked down
the street and tried to examine my visual ﬁeld as something separate from myself, picking out
various bits of it that I would recognise. Within twenty seconds, I ran into a pole.
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Bill’s gaze did make contact with the tree, but he had no visual experience
of it. Using Jackendoﬀ’s criteria, the gaze condition alone should make Is e ea
tree felicitous. Yet, in the scenario given above, this is plainly absurd. In the
retrospective perspective of the (5-b) version, this becomes more plausible. Bill
could mean that, looking back, there was some dark area in his ﬁeld of vision that
was the tree, although he wasn’t paying enough attention to realise he was seeing
a tree. (5-b) is still a bit odd, but passable, taken in this sort of clariﬁcation
sense. Of course, one can also look straight at an object and see nothing at all,24
which might cause one to question the felicity of even (5-b) in this case.25
Combine this with the previous section’s casting of doubts on the veridicality
of ﬁrst person seeing, and it is plain to see that the preference rules do not
quite work. Rather, with present tense, ﬁrst person direct perception felicity is
dependent only upon the visual experience condition. I can see a ghost or devil
only because I have a particular visual experience and my gaze is not directed at
these non-existent objects. As was just shown, it is quite possible to have one’s
gaze directed at an object and have no visual experience whatsoever – something
that is not a suﬃcient condition for ﬁrst person, present tense seeing. Moreover,
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a ti fIs e eX ,t h e nt h ev i s u a le x p e r i e n c eo fXi sr e c o g n i s e d
as such, and this is where conceptual knowledge plays a role.
With a visual image of a tree in mind, this might seem a rather trivial point.
This, I believe, is also what helps (5-b) make sense. One knows how to see a tree,
and can introspectively realise that this is what he was looking at, though he
didn’t realise it at the time. But suppose I am learning elementary biology and
a tutor is guiding me through the basics of microscope work. Looking at a slide
that supposedly has ﬁne examples of a particular virus. Being a novice, when I
look through the microscope I see very little I can deﬁne, and certainly nothing
Ir e c o g n i s ea sav i r u s .
At this point, if I tell my tutor that I see the virus, I am not only lying, but
doing harm to my biological education. Telling my tutor that I see the virus would
lead her to believe that not only do I now grasp microscope viewing basics but
also how to see the particular virus. Here is where matters become interesting.
Suppose I am a biological failure, never learn how to use a microscope, or how to
see a virus through one. Even retrospectively, as I still don’t know what it is to
see a virus, it is rather odd for me to say
(6) ??I saw the virus, but didn’t recognise it at the time.
As a more honest student, I tell my tutor I am having diﬃculty with the micro-
scope process, and she dutifully guides me through the process. Even though I
24There is the common experience of looking for one’s keys in the same place many times
and ﬁnding nothing. Suddenly, they appear as if by magic.
25It may be a case of idiolect diﬀerences, but I would hesitate to use the verb see in either
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still see nothing but random shapes and colours, she can use the 2nd person form
to tell me, “What you see in the centre of your visual ﬁeld surrounded by the
black dots is the virus.”26 I still may not recognise it and still not see it, but after
reading a nice picture book, learn how to see it. Now, (6) is perfectly felicitous.
I leave it to someone with a better intuition than myself to decide whether the
two cases sketched above aﬀect the felicity of the third person version.
This example may seem fanciful, but is actually rather common. Being a fan
of detective novels, I have read many times the detective being frustrated when
confronted with forensics. Often, when dealing with the coroner or scientist
about a piece of evidence, they will sadly wish that they could be able to see
what the forensic scientist does. While I can’t say I understand this phenomenon
completely, I don’t think it is an example of interpretation in perception, but a
skill on the part of the forensic scientists that changes how he sees (in certain
contexts) once he has become involved in a speciﬁc practice.
Finally, as with the keys example, it is quite common to not see or hear objects
or events that are quite ordinary. For example, I live very near a church where
loud bells ring every ﬁfteen minutes. Thankfully, after a week, I rarely heard
them, though doubtless they are still ringing with appalling regularity.
Conceptual aﬀects of activity and event perception
With direct perception of events and actions, the perceptual content or how it
is too see an object, may not come into play at all. Similarly to objects, the
same physical activity can be described in a number of diﬀerent ways. The
deciding factor in what an activity actually is may be only the intention of actor,
conventional rules, or background knowledge the speaker does not have to hand.
Slightly altering an example from (Gee, 1977)
(7) I saw Tom steal your car, but I didn’t realise it at the time.
At issue is not that of substitution27 –t h es p e a k e rs a wT o md o i n gs o m e t h i n g–
but rather the activity seen. I see Tom use keys to unlock my friend’s car and
drive away. At this point and my background knowledge,28 I see Tom borrowing
the car. It is only later that I learn Tom and my friend have had a row that
included Tom taking the car keys and stealing the car. My friend could say
to me, “You didn’t see Tom borrowing my car, you saw him stealing it.” Our
omniscient third person narrator could say, “He saw Tom stealing the car, but
at the time thought it was only borrowing.”29 Only once I know that Tom has
26This is a thought experiment and not meant to be an accurate description of viewing a
virus in a microscope – something I know very little about.
27If Tom is my brother, substitution would imply that the intensional transparency of see
demands that I also saw my brother steal the car.
28It is a mutual friend’s car.
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stolen, and not borrowed the car, can I utter sentence (7).
The same veridicality issues with respect to person and tense occur, but for
diﬀerent reasons. It is not the reﬁnement of perception or learning how to see
a particular activity that is at stake here,30 but an update of knowledge that
changes what the activity seen actually was. Stealing and borrowing can (as a
physical activity) take many diﬀerent forms. Certainly, if one had a gun, or broke
a window intentionally, one would more likely infer the former, but sometimes only
context can diﬀerentiate between the two. The past tense, ﬁrst person version
with the correction is only felicitous once the actual act is known. This parallels
the way the object version (I saw the virus, but...) is only possible once I know
h o wt os e eav i r u s .
Notice that interpretation is certainly an issue here, but in a strange way.
In the above example, what is seen, spatio-temporally, does not change, but our
deﬁnition of what the event is, does. But, as shown in Chapter 3, intention
and social rules are part of what deﬁnes events just as much as spatio-temporal
changes, and that is what is at stake in this example – not the perception, but
the proper reporting of it.
Substitution issues
The rather common example of substitution when applied to activity seeing is as
follows. Assuming Carol is the mayor, then if I see Carol jog in the park, I also
see the mayor jog in the park. Of course, if I did not know this identity at the
time, I may not know or utter this equivalence. On retrospect, and now knowing
that Carol is the mayor, I would assent to the fact that I saw the mayor jog in
the park.
Most ordinary examples of both object and activity seeing would follow along
these lines. But, as hinted at earlier, there is something rather special about
seeing that allows exceptions to this truth preservation principle. (Gee, 1977)
uses Wittgenstein’s drawing of the duck-rabbit and notes that even if the observer
knows that duck=rabbit, substitution does not work. Suppose that while staring
at the picture for a bit too long, I see the duck wink. No matter the veridicality,
it is certainly reasonable for me to exclaim, “I saw the duck wink”. However,
even if I am familiar with the illusion, and have seen the rabbit before (and have
even see the rabbit wink, before), it would certainly false for me to utter, “I saw
the rabbit wink,” as I saw no such thing. Recall the conceptual nature of seeing
has a certain immediacy and (for lack of a better word) intimacy, especially in
the ordinary case, where the visual experience is something that happens to us,
is impressed upon us. From (Gee, 1977) (p.477)
Semantically, I believe NI-constructions31 have a particularly close
30Though this could also be the case – there are plenty of hopefully apocryphal stories that
end with a small child asking, “Why is daddy hurting mommy?”
31‘NI’ means ‘naked inﬁnitive’ and refers to what are called ‘bare inﬁnitives’ in the next132 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
relationship between the VP in the complement and the higher per-
ception verb (an almost “direct object”-like relationship. In the way
in which “John felt Mary” means that what John felt was Mary, ”John
felt Mary hit him” means that what John felt was the hitting of Mary
on him.
Whether or not it is even correct to say that duck is the same as the rabbit
in the picture, it is certainly incorrect to say that the activity of a duck winking
is the same as that of a rabbit winking. In this light, it is rather that even
explicit knowledge of the identity of the two picture animals is not enough to save
substitution. Certainly, this relies on the fact that the duck and rabbit cannot
be seen simultaneously. Unlike the example of Carol and the mayor, which is
merely an issue of world knowledge, seeing a duck and seeing a rabbit are two
completely diﬀerent experiences. It would certainly follow that seeing activities
or events involving them would also be completely diﬀerent experiences.
4.2.5 Conclusion
Our initial notions of perception reports is that a perception verb is truth pre-
serving. After all, we are seeing the world, and so if we honestly report seeing
something, it must be the case in the world. A few examples and a little psy-
chology of the perceptual system are enough to show that this is not quite the
case. There is a certain rhetorical power to perception statements that makes one
think that in general, we do take them to be truth preserving. Indeed, certain lan-
guage styles such as third person narration indeed lend themselves to perception
statements being truth preserving.
But when examining ﬁrst person statements, especially in the real present
tense, many factors can go awry – perceptually, conceptually and contextually.
These caveats apply where the complement of the perception verb is either an
object or event. Truth preservation, instead, must be taken as a default of a
perception statement – the strength of the default depending often on the gram-
matical number and tense of the report.
We saw one attempt by Jackendoﬀ to give default conditions for xs e e syvia
a pair of preference rules, only one of which needs to hold for such an utterance
to be felicitous. This is certainly on the right track, but breaks down, especially
in the case of ﬁrst person perception reports. Ultimately, we need to look for
conditions that extend beyond an individual’s psychology,32 and add conditions
based on a more conventional, conceptual readiness that emerges in a individual
as part of the ordinary social and cultural learning process.
section. They are sentences of the type, “I saw the duck wink” as opposed to the participial,
“I saw the duck winking.”
32A theory of an individual’s psychology is necessary, but not suﬃcient for a full account of
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I have no equivalent of Jackendoﬀ’s preference rules that could handle many
of the varieties of perception reports, but it is clear that there needs to be some
sort of perceptual readiness.33 Secondly, we must assume veridicality as a strong
default, that if mistaken34 has something in the real world that it can be matched
to. The limiting case would be a hallucination, where there is nothing in the real
world for the hallucination could correspond to.
4.3 Perception reports of eventualities
In the previous section we examined various logical and conceptual properties of
perception reports – mostly of object perception. It is now time for a slight change
of direction, and examining the tense and aspect interaction involved in event
perception. We will ﬁrst look at basic syntactic, aspectual and argument structure
properties of direct perception sentences. This is followed by an examination
of the status of the activity complement, with special attention paid to recent
work in a minimalist framework by (Felser, 1999). The following brings a deeper
examination into the interaction of aspect and aktionsart of both see and watch,
leading to a formalisation of these interactions in the Event Calculus.
But to start it is best to constrain the class of perception reports we are to
examine. Direct perception of activity, such as
(8) a. I see John walking across the street.
b. I hear a bell ringing.
c. I’m watching John walk across the street.
brings up many interesting tense, aspect and aktionsart interactions on top of the
general logical and conceptual diﬃculties inherent in perception reports. Exam-
ining the relevant interactions in perception verbs sheds an interesting light on
the conceptualisation of events. Moreover, there is Wittgenstein’s ‘untangling’ of
see into a variety of related senses, coupled with the intimate relation between
the ‘act’35of seeing and what is seen. Perhaps, then, it is better to say that the
perception report itself takes a number of diﬀerent event-type senses depending
on how the activity is characterised.
33With the caveats that sometimes our senses may work perfectly but still we don’t see or
hear something. It also needs to allow for cases where an expert in a ﬁeld is able to see things
that an amateur can only dream of.
34For an event, it could be the stealing/borrowing example, or even mistaken spatio-temporal
perception such as seeing a monster tapping a the window that is actually a tree branch blowing
against the window in a storm.
35Wittgenstein rightly characterises seeing as a state, but in the sense of a mental state, not
in the event-type sense of the word. Nevertheless, it will be seen that with verbs such as see or
hear, the nature of the activity (in its aspect and event type) does colour (phenomenologically)
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We will begin by looking at the ‘syntax’36 of perception reports and, as it
becomes increasingly necessary, bring in certain semantic notions. This will be
followed by an examination of the necessary aspectual interactions between matrix
verb and complement that make verbs such as see and hear rather special, and a
challenge to formalise.
4.3.1 Syntax and Argument Structure
We ﬁrst need to deﬁne what is meant by direct perception of an activity. The
two basic types are as follows.
(9) a. I saw Mary crossing the street. (participial)
b. I saw Mary cross the street. (bare inﬁnitive)37
The ﬁrst takes an -ing, participial complement and the second a bare inﬁnitive
(crossing the street vs. cross the street). Both complements have no tense marking
themselves, something that turns out to be very important for their understand-
ing, both syntactically and semantically. With the related, indirect perception
sentences, the complement carries tense and will sometimes have a marker such
as why or that emphasising that the eventuality is independent of what is seen.
Indirect Perception Sentences:
(10) a. I see (that) Mary crossed the street.
b. Jane saw why Peter had voted Green.
Intuitively, what is seen in the second case is not the eventuality, but in the case of
(10) (a), some evidence for the result. For example, if I see Mary on one side of the
street and then the other a minute later, (10) (a) is quite a reasonable inference.
However, neither (9-a) or (b) would be a felicitous account of what I saw. Both
(10) (a) and (b) are rightly called indirect as no direct perception need be involved
in the utterance. It is a use that plays upon the importance of understanding
or realising in direct perception, but extended to interpretation and inferences.
The sceptical reader should attempt to replace see with understand in both sets
of examples to see the diﬀerences for themselves. This chapter is concerned with
sentences such as those are seen in (9).
36Syntax is in quotes, as syntax will be of a mostly informal nature in this chapter. The
reader will be referred to works that are more concerned with and focussed on a formal syntactic
account of these structures.
37I will follow (Felser, 1999) and use the terms PPVC and IPVC to be shorthand for participial
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Catenative Verbs
The unique character of perception verbs can be seen, when we compare them
to other complement taking verbs. At ﬁrst glance, there seems to be a syn-
tax/argument structure mismatch. In (Huddleston, 2002a), See or hear are verbs
that come under the heading of catenative verbs, i.e. verbs that take complements
as well as ordinary nouns as objects. Basically, there are two common types of
catenative verbs, the catch and regret type, in the sense of how the syntactic
arguments align with the semantic ones.38
(11) a. I caught Kim mistreating my cat.
b. I resented Kim mistreating my cat.
c. I saw Kim mistreating my cat.
In sentence (11-a), Kim is the argument of catch – Kim is caught in the act,o n e
could just as easily (though a bit awkwardly) say, I caught Kim while she was
mistreating my cat.
With sentence (11-b), Kim is not matrix argument, but rather the situation is.
It is easily paraphrased as I resented that Kim mistreated my cat. Grammatically,
the diﬀerences between the two types are clear. Where Kim is a matrix object,
no genitive is allowed, but passivisation is acceptable when the intervening NP
is a matrix object. Huddleston calls Kim rather a subordinate subject with a
matrix verb such as resent. In this case, the genitive is allowed, but passivisation
is impossible.
(12) a. I caught Kim/∗Kim’s mistreating my cat. [matrix object; no genitive]
b. I resented Kim/Kim’s mistreating my cat. [subordinate subject; gen-
itive OK]
(13) a. Kim was caught mistreating my cat.
b. ∗Kim was resented mistreating my cat.
In terms of the upcoming Chapter 6, it looks as if the complement of resent is
an imperfect nominal with a propositional denotation. Certainly, the paraphrase
given in (11) is exactly what one would expect if the complement were this type
of nominal. Also note that not only are both Poss-ing and Acc-ing types allowed
as a complement of resent, but so are the PRO-ing type. Again, where a verb like
catch requires a matrix object, with the -ing form intervening NP is necessary.
(14) a. I resented having to wake up early.
b. *I caught mistreating my cat.
c. As I emerged from the trance, I caught myself mistreating the cat.
38All examples with catch and regret as well as the table in this subsection taken from
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Using (11)(c) as a guide, see i sah y b r i do fb o t ho ft h ea b o v et y p e s–t h e
intervening NP is a matrix object but not matrix argument
(15) a. I saw Kim/∗Kim’s mistreating my cat. [no genitive allowed]
b. Kim was seen mistreating my cat. [Matrix passive OK]
But, Kim is not the argument of see, rather the activity is. Compare this to
(11)(a), where there it seems that in order to catch Kim in the act, I must catch
Kim. While this also seems to be the case in (11)(c), where I most likely will also
have seen Kim, this needn’t always be.
(16) a. I saw the wind rustling the leaves.
b. I saw Kim as she was mistreating my cat.
c. ??I saw the wind as it was rustling the leaves.39
It seems as if there is a syntax/argument structure mismatch, as the table below
shows.
Matrix Argument Matrix Object
I caught Kim mistreating my cat Yes Yes
Is a wK i mmistreating my cat. No Yes
I resented Kim mistreating my cat No No
Another uniqueness of the perception verbs is that unlike catch or regret, saw
can also take a bare inﬁnitive complement.
(17) a. I saw Kim steal my cat.
b. *I caught Kim steal my cat.
In light of ordinary language usage, this is rather unsurprising. We can easily
talk of seeing an event, seeing something happen. In the case of (17-a), what
happened is my cat was stolen – this is the implication of (17-a). But, if I catch
Kim stealing my cat, the implication vanishes, and one is more likely to conclude
the activity portion of steal must hold at the time of catching, and was thwarted
before culminating. Now if the implication of (17-a) is because the culmination
is reached, (17-b) is the exact opposite. Something is caught happening. In more
technical terms, should the culmination have been reached (indicated by use of
the simple form), caught would no longer be contemporaneous with the activity
39The acceptable form, I saw the wind rustling the leaves shows the interpretative aspect of
activity perception. Shown a silent ﬁlm of a trees in the forest with their leaves rustling, the
former is a perfectly reasonable perception. From seeing the activity along with interpretation,
we know that causally, something is rustling the leaves, and world knowledge gives us the
rest. Other descriptions of this activity follow rustle’s taking part in the causative/inchoative
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of stealing.
Interestingly, a IPVC such as (17-a) does diﬀer from a PPVC such as (15) in
that it cannot passivise. For example, there is an ungrammaticality with
(18) a. I saw Kim steal my cat.
b. *Kim was seen steal my cat.
Nevertheless, some authors such as (Akmajian, 1977) held that at deep struc-
ture Kim is a direct object of the matrix verb. However, the slightly diﬀerent
structures of the PPVC’s and IPVC’s make it that passivisation is blocked for
IPVC’s. It is exactly this mismatch, along with a strong semantic intuition that
leads (Gee, 1977) to voice his response to the treatment of perception verbs in
(Akmajian, 1977). It is the semantic notion that the entire perception verb com-
plement is an argument of see that inspired the quotation seen in the section 2.4.
Ideally, one would like the syntax to reﬂect the semantics in a way they do in the
complements of catch and regret.
Already, an aspectual dimension can be gleaned from the comparison of the
two examples. Arguably, part of the diﬀerence between (18-a) and (b) are the
matrix verb’s diﬀering aspectual natures. Indeed, the aspectual nature of see (as
well as hear, feel, etc.) plays a crucial role in determining their semantics. But
ﬁrst, a closer look at the uniqueness of perception verbs.
4.3.2 Seeing more
Aside from an apparent syntax/semantics mismatch there are tense, aspect and
interpretational restrictions that taken together make perception verbs rather
unique.
Tense
Compare the following
(19) a. Mary wants to become an actress.40
b. Mary regrets having become an actress.
c. Mary saw (that) John had left.
d. Mary saw (that) John would leave.
e. *Mary saw John to leave.
f. ??Mary saw John to have left.
(20) a. *Mary saw John have left.
b. *Mary saw John be going to leave.
c. *Mary saw John be leaving.
40(Felser, 1999) uses this example from Stowell to show that “control inﬁnitives often express
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d. Mary saw John leave.
e. Mary saw John leaving.
The relation of the matrix verb to the complement in (19-a) and (b) oc-
curs in numerous catenative constructions in terms of tense. Mary’s desire is in
the present tense, while become an actress is located somewhere in the future.
Sentence (19-b) has a opposite tense relation between matrix and complement.
Again, the matrix verb is in the present tense, but the complement event occurred
at some point in the past.
Indirect perception constructions such as (19-c) and (d) have the same possi-
bilities. Sentence (19-c) could be a description of an inference Mary makes upon
no longer seeing his car in the garage. Similarly, if she sees John a bit restless,
looking at the door and playing with his car keys, (19-d) is a perfectly reasonable
inference. In both cases the complements have complete temporal independence
from the time speciﬁed by the matrix clause, either before or after the matrix
clause.41
The direct perception sentences are a quite diﬀerent in their temporal in-
terpretation. If Mary saw John leave (or sees him leaving), then her perception
temporally coincides with the leaving event of John. It will become clearer in next
section, but with BI complements the time of the complement event is identical
to the time of the matrix see.42 For PPVC’s (direct perception reports with -ing
forms such as (20-e)), the requirement is less strict. If Mary sees John leaving, it
is only required that he sees part of this event. For example, if Mary sees John
putting on his coat and walking to the door, this perception is suﬃcient for her
to utter (20-e), but not (20-d). Nevertheless, there is a necessarily a temporal
overlap between the matrix and the complement that does hold for many other
catenative verbs.
It is also important to note that a major syntactic diﬀerence between the
direct perception and indirect perception sentences is the tense status of the
complement. As already noted, the complement of a direct perception is non-
ﬁnite, either a bare inﬁnitive or a participial. Contrast this with the indirect
perception sentences in (19). What marks them as indirect perception is not the
presence of that or another complemetizer (this is often optional), but that the
complement has morphological tense of its own. For example, sentence (19-a) is
morphologically pluperfect, but could just as easily be simple past, i.e. Mary saw
that John left. The ungrammatical sentences in (20) are examples of unsuccessful
use of auxiliary tense markers in their bare form (have and be). With direct
perception sentences, the complements are always non-ﬁnite and do not allow
auxiliaries.
41Simultaneity is also possible, as in Mary sees that John is leaving (and runs after him).
42This is Felser’s Simultaneity Condition for IPVC’s (direct perception reports with
BI’s)(p.39) which isn’t quite right. Certainly, the temporal endpoint of the complement event
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Direct perception sentences do have a peculiar property that the complement
contains no tense morphologically and that its semantic tense must overlap with
the temporal interpretation of the matrix. The question then arises as to whether
this ‘simultaneity’ between the time of the matrix perception verb is syntactic in
nature43 or a semantic restriction due to the nature of the perceptual activity.
This will be examined in more depth in a coda to this chapter, but the reader
should keep in mind a pair of possible counterexamples for now.
The ﬁrst involves a variant of (19-a), where a verb of intention needn’t use
a to inﬁnitive to capture the future tense reading of the complement. The verb
intend can do exactly this.
(21) a. I intend becoming undisputed champion and leaving my legacy.44
b. I intend to become undisputed champion...
c. I intend on becoming undisputed champion.
The ﬁrst example is typical of non-North American English dialects,45 while the
either form seen in sentences (b) and (c) would be preferred in American dialects.
Interestingly, sentence (a) seems to violate both constraints in generative gram-
mar as well in as some versions of functional grammar, but this will have to wait
until the ﬁnal section.
A second counterexample has to do with the use of see, not in a direct percep-
tion context, but rather used as a prediction, for example what one would hear
when going to a fortune teller.
(22) I see you meeting a tall, dark stranger.
where the interpretation (in this context) is that the addressee will meet a tall,
dark stranger. This is not such a surprise, actually. Simple present tense sentences
do have a futurate interpretation, despite simple present or present progressive
marking, and in these two counterexamples, something similar may be occurring.
Aspect
There is an opposition of entailment properties between IPVC’s and PPVC’s,
whose recognition goes back several decades at least. Observe the following pair
(from (Valin & La Polla, 1997)).
(23) a. Kim saw Sandy leaving early (and stopped her and asked her to stay
43i.e., if the complement is non-ﬁnite and carries no tense marking itself, it will inherit the
tense of the matrix verb. While this certainly does happen in direct perception reports, it is
not always the case with other verbs, even perception verbs used in a non-direct context.
44www.boxing-monthly.co.uk/content/0402/three.htm
45The UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, at least. In many dialects of
these countries both the bare complement and complement with a preposition are possible.140 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
a few minutes longer).
b. Kim saw Sandy leave early (and called her and asked her to come
back/*and stopped her and asked her to stay a few minutes longer).
As can be seen in the follow-ups, when the complement is a PPVC, there is
no entailment of completion. Sandy never manages to leave in sentence (23-a),
but does in (23-b). The BI version does have an entailment of completion, as
can be seen when (b) is followed up by (“and stopped her...”). Compare these
entailments to those in the standard contrast between simple and progressive
aspect.
(24) a. Sandy was leaving early, but Kim stopped her...
b. Sandy left early, but Kim called her at home.../*but Kim stopped
her...
Furthermore, the fact that the simple present tense for non-states is not inter-
pretable as a semantically real present tense, but rather narrative, extends to
perception sentences.46
(25) a. #A man walks in the park.
b. A man is walking in the park.
c. I see a man walking in the park.
d. #I see a man walk in the park.
The progressive paradox also extends beyond the complement to the whole per-
ception report itself. Recall that a standard way to diﬀerentiate an activity and
an accomplishment is by the implications of the progressive, that is
(26) John was running in the park.
entails that
(27) John ran in the park.
while there is no such implication from John was running a mile to John ran
am i l e . Perception reports respect this as while there is a huge implicational
diﬀerence between
(28) a. I saw John run a mile.
b. I saw John running a mile.
there is no implicational diﬀerence47 with
46‘#’ is used to denote infelicity for a real present tense interpretation. All of the examples
are perfectly acceptable in a narrative (or similar) context.
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(29) a. I saw John run in the park.
b. I saw John running in the park.
which is to be expected as simple activities are arbitrarily divisible. If John was
running from 1 to 2, he also ran from 1 to 1:30, and perception reports follow
likewise. On the contrary, if John was running a 10K run from 1 to 2, it is not
the case that he ran the 10K from 1 to 1:30. Finally, (Felser, 1999) points out
that when certain verbs (often achievements) are infelicitous in the progressive
they are also infelicitous in IPVC’s.
(30) a. ?*She was ﬁnding her long-lost ring.
b. ?*She was recognising her old friend.
c. ?*I saw her ﬁnding her long-lost ring.
d. ?*I saw her recognising her old friend.48
(Fillmore, 1963) is apparently the ﬁrst author to probe the connections between
PPVC’s and the progressive.49 In the transformational spirit of the early 1960’s,
he proposed that PPVC’s are derived from progressives by BE Deletion.T r a n s -
formational syntax may be long deceased, but Fillmore’s basic idea was taken up
again in the 1980’s and has made its way into many accounts of PPVC’s.
Aktionsart restrictions
(Felser, 1999) relies on the distinction in (Carlson, 1980) between stage-level and
individual-level predicates. It seems similar to the structural/phenomenal distinc-
tion to arrive at a restriction on the aktionsart of the perception verb complement.
Some states, such as be obnoxious50 can apply to stages of individuals, and this
is manifest in that such predicates readily occur in the progressive.
(31) John is being obnoxious.
Others, such as be intelligent, apply only to the individual and do not appear in
the progressive, being interpreted as inherent properties of an individual.
(32) *John is being intelligent.
Felser uses this distinction to give the SLP51 constraint which says that “for a
direct perception interpretation to be available, the bare inﬁnitive complement
must contain a stage-level predicate.” (p.45)
48The judgements are from Felser. Personally, I ﬁnd recognise to be ﬁne in both the simple
progressive and PPVC, but this does not dilute the point.
49IPVC’s are parallel to simple aspect, which in English, is completive/perfective for non-state
predicates.
50As seen in Chapter 2, predicates such as be obnoxious can be interpreted as temporary
behaviour of an individual or the inherent way an individual is.
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Thus, when comparing an stage-level predicate (drunk), with the individual
level (intelligent) the following contrast occurs
(33) a. We saw John drunk.
b. *We saw John intelligent.52
While, out of context, (33-b) is quite unacceptable, (Higginbotham, 2005) notes
that if Carol is intelligent on alternate Wednesdays by taking a pill, then I have
seen Carol intelligent is perfectly ﬁne.53
In Chapter 2, it was demonstrated that a state could be coerced into having
an activity reading by the use of the a copular auxiliary. This can also happen
with direct perception sentences. In arguing over the merits of a new talk-show
host, the following discourse between A and B occurs.
(34) A. With those kind of shows you really need an intelligent host to carry
the thing. DL Hughley just seems kinda...dumb. He can’t pull it oﬀ.
B. I’ve seen him be intelligent before, though. I don’t know what the
deal is with this show.
The respondent has seen DL Hughley behave in an intelligent way before, which
is how the sentence should be interpreted.
Finally, Felser notes the ungrammaticality of the following
(35) *We saw ﬁreman be intelligent.
While already establishing that be intelligent can be a complement in a direct
perception sentence, the reason is slightly more complicated. In general, bare
plurals have only a generic reading with individual-level54 predicates, but can
have either a generic or an existential reading with stage-level predicates. For
example, (36-a) has both existential and generic readings, with (b) has only a
generic reading.
(36) a. Firemen extinguished ﬁres.
b. Firemen are intelligent.
Combine this with a constraint on bare plural subjects in perception complements
that says they cannot be interpreted generically, then (35) will be ungrammatical
as it only has a generic interpretation. But, imagine a discourse where someone
52There is a indirect version possible, i.e. We saw John to be intelligent, which is an inference
from his behaviour to his nature.
53Interestingly, in this article, Higginbotham is arguing for E-positions in even stative (nor-
mally individual-level) predicates. In the next section, we shall see that it is exactly the supposed
lack of an E-position in intelligent that Felser claims causes the ‘ungrammacticality’ of (33-b).
In general, Higginbotham argues that when stative verbs are used in direct perception contexts
they are interpreted as perceptions of activity. I am in full agreement with this.
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holds of ﬁremen in general that they are unintelligent, but I disagree.
(37) A. Firemen are not intelligent.
B. Well, I saw ﬁremen be intelligent just last week. They made it to the
building before it burned down and put the ﬁre out.
Of course, the interpretation of the subject is not generic, but it is used in a
context to contradict a generic statement, and is perfectly acceptable. There-
fore, while I agree somewhat with Felser’s restrictions, they are interpretational
restrictions, rather than the restrictions on grammaticality of direct perception
sentences. (Ordinarily) individual-level predicates and bare plurals are gram-
matical, but they must be interpreted as being activities predicated of speciﬁc
individuals.
General summary of restrictions
As the syntactic details not speciﬁcally related to the status of the complement
in its tense, aspectual and selection restrictions will not be examined here, the
reader is referred to (Felser, 1999, Chapter 2) for an exhaustive summary of some
of the more detailed syntactic properties of direct perception complements. How-
ever, we shall sum up the previous sections of the germane tense, aspect and
aktionsart properties. First, there is the simultaneity constraints on perception
reports, in Felser’s words, “the time interval taken up by the event described by
a direct perception complement includes the time interval assigned to the ma-
trix event” (p.81). Second, we saw that the major diﬀerence between IPVC’s
and PPVC’s is their aspect – IPVC’s have completive/perfective aspect, while
PPVC’s have progressive aspect. In the last section we saw what Felser calls
the SLP constraint – direct perception complements must contain a stage level
predicate. In our terminology, the complement must be interpreted as an event
(or activity). Any typically stative verb used in a perception verb complement
is only interpretable as a stative verb coerced into an activity meaning. Given
the aspectual restrictions on perceptual complements this is no surprise – states
have neither completive or progressive aspect, though it is held here that these
constraints are interpretational rather than syntactic. Felser also chooses to fol-
low the tradition that the logical properties of perception sentences (verdicality,
etc.) are non-default implications. Finally, there are a number of more syntactic
constraints ruling out complementizers and ﬁniteness markers,55 expletive there,
and passivisation of the intervening NP, which will not be examined here.
Status of the complement
Armed with the above constraints and properties of perception verb complements,
Felser sets out to give a structure for them in minimalist syntax. The number
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of previous analyses of PVC’s are legion and the interested reader is invited to
see (Felser, 1999, Chapter 2) for the relevant history.56 Felser takes Fillmore’s
progressive hypothesis seriously, noticing that the only major diﬀerence between
PPVC’s and IPVC’s is their aspect.57 Both types are perception verb comple-
ments are said to be aspect phrases, i.e. maximal projections of the functional
head Aspect.
Not being a syntactician,58 there is very little to say on this point, or even the
status of a functional head Aspect.59 This head comes between T and v, meaning
that both the complement VP and aspectual information is part of the aspectual
phrase, but it is unspeciﬁed for tense. What is important for our purpose, is that
on this account, the complement is taken to be a constituent as a whole, and has
aspect, but no tense. For the more syntactically naive amongst us, the aspectual
phrase has everything needed to be a simple sentence,60 but tense.61 Given that
we want to follow Gee’s initial intuition,62 and treat PVC’s as denoting events,
a structure that carries both lexical verbal information and aspect is the perfect
candidate.
A simpliﬁed version of an Aspectual Phrase that serves as the complement to
I see John draw(ing) a circle can be see in the following tree.63
56Attempts include PVC’s as IP’s, bare inﬁnitive there clauses, bare VP’s, auxilliaries, small
clauses and predicate phrases.
57There is one ostensible diﬀerence, however. PPVC’s appear to passivize, as in John was
seen stealing my car. Recall, that this is not always allowed, i.e. #The wind was seen rustling
the leaves. Felser proposes that a sentence such as I saw John stealing my car has two structures
– one of a PPVC, and one that is more similar to a complement of catch. In the ﬁrst, it is the
event or activity that is seen. In the second, it is the agent that is seen while doing an activity.
When direct perception reports involve a situation where the agent cannot be seen, only the
ﬁrst structure is available.
58Or being wedded to a particular syntactic theory.
59As opposed to a lexicalist account or subsuming it under an inﬂectional head.
60i.e. the complement of I saw John steal my car is very close to John stole my car, but lacks
any tense.
61This is a bit of an over-simpliﬁcation, but as we are most concerned with the ‘eventive’
relation between matrix and complement many of the syntactic details are extraneous. But do
note that as the aspectual head come with no tense speciﬁcation of their own, and also come
before C, complements and auxiliaries are also ruled out of PVC’s.
62And taken up in the event semantics ﬁeld by Higginbotham and followers arguing against
a propositional interpretation of PVC’s, but rather an ‘eventive’ interpretation.
63Simpliﬁed in the sense that arrows for particle movement and case checking to account for
purely syntactic features that are not germane to this discussion are left out.4.3. Perception reports of eventualities 145
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The aspectual phrase falls under the AP of the matrix verb,64 w h i c hi nt u r n ,
having tense, falls under a TP, which gives the tense. The event variable of the
matrix (E-proi)65 receives tense from T and via event control, sets the tense of
E-PROi in the complement AP. This can be seen, schematically, below:
[cpC[TPSpec[TTi[AspPE-proi[vP...[AspPE-PROivP]]]]]]
Every non-stative66 verb is realised as an AspP – the rightmost AspP (the
complement for e.g. I saw John draw a circle) dominates a vP (this is a DP
v’67) which is ‘John draw a circle’. More precisely it is Asp’ that right-branching
dominates a vP, and left branching spells out aspect (+/- prog). In turn, Asp’
is dominated by AspP, which branches to the left with E-PRO. All non-stative
verbs are realised as AP’s. Inﬂected verbs are then dominated by a TP and CP.
In the above there are two AP’s – the one to the left is ‘I saw’ and the latter is
the AP that it selects. The E’s serve to bind tense.
For those who can’t understand the preceding formulation, the important part
to remember is that an aspectual phrase has no tense of its own, but receives it
from the higher, matrix verb, which as the name suggests, does carry its own
grammatical aspect.
64All stage predicates are realised as AP, syntactically.
65Lower case pro is the controller while PRO is the controlled.
66Stage-level predicate in Felser’s terms. Individual level predicates are ruled out as ungram-
matical as clauses projected by an Individual level predicate have no event argument, thus
ruling them out as AP’s.
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4.3.3 Semantics
Event control analysis
The last section brieﬂy stated what Felser takes a PVC to be syntactically, and
helps to explain certain syntactic properties as well as the aspectual diﬀerence be-
tween IPVC’s and PPVC’s. However, more is needed to explain the simultaneity
of tense as well as the logical properties of perception reports.68 This is achieved
by what Felser calls an event control analysis.
Brieﬂy,69 all stage-level predicates are realised as Aspectual Phrases. The
speciﬁer, in English, of AspP is a position which holds a stage-level predicate’s
external argument. This external argument is a Kratzerian event argument E.
This diﬀers from a standard Davidsonian event variable in that it is determined
syntactically (not lexically) and serves semantically only to locate the spatio-
temporal location of an event.70 Being, an external argument, the event argument
is realised outside of the predicate. The two conditions on Event Arguments are
that they are licensed by an aspectual phrase, and furthermore they must receive
at e m p o r a li n d e x .
In simple, tensed (stage-level) sentences, this is done by T position, i.e. John
drew a circle would have an aspectual phrase that is non-progressive, as well as
an external event argument. This argument is then assigned a temporal index by
T, in this case, sometime in the past. But, when there is an non-ﬁnite (untensed)
aspectual phase, such as John draw a circle in I saw John draw a circle, matters
become slightly more complicated. Analogous to anaphoric PRO, there is an
E-PRO that allows an non-local event argument to receive a temporal index.71
E-PRO is like the obligatorily controlled PRO that is co-indexed by the event
position in the higher clause. This is Felser’s Event Control Hypothesis (p.146)
In direct perception constructions, the perception verb functions
as a control predicate in that its event argument controls the event
argument provided by the embedded predicate.
Stated more plainly with the example I saw John draw a circle,t h e r ei sa n
event argument that is associated with the matrix verb (i.e. see) – this argument
receives its temporal index from T. The IPVC is an untensed aspectual phrase
whose event argument needs receive tense. As there is no T locally, the event
argument of the IPVC is bound by the event argument of the matrix verb. Thus,
68There is also a syntactic account for the non-passivisation of perception reports. It is more
than that a PVC is a complete constituent, but involves purely syntactic issues that are of no
concern for us.
69The interested reader is directed to (Felser, 1999, Chapter 4).
70In a discussion, she notes some authors have attempted to reconcile the two concept to the
eﬀect that there is both a syntactic event argument in Kratzer’s sense as well as a Davidsonian
event variable that is lexically determined.
71Standard examples of PRO in action are sentences like Billi decided [PROi to get up early].4.3. Perception reports of eventualities 147
the temporal index of the complement is identiﬁed with that of the complement,
deriving simultaneity. There are two Asp’s, the leftmost corresponding to [see
Asp], and the rightmost corresponding to the complement. Note that the event
argument of see is E-pro, while that of John draw a circle is the controlled E-
PRO, giving them both the identical temporal index assigned by T. A simpliﬁed
version, looking only at the event binding relations (and the sentence ﬁlled in for
ease of reading) is
I E-pro saw [John E-PRO draw a circle.]
The important part to note are that only stage-level predicates receive a E-
variable. This means that see must be a stage-level predicate and that individual-
level predicates such as (be) intelligent are ruled out as complements. Also,
generic sentences are only interpreted on an individual-level, thus also not allowed
in direct perception constructions.
While we agree with the simultaneity condition for direct perception sentences,
the way Felser derives it is primarily syntactic. IPVC and PPVC complements
are aspectual phrases that have no tense of their own, and instead receive it from
the matrix. But,72 the ﬁnal section of the chapter will show that doubt should
be cast on this more generally. It may be only an accident of dialect rather than
a hard syntactic constraint.
Event Control and Logical Properties
On the event control analysis both veridicality and substitutivity follow rather
directly. On the syntactic level PVC’s lack the categories C and T and do not
allow sentential operators. The lack of any of these properties means that the
two events are linked together. Felser writes that “direct perception statements
form a single proposition in the sense that they are associated with the same
(referential) T, and share a single truth value” (p.177). Thus the truth value
of the matrix event implies the truth of the complement. This takes care of
veridicality and, as there is no referential opaqueness, substitution as well. The
only question is whether or not determining such implicational properties purely
by syntactic means might be a bit too strong. The discussion at the beginning of
the chapter casts doubt on such strong logical notions.73 In ordinary language,
one would deny that there were pink elephants dancing in the room, but it seems
rather strange to tell the alcoholic that he didn’t see them dance.
72As already hinted.
73In (Felser, 1999, Chapter 2), she qualiﬁes veridicality with the caveat, “in the normal case”,
which is absolutely correct. But to then derive the principle by syntactic means alone makes it
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Problems and unﬁnished business
Syntactically, this proposal seems to work and provide not only simultaneity,
but also the various logical properties such as veridicality, substitution and ex-
portablity. However, there are a few issues that need to be addressed. The ﬁrst is
that her arguments for see being a stage-level predicate are not that convincing.74
However, we do concur that see is not an ordinary state or individual-level predi-
c a t e .T od ot h i so n em u s tt a k eac l o s e rl o o kt h ee v e n t - t y p ef o rsee,w h i c hi st a k e n
up in a later section. The use of a very syntactic event argument by Felser does
justify her not taking such a close look at the semantics below the event variable
level; but the unsatisfying arguments that see as a stage-level predicate make a
closer look at the aktionsart of see to be a worthwhile enterprise if we want to
take it as an event. The second issue arises when one looks at what happens to
the progressive hypothesis when watch is used in place of see.
See as stage-level predicate
Felser’s proposal is that see is a stage-level predicate and has an event variable
in its thematic grid. The complement has completive or progressive aspect, but
no tense. Thus it has an event variable, but its tense still needs to be anchored
– there is no TP layer in an aspectual phrase (and these are Kratzerian event
arguments that need to receive a temporal index). The event control works very
much like PRO in the argument world.
This proposal is enough to get the tense simultaneity, and is compatible with
the durative type of complement with a progressive, the perfective and possible
instantaneous type with a BI. However, there are two problems. I agree that
see is not a state, but the arguments that it is stage level in contrast to sup-
posed individual-level only verbs do not convince. For example, appearing in the
progressive is a hallmark of a stage-level predicate. But she gives examples of
see with PPVC’s are either non-veridical or not an event of direct perception.
Thus, whether direct perception see is a stage-level predicate or not cannot be
concluded from them.
(38) a. John thought he was hearing those voices again.
b. I am hearing lectures.
c. He was seeing them robbed day by day.
The last two are rather iterations of many seeing events. However, there are
perfectly good examples of seeing as a single, perception event. However, in
order to make her point that see is stage level, she contrasts it with know –t h e
paradigm of an individual predicate. Know is ﬁne in the progressive, as is detailed
in the introduction to this thesis.
74See must be a stage-level predicate in order for to contain an event variable, allow for event
control and tense binding.4.3. Perception reports of eventualities 149
She also says that true statives such as know cannot be embedded under the
verb force, while see obviously can be. So
(39) *Mary forced him to know the answer.
This does sound bad, but as I presume believe must be just as much of a state
as know, it is no stretch to say “I was forced to believe that...”, by my parents or
the church. In any case, “forced to know” is quite common in ordinary usage.
(40) a. So they forced me to lose my job and they forced me to know that they
did it to me on purpose, and that it was related to the things that the
same family has done to me for about 40 years.
b. Having a neighbour like this has been an adventure, to say the least.
He has forced me to know the local bylaws more than I ever wanted to.
There are many such examples, and arguably they could mean the end-state of
learning something and be a sort of coercion. However, this is not the case with
believe and we can ﬁnd many examples like the following.
(41) So my search for truth forced me to believe that language is not an exact
science.75
She also argues that see is ﬁne in an imperative, but individual-level predicates
are not. We can say, “See that man over there”, but not “Know the answer” or
“Be tall”. However, Know the answer, dammit is perfectly ﬁne to tell a quiz-show
contestant at the appropriate moment, and any legal-aid foundation will tell you
to ‘Know your rights!’. Thus, I can see little justiﬁcation from these cases for
treating see diﬀerent from verbs such as know.
Nevertheless, there is certainly a huge event type diﬀerence between see and
typical states that belies it use in the simple present. But this is also a problem,
as will be shown in section 4 of this chapter, in that there is more than one event
type for see;76 this depends on the event type of the complement. Felser never
goes below the event variable and pays little attention to Aktionsart except to
ban individual-level predicates. But if the event variable of the complement is
controlled by that of the matrix, how does the event type of the complement
determine that of the matrix? Moreover, there is no explanation as to what
happens when the complement is morphologically simple, but must receive a
progressive interpretation. To be fair, this is a property not of see, but it’s
activity counterpart.
75www.beneﬁcentchurch.org/srmn101903.html
76This is done through the methodology discussed in Chapter 2. Aktionsart is often not a
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The peculiarities of Watch
Felser says very little about watch, but as a preview of the next section, direct
perception sentences with watch in the progressive cause their complement to also
be progressively interpreted, even if the complement is an IPVC and presumably
of completive aspect.
(42) a. I was watching Mary cross the street when she was hit by a car.
b. I watched Mary crossing the street when she was hit by a car.
c. ??I watched Mary cross the street when she was hit by a car.
Unlike see,77 the aspect of the matrix verb controls not only the tense of the
complement, but also the aspect. If the complement in (42-a) is an aspectual
phrase that comes with its own aspect, it brings up the question as to where the
progressive interpretation for a simple form aspectual phrase comes from.
4.4 Preformal matters
Having established that the eventive complements of perception verbs are seman-
tically events, that have their own aspect,78 but are derivative on the matrix
clause for tense, we can begin examining further properties that are necessary
for a formalisation. At the beginning of the chapter we saw a tension between
a perception statement of direct experience and a one where interpretation is
part of the report. The examples where the speaker reports an other’s presumed
perception (by inference) or there own at a later date, once new information is
known are perhaps the most interesting and are examined further in the next
section. Following that, as it is necessary to ﬁrst understand the aktionsart of
see, a section will be devoted to that. Finally, a contrast will be made with watch.
4.4.1 Aktionsart of See
Felser needed see to be an individual level predicate in order for there to be a
matrix event, and thus control of the tense of the complement. While her argu-
ments are somewhat wanting, it is certainly the case that see is no ordinary state,
despite the present tense appearing in the simple form as a default. Instead, the
part of perception that is direct and experiential renders see, in a sense, transpar-
ent to the event that is described. This can be demonstrated by examining the
77For see in simple aspect. When something like I’m seeing Mary cross the street is acceptable,
the complement is also interpreted as progressive. I have no explanation, but somehow when
the matrix is in the progressive aspect, it determines the aspect of the complement.
78This last part holds for experiencer perception verbs such as see or hear. When the more
agentive versions are examined (i.e. watch or listen), the relation of aspect between matrix and
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standard behavioural tests for Aktionsarten (see Chapter 2), but ﬁrst, a lovely
impressionistic account of perception verbs taken from (Huddleston, 2002a).
The non-modal construction79 is at the boundary between stative
and dynamic. I heard a plane pass overhead contrasts clearly with
I could hear planes passing overhead as dynamic (an achievement)
vs. stative, but we can also have I heard the tap dripping,w h i c hi s
also state-like, diﬀering little from I could hear the tap dripping.I n
the present tense, the simple form tends to sound somewhat more
dramatic, suggestion a quasi-dynamic interpretation: Yes, I see it
now; I smell something burning.
While terms such as ‘state-like’80 and ‘quasi-dynamic’ may seem a linguist’s
equivalent of a the description on a label of a bottle of wine, it is no accident. The
diﬀerent events described are normally construed as having a certain structure. A
plane that passes overhead (aurally) is a quick bit of noise, altered by the Doppler
eﬀect, and then quickly disappearing. Iterated as a series of plane-passing events,
the quality changes to focus less on a quick change, but rather a series of events
envisaged as a continuing activity. Perception verbs unsurprising reﬂect these
distinctions. But not content at leaving the matter at the poetic level, we shall
see what happens to the event type of see given diﬀerent Aktionsart and aspect
conﬁgurations of the complement.
Seeing an activity or accomplishment
Recall from Chapter 2, that an activity or accomplishment is only felicitous in
(real) present tense in the progressive aspect.81 The simple form can be used
in the past tense, but this implies that the event is no longer occurring. This
question remains open if past progressive is used. Thus
(43) a. #Mary jogs in/across the park.
b. Mary is jogging in/through the park.
c. #Mary just jogged in/across the park. She still is.
d. Mary was just jogging in/through the park. Maybe she still is.
79We have not examined these sorts of modal constructions, but they have a less direct, more
neutral ‘ﬂavour’.
80Huddleston seems to use the term ‘stative’ for iterative activities (i.e. the tap dripping,
planes passing overhead). Certainly such progressives proﬁling uniform activities have a more
‘stative’ quality than accomplishments or achievements, most likely due to the fact that any
part of a ‘tap-dripping’ event will be much the same as any other. Nevertheless, they are not
states.
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See can be used with the above complements in the simple present tense, if the
complement is in the progressive, but not if the complement has simple aspect.82
(44) a. #I see Mary jog in/through the park.
b. I see Mary jogging in/through the park.
c. I just saw Mary jogging in/through the park. #I still do. Maybe she
still is.
d. I just saw Mary jog in/through the park. #I still do. #Maybe she
still is.
The examples in (44) show an interesting interaction between the aspect of the
complement and the aspect of the entire sentences and/or discourse. In sentences
(44-a) and (b), the aspect of the complement determines the felicity of the matrix
verb in its tense/aspect conﬁguration. Here see behaves like an ordinary dynamic
event, if we assume that the aspectual status of the complement is mirrored in
the matrix.
But sentence (44-c) complicates matters considerably. As evidenced in the
continuations, a progressive complement allows continuation of the event into the
present. However, see now behaves as the simple form it actually is. If I saw
Mary jogging in the park a minute ago (and express this using a progressive com-
plement),83 it is certainly possible she still is. But the seeing part is completed,
regardless. With the simple aspect complement in (44-d), it is not only the seeing
that is ﬁnished, but, from the speaker’s point of view, also the jogging activity.
In reality, what the speaker saw as and end to the activity, may have merely been
a stretching break. But the activity is presented by the speaker as complete, thus
making the continuation infelicitous.
For present tense, see behaves like its dynamic complement, only felicitous
when its complement is also felicitous in simple present. In past tense, it is
stronger, and always behaves like a past tense simple form of a dynamic event
t y p e .T h i si sm o r er e a s o nt ot h i n kt h a tsee is not a typical state.84
82Given that the simple aspect complement is perfective or completive, the object of present
tense see has an extended temporal proﬁle. Given the semantics of see, it would then have the
same (or similar, allowing that all the event needn’t be seen) temporal proﬁle. Therefore, the
reasons given in Chapter 2 for the infelicity of simple aspect activities and accomplish in real
present tense hold for see as well.
83The notion of how the speaker expresses the situation is quite important. Should I have
used the simple form, I imply that the event is completed (even for an activity). Mary may still
be jogging, but this cannot be recovered from the way I construed and expressed the situation.
84We have yet to see an example of see in the progressive. The reason is that I have very little
understanding of this sort of usage that is not iterative or habitual. However, watch appears
quite normally in the progressive aspect. We will discover that the aspectual interactions
between matrix and complement become even more complicated when a progressive matrix is
brought into the picture.4.4. Preformal matters 153
Seeing a point
Similar to dynamic event types, points are also infelicitous in a simple present
conﬁguration. When used in the progressive, the are coerced into an iterative
activity, construing a series of points into a uniform activity. In the past tense,
simple form can be used, and can mean either that one instance of the point
happened, or an iterative activity happened.
(45) a. #The light ﬂashes.
b. The light ﬂashed. (once)
c. The light ﬂashed several times.
d. The light is/was ﬂashing.
(iteration of ﬂashes)
Embedding these complements under see, the pattern remains the same.
(46) a. #I see the light ﬂash.
b. I saw the light ﬂash. (once)
c. I saw the light ﬂash several times. (iteration of seeing and ﬂashing)
d. I see/saw the light ﬂashing.
e. I keep seeing the light ﬂash.
Should the event be punctual, the experience of it will be as well,85 making
seeing a point having the aktionsart of a point. (46-d) behaves just as see with
a progressive activity complement, which is as to be expected. Sentence (46-e)
with the aspectual verb is a bit more interesting. Though the complement is in
simple aspect, a point interpretation of it is impossible. The dynamicity of the
matrix coerces the complement into having an iterative reading.
Seeing an achievement
Achievements are similar to points in that they are instantaneous (though with
an added change of state). The diﬀerence comes when they are used in the
progressive. They do not become an iterated activity, but something resembling
an accomplishment.
(47) a. #Mary reaches the summit.
b. Mary reached the summit.
c. Mary is/was reaching the summit.
Sentence (47-c) does not mean that Mary is continually getting to the summit,
but rather that she is in the middle of a preparation activity (e.g. climbing),
that, if successful, will lead to the achievement. While a run-up activity can also
be inferred in (47-b), the sentence proﬁles only the instantaneous change of state
85Ignoring examples of extreme slow motion ﬁlm and the like.154 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
that is the hallmark of an achievement. These properties are parallelled under
embedding with see.
(48) a.#I see Mary reach the summit.
b. I saw Mary reach the summit.
c. I see/saw Mary reaching the summit.
For sentence (48-b) to be felicitous, it is enough that I see only the instantaneous
change that brings Mary from a non-summit state to a being-on-the-summit
state. With an accomplishment complement, such as I saw Mary cross the street,
it is a rather odd thing to say if I only saw the last step Mary took, rather
than at least some portion of the activity sub-event as well. Sentence (48-c)
is the perception of a run-up achievement (i.e. an achievement coerced into a
progressive accomplishment structure) and has the same properties as seeing an
accomplishment.
4.4.2 Watch and aspect of the complement
Aktionsart aside, an interesting phenomenon happens when see is replaced by
watch. Felser has little to say about watch aside from the observation that it
cannot be used with either indirect perception complements or inﬁnitival com-
plements.
(49) a. #We watched that he drew a circle.
b. *We watched him to be an impostor.
Watch is a more intentional verb than see, and it is also an unabashed activity.
Unlike see, but typical of activities, the simple, present form of watch can only
be interpreted as a narrative tense. For ordinary present, the progressive must
be used.
(50) a. I watch John crossing the street. (narrative only)
b. I’m watching John cross the street.
Presumably the complements of watch are the same sorts of bound aspectual
phrases that are associated with see.86 If this is so, then something interesting
happens with the aspect of the complement that is then left unexplained.87 The
complement of (50-b) is a non-progressive aspectual phrase. As expected, there
is temporal simultaneity between the matrix and complement, but there is also a
change of aspect. (50-b) in no way implies that John crosses the street. Compare
(51) a. I was watching John cross the street when he was hit by a car.
86Chapter 4 of (Felser, 1999) does extend the event control analysis to apply to aspectual
v e r b sa sw e l l .
87In cases where see can be used in the progressive with an activity, this will also be the case.4.4. Preformal matters 155
b. I watched John crossing the street when he was hit by a car.
c. I watched John cross the street #when he was hit by a car.
When watch is in the progressive, the complement must interpreted likewise, even
when the complement is morphologically in simple aspect. Here it seems that not
only is the temporal index controlled by the matrix verb, but also the aspect. I
have no syntactic explanation for this, but it is not particularly surprising given
the agentive and attentional nature of watch. Sentence (50-b) is interesting in
that while there is no strict implication of completion, the speaker is approaching
what he sees in that way – he assumes that John will make it across. Yet this is
the event he is in the middle of watching.88
When watch is used in the progressive (obligatory for present tense use),
the aspect of the complement is also progressive (semantically), whether it is
morphologically a bare inﬁnitive or an -ing form. For example, suppose Ia m
watching John cross the street is uttered at time T.89 At time T, it also holds
that John is crossing the street. Moreover, as with (51-a), the default that John
actually crosses the street can easily be cancelled.
There is also a double telicity when watch is used in the progressive. The
previous examples show that the complement event needn’t complete, but, as
expected watch carries its own telicity.
(52) As, I had to wait for her anyway, I was watching Mary cross the street
to meet me. I quickly bored of it, and looked at advertisements until she
reached me.
Here the complement did (for Mary’s sake) happily complete. But the watch event
did not. In this example, while I did watch her crossing the street, I preferred to
whet my consumerist appetite rather than watch her cross the street. With this
in place, we can now examine the Aktionsart of watch.
Watching an activity/accomplishment
As noted already, watch always needs to be in the progressive in (real) present
tense, as with an activity or accomplishment. But unlike see, the standard al-
ternation between simple and progressive forms patterns has implications on the
telicity of the entire sentence.
(53) a. #I watch Mary cross/crossing the street.
b. I watched Mary cross the street.
88Overheard on the radio before the Six Nations France-England rugby match, in an interview
with supporters at an English airport: We’re going to watch England beat France. Hopefully.
The continuation could refer to them getting there to watch the match, but more likely is their
prediction of the outcome. Even if they did make it to the match, they were sorely disappointed.
89To simplify matters, we assume ordinary veridicality of the complement for this example.156 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
c. I was watching Mary run in the park.
d. I was watching Mary cross the street.
(53-b) implies telicity on the part of both the events matrix and complement.
When the complement is an accomplishment, so is the entire sentence. When the
complement is an activity (as in (53-c)), the entire sentence is as well. Sentence
(53-c) implies that it is also the case that
(54) I watched Mary run in the park.
As noted earlier, with sentence (53-d) there is telicity normally associated with
aV Pcross the street, but now also with the matrix verb as well. There is no
implication from (53-d) that I watched her cross the street. It then is safe to
say that watching an activity or an accomplishment is just the event-type of
the accomplishment. The major diﬀerence between see and watch is that the
aspect of the complement has much less aﬀect on the sentence as a whole. The
determining factor is whether or not watch is in simple or progressive aspect.
Watching a point
Again, the ability of watch to more readily appear in the progressive has both
aspectual and event-type coercion eﬀects upon the complement.
(55) a. #I watch the light ﬂash.
b. I’m watching the light ﬂash.
c. I watched the light ﬂash. (once)
d. I watched the light ﬂash 5 times.
e. I watched the light ﬂashing.
f. I was watching the light ﬂash.
When watch is in the progressive, a present tense watch report is perfectly ﬁne in
present tense. The same holds for The light is ﬂashing.B u t , 90 as sentence (55-b)
coerces the complement into having a progressive reading, the complement is
forced into an activity reading. The entire sentence (55-b), is then an activity.
Example (55-c) can be seen to be a point. Note that the progressive versions
in (55-b) and (f) has a point coerced to an activity reading, as is standard with
points. Progressive aspect can be on either the matrix verb or complement and
s e e m st og i v et h es a m er e a d i n g . 91
Example (55-c) seems to be a activity constructed out a speciﬁc number of
semelfactive events. This is now in the territory of the quote from Huddleston,
and only impressionistic comments are possible. But the report of (55-d) has a
90Ignoring a futurate reading.
91Something like, I’m watching the light ﬂashing also has the same reading, but is stylistically
awful and unnecessary, especially as the double -ing has added aspectual impact.4.5. Formalisation of see and watch 157
less uniform activity feeling that the progressive version in (55-f), even if they are
describing the same situation.
Watching an achievement
The last case to be looked at is the interaction of watch with an achievement
complement.
(56) a. #I watch Mary reach the summit.
b. I watched Mary reach the summit.
c. I’m watching Mary reach the summit.
d. I watched Mary reaching the summit, but she slipped at the last
foothold.
e. I was watching Mary reach the summit when she slipped at the last
foothold.
At ﬁrst glance, this appears to be quite similar to see.92 However, sentence (56-b)
does pick quite a major diﬀerence between the two verbs. One can see an event by
only seeing a split second of it. For example, if shown a stop-motion picture of a
runner, the body position and context is enough to say, “I see him running”. That
is, the temporal proﬁle of see can be an instant or a drawn out event. Recall that
I saw Mary reach the summit can easily proﬁle only the instantaneous change of
state, and ignore the run-up activity.
But with (56-b), it is far more likely that the time proﬁled also includes at
least some of the climbing event as well. With watch an instantaneous temporal
proﬁle seems impossible, and the matrix becomes a simple past tense accomplish-
ment. Again, the progressive watch coerces the complement to have a progressive
reading, in this case a run-up achievement. The complement may also be in the
progressive, also giving the complement run-up achievement reading. As with
watch plus accomplishments with a progressive reading, the aktionsart of watch
becomes an accomplishment itself. Sentence (56-c) transformed into a past pro-
gressive could easily be continued with, But I got bored and went back to cabin.
4.5 Formalisation of see and watch
In this section we will ‘see’ a formalisation of the tense, aspectual and implica-
tional properties discussed in the last section. Before moving on the nuts and
bolts, a few remarks are in order. The ﬁrst is that we have a constraint on the
‘seeing’, which we are calling ready, as shorthand for perceptual readiness. This
is a bit of a ‘catch-all’ constraint, as it is not just ‘looking at’.93 Rather, as
discussed in the second section of this chapter, one can look at something and
92Ignoring, for a moment, the progressive in (56-c).
93Or for hear, whatever the equivalent expression would be for ‘having one’s ears pointed’.158 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
not see it, for esoteric reasons of not ‘knowing how’ to see an object or event, or
mundane reasons of inattention, distraction and the like. In a sense, we could say
that ready is shorthand for ‘ready, willing and able.’
4.5.1 Seeing a point or achievement
In Section 4, there were a number of restrictions on perception verbs with instan-
taneous events discussed. As with sentences involving instantaneous events, the
perception analogues are only felicitous in the simple past.94 The entire event
described by the sentence is instantaneous, giving see in this context a point-
like temporal proﬁle. The basic ingredients are listed below, with two punctual
events, and the ﬂuent ready as described above, and deﬁned as follows:
1. The verb See is represented as a canonical punctual event seee
2. ec is the canonical punctual event of the complement.95
3. as a precondition on perception, a ﬂuent ready is required.
4. seee is deﬁned in relation to its complement event: HoldsAt(ready,t) ∧
Happens(ec,t) → Happens(seee,t)
As see carries the morphological tense (e.g. I saw the light ﬂash), it is this
event that is subject to the tense integrity constraint:
The query ?Happens(seee,R), R<n o wsucceeds, and the query ?HoldsAt(f1,R),
. . . , HoldsAt(fn,R), R≥ now, Happens(seee,R) fails.
The deﬁnition of see ensures that the seeing and the complement event happen
at the same time and are instantaneous. The ready ﬂuent also must hold at the
same time, but, being a ﬂuent and not a canonical event, it may have been holding
for a arbitrary time before. For example, I could be eagerly waiting for a light to
ﬂash. The integrity constraint for the tense requires the reference time to be in
the past.
The other issue is that of veridicality. Note that the integrity constraint only
enforces that see happens. When starting the derivation with Happens(seee,t),
the database then looks to verify the conjuncts in the antecedent. For example, if
the sentence was I saw the light ﬂash, ec is the canonical event of a light ﬂash. The
database will then look for this event happening at t to verify the scenario. But,
if it was not a ﬂash of a light, but an atmospheric phenomenon that happened
(at t), the database will unify Happens(ec,t) with this.96 Thus, veridicality is a
94Excluding narrative contexts.
95In the formalisation of the various aspects of see, the subscript c is used to indicate that
the event of ﬂuent belongs to the complement event scenario.
96The more complicated example of stealing/borrowing will be handled at the end of the
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strong default, but does allow mistakes.97
4.5.2 Seeing an activity or accomplishment
Matters are a bit more complicated here. First there is the implicational diﬀer-
ence between a progressive and simple aspect complement. Also, see can appear
in either simple present or past tense.98 Finally, unlike seeing a point,t h esee
event takes time, but the temporal proﬁle also diﬀers depending on whether the
complement is in simple or progressive aspect. There are three possible cases
here.99 With present tense see only a progressive complement is allowed, but
with saw, both simple and progressive aspect are allowed in the complement.
Present tense with progressive complement
In this case, the telicity of the complement event is irrelevant. I see Mary crossing
the street and I see Mary running in the park have the same lack of implications.
What does need to be taken into account, however, is that see, takes time and has
a special kind of dynamics, in that it is driven by the complement event in, to use
Huddleston’s words, a quasi-dynamic way. To connect see with the complement
and obtain the proper dynamics, the following scenario is used.
1. ?Terminates(e,ready,t), ¬Terminates(e,see,t) fails
2. Releases(startc,see,t)
3. HoldsAt(ready,t) → Trajectory(f c,t,see,d)
The above constraints ensure that if an event should terminate my readiness
(e.g. being instantly struck with blindness, or getting bored and turning away),
the seeing shall also stop.100 The second line of the scenario allows the dynamics
of see to be started. It it the start event of the complement event that does this.
The third line is the dynamics proper, and says that as long as readiness holds,
see is driven by the activity ﬂuent associated with the activity or accomplishment
complement.101
The template above integrates the complement event in the sense that (e.g.
for crossing the street)i ti st h es t a r to ft h ec o m p l e m e n te v e n tt h a tr e l e a s e st h e
97In the limiting case, the complement event could be uniﬁed with a hallucination.
98The progressive see works analogously to watch, which will be treated formally in the next
section.
99Plus slight telicity diﬀerences depending on whether the complement is an accomplishment
or an activity.
100The literal reading of the constraint is that no event shall terminate ready and not terminate
seeing.
101As well as points or achievements coerced into activities/accomplishments, such as, Is e e
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dynamics and the cross ﬂuent that drives the trajectory. For the sake of clarity,
the last two lines of the above scenario for the speciﬁc I see Mary crossing the
street are as follows:
1. Releases(startcross,see,t)
2. HoldsAt(ready,t) → Trajectory(cross,t,see,d)
The only remaining ingredient is the tense integrity constraint for see.A si t
is ‘quasi-dynamic’, it is treated as if it were a progressive.
Integrity constraint: ?HoldsAt(see,R), R=now succeeds
Again, there is a default veridicality as the integrity constraint only requires
that see succeeds, while the complement needs to emerge from the derivation
and could be uniﬁed with another event if need be. The temporal simultaneity
is assured as it is the activity ﬂuent of the complement that drives the see event.
The derivation starts with ?HoldsAt(see, R), which then reduces to a query of
the dynamics, and as the trajectory predicate includes the complement event,
this is then derived. Finally, as only the start event and activity portion need to
be accounted for, there is no implication as to whether the complement stops or
completes.102
Past tense with simple aspect complement
This is the most complicated case, and encompasses both accomplishment com-
plements (I saw Mary cross the street) and activity complements (Is a wM a r y
running), with the major diﬀerence being that the accomplishment does complete
successfully, while the activity is presented (by the speaker) as having ended, but
in a more arbitrary way. We shall focus on the more complicated, former case.
Recall from the last section that I saw Mary cross the street implies both that
Mary made it across and I saw it until the end. Importantly, however, I needn’t
see the event from beginning until the end,103 but could have seen only the last
bit of the crossing activity along with the ﬁnal bit where she makes it to the
other side.
As the event is one of temporal duration, the see event also has this proﬁle,
and, being past tense, will have be constructed via hierarchical planning in the
normal way.104
102Depending on whether the complement event is an activity or accomplishment.
103Though this is the limiting temporal possibility.
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Happens(start,s) ∧ Happens(ﬁnish,r) ∧ s < t ≤ r ∧ HoldsAt(see,t) → Hap-
pens(see,t).
What remains to be done is to connect the conjuncts of this formula to the
complement event. The HoldsAt conjunct is already connected via the dynamics
for see given in the last section. The start event is a bit more complicated. Recall
that for I saw Mary cross the street I can see it from the beginning until the end
(assuming I am ready), or from a point in the middle of the complement event
until the end. Thus, startsee is deﬁned by the following two clauses:105
Happens(startc,t) ∧ HoldsAt(ready,t) → Happens(startsee,t)
HoldsAt(fc,t) ∧ Happens(estart,t) → Happens(startsee,t)
where estart is any event that starts ready, for example, suddenly looking in
the direction of the street. The ﬁrst disjunct is where the seeing starts from
the beginning of the event, and the second disjunct is where something triggers
readiness, and seeing begins.
Finally, a constraint is needed to ensure that the seeing makes it until the
end. This can be done by deﬁning a finishsee event in two clauses, that (for
telic events) synchronises the finish event of the complement to be the finish
event of our deﬁnition of see. Second, ready, and therefore seeing, must still hold.
Happens(finishsee,t) → Happens(finishc,t)106
Happens(finishsee,t) → HoldsAt(ready,t)
For accomplishments like cross the street, this means that the crossing is seen
until the end.107 For activities like run, as the atelic activity can be divided arbi-
trarily, it is presented as complete,108 though, in reality, may continue arbitrarily
in the future.
The only remaining thing to do is to specify the integrity constraint for saw
an activity/accomplishment is to formulate the appropriate integrity constraint.
This is quite easy, as it just the ordinary integrity constraint for simple past
events:
The query ?Happens(seee,t), t<n o wsucceeds, and the query ?HoldsAt(f1,R),
105estart is any event that causes readiness to begin. Supposes Mary is crossing the street and
I turn my head and see it.
106For atelic events, any arbitrary stop of the complement will do.
107Note that as the complement event is in simple aspect, it is also deﬁned as a hierarchically
planned event that does include a finish event that stops the activity ﬂuent and triggers the
result state of having ﬁnished the accomplishment.
108From the speakers point of view, a stop event has happened, which may in reality only be
a brief pause, or just enough running for the speaker to view it as a running event.162 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
. . . , HoldsAt(fn,R), R≥ now, Happens(seee,R) fails.
As see is deﬁned to be a hierarchically planned event, it not only takes time,
but the seeing is bounded by the time of the complement event, i.e. there is no
seeing after the complement event. Once the complement event ﬁnishes, there is
nothing to drive the trajectory clause of see, and so the query ?Happens(seee,t),
t<n o wfails as the hierarchically planned deﬁnition of see requires that the
ﬂuent see holds at t, which can only be the case when the complement event is
happening.
Past tense see with a progressive complement
This is the case with sentences such as I saw Mary crossing the street or Is a w
the earth spinning on its axis, which have no implications on the complement
except that the associated activity occurred. This tense/aspect combination is
virtually the same as that for present tense see with a progressive complement,
except that the integrity constraint is located in the past instead of the present.
There is one possible diﬀerence. I am unsure as to the felicity of continuing see
into the future. For a contrived example, I could be on a surveillance assignment
and asked what I saw Mary doing a minute ago.
(57) When I ﬁrst looked through my binoculars, I saw Mary standing by the
window, and I still do.
More likely I would say, ‘she still is standing there’, as my seeing it is implied.
Nevertheless, this type of formulation is possible, whereas if I say, “I saw Mary
open the door a minute ago”, I cannot still be seeing it. Now, if something like
sentence (57) is acceptable, nothing more needs to be done to the formalisation.
But, if seeing is restricted to the past, even for a progressive activity, then we can
copy most of the scenario for the present tense version, but treat see as a simple
past tense event. That is, we turn it into a hierarchically planned event with the
corresponding integrity constraint. The former is preferable to me on aesthetic
reasons. The other cases would have to be created as sort of parallel reﬂection
of the complement event in the event structure of see. It would be nice to keep
this parallelism. For the case where see can extend arbitrarily in the present,
the formalisation109 is exactly the same as for present tense see with a progres-
sive complement, but for the location of R. In this case, the integrity constraint is:
?HoldsAt(see,R), R< now succeeds
109And associated scenario for the dynamics of see.4.5. Formalisation of see and watch 163
Been caught borrowing
The ﬁnal example for see is a sketch of how a derivation of a ‘mistaken’ activity
would work. Recall the variant of an example from (Gee, 1977)
(58) I saw John stealing the car, but at the time I thought it was only bor-
rowing.
This is said from the perspective of the speaker recalling the (complement) event
and changing his mind about what it actually was.110 For this context, there
is no spatio-temporal diﬀerence between steal and borrow. Suppose John is the
brother of the car’s owner, and took it without his permission. A third party
observer who knew this much would naturally see it as borrowing at the time,
only later ﬁnding out that John and his brother had a blazing row and this was
John’s revenge. It is this sort of knowledge update that changes the appropriate
characterisation of the event.
For this context, we will assume that the relevant diﬀerence between a stealing
and borrowing event is the ﬂuent permission. If it holds at the time, the event is
borrowing, if it does not, the event is stealing. Furthermore, as we are speaking
of brothers, we can give a constraint on permission, such that if something (like
taking the car) is not forbidden, then there is permission.
¬HoldsAt(forbidden,t) → HoldsAt(permission,t)
Importantly, if the speaker has no information one way or the other, then by
negation as failure, we get ¬HoldsAt(forbidden,t), meaning that a query begin-
ning with ?HoldsAt(permission,t) will then succeed. Now, the two events can be
deﬁned in terms of these ﬂuents plus a spatio-temporal bit they have in common.
(59) a.
Happens(take,t) ∧ HoldsAt(forbidden,t) → Happens(steal,t).
b.
Happens(take,t) ∧ HoldsAt(permission,t) → Happens(borrow,t).
At the time of the theft (where the speaker sees only borrowing), the query for
the complement event will be
110At the time he would have said, ‘I see John borrowing the car.’164 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
?Happens(e,t), t < now
with parallel uniﬁcations for e = borrow and e = steal.
Which event gets substituted depends on the status of ?HoldsAt(forbidden,t).
If this query succeeds, the substitution e = steal succeeds, and e = borrow fails.
If ?HoldsAt(forbidden,t) fails, e = borrow succeeds and e = steal fails. Thus, in
a minimal model, with no information about forbidden, the complement resolves
to borrowing, but in an extension the complement may resolve to stealing. This
is exactly what happens in sentence (58), where the speaker is looking back on
the event with an update of knowledge, in this case that John was forbidden to
take the car.
4.5.3 Watch
As seen in section 4.2, watch is not nearly such an event-type chameleon as see, but
is rather an unabashed activity. It behaves like a typical activity in requiring the
progressive for non-narrative present tense, and is incompatible with uncoerced
achievements or points. A major diﬀerence between the two verbs is also the
interpretation of their complements. Where the ‘progressive hypothesis’ certainly
holds for see, the semantic aspect of the complement is sometimes dependent on
the aspect of the matrix verb. The diﬀerence can be seen in the following:
(60) a. I saw Mary cross the street.
b. I watched Mary cross the street.
c. I was watching Mary cross the street.
In the ﬁrst two sentences of (60), the simple aspect complement is indeed perfec-
tive and completive, with the strict implication that Mary made it to the other
side of the street. In contrast, in sentence (60-c), thought the complement is also
simple aspect, the implication is only that Mary was crossing the street, with no
implication of completion.111 It seems then, that though there is a simple aspect
complement in (60-c), it nevertheless has an imperfective interpretation. This
phenomenon is also most likely responsible for the observation that in both
(61) a. I am watching the light ﬂash.
b. I watched the light ﬂash.
111There is also the less stylistically preferred I was watching Mary crossing the street,w h i c h
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the light must ﬂash more than once.112 Informally, it is best to view watch as
shining a spotlight on an activity for at least a small amount of time, making an
analogue of seeing something in an instant impossible.
The second major diﬀerence between the two verbs of perception is that there
is a more ‘intentional’ nature to watch. This can be seen by comparing the
following two questions:
(62) a. Why did you see the young children playing?
b. Why were you watching the young children play?
(62-a) is a rather odd question, and would normally be answered as if it were a
‘how’ question, i.e. I was walking by the playground and looked up, etc. In a
contemporary climate the question in (62-b) has a more sinister implication, and
had better be answered in a way that one is innocent in intention. Of course, one
could be forced (in a Clockwork Orange sort of way) to watch something,113 so
intention is not quite the correct formulation. Rather, the this diﬀerence between
see and watch is a matter of paying attention in the latter case.
Finally, there is the implicational chain for watch that needs to be taken into
account. A sentence like
(63) I am watching Mary cross the street.
implies both that I see Mary crossing the street, and (assuming a default veridi-
cality) that Mary is crossing the street. Thus it can be concluded that watching
something is seeing it and paying attention to it for a given amount of time.
Indeed it is just these insights that are needed for the formalisation, along with
taking the imperfective aspectual shift into account.
The basic scenario
While watch does share much in common with see, the previous discussion makes
clear the major diﬀerences. The major distinction is watch’s activity aktion-
sart, coupled with the notion mentioned in the last section of watch shining a
metaphorical spotlight on an event. Thus the scenario of watch will diﬀer from
that of see in two major ways. The ﬁrst is that the verb itself, is always a ﬂuent,114
and moreover not a parameterised state ﬂuent, but one denoting an activity.
112This aspectual shift is not conﬁned to watch, but may be something more general that
occurs with a progressive matrix verb and simple aspect complement. In Chapter 5, it is
observed that one of the readings of I’m making the puppet walk across the stage has the same
sort of imperfective interpretation of the complement.
113We can also be internally compelled to watch something horrible (‘I just couldn’t turn
away’). Whether this is intention or not is a matter I shall leave to the psychologists.
114As opposed to possibly being a punctual event, which is a special case of see, e.g. Is a wa
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Thus the constraint on watch that will serve as an analogue to the stative
ready, is an activity ﬂuent attn. That is, one cannot merely happen to watch
something (for a brief instant) by accident, but rather must put some eﬀort into
the process. Certainly, one talks of paying attention, i.e. doing something, and
in the case of watch, this could mean having one’s eyes follow a scene, or simply
staring intently. Of course, such activities do take some time, thereby ruling out
the possibility of paying attention to an instantaneous point.
Thus, the ﬁrst ingredient needed is a ﬂuent attn which is the formal analogue
of the attentional nature of watch described above. Secondly we shall use the
version of see deﬁned in Section 5.2 that models such sentences as Is e eM a r y
crossing the street or the perfective analogue, I saw Mary cross the street. We
shall refer to this as seef, i.e. seeing an activity, with watchf is deﬁned as an f1
activity ﬂuent as follows:
HoldsAt(attn,t) ∧ HoldsAt(seef,t) → HoldsAt(watchf,t)
with the constraint on the ﬂuent attn being similar to that of ready:
?Terminates(e,attn,t), ¬Terminates(e,watch,t) fails
meaning that no event can terminate one paying attention (to something) without
also terminating watching it.
As the deﬁnition of watch is dependent upon see, the scenario of the comple-
ment of watch is already taken care of. The completion of the activity denoted
by the complement (unlike with simple aspect see) depends both upon the as-
pect of watch as well as on the aspect of its complement. When watch is in the
progressive aspect, these completion conditions are not an issue an we shall thus
start with the simpler construction ﬁrst.
Watching
As watch is a simple activity, the standard condition that watch must appear in
the progressive in non-narrative or habitual present holds. Moreover, as detailed
in 4.5.3, the morphological aspect of the complement is irrelevant. Whether
morphologically simple or progressive aspect, the complement activity is always
interpreted as ‘in progress’ at the reference time. For a concrete example, we
shall return to
(64) I’m watching Mary cross the street.
Using the ﬂuent cross which denotes the activity of a cross the street accomplish-
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HoldsAt(attn,t) ∧ HoldsAt(seecross,t) → HoldsAt(watchcross,t)
The only thing remaining is then to give an Integrity Constraint for the present
progressive in (64).
?HoldsAt(watchcross,R), R=now succeeds
This Integrity Constraint begins a derivation with the conditional above, caus-
ing the database to add to the discourse model both that the activity portion of
the complement115 is seen (and is also imperfective) and that attention is being
paid to it. A property of this construction is that watch and see may be exten-
sionally equivalent, but are intentionally distinct due to the addition of the attn
condition.116
Finally, there is the manner of implication to the perfective to examine. While
sentence (64) has no strict implications for either the complement activity com-
pleting or watching it until completion, it is the case that if all goes well, I will
have watched Mary cross the street. The telicity of the latter is taken care of
in by the occurrence of seef, which calls upon the complement’s scenario in its
deﬁnition. What remains then is to deﬁne what it is to watch something until
the end.
Watched
There are two cases to consider here, exempliﬁed by the following two examples:
(65) a. I watched Mary cross the street.
b. I watched Mary crossing the street.
In both cases, the watching is conﬁned to the past, with the diﬀerence lying in
the status of the complement event. In sentence (65-a), Mary successfully crosses
the street, while in the second case, the status of her safety is left open. Should
the complement be an atelic activity rather than an accomplishment, the only
diﬀerence would be the progressive rendering could continue into the future, while
the simple aspect version will have stopped.
Beginning with the case in (65-a), there are two event completions to be ac-
counted for. The ﬁrst is that the complement event does ﬁnish, and the second is
that it is watched until the end.117 So, like the treatment of past-tense see,t h e r e
will not be a partial object counterpart to watch in a standard accomplishment
115This is when the complement is telic, as in cross the street. Should the sentence be I’m
watching Mary run, there is only the activity to worry about.
116The extensional equivalence may be partial. An interval of watch will always be an interval
of see, but the converse may not be the case. I can see something happening, and ﬁnd it
interesting enough to then begin watching it.
117Though as with see, it needn’t be watched for the entirety of the complement event.168 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
dynamics, but rather a construction that connects the canonical events of watch-
ing to the complement event, which is where the true accomplishment dynamics
lie. That is, we need to deﬁne start and stop events for watch that will allow
us to build a perfective, hierarchically-planned event. This is seen in the following.
startwatch is deﬁned in two separate clauses:
• HoldsAt(seef,t) ∧ Happens(eattn,t) → Happens(startwatch,t)
• Happens(startsee,t) ∧ HoldsAt(attn,t) → Happens(startwatch,t)
The ﬁrst clause handles the case where one sees something already happening
and it captures there attention enough to begin watching it – the event eattn is
merely any event that begins the attn ﬂuent. The second clause is a rather special
case. Imagine a spectator avidly awaiting the beginning of a race and already
paying attention to the runners in the starting blocks. As they are still motion-
less, one can neither see, never mind watch them running. Once the starting gun
goes oﬀ and the contestants start running, this is then seen, and since attn also
holds, watching also begins.
The ﬁnish event is a construction very similar to that for the complement
of see. Finishing watching something requires both that the complement event
completes,118 and that it is watched up until the end. As with the ﬁnish event
for perfective versions of see, this is deﬁned by two clauses. Taking finishc to be
the telic culmination point of an accomplishment, the two clauses are
Happens(finishwatch,t) → Happens(finishc,t)
Happens(finishwatch,t) → HoldsAt(attn,t)
Putting the ingredients together, we can then deﬁne a hierarchically planned
event for a sentence like (65-a).
Happens(startwatch,s) ∧ Happens(ﬁnishwatch,r) ∧ s < t ≤ r ∧ HoldsAt(watchf,t)
→ Happens(watche,t)119
The integrity constraint for past tense is of the standard form
118If the event is not an accomplishment, but an atelic activity it is enough that it merely
stops at an arbitrary point.
119Should the complement event be atelic, the ﬁnish event associated with the complement
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The query ?Happens(watche,t), t<n o wsucceeds, and the query ?HoldsAt(f1,R),
...,HoldsAt(fn,R), R ≥ now, Happens(watche,R) fails.
The case of (65-b) conﬁnes the watching, perfectively to the past, but says
nothing about the activity either completing or continuing on into the future.
Thus, the only modiﬁcation that needs to be made is for the end of the event.
For this an event, stopwatch,120 is needed which is merely an event that terminates
watchf, i.e. an event that terminates either attn or seef and says nothing about
the complement event completing or stopping. This hierarchically planned event
is then:
Happens(startwatch,s) ∧ Happens(stopwatch,r) ∧ s < t ≤ r ∧ HoldsAt(watchf,t) →
Happens(watche,t)
whose tense is anchored also by the integrity constraint above.
4.5.4 Comments on the formalisation and syntax
Despite the criticism of Felser’s analysis in the preceding sections, there is only
one major point of diﬀerence, and one minor. Certainly, there are generally
syntactic elements of restrictions on the complement (i.e. no complementizers,
particle movement, etc.) that are captured perfectly. Moreover, that she treats
the complement as a constituent, rather than an argument structure mismatch (as
d i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n3 . 1 ) 121 simpliﬁes matters considerably. We have also taken
the notion of linking between the two events rather seriously. However, this is not
done to merely guarantee temporal simultaneity, but to derive some of the more
subtle aktionsart phenomena discussed in Section 4, where the temporal proﬁle
of the perception event is partially deﬁned and dependent upon the nature of the
complement.122
The two diﬀerences are of semantic interpretation and that of how tense is
handled. The ﬁrst has to do with her incorrectly ruling out perception comple-
ments with ‘individual-level’ predicates. This has nothing to do directly with her
syntactic analysis, but rather her not allowing all verbs to possibly have stage
level interpretations. As seen in this chapter, as well as Chapters 2 and 3, this is
empirically false. But,123 should such an interpretation be allowed, verbs such as
know would then be allowed to have a syntactic representation that would make
them felicitous in direct perception reports.
120No pun intended.
121As well as reviving Fillmore’s progressive hypothesis.
122The sort of ‘event control’ goes both ways in the EC analysis, which I think is justiﬁed
when the aspectual properties of reports with watch are taken into account.
123Still speaking in terms of event variables and positions for the sake of argument.170 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
The second issue is more diﬃcult, and is discussed in further detail below. It
is simply that ing forms may indeed carry their own tense in certain construc-
tions, which does cast doubt on the syntactic analysis.124 I have no answers to
this problem, but will oﬀer the barest of comments and suggestions in the next
section. Originally the plan was to use the syntactic analysis as a platform to
explore solely the interactions between event-type, tense and aspect. From the
syntax, the complement as an independent event, whose tense overlapped with
the complement came for free from the syntactic analysis. At present, tense is an-
chored semantically,125 which conceptually doesn’t seem particularly out of order.
Nevertheless, the original plan was to only use an alternative event semantics that
is particularly suited for modelling the phenomena seen in Section 4. As a pre-
view of the tense conundrum, here are two (simpliﬁed) structures (Felser, 1999,
p. 119)126 that show the diﬀerent tense relations between a simple Asp and a
futurate inﬁnitive.
(66) a. John [T is [AspP [Asp lookingi [vP the reference...ti up...
b. We expect John [T to [AspP[Asplooki [vP the reference...ti up...
The ﬁrst is an example of the present progressive,127 where the time is only present
time. For (66-b), expect is indexed for the present tense, but since the inﬁnitival
has its own tense head, the complement tense is not controlled by the matrix,
but rather by the inﬁnitive, and has a future interpretation.
This patterning works ﬁne with expect, but with intend it breaks down for
many English dialects. This matter and others are discussed in the ﬁnal section
of the chapter.
4.6 Coda – Prepositions vs. ing
In section 3, a bit of doubt was cast on the universality of the simultaneity
principle. Certainly, for direct perception sentences the is a temporal linkage
between the matrix verb and the complement. For Felser, this was due to the
complement being an aspectual phrase and having no tense of its own. We saw
that see itself is no guarantee of this, as one can use it in a non-direct perception
124Not only hers, however. In the next section we will see that this also contradicts some
authors in the functional tradition as well.
125This is done with clauses that include both the complement event and the seeing event with
identical timepoints.
126Example (66)-(b) is modiﬁed in that the matrix verb is put in the present tense.
127How a futurate progressive of John is looking the reference up will work under this analysis
is a mystery to me as the time of is and the time of the event will diﬀer, unless a preparatory
event is accounted for somewhere in the semantics. I think the solution to the problems pointed
out in more detail in the next section, will partially involve teasing out the diﬀerence between
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predictive sense that places the complement event in the future. She extends this
analysis to aspectual verbs as well, (p. 190)
(67) a. Sue continued ﬁlling in the form.
b. Bill started ﬁxing his car.
c. Mary stopped cleaning her room.
where the complements of the aspectual verb are aspectual phrases, and indeed,
the complement is simultaneous with the aspectual event (e.g. stop, continue,
etc.) For some reason, she neglects to include the ing phrase having an overt
subject, such as
(68) Bill stopped Mary cleaning her room.128
The diﬀerence is important, however. The ﬁrst type are ‘raising’ predicates, where
the subject of the matrix verb is co-identiﬁed with the subject of the complement.
This alone, doesn’t guarantee simultaneity as intend is also a raising predicate,129
but in non-American UK derived dialects there is no necessary simultaneity be-
tween matrix and complement.
(69) a. A priest who regularly conducts Mass for Tony Blair and his family
refuelled speculation last night that the British Prime Minister intends
becoming a Roman Catholic.130
b. He intends taking legal action.131
Matters become more complicated when we look at non-raising examples of as-
pectual verbs, such as in sentence (69). It is dialect dependent on whether they
obey the simultaneity principle. This is in contrast also to a functionalist syntax
point of view, as is illustrated in (Valin & La Polla, 1997, p. 472).
(70) a. Robin stopped Kim singing ‘Advance Australia Fair’.
b. Robin stopped Kim from singing ‘Advance Australia Fair’.
Example (70-a)132 is marginal (emph. added) for many speakers, but
nevertheless the contrast relevant to this discussion comes through
clearly. In (a), Kim is singing the Australian national anthem and
128It could be that she is focussing on a standard American English dialect, where such con-
structions are less felicitous than more UK derived dialects.
129Though not an aspectual verb, of course.
130Irish Independent, 15 October 2004.
131As noted previously, in American dialects it is preferable to use a to inﬁnitive or a prepo-
sition such as on – i.e. She intends to take/on taking legal action. This example comes from a
BBC radio news report.
132This is my numbering obviously.172 Chapter 4. Perception Verbs
Robin stops her; since the singing has been going on at the time of
the stopping action, the two overlap temporally. In (b), on the other
hand, no singing ever occurred; that is Robin acted to stop Kim before
she even started to sing the song.
He then gives a more generalised formulation for the linking between matrix and
complement
a. Constructions with zero marker on linked unit: [+temporal over-
lap]
b. Constructions with to/from marker on linked unit [-temporal over-
lap]
Indeed, this does work when the aspectual verb is of the ‘raising’ kind; the dif-
ference can be seen via the contrasting interpretations in inﬁnitives and ing com-
plements.
(71) a. Mary started to drive to work (but before she got in the car she
changed her mind and took the bus).
b. Mary started driving to work (*but before she got in the car she
changed her mind and took the bus.)
But once there is an intervening NP between the aspectual verb and the ing
complement,133 simultaneity may merely be an accident of dialect. The following
is taken from an article in the Observer.134
For nearly 20 years, Sin Phillips was in thrall to Peter O’Toole,
the man she married and describes now as ‘a dangerous, disruptive
human being’. She loved him to distraction, but, whether deliberately
or not, he stopped her doing the one thing she had always wanted to
do.
’Of course I could have been more successful. I would not have
lost that crucial decade where you should be laying down a body
of work... I never stopped working, but I wasn’t doing what I wanted,
serious work at the RSC. I was extremely occupied with being married
and being a mother and ﬁtting in with a very, very successful career.’
As can be seen from the above, it is not the case that she was ever doing
what she wanted to do (work at the Royal Shakespeare Company). For a group
of British speakers, at least, (70-a) can also be interpreted as (70-b). I suspect
133Something that is necessary for verbs of perception with aspectual complements. Is a w
Mary crossing the street, but not *I saw crossing the street.
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this is an -ing form used as a futurate or at least for what is planned or intended.
Simultaneity can then be saved (in a sense), but only with a broader view of the
event.
This is no anomalous example. The following is from the City of Edinburgh
web-page regarding the Victorian body snatching controversy.
(72) Mrs. Gray returned in the morning to ﬁnd Burke acting very suspiciously,
and he stopped her going over to the bed to collect her child’s stockings.135
There is also the verb remember, which is examined in (Higginbotham, 2003).
He calls complements for sentences like He remembers giving the speech, gerun-
dive,136 but also that they denote events. The paper is partially an excuse to
explore the contribution of PRO. But there are diﬀerences between the PRO
version above, an aspectual phrase and a real gerund. This is Higginbotham’s
pair.
(73) a. I remember saying that John should ﬁnish his thesis by July.
b. I remember my saying that John should ﬁnish his thesis by July.
He rightly notes that in (73-a) it is not only the event that is remembered but
it is remembered from the point of view of the speaker being the agent of it.
This isn’t quite the case with (73-b). In any case, semantically, there can be no
simultaneity of course. This is less of a problem for Felser, as they are gerunds
and not aspectual phrases. But the point was brought up to show the diﬀerence
in other cases, between the use of PRO and an explicit subject.
While I have no answers for any of this, my guess is that a variety of factors
involving both argument structure and lexical semantics137 are at work, along
with optionality for diﬀerent dialects. Chapter 6 will explore in greater depth the
profound mystery of verbal ing. This too may brings up many new questions.
135As there is no additional context as in the other example, the situation is no entirely clear.
Mrs. Gray could have been going over to the bed and stopped her (temporal overlap) or could
have ushered her out of the room before she had a chance to begin going over to the bed (no
temporal overlap). In either case, this was probably her intention when she entered the room.
136Strictly speaking, they cannot be aspectual phrases as they allow a possessive as the ‘sub-
ject’ of the ing complement.
137When an aspectual verb is used in its raising construction, simultaneity happens, but not
in the case of intend, which is, semantically quite a diﬀerent animal.Chapter 5
Causatives
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 What are causatives? The general notion
In a general way, the notion of causation is crucial for the representation of
semantic structure. Ordinary transitive sentences that denote accomplishments
or activities, such as John built a house or Bill threw the ball, while not considered
‘causatives’ undeniably have a notion of causation at their core. The ﬁrst sentence
represents a verb of creation, where John causes something to come into existence,
while in the second, there is a force transmission of Bill to the ball that causes
t h eb a l lt om o v e .
(Croft, 2000b), revising his notion of causal chain from (Croft, 1991), stresses
the importance of capturing force-dynamic and causal relations between events
along with aspectual contours of the events. This especially crucial for argument
linking. However this notion had presented him with a number of problems.1 His
solution is rather elegant, and can be illustrated by the quote that follows.
... these problems can be solved in a single, disarmingly sim-
ple stroke. A complex verbal semantic structure is decomposed into
subevents such that each subevent involves only one participant and
its own aspectual contour; and the subevents are related to each other
causally. (Croft, 2000b, Chapter 3, p. 6)
Serendipitously, this is the basic strategy of the Event Calculus as well, and
while in the formalism later in the chapter we have not formulated an explicit
method of argument linking, we do use the spirit of the above quote as our guide,
as the notion does form the heart and soul of the Event Calculus, as far as
aspectual and aktikonsarten representation is concerned.
1See (Croft, 2000b) for a list of them.
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While causation can be said to be a core facet of many verbal proﬁles and event
types, there are also, in the literature, speciﬁc constructions that are appropriately
named causative constructions. For (Song, 2001), the following sentence can be
seen as a prototypical example of a causative construction,
(1) Elizabeth made the chef eat the leftovers.
where Elizabeth did something that has a result that the chef carries out an event,
in this case eating the leftovers. Importantly for Song, the cause is expressed by an
abstract predicate (made), while the activity of the chef (eat) has far more speciﬁc
lexical content. He notes (citing (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994)) that all that is
expressed by verb representing the cause is ‘the pure notion of cause...without
more speciﬁc lexical content.’ (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994, p. 117)
Moreover, the causer NP and the causal predicate are ‘foregrounded’ in respect
to the causee and his event. The causer is the subject NP of the construction, and
the predicate is inﬂected. Contrastly, the predicate of the caused event is non-
ﬁnite, or what Song refers to as ‘not a full-ﬂedged verb’ (p. 258). He contrasts
(1) with the following, that, while certainly causal in nature, is not an instance
of the causative construction.
(2) The chef ate the leftovers because Elizabeth burnt his meal.
Here two substantive lexical verbs are used to indicate the separate events (and
are grammatically independent of each other), and the information regarding the
causer is placed in the background (in the ‘because’ clause) rather than fore-
grounded as in (1). Finally, the cause in sentence (2) has speciﬁc lexical content
rather than the abstract causal predicate in sentence (1).
However, it is not the case2 that causative constructions can only use ‘abstract’
predicates such as make or let. While burn certainly has lexical content, the
following sentence would also be considered a causative construction.
(3) Elizabeth burnt the meal.
A crucial distinction between sentences (2) and (3) is the relationship between
the causal event and recipient of the causality. In (2), the causal recipient is the
chef and we are given a great deal of lexical speciﬁcation of what the casual event
was. In sentence (3), the causal recipient is the meal and while burn certainly
has lexical content, this content indicates only what happened to the recipient
of causation. Whatever act Elizabeth does (or fails to do) to cause the meal
to burn is completely abstract. While we may stereotypically associate certain
actions that Elizabeth could have done in (3), the causing event can be nearly
anything, and in this sense, the causing event in (3) is just as abstract as if make
were used. With this in mind, we shall be focussing on causative constructions
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exempliﬁed by the ﬁrst and third sentences, and ignore the more general ‘causal’
constructions such as sentence (2).
5.1.2 Causation
The notion of cause is an incredibly rich and complex notion and can be looked
at from scientiﬁc, philosophical or psychological perspectives, to name just a few.
Instead, we shall follow (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994) in restricting the notion of
causation to its manifestation in human conceptualisation.3 What is important
is how the speaker views a given situation. Whether or not a speaker views
a given situation as causal, and in what way it is causal will go a long way in
determining what kind of linguistic structure they will use to express their view of
the situation. Moreover, allowing for construal diﬀerences in the area of causation
and the participants involved allows us to incorporate into a semantic theory many
creative extensions of certain constructions, violations of defaults, and changes in
the language over time in regard to causative verbs and constructions.
5.1.3 Plan of chapter
We begin by looking in the next section at general conceptual notions of causa-
tion and their semantic typology. Section 2.3 brieﬂy brings us to a basic look at
English causatives followed by sections 2.4 and 2.5 which look to cross-linguistic
typology to broaden the notion of causation types and understand the various
possibilities that are possible in conceptions of causation. This allows us to dis-
cover types, which while not explicitly obvious in English (on the surface) do
indeed manifest themselves. After section 2.5, which brings the previous two sec-
tions together, we enter into the preliminaries of the formalisation of some types
of causative situations for English. This entails a close examination of the role
of the participants and its eﬀect on the implications for tense and aspect con-
structions, followed by the actual formalisations. The last two sections are rather
short and serve as codas to the previous sections. Section 3 is a quick look at
the change in the applicability of lexical causatives in English diachronically, and
Section 4 is an all to short look at resultative constructions, especially when they
involve lexical causatives. While short, it provides a good look at the importance
of taking construal rather seriously, as we shall see some rather creative (and
technically ‘ungrammatical’) uses by speakers that only make sense if one allows
for the speaker’s view along with the general causal meaning of many types of
resultatives4 to interact felicitously.
3They expand on this, saying that ‘the human conceptualisation of causation...must be based
in some fundamental mode of modes of chunking and organising perceived reality that allows
humans to interact successfully with their physical and social environment. (p. 117)
4As well as the ‘X’s way’ construction.178 Chapter 5. Causatives
5.2 Causatives
This section explores causatives from a variety of angles. We shall ﬁrst look at
what causation is considered on the semantic level, followed by a brief survey of
English causatives and how they exemplify the causative concepts. The reader will
then be asked to leave familiar territory and embark on a typological exploration,
which is useful in revealing subtleties about causatives that are not immediately
apparent from the English examples.
These subtleties will then be shown to also exist in English, not through
morpho-syntactic marking, but rather through contrasting implications depend-
ing on the various causal scenes. With these distinctions in mind, only then can
a proper way of formally describing causative structures in English be made.
5.2.1 Semantic Parameters
(Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994) give a series of sentences that are illustrative of the
various semantic intricacies involved in causation and are repeated here for the
beneﬁt of the reader.
(4) a. She made it fall over by pushing it.
b. She made it fall over by rolling the ball into it.
c. She made him cough.
d. She made him type the letter.
e. She had him type the letter.
f. She let the water run out of the bathtub.
g. She let him eat some brownies.
These are typical examples of periphrastic causatives. It may be useful for the
reader to ﬁrst imagine what the diﬀerent causative possibilities are, depending
both on the auxilliary verb used as well as the situation denoted by the comple-
ment. Imagine, especially, the diﬀerent possible ways that the cause produces the
eﬀect, temporal linking, and control relations between the participants.
Causation Types
(Song, 2001) provides a description of various causation types that are used to
then identify and diﬀerentiate diﬀerent morpho-syntactic causative constructions
cross-linguistically. In essence, a transitive or ditransitive causative5 expresses a
complex situation with a causing event, initiated by a causer in order to bring
about the caused event. In the caused event, there is a causee who either carries
out an action or undergoes a change of state. Observe the basic examples
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(5) a. Mary broke the vase.
b. John made Bill turn on the light.
In (5-a) Mary is the causer who either does (or can be held responsible for) a
certain event that causes the vase to undergo a change from whole to broken –
dropping it on the ﬂoor, for example. In (5-b), John is the causer who manages
to have the causee (Bill) perform the action of turning on the light.
This brief description seems simple enough but hides two distinct levels of de-
scription – causation between the events and causation between the participants.
First, there is a distinction to be made between whether the relationship between
the two events can be seen as direct or indirect causation. That is, can the event
associated with the causer be directly associated with the causee event? Taking
the example in (5-a), a typical scenario would have Mary knocking it over thus
causing it to break. This would typically be considered an example of direct cau-
sation, as the two events are temporally linked and there is no intervening event
in the vase breaking.6 In other words, direct causation can be seen as a causative
situation where both events temporally abut with no intervening events playing
ar o l e .
Indirect causation, as expected, is the opposite of the above. Imagine (5-b)
as describing a situation where John put an obstacle in front of the doorway
knowing that Bill always rushes into rooms regardless of the light situation. Bill
falls and realises that he should turn on the light. Here John is nowhere about
and his sole event contribution (placing the obstacle) could have occurred at any
time before the caused event. Obviously then, the causing event and caused
event are separated by time, requiring the intermediate events of Bill entering
the room and falling down to carry out the caused event. However, in order to
see John as the causer (and hence as seen to have done something responsible
for the caused event) the caused event must be temporally connected back to
the causing event though a chain of events. In future I will refer to the level
of causation as ‘granularity’, which shall be explored informally in a following
subsection and then return to play a role in the formalisation. Moreover, cross-
linguistically there are markedness diﬀerences depending on whether the cause is
direct or indirect.
The reader should note that (4-a) is the only unequivocal example of direct
causation, while (b) and (e)-(f) are all examples of indirect causation. (4-c) and
(d) can be interpreted either way, but the more natural way is to assume that
they are more compatible with a direct causative reading. Note that under a
direct causative reading of (b), it is the case that another distinction is necessary.
Making something fall over by pushing it and making someone cough by telling
them to are both direct causation, but the way the participant brings the cause
about hints at the need for a deeper analysis.
6This is not a claim that (5-a) always involves direct causation, but only that the typical
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The second distinction, that of the level of description between the causer and
causee often has an eﬀect on case-marking or choice of causal verb. The distinction
to be kept in mind here is what is called either manipulative or directive causation.
Typically, manipulative causation involves the causer acting physically upon the
cause, while directive causation relies on other, more subtle, means.
Song gives a nice example of John causing Bill to fall by rolling a shopping
trolley into him. Given the distinctions made in the last paragraph this is an
example of manipulative causation. But unlike our scenario for (5-a), it is also
an example of indirect causation. John acts physically to aﬀect Bill, but there is
an intervening event, namely that of the shopping trolley rolling into Bill that is
needed to make the causal chain complete.7 Thus there is the possibility to have
manipulative causal situations that are either direct or indirect, reinforcing the
need to analyse the situation on two distinct causal levels.
Directive causation is associated with non-physical means that the causer may
use in order to aﬀect the causee. Song’s example involves a doctor telling a patient
to lie down. Here the causal event is non-physical, but may be seen nevertheless as
an example of direct causation. But if the doctor told his nurse to tell the patient
to lie down, it would be an example of both indirect and directive causation. As
expected, the diﬀerence between the two types of directive causation becomes
manifest when we look at the ways the two types would generally be expressed.
While ostensibly a topic in another area, the cross-linguistic section will show
that the worlds languages take account of the levels of causality more explicitly
than shown so far. The type of causative situation will often determine the
way it can be expressed, with direct types of causation usually corresponding
to less marked or direct linguistic forms. We have already observed types of
situation that are both direct and directive or indirect and manipulative. The
various combinations along the two dimensions allow for a good deal of variation
in languages that have the morphosyntactic ability to do so. Languages such as
English (or Dutch) may express the diﬀerences lexically,8 but often this morpho-
syntactic poverty can lead to an initial confusion when analysing causality. For
example, the ambiguity of ‘She made him cough’ revels in the various ways the
two dimensions of causality can combine.
Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) further elaborate on the participant causal dis-
tinction by noting that both enablement and permission (the former physical and
the latter social or inaction) can be also seen as causation types, where it is even
7One might argue that Mary dropping the vase, thus breaking it, also involves an intermedi-
ate event, namely the vase falling. A crucial diﬀerence is that this purported intermediate event
is part of what happens to the vase, rather than intervention by a third object. The diﬀerence
is one of perspective, but it crucial for understanding how causality is construed. Should the
reader still be sceptical, imagine that Mary breaks the vase by smashing it, thus disallowing
any third party mediation.
8(Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994)) note that laten is used more for indirect (and often directive)
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possible the causer may have no intention of having the caused event come about.
For example, if I see someone walking near a precarious cliﬀ and do nothing to
warn him, my inaction can be said to be a cause of him falling oﬀ. Similarly if
I have removed the fence thus causing him to fall oﬀ, it can be seen as a type of
enablement causation.
Now, despite the possibility of ambiguity conceded above, the distinction just
made between more intentional forms of manipulative and directive causation
does sometimes manifest itself the very non-exotic language of English. Going
back to Kemmer and Verhagen’s examples in (4), those with ‘make’ are much more
likely to involve manipulative causation (telling someone to cough, or hitting them
on the back, for example), while ‘having’ someone type a letter is more likely to
involve the intermediacy of someone else or the willing participation of the causee.
Before moving on, the reader may have come up with a variety of situations to
ﬁt the ﬁrst example of the section and then, upon reﬂection, wondered whether
a certain situation was direct or indirect, manipulative or directive, and perhaps
even pondered over whether it matters if the causee had any autonomy in per-
forming the caused event. For example, a bare situation such as causing someone
to type a letter can be construed in various ways. This, and if the causation
is construed as direct or indirect aﬀects the linguistic form used. That is, the
same real world situation can be seen in various ways, the way in which a speaker
desires to present the situation aﬀects the way the utterance will be coded. Much
more will be said of this in upcoming sections, but ﬁrst we shall examine in detail
two semantic notions that will be highly relevant to the formalisation.
Notion of external event
From the above, it is clear that the idea of causation can be realised in a number
of ways. One of the basic notions is that where a causative is used with a causer
argument (e.g.“Sunshine” in “Sunshine melted the ice” or a periphrastic version
using ‘make’) there is an external event that causes the caused event. In this
caused event the participant can either be the agent of the caused event (e.g.
ordinary uses of “John walked the dog”, or undergoing a process, as with “melt”.)
On the verbal level, (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) make a distinction
between internally and externally caused eventualities. An intransitive verb that
describes an internal eventuality can be said to be describing “some property
inherent to the argument of the verb” that is “responsible” for bringing about
the eventuality. With agentive verbs (“play” or “speak”), the internal cause is
the will or intention of the agent. But, they note lack of control by an agent
does not mean that the eventuality is not internal. They cite the verbs “blush”
and “tremble”, which while not agentive, can be said to arise from the internal
property of the subject (in these cases an emotional reaction).
Externally caused verbs (as the name suggest), are those verbs whose eventu-
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degree of control in bringing about the eventuality. Break is a typical example
of such a verb. While it is natural to describe something either ‘breaking itself’
or ‘breaking by itself’, this is a case of the object being both the external cause
and the causee. In fact, when a verb like break is used intransitively, “our knowl-
edge of the world tells us that the eventuality these verbs describe could not have
happened without an external cause.” (p.93).
The point of this is that (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) proposes that the
diﬀerence between internally and externally caused verbs is that only the latter
can participate in the so-called transitive alternation. Internally caused verbs can
only appear intransitively or can be seen to be caused in an indirect way using a
periphrastic such as ‘make’.9 This distinction is more generally used to predict
argument selection, categorisation properties and word derivation.
They do note, importantly, that the external/internal distinction does not
directly reﬂect real world facts, but our conception of them. Certain events can be
seen as either or both type of cause. This is certainly the case and, for this author
changes the focus of the work. (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) does note that
cross-linguistically certain verbs vary as to how the language construes them.
But this also occurs within a language both diachronically and synchronically.
This makes a prediction of the argument structure that is stronger than a default
situation rather diﬃcult.
For example, they note that shudder and shake are the same in every respect
aside from the fact that the former is internally caused and thus cannot be used
as a transitive causative. Shuddering is a certain type of shaking coupled with
an emotion reaction. This emotional reaction is characteristic of a self-controlled
body and usually it is only people, animals, and animate machines can be said to
shudder. Things such as teacups and leaves can only shake. Thus shudder is an
internally caused verb, with agency having nothing to do with the distinction.
However, while grammatical agency indeed has nothing to do with things,
control certainly does. Take away the emotional component and shudder works
ﬁne as a transitive. Inanimate objects with no control or emotion can be said to
shudder, presumably as the motion resembles an animate agent shuddering. This
is from fan ﬁction found on Google.10
(6) The warm wind shuddered the leaves of the old oak tree beyond the win-
dow.
The OED does have rare uses of ‘shudder’ as a causative verb as well. One use is
9They do note however, that some internally caused verbs can be used transitively but these
sort of causatives represent a distinct phenomena.
10It may be the case that shudder and shake are not the same in every respect. There are many
ways a tree can shake, but if it shakes in a certain way that (metaphorically speaking) resembles
a certain type of shaking behaviour that a disconcerted person does when shuddering, it seems
no stretch to extend its use to inanimates. Typically, the emotional component of shuddering
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poetic, but does use ‘shudder’ in a sense that does include an emotional reaction
in the causee. (From E. Blunden, English Poems, 1925)
(7) A drowned sheep lodged In a black holt of alders, Its poor ﬂeece brown
and vile, To shudder young beholders.
Ultimately, it really is a matter of construal, along with context, information
structure and a number of other factors that determine whether a verb can be
used in a transitive causal construction. It is often the case that the linguist
attempting to rule out certain uses is too constrictive.11 For the interaction of
various factors (including psychological construal) that inﬂuence the argument
selection of various verbs see (Goldberg, 2000) and (McKoon & MacFarland,
2001).
The point of this is not to rubbish the semantic distinction between external
and internal cause, but rather to change the perspective. Instead of trying to pre-
dict which sentences are felicitous or how a particular verb’s argument selection
is always like, the purpose is instead to predict the meaning if such an argument
selection is used. So, rather than deal with such matters as predicting traditional
thematic roles, argument linking and structure, it is better to examine the var-
ious ways something can be causal and to precisely formalise these. Should a
form be used that is not conventional, I would rather explain how it works than
pedantically star something that does not ﬁt the theory at hand.
Nevertheless, the verb class distinction and distinction between external and
internal cause is a good default starting point. But even when we allow that there
can be a range of construal of a verb as internally or externally caused, they are
most likely other factors that determine a verb’s behavioural possibilities. For
example, they correctly class certain verbs of manner of motion, such as roll or
swing as externally caused when predicated of inanimate objects, e.g. The ball
rolled down the hill or The door swung open. In their terms these are unaccusative
verbs (where the subject is patient-like), that are restricted in their participation
in certain constructions. For example, they are supposedly not allowed in reﬂexive
resultative constructions or the ‘way’ construction.12 Therefore
(8) a. The door rolled open.
b. *The door rolled itself open.
c. The shutter swung shut.
d. *The shutter swung itself shut.
(9) a. *The pebbles rolled their way into the stream.
b. *The ball bounced its way into the street.
11(Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) does this as well with ‘decay’ and many other verbs that
are supposedly only internal cause verbs but are often seen in their transitive counterpart.
12These constructions will be examined in more depth at the end of the chapter. For now,
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Intuitively, the subject must be seen as doing something in the above. Given
that the verbs are externally caused, it is rather the case that they are having
something done to them, thus ruling them out of reﬂexive resultatives and the
‘way’ construction. Nevertheless, even when the context suggests that the motion
is externally caused, it seems that their prediction is false, as can be seen from
people’s descriptions of bowling (taken from Google).
(10) a. She bounced in anticipation as her ball rolled its way down the alley,
leaping in victory as it struck down every pin in its wake.
b. Frequent calls of ”take two” could be heard on several courts as stray
balls rolled their way into others’ territory.13
Clearly in these examples the tennis and bowling balls’ motion is externally caused
(by the sportspeople), but nevertheless we can still view the balls (once set in
motion) as doing something on their own, regardless of the external/internal
distinction. The stereotypical motion associated with a shopping cart can also be
used in the way construction14 to give a poetic trajectory to its success.
(11) The shopping cart thus rolled its way into marketing history.15
and even a glacier melting16 can be conceive as a method of propulsion for the
glacier, rather than something happening to it.
(12) a. As the last great glacier slowly melted its way north, torrents of water
and debris raced south.17
b. When a retreating glacier – about 12,000 years ago – reached this soft
seabed substance (as it melted its way north), the glacier was able to dig
much, much deeper than when it dug into hard, non-porous rock.18
Similarly, inanimates can participate in the reﬂexive resultative construction as
well.
(13) a. Once the telescope has swung itself into position and stops moving,
you’ll see Saturn in the eyepiece.19
b. The door swung itself slowly open with a languid creek, and he smiled
as he went inside.20
13http://www.cavalierdaily.com/CVArticle.asp?ID=9973&pid=780
14This is a typical use of the ‘way’ construction, where the path generated by the verb needn’t
be literal motion, but a ‘way’ to a result, nonetheless.
15http://www.snopes.com/business/origins/shopcart.asp
16Sadly this will happen all the more.
17www.tomifobia.com/lowwater.html
18http://www.odysseymagazine.com/pages/askascientistarchives.php
19www.allenhayden.com/telescope.html
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Certainly, the latter example is taken from ﬁction and one could argue that a bit
of animacy is attributed to the door, giving it an internally caused construal. But
the former is merely an instructional piece on how to use a telescope. Here (as with
(13)), I believe that what is going on is that the external cause is ignored entirely.
In these cases, the motion is started by an external cause, but (ignoring inertia,
gravity and friction) once the motion starts it seems no great leap to construe
the motion as now self-propelled and thus available for the constructions.
Finally, using a transitive structure with an internally caused verb such as
‘walk’ is normally considered to idiosyncratic and parallel to an extent with a
periphrastic causal version. Think about the normal instances of ‘John walked
the dog’ which is more than just ordinary causality but describes a rather complex
event where the causee is really in control of the walking.21 But when construed
as the causee having no power, essentially the ‘walking’ is externally caused. As
will be seen in the formalisation, this makes a huge diﬀerence and eﬀects the
event structure (imagine when someone is said to ‘walk a puppet’ rather than a
dog).
What the above shows is that a deeper exploration into the notion of cause (in
language) is necessary. One or two factors cannot account for the great variability
of behaviour, matters are far too complex than that. Instead, we must look
beyond the traditional formal semantic literature to arrive at a fuller notion of
cause (or rather the multifarious types of causes). In the following sections we
shall examine both in English and cross-linguistically what the various factors
involved in causatives are, beginning with another semantic distinction.
Causal level
The notion of diﬀering causal levels will be used to denote the scale of causation
along the event pole, that is, how direct or indirect is a given causal event. Imagine
the situation of ice melting where John purposely takes it out of the freezer and
puts it in direct sunlight. It can be described both by
(14) a. Sunshine melted the ice.
b. John melted the ice.
(14-a) is a prime example of direct causation where the eﬀect of the sun’s rays
and heat directly causes the ice to melt. It meets the criteria of no intervening
events and temporal abutment. With the latter however, John could be on the
other side of the world by the time the ice melts, and is a paradigmatic example
of indirect causation. Both are expressed via the same form which may lead one
to think that the type of causation is irrelevant. However, we could also express
the situation as one of
21(Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) note that these sort of transitives are a diﬀerent phe-
nomenon than the ordinary alternation. I agree, but when construed as a true causative, the
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(15) a. John let the ice melt.
b. John had the ice melt.
But the above two sentences with ‘sunshine’ as the subject are a little bizarre.22
It may be objected that the sun’s inanimacy is really the culprit in their infelicity.
However, using the famous example from Horn, we can see that causation, and
not animacy is really at issue here by using only animate participants. A classic
of example of the division of pragmatic labour involves two situations involving
Black Bart and the Sheriﬀ. The ﬁrst involves Black Bart shooting the sheriﬀ and
the second involves sabotage of the sheriﬀ’s gun, causing it to backﬁre and killing
the sheriﬀ. Horn proposes that in the following two sentences, only the ﬁrst is
compatible with the direct situation and the second is only compatible with the
indirect situation:
(16) a. Black Bart killed the Sheriﬀ.
b. Black Bart caused the Sheriﬀ to die.
Conventional wisdom is completely correct in say that (16-b) is only compatible
(pragmatically) with the indirect situation, but (16-a) is actually compatible with
nearly any causal situation that has Black Bart as the ﬁrst cause. Sticking to
the indirect causal situation, imagine the Sheriﬀ’s wife is out for revenge and ties
Black Bart to train tracks, awaiting the inevitable. Black Bart, not knowing who
she is, asks the wife why exactly she is doing such a dastardly act. Her natural
response would be
(17) You killed my husband.
and less likely to be
(18) You caused my husband to die.
yet this refers to an indirect situation. Once again the way the speaker views the
situation (not necessarily the situation itself) manifests in the choice of form used.
(17) removes the intermediate causal events and focusses strictly on the initial
cause. By using a direct causal structure she manages rhetorically to emphasise
Black Bart’s culpability and not the gun’s, in a sense making her revenge more
morally justiﬁed (on the Old West’s morals at least).
Here, it can be seen that for English, at least, granularity is one of the ways the
speaker construes the situation and the way it is coded linguistically is dependent
upon this and not necessarily relying on a speaker-independent notion of direct
or indirect causation. Granularity of this sort used in direct causal constructions
has aspectual implications as well that will be explored when we move on to
the formalisation. Cross-linguistically, this sort of construal may not be quite
22‘Make’, as Kemmer and Verhagen note, expresses and intermediate notion of causation that
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so ﬂexible, but there is a consistent coding relation between causal type and
linguistic form used. We will ﬁrst look at the range of causatives in English and
then broaden our outlook.
5.2.2 English typology
Having examined the basic semantic concepts about causation and the way these
are expressed in a number of languages, this section will focus on English causatives.23
A connection to the basics of semantics of causation will also be made, but more
speciﬁc causative quirks will be left until the closing sections, focussing on the
formalisation.
English causatives
Observe the following well known pairs (or triples)
(19) a. Sunshine melted the ice.
b. The ice melted.
c. John burned down the house.
d. The house burned down.
e. Fire burned the house down.
f. Mary walked the dog.
g. The dog walked.
The transitive sentences (a and c) imply the intransitive alternates. At ﬁrst
glance one could analyse (19-a) and (c) as ordinary accomplishments, with the
intransitive versions as their passive alternates (e.g. John built the house)t oThe
house was built. This however is not the case for a couple of reasons.
First, the (b) and (d) sentences are not passives at all, but, in fact what is
called in the literature “anti-passives.”. Compare the following:
(20) a. The house was built (by John).
b. The vase broke.
c. The vase broke *by John.
d. The vase was broken by John.
(20-a) is a typical passive, (b) a typical inchoative alternation and (d) a passive
version of the active/causative John broke the vase. Typologically, something
very interesting is happening here. While in both the passive (c) and intransitive
sentence (b),24 the verb form is diﬀerent, as is the possibility for expressing an
23A brief examination of their diachronic evolution is presented near the end of the chapter.
24In the semantic literature, examples such as (20-b) would be called unaccusative and (19-g),
unergative. Unfortunately, this terminology is almost exactly reversed in much of the syntactic
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agent. With the passive, the agent argument, though not obligatory, can be
expressed using a ‘by’-phrase. This is impossible with the intransitives. Sentence
(20-c) is of the form ‘S=P’ but the event is presented as happening with no regard
to an external cause. Croft notes that such constructions as the intransitive break
are those in which “A is rendered nonsalient or nonexistent, and only P remains
as the sole participant in the event.” (Croft, 2001, p.317)
As touched upon, the verb form used by passives and the related intransi-
tives is completely diﬀerent. With a passive, a form of be is used along with a
past-participle. With the intransitives, the verb is just the normal verb form that
would be used with an active sentence. I used break in the last examples since
it conveniently distinguishes morphologically the simple past and past participle,
which is becoming rarer and rarer in actual usage.25 The S=P intransitive sen-
tences are a simple active intransitive similar to John smiled except the subject
is now the patient instead of the agent.
S=P type intransitive forms are not the only type of intransitives that can be
related to a transitive causative form. The pair in (19-f) and (g) can also be seen
as a transitive ‘alternation’ but (20-g), is not of the form S=P, but rather S=A,
that is the dog does the walking and is not undergoing something in the way ice
melting does. But, regardless of the argument status, the transitive versions of
both are lexical causatives. Note that this sort of agentive cause patterning is not
productive, but can be a matter of historical accident or convention. For example,
walk (in the literal sense) occurs quite easily in this alternation, but a verb of the
same type, run can usually only be used causatively in a more metaphorical sense,
e.g. running a business, or in a resultative, e.g. run someone into the ground.
Someone who takes their dog for a run in the park, cannot conventionally be said
to have ‘run their dog’.
It is important to realise that the fact that a given verb does not participate in
this transitive/intransitive alternation does not mean that there is no causation
going on. For example, it would be rather hard to deny inherent causality in
‘Mary cut the cake’. Yet, unlike, break or melt, one cannot say ‘the cake cut’.26
Instead one should view these causatives as a special type of grammatical con-
struction, that presents causation in a certain way. Aside from certain syntactic
restrictions, I have seen no account that can correlate the nature of the verb with
its participation in the alternation absolutely, though there is indeed a degree of
patterning by verb class.
of (Dixon, 2005) and (Croft, 2001). ‘S=A’ means that for an intransitive like John walks,t h e
subject, John is agentive in nature. ‘S=P’ means that for an intransitive like the ice melted
means that the subject is patient-like, i.e. being aﬀected by the melting.
25In fact, one is just as likely to hear The vase was broke – for all I know this is not a recent
phenomenon and indicator of degraded language ability. There is perhaps a continuing trend
to conﬂate past tense and past participle.
26For this sections, middle voice is ignored, but something like ‘the cake cut easily’ is perfectly
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The syntactic restriction is that a transitive sentence cannot be used in a
lexical causative situation. With any lexical causative, the subject corresponds
to the causer of the verb, e.g. if Mary broke the vase, she was the causer of the
breaking. But, now begin with John cut the cake. Supposing he did this under
Mary’s instruction, it must be expressed as an analytic causative, such as Mary
had John cut the cake (contrast with the more morphological and case marking
Turkish ((56))). Trying to express this non-periphrastically, we get ‘Mary cut
John the cake’ or ’Mary cut the cake PREP John’. In both cases, Mary is the
one doing the cutting, which is not the causality desired. The transitive, already
having a direct object makes it rather diﬃcult for the causee to also be a direct
object. Thus, the alternation from S=A intransitives to a causative like ‘Mary
walked the dog’ may indeed be acceptable. Note also, that my gloss of (45) (‘I
coughed the child’), while conventionally unacceptable is perfectly understandable
nevertheless, as there is no syntactic restriction here. See (Dixon, 2005) for more
details.27
Finally, aside from the lexical causatives examined in this section, there is
a more productive way of expressing causation, the analytic causative. There
are many auxiliary verb choices involved, and the next section we shall compare
diﬀerent analytic causatives to each other as well as to lexical causative to uncover
the semantic distinctions already made.
Diﬀerent English causative types and semantics
From (Dixon, 2005, p. 312)
(21) a. John walked the dog in the park.
b. John made the dog walk in the park.
(22) a. Mary opened the door.
b. Mary made the door open.
(23) a. Fred dissolved the sugar in the liquid.
b. Fred made the sugar dissolve in the liquid.
The (a) sentences all imply that the causal event went in the expected manner,
and will also be associated with direct causation (either manipulative or directive),
while the (b) sentences can be used for either indirect causation or to imply that
the causal event was not carried out in the normal manner. For example, (21)(a)
causes one to imagine that John merely took the dog in the park and walked with
him. Sentence (21)(b) can also be direct causation, but conjures up some use of
force by John to get the dog to walk. This could still be direct causation, but
27One could also try to come up with such alternates as ‘Mary John cut the cake’, but these
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the force relation between the participants is highlighted.28 (23)(a) and (23)(b)
are periphrastic causatives of an S=A type, and one imagines that with (23)(a),
Fred needed to do more than merely put the sugar in the liquid, but had to resort
to additional means. Depending on the means, this could then be an example
of direct or indirect causation, but, either way something other than the normal
way of dissolving sugar is going on.
Again, semantic diﬀerences can arise along a lexical/analytic scale. As seen
with many other languages, the diﬀerence in the construal of closeness of cause can
lead the analytic forms to have a variety of other implications (including diﬃculty
of realising the caused event). Remember, however, that even if Fred needs to
dissolve the sugar in a roundabout, complicated way, (23)(a) is still applicable.
Should the lexical causative be a construction that means not only causality, but
that the causality is done in a direct or normal way, this does seem a bit odd.
But, if one is only concerned with Fred being the cause and the sugar dissolving,
the lexical causative is perfectly acceptable – one merely decides not to present
the indirectness as it is irrelevant to what the speaker desires to say. As we shall
see later, the notion of directness seems to have expanded allowed implications
to arise to the subjects intention or responsibility, and this is often enough to
make recourse to a lexical causative perfectly ﬁne in these circumstances. Should
the speaker want to emphasise the diﬃculty or novel way Fred achieved his goal,
then (23)(b) is the appropriate form.
The above contrasts the use of lexical vs. periphrastic causative types, but it
has already been established that if one wants to make a causative of transitive
sentences, then the only way to do this is by using an analytic causative. There-
fore, any putative distinctions between the level of causation or relation between
the participants cannot be elucidated through contrasting syntactic forms. Also,
unlike the languages studied in the cross-linguistic section, there is no recourse
to diﬀerential case marking to make these distinctions. Instead, the choice of
auxiliary verb becomes all important.
(24) a. Mary made John cut the cake.
b. Mary had John cut the cake.
c. Mary let John cut the cake.
(24-a) would be used to express directness of cause, as well as a degree of force
involved on John. For example, it could be both direct and manipulative, where
Mary actually manipulates John’s limbs to get the cake cut. It could also be
indirect, but directive, involving Mary commanding John to cut the cake. (24-b)
on the other hand implies a degree of indirectness, and can express a situation
where Mary is organising a party and assigns various tasks via a list or an assis-
tant. It is also much easier to imagine with (24-b), that John was quite willing to
28One could also with this sentence imagine various bizarre ways of indirect causation used
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cut the cake (or at least more willing than in (24-a)). (24-c) is a typical example
of a permissive construction. The reader may also want to revisit (4) for more
semantic diﬀerences between various analytic types.
Verbs such as force, get to, cause can also be used to express the causal
relations between the events or the participants. The perceptive reader will note
that with any of these analytic constructions, the causal distinctions are not
nearly so clear-cut as will be seen in the cross-linguistic section. Certainly, force
is clear, but depending on the verb and situation, make can be either direct or
indirect and can even be stretched to the situation where Mary uses her assistant
to tell John to cut the cake. But, the use of make does imply that even though
Mary accomplished the causation indirectly, she was wilfully using her power to
force the causal event (regardless of the causee’s wishes). This isn’t the case with
have or certainly let. But, if we look at these causatives as not just directly
constraining the ‘real’ situation, but as also constraining the way the situation
is presented, this apparent diﬃculty dissolves. We shall now see that this sort of
phenomenon is exactly what happens with lexical causatives as well.
Lexical causatives and level of cause
It is typically assumed that lexical causatives are associated with a direct cause
and the corresponding analytics with an indirect cause. However, actual level
of causation has nothing to do with whether the causee can be the subject of a
lexical causative
(25) a. Fire burned down the house.
b. John burned down the house.
c. The landlord had John burn down the house.
d. The landlord burned down the house.
(25-a) is an unequivocal example of direct causation. (25-b) in the situation where
John pours petrol in the house and lights a match is also normally considered to
be an example of direct causation, even though one could make recourse to the
petrol and match sub-events. (25-c) is an analytic, where the landlord, wanting
to evict the current tenants and rebuild expensive yuppie ﬂats is the ultimate
cause of the ﬁre. But he is not seen as a direct cause as he was most likely
temporally unconnected with the burning event and the intermediary events are
clear. Nevertheless, (25-d) is also a perfectly acceptable way of construing the
situation, and both types are regularly used depending on the situation and the
speakers intentions. Indeed, in regard to the landlord, it can be seen as a much
stronger statement.
The example of Black Bart and the sheriﬀ already touched upon this point.
Whether the ‘causer’ availed himself of a direct or indirect causal event, the
lexical causative rhetorically makes the subject more responsible by using a form
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expand or change their meaning in regular ways,29 and this seems to be exactly
what happens with at least some English causatives. But it is not the case of
it only being a lexical item expanding its meaning or domain of application, but
rather also the construction itself.30
5.2.3 Cross-linguistic typology
In the previous section we examined the semantic types of causality and saw that
the matter is much more complicated than a simple notion of cause and eﬀect.
Both the relationship between the events and between the participants give rise
to a variety of causal situations. The morpho-syntactic coding of these relations is
the topic of this section, as is their relationship to the diﬀerent semantic types. Be
advised that this section’s intention is not to give a complete typological account
of the world’s languages in this area, but only to allow the reader to see both
the variation and similarities among the worlds languages, and how their coding
directly parallels the informal semantics sketched above. Many issues such as
Comrie’s case and animacy hierarchy are ignored (Comrie, 1989). For a more
elaborate explanation of a typology of causatives, the reader is encouraged to
look at (amongst others) (Comrie, 1989), (Comrie, 1985a), and (Song, 2001).
This section may initially cause baﬄement as to its relevance to the subject.
But, by beginning with examining the various ways verbs in various languages
change valency is the ﬁrst step in understanding how causatives work. Tak-
ing seriously (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994)’s proposal that non-lexical causatives
are related to ‘ordinary’ transitives, it is helpful to ﬁrst look at ordinary verbs,
their morphological and case-marking eﬀects and then look at parallels with
causatives. The same morpho-syntactic mechanisms used in valency change are
used in causatives, with markedly diﬀerent semantic eﬀects however. This helps
determine the constraints and properties of linguistic causation, a necessary step
to any formalisation.
Valency Change
As is well known in English, both ordinary verbs and causatives allow a change
in valency (number and role of syntactic arguments) with no change to the verb
or case-marking whatsoever. For example (Comrie, 1985a):31
(26) a. Mary is reading a book.
b. Mary is reading.
29See e.g. (Traugott & Dasher, 2002).
30(Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994) posit a similar eﬀect with the languages where case marking
normally indicating indirectness and independence on the part of the causee, can be used to
mark topicality of the caused object.
31Unless otherwise noted, all examples in this section come from (Comrie, 1985a).5.2. Causatives 193
c. John is boiling the water.
d. The water is boiling.
The form of the verb in both sets of examples does not change, yet especially in
the boiling example, the valency changes radically. In (26-c), the aﬀected partici-
pant is the water and is syntactically the direct object, while in (26-d), the water,
while retaining the same semantic role is now syntactically the subject.32
In many languages, ordinary transitives require special verbal marking in order
to express the rather simple valency diﬀerence between (26-a) and (b). Wolof is
an example where the reduction of valency requires no verbal change, but the
addition of an indirect object where the verb is not by default ditransitive does
require one. In other words, adding an argument on a verb that normally does
not allow that many arguments requires the verb to change form.
(27) Mungi
PRES(3SG)
dy` ang
read
t´ e´ er´ e
book
bi
the
He is reading the book.
(28) Mungi
PRES(3SG)
dy` ang
read
He is reading.
(29) Di
FUT
na
AUX
nyu
3PL
la
you
dyaay
sell
suma
my
xar
sheep
They will sell my sheep to you.
(30) Di
FUT
na
AUX
nyu
3PL
dyaay
sell
suma
my
xar
sheep
They will sell my sheep.
(31) Mungi
PRES(3SG)
dy` ang-al
read-
eleew
pupil
yi
the(PL)
t´ e´ er´ e-` em
book-his
He is reading the book to his pupils.
The ﬁrst pair (27) and (28) directly parallel (26)(a) and (26)(b), where the direct
object is merely dropped. Similarly, the morpho-syntactic diﬀerence between (29)
and (30) involves merely dropping the indirect object, where the verb (sell) allows
32Of course there are suppletive causal pairs such as fall/fell and even die/kill where diﬀerent
verbs are used depending on whether a transitive of intransitive form is used. Being suppletive,
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ditransitivity as a basic valency. But when a basically transitive verb requires the
addition of an indirect object, the verb requires a suﬃx in order to allow this.
This sort of patterning is rather common – languages such as Swahili (and
other Bantu languages) use an applicative suﬃx on the verb to add an extra
argument to the verb (with some object order change), while Russian requires a
the verb to change in the case of valency reduction for some verbs33
(32) Boris
Boris
ˇ citajet
reads
knigi
books.
(33) Boris
Boris
ˇ citajet.
reads.
(34) Kury
Hens
nesut
lay
jajca
eggs.
(35) Kury
Hens
nesut-sja
lay.
The ﬁrst pair, (32) and (33) show that the verb ˇ citat’ requires no derivational
morphology change to omit its direct object while the second pair, (34) and (35),
shows that the verb nesti requires the verb to take the reﬂexive suﬃx -sja (or -s’
after vowels) to reduce its valency.34 Hungarian, Swedish, Dyirbal and Georgian
all have a similar type of derivational morphology, with it being the case in Dyirbal
that it is systematic enough that this sort of derived passive is often named the
‘antipassive’ voice.
Only a few of the possibilities of valency change have been sketched and the
complication of the derivational morphology aﬀecting both case marking and
aspect has not been shown. Nevertheless, one may wonder what any of this has
to do with causatives.35 Recall the so called causative alternation is not merely a
valency change, but really a change of a core meaning of the verb – its argument
structure. To repeat an oft used example, the diﬀerence between
(36) a. Sunshine melted the ice.
b. The ice melted.
is not just of valency, but the fact the subject in (36-a) is the causer and the
subject in (36-b) is the causee. As with ordinary English verbs, there is no
33The examples below refer to habitual situations. For some of the verbs that change in
habitual aspect, they do not change form in the case of a sentence referring to a speciﬁc instance.
34Could there be a patterning according to aktionsart? Unfortunately two examples is not
enough to say anything interesting.
35(Comrie, 1976b) examines valency change and related case marking as a purely syntactic
phenomenon. That is, as verbs take additional arguments the cases of the various objects and
direct objects alternate in a hierarchical pattern. (Song, 2001), (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994)
and even later Comrie view case marking in many languages as expressing semantic diﬀerences
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change in verb form when this happens, but a number of languages do need to
mark the verb when there is a valency change that changes the thematic nature
of the subject.
The Causative Scale – bringing periphrastics into the picture
36
Examine the following three sentences from Nivkh (Slavic language, produc-
tive morphological causative is -gu)
(37) Lep
bread
ˇ ce-d’
dry(INTRANS)-
The bread dried.
(38) If
He
lep
bread
seu-d’
dry(TRANS)-
He dried the bread.
(39) If
he
lep
bread
ˇ ce-gu-d’
dry(INTRANS)-cause-
He caused the bread to dry (e.g. by forgetting to cover it)
(38) has a simple transitive causative that (when comparing to the verb in (37))
can be considered lexicalised in the same way that suppletive pairs (e.g. fall/fell)
are in English. But in (39), the intransitive form has a causal marker converting
the verb from intransitive to transitive. Both (38) and (39) are transitive, yet as
can be seen from the glosses, their meaning does diﬀer as far as the type of cause.
(38) implies that the subject did something directly (and perhaps intentionally)
to dry the bread, while Comrie’s gloss of (39) makes clear that the causation at
stake is indirect causation, here a possible situation is merely leaving the bread
to dry by accident.
In Nivkh, the contrast is between a lexical and morphological causative, where
the situation expressed by the lexical causative implies direct causation, whereas
the latter expresses indirect causation. Russian on the other hand, has lexical
causatives (40) as well as morphological causative markers (-sla or -s), and yet
another way to express causation
(40) Anton
Anton
slomal
broke
paloˇ cku
the stick.
(41) Anton
Anton
sdelal
brought
tak,
it
ˇ ctoby
about
paloˇ cka
that
slomala-s’
the stick broke.
36These type are also called analytic or syntactic, and the terms will be used interchangeably.196 Chapter 5. Causatives
where the latter (as is easily seen in the gloss) directly parallels the English, in that
the lexical version implies direct causation, and the latter indirect. (41) makes
clear that the strict morpho-syntactic distinction between lexical, morphological
and analytic causatives is not always so clear cut. Unlike the simple, lexical
transitive of (40), the latter example combines both periphrasis and morphological
causation ( slomala-s is an anti-causative with a morphological suﬃx to derive it).
Therefore, the causativity of the causing event in (41) can be unequivocally seen
as an analytic causative. However, what appears to be strict analytic causation
in French is not quite what it seems at ﬁrst.
(42) Paul
Paul
ﬁt
made
manager
to-eat
les
the
pommes
apples
` a/par
to/by
Pierre
Pierre
Paul made Pierre eat the apples.
Faire is used along with the basic verb, working in French similarly to make
or cause, and appears to be the equivalent of the English analytic construction.
Thus, faire courir is ‘to make run’ and faire manger is ‘to make eat’. But, a
closer examination shows that the English parallel does not hold
(43) *Paul
Paul
ﬁt
made
Pierre
Pierre
manger
eat
les
the
Pommes.
apples.
(44) Paul
Paul
lui
to-him
/?*le
/him
ﬁt
made
manger
to-eat
les
the
Pommes.
apples.
Paul made him eat the apples.
Comrie notes that a single French predicate cannot take two subjects or two
direct objects. In (43), both Paul and Pierre are subjects, and in the English
gloss, Paul is the subject of made and Pierre the subject of eat. Therefore one
would expect that (43) should be grammatical as it conforms to this rule as while
there are two subjects, there appears to be only one subject per verb. However,
faire with an inﬁnitive behaves in many cases as a single verb, making the like of
(43) impossible. In (44), ‘him’ must be in the dative case as ‘apples’ is already
a direct object. Therefore, faire + inf. can really be considered as either an
analytic or morphological morphological causative, depending on one’s analysis.
We have already seen a similar diﬃculty in sometimes distinguishing whether a
particular causative is lexical or morphological such as the existence of suppletive
pairs, and not fully productive morphological causatives.37
Nevertheless, we can still imagine a morpho-syntactic scale of causes with two
37For example, in Russian, we saw how the causative suﬃx is only applicable to some verbs
with no discernible syntactic or semantic patterning. In Turkish, it is possible to form a
causative with nearly any verb. Causatives in Turkish are unique enough to get a special
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endpoints – lexical and analytic with morphological in between. Corresponding
to this syntactic scale, is the ‘scale’ with endpoints of direct and indirect causa-
tion. Lexical causatives with correspond with direct causation situations (or the
interpretation of the situation), while indirect causal situations correlate with the
analytic type – in languages where more than one type of causative is available.
This shall be further elaborated upon in 5.2.4, but ﬁrst recall that the diﬀerence
between direct and indirect causation was not the only semantic distinction made
in (4).
Case Marking
The last section dealt primarily with diﬀerent expressions for either direct or
indirect causation and the continuum from lexical to analytic causatives. This
involves diﬀerent ways of linguistic coding to express the relations between the
causing and causal event. Diﬀerences in case marking, can express the other main
causal distinction, that between the causer and the causee. The following is from
Hungarian. (Comrie, 1989)
(45) ´ En
I
k¨ oh¨ og-tet-te-m
cough-CAUSE-PAST-1SG
a
the
gyerek-et
child-DO
I coughed the child.38
(46) ´ En
I
k¨ oh¨ og-tet-te-m
cough-CAUSE-PAST-1SG
a
the
gyerek-kel(INSTR)
child-INST
I made the child cough.
Both of the above can have a direct causal interpretation, where there is no in-
tervening event between the subjects action and the child coughing. In fact, both
sentences are examples of morphological causatives, so the same causal interpre-
tation on the event level is no surprise. The formal diﬀerence between the two
examples is that in (45) the causee (the child) is marked as a direct object (ac-
cusative case) while in (46), is with an instrumental. Their is also a semantic
diﬀerence. In (45), the causee retains little sense of control and suggests a situ-
ation where the subject slapped the child on its back. (46) is more appropriate
where the child is merely told or asked (perhaps by a doctor) to cough. Both are
examples of direct causation, but do express the distinction between manipulative
and directive causation.
Generally, there is said to be a patterning that the more the causee has control
of the caused situation, the more likely it is to be marked in a non-accusative case.
(Cole, 1983) suggests a scale:
38This gloss is not allowed in English, but its use in the direct, lexical construction allows the
gloss to express the manipulative causal meaning in the Hungarian.198 Chapter 5. Causatives
(47) Instrumental > Dative > Accusative
where the nature of the causee is more agentive on the left end, exerting more
control, while on the right end the causee is more patient-like, and exerts less
control of the situation. It is then easy to how markers associated with greater
and lesser control by the causee can be used to express the diﬀerence between
manipulative and directive causation. Direct physical manipulation of the causee
would usually mean that the causee has little control over what happens, while
non-physical causation may allow the causee some degree of freedom as to whether
perform the caused event. However, Song’s weaker distinction is more correct –
the causee may be in a non-physical causal situation that but still be aﬀected
enough by the causer to have little choice in carrying out the action. From
Bolivian Quechua (Cole, 1983):
(48) nuqa
I
Fan-ta
Juan-ACC
rumi-ta
rock-ACC
apa-ˇ ci-ni
carry-CS-1SG
I made Juan carry the rock.
(49) nuqa
I
Fan-wan
Juan-INST
rumi-ta
rock-ACC
apa-ˇ ci-ni
carry-CS-1SG
I had Juan carry the rock.
In neither of the two examples is there manipulative causation, but in (48), Juan
is perceived to have no control as to whether or not he will carry the rock (perhaps
he is in a prison chain gang). Sentence (49) works better in a situation where Juan
submits voluntarily to an order or request. The glosses indicate that in English,
the degree of aﬀectedness of the causee may be made by the use of diﬀerent lexical
auxilliaries. Case marking also aﬀects topicality and the goal of the causer. From
Hindi (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994):
(50) Mai-nee
I-AGT
raam-koo
Ram-DAT
kitaab
book
park-vaa-ii
read-CAUS-PAST(f.)
I had Ram read the book.
(51) Mai-nee
I-AGT
raam-see
Ram-INST
kitaab
book
park-vaa-ii
read-CAUS-PAST(f.)
Ih a dt h eb o o kr e a db yR a m .
Sentence (50) indicates that the causee’s goal was to get Ram to read the book,
but in (51) Ram is not topical, but the aim is simply to have the book read.
According to the scale in (47), with (50), the causee is more directly aﬀected
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(Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994), “the more aﬀected the participant, the more object-
like and therefore central...to the event as a whole” (p.133), while the causee with
instrumental marking is a more peripheral participant. The authors note that
“periphality normally would not cohere with topicality” (p.133). Sentence (51),
the more peripheral causee of the pair, ﬁts less well as a topic (in comparison to
(50)), thus allowing the book to be the topic of the sentence.
Their generalisation is that where a language admits the two oblique cases
(dative and instrumental) to be used in contrast, there is the same semantic
patterning. (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994, p. 135)
DATIVE = more integrated, highly topical participant, aﬀected as a
human entity vs. INSTRUMENTAL = low degree of integration into
event, low topicality, low degree of aﬀectedness.
In a similar manner to the distinctions between types of causatives, there is
a scale regarding the case marking of causees (depending on the contrasted case
markers) that reﬂects both the relationship between the cause and the causee, as
well as how aﬀected and integrated the causee is to the event as a whole. Agency
and periphery of the causee lie on one end of the scale – the polar end having the
causee be more patient-like, with less control over the caused event.
5.2.4 Causative types and semantics
Thus far, a case has been made for distinctions in the notion of causality in regard
to direct or indirect causation between the causal sub-events and level of control
and independence between the causer and the causee. The last two sections have
illustrated how these various notions of causality are coded by diﬀerent languages.
(Song, 2001)
(52) lexical morphological syntactic 39
For Song, “there is a strong tendency for manipulative or direct causation to be
mapped onto the causative types at the left of the continuum in preference to those
on the right...Directive or indirect causation...is far more likely to be expressed
by the causative types to the right of the continuum.” (p. 278). This introduces
a slight complexity to what has be seen so far. (52) has previously been used only
in pairs to point out the diﬀerences between direct and indirect causation, but
there is also a correlation with the distinction between manipulative and direct
causation. Mixtec (Song, 2001)
(53) s´ a
￿` a
cause
h` a
NR
n` a
OPT
kee
eat
Make him eat.
39Song’s use of ‘syntactic’ is equivalent to the use of ‘analytic’ in preceding sections.200 Chapter 5. Causatives
(54) s-k´ ee
CP-eat
Feed him.
The causal diﬀerences can be partially brought out by examining the English
glosses. Both are examples of direct causation, but (53) implies that the causer
induced the causee to eat by suggesting (or commanding) that the causee eat the
food available. Sentence (54) is more appropriate where the causee is either refuses
to eat food or is unable to (perhaps in a coma). The morpho-syntactic diﬀerence
is a contrast between an analytic causative and a morphological causative, while
the semantic contrast is between manipulative and directive causation, rather a
direct/indirect distinction.
In fact, it might be better to change the English glosses to something more
parallel to the situations described: (53) could be glossed as Feed him, while the
situation given for (54) would be perfectly appropriate with the lexical Force-feed
him. Both, then, are lexical causatives, consistent with the notion that both
situations are examples of direct causation.40 Song gives a number of similar
examples from Japanese and Newari where the formal diﬀerence between mor-
phological and analytical causation is also used form the directive/manipulative
distinction. (p. 279-280).
Both scales, (52) and
(55) Instrumental > Dative > Accusative (=(47))
correlate morpho-syntactic marking with a degree of closeness, either closeness
of the causal events or of the participants associated with the events. For the
ﬁrst scale (52), Song appeals to a notion of iconicity or iconic distance to explain
the correlations along the from the left to the right of the scale. Quoting (Croft,
1995), iconic distance can be seen as “the principle that the structure of language
should, as closely as possible, reﬂect the structure of experience expressed by
language” Space does not permit here but the reader is encouraged to see (Croft,
1995) and (Song, 2001) for a description and analysis of the relations between
semantic distance and conceptual distance. (Song, 2001) takes this a bit further,
attempting to construct a cognitive notion of causation, along with a semantic
typology of causation.
40Recall that for English, make is a sort of causal middle-ground and can be associated with
either direct or indirect causation, and with eat can be seen as sometimes synonymous with
‘feed’. Simply leaving food and the permission (or lack of prohibition) to eat it is less easy to
call feeding. The UK has an expression to keep someone fed and watered. This quasi-passive
construction can be related to the use of diﬀerential case marking to indicate the degree of
control of the causee. Notice that the formal diﬀerence remaining (of the new glosses) only
involves the choice of verb used, with force-feeding not only meaning direct causation, but also
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The second scale (47) is used by (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994) to further
their proposal that transitive causatives41 are modelled upon simple transitive
structures. Should the causee be directly aﬀected by the causer’s action, where
diﬀerential case marking is available, the causee will be marked by the accusative
case, just as a patient is marked in an ordinary transitive cause. Recall that
dative marking may be used (in opposition to accusative) to indicate that the
causee is somewhat in control of the causal situation. Transitive, experiential
verbs in Bolivian Quechua (there is a also a causative suﬃx) also exposes this
diﬀerence:
(56) nuqa
I
runa-man
man-DAT
rikhu-ˇ ci-ni
see-CS-1SG
I showed it to the man.
While the experiencer is shown something, note that the verb is really something
like ‘cause-to-see’, but unlike being hit with a hammer, the experiencer does have
some choice as whether to see it or not.42 Instrumental marking separates the
causee from the causer even further. For a further elaboration on this notion
as well as a Dutch corpus study showing that diﬀerences in the causee’s agency
depends on both the verb used (laten or doen) along with how the causee is
marked, the reader is encouraged to see (Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994).
To conclude this excursion into the world’s languages, it is important to re-
mind the reader of the reason for the detour. Our examination of causality began
with purely semantic distinctions encouraged by examining a few sentences of En-
glish along with various interpretations or imagined situations. Often the same
lexical item or syntactic form could be used somewhat ambiguously, that is it
could apply to various types of causal situations. Languages that make these
distinctions more explicit are useful for strengthening the notion, say, that grada-
tions of the causee’s control is not merely an eﬀect of diﬀerent ways of envisioning
the situation, but is encoding it (where it is morpho-syntactically possible) for-
mally into the utterance. Thus, any semantics of causation will need to take these
notions seriously and come up with ways of accounting for all of them.
To be sure, some of the diﬀerentiation is purely syntactic such as the French
examples in (42), (43) and (44). In English, syntactic reasons alone account
for the fact that transitive lexical causatives can only apply when the causee is
patient-like or the agent of an intransitive – that is, many transitive verbs in
English lack a simple causative use (see 5.2.2) due to purely syntactic reasons.
Nevertheless, we have also shown how both semantic and cognitive notions can
used to account for various morpho-syntactic phenomena, and can be useful in
41They explicitly ignore lexical causatives in their paper.
42Chapter 4 on perception verbs incorporates the perceiver’s attention or readiness to see
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accounting both for developing our semantic account as well as examining the
development of language diachronically. But before moving on to English, a ﬁnal
excursion into Turkish causatives makes clear the notion of an extended causal
chain, as well as providing an example where the case marking diﬀerences are
strictly syntactic, with changes to the verb doing the semantic work.
Turkish holiday
Our last look at causative typology is a quick look at the way Turkish allows
causatives of ditranstives, where a rather complex situation can be expressed
with only one verb, and clever use of case marking.43 We have already seen the
way various languages can use a causative preﬁx or suﬃx along with a change in
case marking to turn a mono-transitive sentence into a causal one. In Turkish, it
looks like
(57) M¨ ud¨ ur
director
mektub-u
letter-ACC
imzala-di
sign-PST
The director signed the letter.
(58) Disci
dentist
mektub-u
letter-ACC
M¨ ud¨ ur-e
director-DAT
imzala-t-ti.
sign-CS-PST
The dentist got the director to sign the letter.
Comrie proposes a hierarchy of grammatical relations to reﬂect the status of
the participants.
subject > direct object > indirect object > oblique object
The encoding of the causee is that of the leftmost unﬁlled position on the
hierarchy. Thus, in (58), the causee (the director) must be marked as an indirect
object, as the subject and direct object slots are taking up by the dentist and
the letter, respectively. While even such a construction such as (58) would be
impossible in a morphologically impoverished language such as English, things
become even more remarkable when we look at what happens with ditransitive
sentences.
(59) M¨ ud¨ ur
director
Hasan-a
Hasan-DAT
mektub-u
letter-ACC
g¨ oster-di
show-PST
The director showed the letter to Hasan.
43All examples in this section are from (Comrie, 1976b) and (Comrie, 1985a).5.2. Causatives 203
(60) Disci
dentist
Hasan-a
Hasan-DAT
mektub-u
letter-ACC
M¨ ud¨ ur
director
taraﬁndan
by
g¨ oster-t-ti
show-CS-PST
The dentist got the director to show the letter to Hassan.
In the standard ditranstive the director is an ordinary subject, but when turned
into a causee in (59), he must now be encoded as an oblique, as the higher-up slots
are already ﬁlled by the causer, the letter and Hassan. Unfortunately, as is pointed
out in (Song, 2001), Comrie’s hierarchy appears not to be universal and exhibits
some exceptions in the few languages that mark causatives in this particular
fashion.44 Nevertheless, the examples from Turkish suﬃce for our purposes.
First, it is (for readers mostly familiar with only Germanic or Romance lan-
guages) a quite mind-boggling way of expressing quite complex causal situations.
Second, it shows the importance to the casual scenario of the status and relation-
ship of the participants.
5.2.5 Participants and Causal Level – steps toward En-
glish formalisation
Having examined various types of linguistic causality, it is now time to connect
these more concretely to their temporal and causal implications. Here we will see
how the role of the causer and causee participants and their relationship to each
other can have a profound eﬀect on the implications of the discourse, especially
when looked at in varying tense and aspectual conﬁgurations.
Notion of cause revisited – the implications
In our earlier exploration of English, it was noted that the following pair of
sentences do diﬀer. While they are both used in a direct, lexical causative con-
struction, they have slightly diﬀerent properties.
(61) a. Fire is burning the house down.
b. John is burning the house down.
Sentence (61-a) closely resembles an ordinary transitive and, indeed, behaves the
same as an ordinary activity or accomplishment. For example, the use of the
non-futurate progressive implies that the house was indeed on ﬁre. Removing the
telic ‘down’, the imperfective paradox vanishes and one could conclude that ‘ﬁre
burned the house’.
The causal chain takes a step backward for (61-b), which while direct in
form, focusses on an animate agent that is somehow utilises an elemental cause
to accomplish the goal. What is important is that (61-b) has no implications
44Comrie himself notices this, as well.204 Chapter 5. Causatives
whatsoever. This may sound odd and an actual example may help. It is taken
from the TV series Arrested Development and involves a conﬂict between father
and son. The son is working at the family banana stand, but for reasons of making
a rebellious statement decides to burn it down. He is busily putting newspapers
at the base of it when his father arrives. Note that there is no ﬁre at this point.
The father is Michael and the son, George Michael.
Michael: (approaches) George Michael?
George Michael: (stands quickly) Dad!
Michael: Hey, what are you doing?
George Michael:( tries to think of something) I was just, uh... (...but
quickly gives up) I was burning down the banana stand.
Should ‘ﬁre’ have replaced ‘I’ in the last sentence, it would be false as the
banana stand had yet to burn.45
When accounting for elemental verbs such as ‘burn’ or ‘melt’ the level of
cause associated with the casual participant must be taken into account. The
most direct level of cause is when the causee is naturally associated with the
process denoted by the verb.46 Here there is quite a direct link and one assumes
a temporal parallel between the ﬁre and the act of burning – something that isn’t
the case with a personal agent.
The agentive version really has a double telicity in the progressive – the telic-
ity of getting the house burning and the telicity of the house burning down. We
will see this again in the next section that focusses on relations between par-
ticipants. Formally, the elemental and personal agency cause will need to be
modelled slightly diﬀerently from each to account for the diﬀerences in regard to
the implications.
Desiderata of participants and events/eventtypes
The last section showed the implicational diﬀerences between a direct lexical cause
form used for both truly direct (elemental) and quasi-direct (personal agency)
types of causal events. This section will show that the relation between the
participants which some languages mark morpho-syntactically also have implica-
tional diﬀerences. Again, by examining the same causal events and participants in
diﬀerent aspectual and tense conﬁgurations. light can be shed on the diﬀerences
and how to handle them.
(62) a. The gardener is clearing the leaves.
b. I’ve had/made the gardener clear the leaves.
45It does do so later in a deliciously ironic way.
46Fire froze the football pitch is not such an example, as while the causee is an element, it
is the wrong type. In this case ﬁre plays a sort of personal agent role – say ﬁre destroyed the
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As the caused event of (62-b) is a transitive (where S=A), there is no lexical
way to express my causal eﬀect upon the gardener. Instead, a periphrastic must
be used, and in normal circumstances there is no implicational diﬀerence between
have and make as far as the events are considered.47 Assuming only a directive
causation scenario, the gardener obeys the orders and is the one ultimately in
control of the leaf clearing.
Imagine that I say (62-b) while the gardener is indeed in the act (62-a). I
can say to an inquisitive neighbour either (62-b) or the progressive version (I’m
making him clear the leaves). This much is obvious, but the interesting part is
that the gardener need not ﬁnish clearing the leaves and my utterance of (62-b)
is still perfectly felicitous. From my causal point of view, my job is done if I
manage to get him started on the job. The gardener could get fed up or be hit by
lightning, yet my causal duty has been completed. Telicity as far as the causer is
concerned only applies to the causing of the gardener.
Contrast this with the earlier scenario of John and the doomed house. The
parallel John has burned down the house or even the periphrastic version John
has made the house burn down has a rather diﬀerent implication. Both of these
utterances48 are only compatible with situations that the house burned down.
Here telicity goes beyond the causal event starting a caused event, but extends
completely to require the caused event (if telic) to run to a natural completion.
At ﬁrst glance the diﬀerence between the two caused situations seems quite
clear cut. Burn is an S=P type or what would also be called an externally caused
eventuality, while the sense of clear used here is an S=A type, or an internally
caused eventuality. However, the related notion of control (which usually corre-
lates with the internal/external diﬀerence) is actually the culprit here.
(63) a. I’ve walked Mary to school.
b. I(’ve) had/made Mary walk to school.
c. I made the puppet walk.
d. I(’ve) made the puppet walk across the stage.
All of the above examples use the internally caused (S=A) walk, but the type
of participants and context change the result of applying the ‘perfect’ test used
above. Take (63-a) and (b) as expressing typical examples of directive causation.
The direct causal version where I walk along with Mary (perhaps she is a small
child who needs help) implies that Mary walked to school. Should I leave on her
own halfway there, (63-a) no longer seems to be a proper utterance, but (63-b)
is. (63-b) is rather similar to (62)(b), in that convincing Mary to walk to school
is enough. Once she leaves for school, I’ve done my causal job and (b) is perfectly
47There is a slight coercive diﬀerence between the two. The former does suggest that I merely
asked the gardener while the latter suggests something a bit stronger. However, sticking to a
directive causation scenario this makes no diﬀerence for our purposes.
48This also holds for the simple past.206 Chapter 5. Causatives
felicitous.
(64) I never should have made Mary walk to school, but I wasn’t aware of the
kidnapping gang in the city.
With this I successfully made Mary walk to school (either relent or in this case
actually begin walking) but there is no guarantee that she makes it to school.
As far as the complement is concerned the bare form version of the imperfective
paradox still holds.
Sentences (63-c) and (d) use the same caused verb (walk), but a puppet has
far less control than a human being, and can only be walked by direct control,
i.e. manipulative causation.49 Thus (63-d) is only felicitous if the puppet makes
it from one end of the stage to the other with my help. The rather odd scenario
where I drag Mary down the street and treat her as if she were a puppet has the
same implications. Importantly, in this scenario Mary has no control over here
walking, and the implications from the perfect are the same as for the puppet
walking or a house burning.
Wrapping up
The previous sections have demonstrated the various ways events and partici-
pants can be related in causative constructions. There can be strict temporal
dependency between the cause and caused event, but this needn’t always be the
case. While the periphrastic type of causative is usually more amenable to a
temporally separate reading, it can also be the case that even lexical causatives
do not have such a tight connection between the events and participants. For
example, with elemental causatives the two events are much more likely to be
intimately connected should the causer be an element (ﬁre, cold, etc.), rather
than an animate agent making use of them.
Conversely, while periphrastic causatives will often be used in more indirect
causal situations, the example of directive causation shown in making a puppet
walk by some kind of manipulation shows that even here, the causal event and
caused event can be tightly connected temporally. (Levin, 2000) points out both
the independence of causation and telicity, and the fact that lexical causatives
cannot be reduced to a single event-type, e.g. an accomplishment.50 The dis-
cussion and examples above should certainly reinforce this point.51 Rather it
49This can be direct, i.e. the normal way of manipulating a puppet or via an elaborate stage
device that is manipulated to make the puppet walk. Pinocchio is, alas, an exception to this
scenario.
50This insight originates with (McCawley, 1976). She also discusses the importance of making
a conceptual distinction between telicity and an incremental theme.
51(Levin, 2000) looks only at lexical causatives and resultative constructions. The diﬀer-
ent type of relations between the participants and periphrastic causatives are not looked at.
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has been demonstrated that if one takes the various notions of causation and
participants seriously a wide range of possibilities of both event-type and telicity
emerge.
Rather than rely on unanalysed CAUSE and BECOME predicates to formalise
causatives,52 in the event calculus, the diﬀerent types of causes and participant
relations emerge as a number of diﬀerent scenario types, that capture the tem-
poral relations between the events involved, diﬀering implications depending on
how the participants are acting, as well various telicity possibilities. That diﬀer-
ent scenarios are needed not only shows that causatives also cannot be formally
reduced to a single, default event-type, but also shows that numerous hybrid
types also exist.
5.2.6 Formalisation
To the delight of the lazy, but attentive reader, handling the diﬀerent implications
requires very little modiﬁcation to the standard EC apparatus. We shall ﬁrst
look at the levels of cause involving lexical, elemental verbs and then move on to
participant control variations.
Elemental eventualities
Recall that using the proper elemental cause with an elemental verb yields some-
thing that is very close to an ordinary transitive. In fact using the dynamics
for a transitive event with a dynamics and temporal duration is exactly what is
needed. Take the oft-used example
(65) Sunshine is melting the ice.
We have already seen that this type of sentence has the same implicational prop-
erties as an ordinary transitive. If melt is construed as telic, then the imperfective
paradox holds. If atelic, there then is the implication that the sunshine did in-
deed melt the ice (but has not necessarily melted it away). With this in mind,
it is probably best to stick to a standard dynamics for wide activities and ac-
complishments. What follows assumes that (65) is construed as telic in order
to demonstrate all of the machinery. The scenario is quite close to that of an
ordinary accomplishment, the relevant changes needed will be pointed out after-
wards. See (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 7), for a full explanation for a
scenario of an ordinary accomplishment such as build a house.
First, a word about the predicate names. Sunshine is the warming activity of
the sunshine, while melt(x) is the parameterized ﬂuent that indicates the stage
of melting the ice is at. It is initially at 0 (e.g. 0 percent) at the time of the
52(Levin, 2000) documents a number of author’s attempts. In this paper, Levin herself is
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scenario’s beginning. This should not be taken as an absolute. For example, if the
observation is made that global warming has begun melting a glacier, beginning
the scenario with melt(0) does not mean that 100 years a heat wave did not do
the same thing. It is the current round of melting that is at issue. Melt(c)i st h e
stage at which the ice is completely melted.
The is an additional condition added of rightpos which means only that the
ice is situated in such a way that the sun will melt it. In general for these sorts
of instrumental causes this can be seen as a requirement that the object must be
situated in the proper way in order to be aﬀected by the elemental cause. For
this particular scenario, rightpos is the most intuitive way of imagining it. This
is a scenario where the object begins in a proper condition for being aﬀected, and
it is the initiation causal ﬂuent that is started.
1. Initially(melt(0))
2. Initially(rightpos)
3. Initiates(start,sunshine,t)
4. Terminates(finish,sunshine,t)
5. HoldsAt(sunshine,t) ∧ HoldsAt(melt(c),t) → Happens(finish,t)
6. HoldsAt(rightpos,t) → Releases(start,melt(0),t)
7. HoldsAt(melt(x),t) ∧ HoldsAt(rightpos,t) ∧ x + g(d) ≤ c
→ Trajectory(sunshine,t,melt(x + g(d)),d)
To trigger the melting, the ﬂuent sunshine must hold along with the added
condition that the object must be situated correctly to receive its beneﬁts. As
with an accomplishments, a start event (here say the sun coming out or clouds
moving away) begins the sunshine activity ﬂuent and this along with the ob-
ject being in the right position allows the parameterized ﬂuent (melt(x))t ob e
released.53
This allows the dynamics to be active, and as long as nothing changes the ice
will keep melting. Three changes can happen however, ﬁrst the sun can disappear,
or the ice can be moved out of the sunshine or completely melted. With the ﬁrst
two it may be that the ice is still melting (from a diﬀerent cause) but (65) is
certainly not the case and the above dynamics conﬁrms this as the trajectory
predicate would not drive the continuous change without the preconditions of
both the ice being positioned properly and sunshine active.
53Alternately, the sun may already be shining and the start event is that which situates the
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If the ice has melted, the diﬀerences with an ordinary creation accomplishment
such as John is building a house,54 diﬀer moderately. With the latter, once the
house has reached the stage that the house is considered ﬁnished, building is
terminated. Instead the elemental causative has more the features of derived
accomplishment such as John is running a mile. It seems odd to terminate the
sunshine just because the ice melted, yet obviously neither (65) or The ice is
melting holds.
This is already taken care of and emerges from the inequality in the dynamics
of statement (7). Once the ice has met the construed ﬁnish point c, the dynamic
the trajectory statement in the consequent will no longer be active. As there may
indeed be no ice left at the ‘ﬁnish’ construal point, one could add
Terminates(finish,rightpos,t)
so that it ensures that if the ice is completely melted then it trivially can no
longer be in the proper position to be melted by the sun. In general the ﬁnish
event of an elemental causative terminates the object condition ﬂuent rather that
the causal activity. However, this is not needed if one only wants to stop the
dynamics from holding once the ice has melted.
Finally, the start event needs to be examined more closely. Both conditions
(sunshine and rightpos) need to hold for melting to happen. For example, one
of the conditions could hold initially and the start event is needed to trigger the
other one. The sun may be out, but the event is bringing the ice outside. Here the
appropriate lines would be Initiates(start,rightpos,t), and Initially(sunshine).
The reverse is the case in the above scenario (e.g. the ice is exposed and the
clouds clear), the start event does begin sunshine. However, should the scenario
be such that the start event is obtaining the correct condition, (7) ensures that
melt(0) is still released, allowing it to be used in the trajectory predicate.
The transitive in the progressive
The progressive Sunshine is melting the ice patterns exactly as an activity or ac-
complishment (this diﬀerence depends on whether melt is used telically or not).
Telic or not, the progressive used with an elemental agent ensures that some of
the ice was melted. Should melt be taken to mean to melt completely, the imper-
fective paradox holds as for an ordinary accomplish. The major diﬀerence is that
it is not enough to use the causal activity to ﬁx the reference time, the object
condition must also be fulﬁlled. Using the above scenario, the integrity constraint
for the present progressive is
?HoldsAt(sunshine,now) ∧ HoldsAt(rightpos,now) succeeds
54A destruction accomplishment would behave the same way.210 Chapter 5. Causatives
This is the case no matter how the event started, i.e. initiating the object
condition, initiating the elemental cause, or both. As either one of these ﬂuents
can be terminated (e.g. a cold snap, moving the ice), there is no guarantee that
the telic goal will be fulﬁlled.
Intransitive version - tense and aspect
Suppose the sunshine has completely melted the ice – the intransitive version The
ice melted (completely) is also the case. This sentence resembles a passive in that
the subject is patient-like rather than agentive, though in this case the agent (or
cause) is not accessible with a by-phrase. In eﬀect, the focus is on the object
and what happened to it. However, while no cause is speciﬁed or the existence
of a cause mentioned, we know that something caused the result and use world
knowledge to ﬁll the cause in. The database is then required to create a scenario
(modiﬁed for causality as seen above) that has some cause,55 and a condition that
that situates the ice to be aﬀected.56 Generally, the scenario for intransitives will
have the same structure as the transitive counterpart. The main diﬀerences will
be the speciﬁcation of the actual cause, and the integrity constraints used.
Given this causal scenario, let melt be the event associated to it by the method
of hierarchical planning as seen in (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 7, Section
3), and the appropriate simple past tense integrity constraint, ?Happens(melt,t)
succeeds, and the query
?HoldsAt(f1,R),...,HoldsAt(fn,r)R ≥ now,Happens(melt,R) fails
This ensures that The ice melted entails that the accomplishment happened
(in the past) and that the event is viewed as durative. This is necessary as this
is a regular simple past tense and diﬀers as expected from the perfect in that57
(66) a. While the ice melted in the refrigerator, I did the dishes.
b. #While the ice had melted in the refrigerator, I did the dishes.
The progressive, The ice is melting, goes through with similar caveats. The
integrity constraint will have the parameterized ﬂuent (melt(x)) coerced into
an activity ﬂuent. The database again comes up with the appropriate causal
dynamics, with a generic elemental cause if need be. This is easily accomplished
using the coercion methods (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 11). Melt(x)i s
a parameterized ﬂuent and not enough on its own to drive a progressive. But, at
55If context is not supplied, something like melter will do, i.e. a generic elemental cause of
melting.
56This is somewhat similar to the (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) who suppress the external
cause in S=P intransitives.
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our disposal is the model of elemental causation given above, the diﬀerence being
that the actual cause is a bit of an afterthought as the focus is on what is being
eﬀected exclusively. Nevertheless, we know some cause holds, which is exactly
what the database is required to search for.
For example, we are given (by the sentence) Initially(melt(0)) and know that
there is some f1 ﬂuent such that
HoldsAt(melt(x),t) → Trajectory(f1,t,melt(x + g(d)),d)
As the elemental cause is left unsaid, the database searches for something to
unify with the f1 ﬂuent. As no speciﬁc causal ﬂuent is given, it can be uniﬁed
w i t ha‘ d u m m y ’a c t i v i t y ,e . g .melter, allowing the dynamics to be driven.58 Aside
from the perspectival diﬀerence between the intransitive and transitive versions,
there is one other crucial diﬀerence.
In the transitive version, if the sunshine is blocked, the progressive no longer
holds. With the intransitive, a variety of actual elemental causes can be opera-
tional during the melting event. For example while moving a block of ice from
the hot sun inside to a hot room, the ice can be considered to be continuously
melting. As the ‘cause’ for the intransitive is a blank slate, so to speak, both the
sunshine and a hot room can be considered the external cause of the intransitive
melting event. For the intransitive the integrity constraint (for present progres-
sive) is
?HoldsAt(melter,now) ∧ HoldsAt(rightpos,now) succeeds
that is, given that the ice is melting, we can infer that some outside factor is
causing this, but we either do not know what it is, or want to focus our discourse
only on the aﬀected object.
What is developing here is an idea of a causative template for elemental causes.
All elemental causative verbs have a default scenario that resembles the one above.
In its barest form it only gives a dynamics that aﬀects the object – real world
details, context or use of the transitive can give rise to ﬂuents (such as sunshine)
that can be uniﬁed with the generic conditions. Personal agents are less direct and
can be said to cause the entire causal event rather than only what is happening
to the object. The template sketched above can then be utilised to capture this.
Personal Agency Cause
In section 5.2.5 we saw that if an elemental transitive causal verb is used with a
personal rather than a elemental agent circumstances change considerably. While
in a direct syntactic form, a personal agents directness is slightly less direct than
58Appropriate start event(s) must also be found.212 Chapter 5. Causatives
what was seen above. In many cases, the personal agent can merely make the
circumstances right for the event to happen or do something not temporally con-
nected to it whatsoever. For example, the quote from the Arrested Development
script has the main character ‘burning down’ the banana stand, yet no burning
occurs. Here, George Michael’s ‘burning’ is the preparation that, if successful,
will cause the banana stand to burn, and perhaps, burn down.
This sort of backward viewpoint is not unique to personal agent causals, but
is a well-used form known as the futurate. For example, one could say
(67) I am ﬂying to London tomorrow.
meaning that if all goes well (i.e. I make it to the airport, do not get detained
as a terrorist suspect and sent to Egypt, board the airplane, etc.), I am ﬂying
on an airplane to London the following day. What is important is the intention,
plan or inexorable chain of events that leads to a ﬂight to London. Notice that
at the time of speech, there is no implication that the subject of (67) is ﬂying.
(Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 8), models this sort of progressive slightly
diﬀerent from an ordinary present progressive.
There is no ﬂying going on at speech time, but the use of the progressive indi-
cates that some activity is happening at speech time. This activity can be seen a
‘preparatory’ ﬂuent that is part of a ‘preparation’ accomplishment that, if com-
pleted, allows the ‘ﬂying’ ﬂuent to hold. Notice that (67), just as certain personal
agent causal scenarios, has a double telicity about it. First, the preparation that
leads to ﬂying is telic and is easily cancellable; second, should the preparation
succeed, then ﬂying is implied, but the telic aspect of getting to London is still
in the lap of the Gods.
So far this exactly parallels the ‘banana stand’ example, but there are some
temporal diﬀerences. Examples of this sort of personal agency cause can more
properly be said to be ‘quasi’ futurates, rather than pure futurates. For exam-
ple, in the preparation scenario, one cannot change the temporal adverb from
‘tomorrow’ to ‘now’, as packing one’s bags the night before can hardly be called
ﬂying. While, in the banana stand example, George Michael could say, ‘I’m
burning down the banana stand, now’ while in the preparatory process of putting
newspapers around it.59
‘Now’ can also be used once the ﬁre is started and George Michael is basking
in the sweet glow of familial revenge. In contrast, the futurate in (67) no longer
holds once the actual ﬂying commences, and the situation must be modelled by
an ordinary present progressive. The ‘quasi’ futurate is modelled the same in
both the preparatory and caused situation. These diﬀerences can be handled
quite easily by changing the integrity constraint, which diﬀerentiates the tempo-
59There is a true futurate where the night before George Michael is gathering the proper
materials for the next day. Here, using ‘now’ would be infelicitous, but ‘tomorrow’ is perfectly
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ral meaning diﬀerence between the futurate and ‘quasi’ futurate. In what follows
I shall only give the scenario and constraints for the ‘quasi’ futurate, but point
out the changes made from the ordinary futurate in order to make the diﬀerences
clear.
The ‘quasi’ futurate progressive requires the presence of an activity ﬂuent f1,
and a parameterized ﬂuent f2(x) which are linked by a dynamics of the form
HoldsAt(f2(x),t) → Trajectory(f1,t,f 2(x
),d),
and a condition for the occurrence of the culminating event e of the form
HoldsAt(f1,t) ∧ HoldsAt(f2(c),t) → Happens(e,t)
where c is some constant. The event e triggers an activity ﬂuent f3 via a
condition of the form Initiates(e,f3,t)
The scenario to which the above statements are added should not imply that
f1 is terminated before e happens.
More concretely, taking the John burn the house scenario, the dynamics are in
the structure of an accomplishment that, if successful, lead to the house burning
down. The f1 ﬂuent is uniﬁed with the activity John is doing, while the param-
eterized ﬂuent f2 marks out the stages of the success of the preparation ﬂuent.
Reaching the successful stage of the preparation initiates at least one f3 ﬂuent.
Doing this calls up an scenario associated with the elemental causative template
discussed in the previous two sections.
Because of this, John’s causal activities can initiate either (or both) of the
activity ﬂuents needed for the elemental causal dynamics. For burn the house,
it is most likely that the rightpos ﬂuent initially holds, as houses are usually
stationary objects, meaning that John’s activity would be to initiate an elemental
cause.
With John burn(up) the chair, one can imagine that John throws a chair onto
a already existing ﬁre. Here, we would have Initially(fire), and the preparatory
activity initiates the rightpos ﬂuent. One could even imagine a situation where
John removes a ﬁrewall in order to have a spreading ﬁre consume it.
Tense and aspect considerations
The temporal diﬀerence between personal and elemental agency is accounted for
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time. Thus, I am burning the house down can apply either during the preparation,
or the time afterwards where I could be home having a celebratory drink.60
Furthermore, the use of ‘burn’ in the utterance invokes a sort of inheritance
procedure in which the f3 ﬂuent is uniﬁed with an elemental causal ﬂuent and
calls up the entire causative dynamic scenario associated with it (and presented
in the last section). This is the second telicity, meaning that even a successful
accomplishment of preparation does not ensure that the banana stand is burnt
down.
Recall that two ﬂuents are needed as conditions for an object to be aﬀected
by an elemental cause. Either one of these can be triggered by an agent. If I burn
a house down, then assume that Initially(rightpos) but I could burn a chair by
throwing it into an already existent ﬁre. Here Initially(fire) is the case and the
ﬂuent that is initiated is rightpos. However, in either case, the actual burning
requires that the two ﬂuents f3c and f3o corresponding to the elemental cause and
the object condition, both hold. The preparatory event can initiate one or both
(if one is not triggered it must be assumed initially).
So far the progressive looks like that for the elemental transitive and intran-
sitive versions. But the diﬀerence with personal agency cause is the preparatory
activity of the agent is enough for the present progressive to be felicitous. As it
is enough that only the preparatory activity hold, the integrity constraint for the
present progressive for personal agent causatives must be:
?HoldsAt(f1 ∨ (f3c ∧ f3o)),nowsucceeds
With this constraint the unwanted implication from John is burning down the
house to The house is burning down disappears. If only f1 holds, the house has
yet to begin burning.
The simple past works as normal, it is just that the event (say, melt)i sah i e r -
archically planned event of both the preparation event and the causative proper.
The perfect is rather more interesting. The statement John has burned down the
house implies that not only his preparatory activity is successful, but also that
the house has, indeed, burned down. This means that the perfect must be mod-
iﬁed to use two consequent states to set the reference time. Let prep(p)b et h e
consequent state of the successful preparation event and burn(c)b et h es t a t et h a t
corresponds to the burned down house. The integrity constraint for the above
present perfect would then be
60Further indirectness, such as The Maﬁa is burning the house down would also hold if the
house is burning and the Maﬁa’s causal role was to hire an arsonist. Interestingly, the ‘quasi’
futurate interpretation of this is a bit more diﬃculty with this scenario and it is the arsonist
doing the preparation. The Maﬁa’s preparation is one level back, and up until the house is
burning, the best non-futurate expression is a periphrastic such as The Maﬁa is having the
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?HoldsAt(prep(p) ∧ burn(c)),nowsucceeds
That is, both consequents must hold to account for the above. It is not enough
that the house merely burns down, but it must be seen as caused by something
John did. This may initially seem a bit odd, but it reveals the nature of control
between the participants that has already been seen.
Participants and Control
In the situations looked at in the last section, the objects such as houses, banana
stands and chairs have very little control over what happens to them. With more
animate participants this may not be the case, as seen in (61). For convenience
this set of examples have already been seen in (21):
(68) a. I’ve walked Mary to school.
b. I(’ve) had/made Mary walk to school.
c. I (’ve) made the puppet walk.
d. I (’ve) made the puppet walk across the stage.
Taking the most obvious situations corresponding to (68-b) and (d). In the for-
mer, my causal job is to convince or order Mary to walk to school, what happens
afterwards is beyond my remit. In the latter, the inanimate puppet has very little
choice in his movement. No matter how directly or indirectly I cause the puppet
to walk, the only participant with a degree of control is me.
The scenario where the causee (Mary in this case) has control over her actions
is quite similar to that of the personal agency causatives for elemental eventuali-
ties. In both cases there is a degree of indirectness. But, as the implications for
the two types of constructions are diﬀerent involving the control relations between
the participants, there will be some vital diﬀerences.
The scenario consists of a preparatory accomplishment on the part of the
causer (the making), and the eventuality caused corresponds to the complement.
The caused event is, of course, quite diﬀerent, in (68-b) being an ordinary accom-
plishment. Furthermore, the causal event needn’t cause any action on Mary’s
part whatsoever, only the assent that she will walk to school. Parallelling the
indirectness of the ‘quasi’ futurate, the causal event will be an accomplishment
that triggers an activity ﬂuent. Creatively, the ﬂuents are called make and made
to stand for the preparatory ﬂuent and the stages of a hopefully successful making
event.
Sentences of the form (68-b) to (68-d) require the presence of a preparatory
event that which are linked by a dynamics of the form
HoldsAt(made(x),t) → Trajectory(make,t,make(x + g(d)),d),
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HoldsAt(make,t) ∧ HoldsAt(made(c),t) → Happens(e,t)
where c is some constant. The event e triggers an activity ﬂuent f3 via a
condition of the form Initiates(e,f3,t)
Here, the f3 ﬂuent will be walk, with the eventuality for walktoschool inher-
ited. With the more complicated version, where Mary merely assents to walking
to school, the f3 ﬂuent would be a preparation ﬂuent for Mary, with the eventu-
ality being a futurate version of walktoschool. This basic scenario is useful for
types of causation both where the causee still exercises a degree of control and
those where she does not. The diﬀerence is modelled in the integrity constraints
for the two types of situations
The Progressive
In both control situations, the progressive I’m making Mary walk to school needn’t
imply that Mary is walking now. The diﬀerence being that once Mary starts
walking, the activity of the no-control version stops, while the control version
(dragging Mary for example), must continue lest Mary’s activity stops.61 In both
cases the reference time for the present progressive is set as follows:
?HoldsAt((make ∨ walk),now) succeeds
that is, as the causer, I’m making Mary walk to school is felicitous if I’m in the
midst of the preparatory activity or Mary is actually on the way to school. In
general, the control diﬀerences between the participants can be illuminated by
the addition of one scenario statement each for the two diﬀerent situations. For
the no-control version.
Terminates(e,make)
For the control version
?¬HoldsAt(make,t),HoldsAt(walk,t) fails
Intuitively, the ﬂuent make is quite diﬀerent in the two cases. In the ﬁrst
case, make is most likely an act of convincing or ordering Mary to walk to school,
i.e. manipulative causation. The second case, where I physically force Mary to
walk, is an example of direct causation. Here, should I stop my causal activity,
I’m making Mary walk to school no longer is felicitous.
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Simple past and perfect
This distinction of whether the causee has a degree of control or not can be seen
with both the simple past and the perfect. Sentence (68-b) only implies that
the preparation event was a success and implies nothing about whether or not
Mary walked to school. Sentence (68-d) does imply that the puppet walked across
the stage. The agent participants contribution can be either as a quasi-futurate,
where I push a button that starts a walking mechanism or something more direct,
where I manipulate the puppet in the normal fashion.62
Contrasting (b) and (d) in their more indirect scenarios, the formal diﬀerences
of participant control can easily be seen. Both scenarios will have a preparation
event and the caused event associated with the complement. These two subevents
will each have a consequent state associated with a successful completion. For
situations such as associated with (68-d), the implications of the perfect are the
same as with the burning examples seen in the last section. Formally, they are
also the same. The simple past goes through with no modiﬁcation, and the per-
fect, as earlier, requires two consequent states to hold. Let make(c) correspond to
the consequent of the preparatory event, and walk(c) to correspond to the state
of the puppet having walked across the stage. The reference time for the present
perfect version of (68-d) would then be
?HoldsAt(make(m) ∧ walk(c),now) succeeds
In general, in cases where the causee has no control, the perfect requires that
both the state that corresponds to the causer and the causee hold. In a sense,
the causee participant is irrelevant for what happens and the consequent must be
appended to what the causer does.
(68-b) in both simple past and perfect forms has implications only for what
the causer does. This is a bit more straightforward, in that it is only the tensed
verb that is involved in setting the reference point, the complement being un-
der no obligation to happen. Thus the implications of the both perfect and the
past only go as far as the causer’s involvement. For the perfect, the ‘I’ve made’
in (d) only implies that the preparation was successful. This is easily expressed as
?HoldsAt(make(c),now) succeeds
The simple past is actually simpler than those where the causee has no control.
Sticking with the intuition that in these situations the past tense, ‘made’ only
62The second would ignore a preparation ﬂuent and insert my activity directly into the dy-
namics. This has the pleasant consequence that the making and walking need to be temporally
co-extensive, causing the implications of the puppets successful walk to come for free. This
situation could also be felicitously expressed with the lexical ‘I walked the puppet across the
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implies the success of the preparatory event, it is indeed only the scenario for this
that is turned into a hierarchically planned event for the appropriate integrity
constraint.
For true63 progressive aspect, both types of participant situation work exactly
like the burning examples in the last sections. The requirement on the reference
time is that either the preparation or caused ﬂuent hold at the reference time.
States
States, as we have seen, can also be caused (as often happens in resultative
constructions), but another more interesting phenomenon often happens, where
the basic causative construction is utilised, not with a ‘real’ (i.e. conventional)
verb, but with a stative adjective. Typically, one would express state causation
using a periphrastic formulation, e.g.
(69) John made me nervous.
Of course there is no acknowledged verbal analogue to nervous, however I have
begun noticing a certain usage. Apparently among some young British people,
Nervous is a verb, whose use seemed to popularise when a Big Brother contestant
was fond of it. Oddly, it has both a transitive and intransitive use (which is not
possible with scare or frighten). So both You’re nervousing me and I’m ner-
vousing (as in getting or being nervous) are somewhat common among a certain
linguistic group. My dialect has a lovely verb unnerve (only as a transitive) which
blocks this awkward verbal form for me. Personally, I ﬁnd nervousing rather ugly,
but there is a chance it could catch on in a broader population.
Final Remarks
While the above three sections do give quite a number of examples of diﬀerent
types of causal situations and their accompanying causative expression, this is
by no means meant to be an exhaustive survey. The sections on the semantics
of causation and the cross-linguistic excursions should be enough to show that
the various combinations of direct/indirect, directive/manipulative and control
between the participants is legion.
What has been done is to provide the machinery and general principles behind
handling the various forms imaginable. Should the reader come up with a causal
situation that has not been handled above, they can amuse themselves by using
the above methods to formalise it for themselves. Break, for example, is a vague
enough causal to allow an incredible amount of situations in both its direct lexical
and periphrastic uses.
63That is, real past or present progressive - excluding futurates and ‘quasi’ futurates.5.3. Coda: Diachronic development of causal level 219
In a general sense, there is an aspect of these causatives has yet to be for-
malised. The manipulative/directive distinction fell out in the integrity con-
straints, but the is a (syntactically) formal diﬀerence that I can’t account for.
With the John burned the house down scenario, either the direct form or John
made the house burn down would be formalised the same way.
In one sense, this is exactly what we want. One can use diﬀerent forms for the
same situation depending upon both intentions of the participants and they way
the speaker wants to convey the situation. Therefore, the formalisation should,
for the most part, be the same for both forms.
But, there are a few diﬀerences. Where there is intention one would more
likely use the direct form if everything goes to plan in a normal way. But, even
where there is intention, but the causer had to do more than he expected to
burn down the house, the periphrastic would more likely be used. Similarly, a
child who plays with matches and causes a calamity could have their behaviour
described in either way. The direct form is much stronger rhetorically. These
diﬀerences would need to be elicited in a broad pragmatic theory. While with
some verbs, a direct/indirect casual distinction may manifest itself iconically in
a mapping to, say, a lexical/periphrastic causative distinction.
Speculatively, I would suggest that once there is a distinction between direct
and indirect causation in the language, it could be the case that the expression
of directness is used not only for the spatio-temporal situation, but for impli-
cations of the causer’s responsibility, intention, in contrast to indirectness used
for accidental causation and the like. As we shall see, sometimes the distinction
disappears (over time) altogether, and a direct, lexical form can be used for any
type of cause whatsoever.
As a coda, a brief diversion follows that examines a few verbs that are paragons
of verbs that are considered externally caused and involve elemental causation.
The range of causes applicable increase in both type and temporally proximity in
a consistent way over the course of time.
5.3 Coda: Diachronic development of causal level
This is a small unscientiﬁc survey into the history of a few causatives that at-
tempts to support the idea sketched above. This is no corpus study, but an
excursion into the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989)
looking at the development of a few causatives and their expanding acceptance
of both types and level of cause. To begin, it may be useful to begin with a quote
from the OED itself as to the change in kill
To put to death; to deprive of life; to slay, slaughter. In early use
implying personal agency and the use of a weapon; later, extended to
any means or cause which puts an end to life, as an accident, over-
work, grief, drink, a disease, etc. (p.427)220 Chapter 5. Causatives
The cause expands to encompass anything, as long as the causative meaning
is maintained. This allows non-animate causes, indirect causes, or event ideas,
feelings, and various activities. The early restrictions required personal agency,
in a rather direct way, to be appropriate. If we recall the diﬀerence between the
subtle distinction of direct causation between John or ﬁre burning down a house
something interesting happens historically. The transitive version of freeze has its
ﬁrst examples of a direct, elemental cause, and only much later shows examples
of animate subjects using such causes.
Freeze (p.170): “Of natural agencies: To change (a ﬂuid) to a solid form by
the action of cold...Also said causatively of personal agents.”
The earliest example of this use is from 1494 (Fabyan, Chron. VII)
(70) In this...yere...began a froste that..frose the Thames.
Only in 1781 is there an example of personal agency. (Cavallo, Phil. Trans. LXXI
516 I)
(71) I have froze a quantity of water with an equal weight of good ether.
This pattern occurs also with age, and I would presume many causals verb where
the causee is subject to eﬀect by natural agencies.64 It is standard to envision an
agent directly using natural means (or created means) as directly causative. Yet
with the above verbs, this distinction may indeed of been made early in the verbs
life.65 Synchronically, one absentmindedly leaving the refrigerator door open
would be cause enough for an exasperated ﬂatmate to exclaim “You melted the ice
cream.” As we have already seen, this subtle distinction has major implicational
diﬀerences when examining these sort of causatives in the progressive aspect.
Acknowledging this is essential to get the formalisation correct.
Finally, the verb disappear66 is traditionally thought to not have a transitive
use. In fact, the sentence
(72) *The magician disappeared the rabbit.
seems to be quite popular in testing the acquisition and over-generalisation of
argument structure.67 However, sentence (72) is not an over-generalisation that
64Melt and Burn originally had slightly diﬀering verbs for transitive and intransitive uses
based on strong and week verb forms. Eventually they merged into a single form and became
prototypical English lexical causatives. However, it is unclear from their examples as to whether
there were any causal level and participant restrictions, as seen in kill and freeze.
65kill as part of a suppletive pair as well as initially having a more speciﬁc semantics is slightly
diﬀerent.
66This is one I ﬁnd to be diﬃcult to determine whether it can be considered externally or
internally caused, or even S=A or S=P.
67See, e.g. (Tomasello & Brooks, 1999). This is paper is but one of many that use this
example to see when and how children make ‘errors’. (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995) give a
detailed account of verbs of appearance and disappearance and conclude that they are a rather5.4. Resultatives 221
children make, but is even attested in the OED. They have an entry for a transitive
use, but the ﬁrst instance is relatively recent and far later than the entry of the
verb into the language.68
(73) a. We progressively disappear the faces of the dodecahedron. (1897)
b. The magician may speak of disappearing or vanishing a card. (1949)69
In current times it is certainly not uncommon to hear talk of malevolent govern-
ments disappearing political prisoners.70 Moving into the realm of bad puns, the
technology website (www.theregister.co.uk) entitled an article about an program
that completely erases incriminating e-mails,71 Honey, I disappeared the e-mails.
What these examples mean for theories of argument structure acquisition, or
the semantics of verbs of appearance remains to be seen.
5.4 Resultatives
T h i sb r i e fs e c t i o no nt h ec l a s so fR e s u l t a t i v e si si nn ow a ym e a n tt ob ea ne x -
haustive exploration of the subject.72 Rather, we shall look at the basics, before
examining their interactions with lexical causatives, implications rising from the
complexity of events, and the causation of the construction in general. The main
point of the next subjection is that simple compositionality cannot account for
both the syntactic oddities and semantic coercion that shows itself in the resul-
tative construction. The clever argumentation in what follows is from one of the
pioneering works arguing for a constructional approach to language, (Goldberg,
1995).
5.4.1 Basics
We will begin with some examples of the most common resultative types.
(74) a. John hammered the metal ﬂat.
b. Jane sang the baby asleep.
c. Sally cried herself into hysteria.
d. Think yourself thin!
special case in that the notions of external or internal causation play no role. However, they are
said to have no transitive, which while not the case for disappear does seem to hold for appear.
681530 is the date of the ﬁrst example of intransitive disappear.
69This is from the journal, American Speech!
70In fact, I thought this is where the usage came from before happening upon the OED entries.
The poor souls are often called the ‘disappeared’, which, to my mind, made the transitive use
fairly natural.
71A boon for individuals and corporations who have to respond to a discovery summons.
72For this, the reader is recommended to see various approaches in (Goldberg, 1995, Chapters
7 and 8), (Rothstein, 2004, Chapters 3 and 4) and (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995).222 Chapter 5. Causatives
Sentence (74-a) can be considered the most prototypical, stating that the result
of John hammering the metal rendered it ﬂat. On the surface, (74-b) is rather
similar in meaning (John’s singing caused the baby to sleep), except that sing is
normally an intransitive verb.73 Thus
(75) *John sang the baby.
(74-c) is rather similar in nature, but is an example of a reﬂexive resultative.
Both (b) and (c) can be called ‘fake object’ resultatives. (74-d) is an example of
a sort of imperative/fake object resultative construction.74
Resultative constructions also exist in intransitive forms, though there are
restrictions to their applicability.
(76) a. The river froze solid.
b. *The river froze itself solid.75
c. John sang himself hoarse.
d. *John sang hoarse.
S=P type verbs can only be used in an intransitive resultative construction, while
S=A intransitives, need an object to participate in the resultative construction.
We shall see the implications of this in the next section, but shall ﬁrst examine
Goldberg’s more general claims about the construction.
First of all, she examines the claim that the post-verbal NP in the ‘fake object’
constructions is not a real argument of the verb.76 The claim against true object
status of the ‘fake’ objects comes from a series of tests comparing standard sub-
categorised objects and fake objects in regard to the middle formation, adjectival
passive and nominalisation, which are considered evidence for argument-hood.
(77) Transitive Resultative: He hammered the metal (ﬂat).
a. Middle Formation: This metal hammers ﬂat easily.
b. Adjectival Passive: the hammered-ﬂat metal.
c. Nominalisation: the hammering of the metal ﬂat.
(78) Fake Object Resultative: He drove his tires *(bald).
b. Middle Formation: *Those tires drive bald easily.
c. Adjectival Passive: *the driven-bald tires.
73When it is sub-categorised for a (syntactic) direct object, the object is not a human, but a
song-like object.
74‘Fake object’ resultatives also passivise, as in The tools were wiped clean.
75The diﬀerences between (a) and (b) are not conﬁned to the resultative construction, but
more to there being an ‘S=P’ verb. Removing the resultative XP from the sentence, *The river
froze itself is reportedly as bad. In both cases, without help from context, it is rather diﬃcult
to conceive the river as causally eﬃcacious for freezing. However, if it is, the (a myth or science
ﬁction context) ungrammaticality disappears. Later in the section we shall see how hyperbole
and metaphor is enough to ‘agentivise’ patients and make them felicitous in these constructions.
76All examples taken from (Goldberg, 1995, p. 182 - 185).5.4. Resultatives 223
d. Nominalisation: the driving of the tires bald.
However, she notes that the paradigm in (77) does not apply across the board to
all transitive verbs with true objects.
(79) a. Middle Formation: *Pat kicks black and blue easily.
b. *The washer loads full easily.
c. Adjectival Passive: *The washed-shiny-clean face.
d. *The shot-dead man.
e. Nominalisation: *The washing of the face shiny clean.
f. *The driving of him crazy.
Thus, while felicitous distribution in these constructions (as in (76)) may be
evidence for being an argument, the converse is certainly not the case, as washer
is a (subcategorised) object of load, Pat is the object of kick, etc. If there is no
reason to consider the objects in (79) as ‘fake objects’ (despite them failing the
tests), then there is no reason to consider those in (78) to be anything but real
objects.77
Finally, Goldberg notes that context has much to do with their acceptability,
and has examples where ‘fake object’ resultatives can participate in the above
constructions, the middle construction, at least. For example, in a situation
where someone in charge of props for a movie need to drive 50 tires bald for a
stunt, the following suddenly becomes acceptable.
(80) Go buy some cheap tires for that scene, those inexpensive tires drive bald
really quickly.
Once this is acknowledged, the constructional approach becomes clear. A simple,
lexical compositional approach will not do. For example, one would need to have
special lexical rules for the fake-object resultatives. But, as the possibilities of
productivity are so varied, endless new senses would need to be postulated for
intransitive verbs, or transitive verbs that take objects in the resultative construc-
tions that they normally do not, as in They drove the tires bald. Moreover, the
basic sense of verbs can also undergo a drastic change as with
(81) Shelly read Jane Eyre to tatters.78
which is about the physical eﬀect Shelly’s activity has on a book, whereas in Shelly
read Jane Eyre the book is not such a force recipient. Given this, Goldberg posits
two resultative constructions which have a meaning (for the transitive) that an
agent does some activity to an object that changes its state. The result XP
(in this case ‘to tatters’), speciﬁes the result, and with world knowledge, gives
77Nevertheless, we will continue to call them ‘fake object resultatives’ out of convenience.
78Example from (Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 2001).224 Chapter 5. Causatives
a clue as to how the activity eﬀects the object.79 The intransitive resultative
construction (The river froze solid) has only a patient, that is the object of a
change-of-state verb, with the result XP specifying the change-of-state in more
detail.
5.4.2 Event Structure Implications
Transitive vs. Intransitive Resultatives
Recall the diﬀerence in the following
(82) a. The river froze solid.
b. *The river froze itself solid.
Here verbs that undergo the causative alternation (as S=P types) can only appear
in resultatives in the intransitive construction. Whereas, verbs that are typical
S=A intransitives can only appear in the transitive construction. Sentence (82-b)
can be seen to ungrammatical in an intuitive way, ﬁrst of all. We have already seen
that the object in the transitive construction is the patient that is acted upon,
ultimately ending up in the result state. However, rivers are generally recipients
of freezing and not the instigators. Looked at in an event structure way, it is
also the case that there simply are not enough event slots, if we maintain that
intransitive freeze is an S=P verb. In (65) we saw that the participant ice (for The
ice melted) was linked to a parameterized f2 ﬂuent,80 with a dynamics associated
with an abstract cause. So, if an abstract cause is associated with the f1 ﬂuent,
the (semantic) object of the verb as an f2 ﬂuent, there is nothing left to link the
‘itself’ to.81 However, it is certainly possible to have such elemental causatives
appear in transitive resultatives, the condition being that the grammatical subject
must be construed as an agent (eﬀecting a cause at least), and the syntactic object
is a patient.
(83) a. The blizzard froze the river solid.
b. The air conditioner froze itself solid.
The only problem then with the ungrammaticality of (82-b), then is that the river
is not conceived as causally eﬃcacious (as far as freezing goes). If it could be so
79This is the Direct Object restriction, which states that it is the object that undergoes a
change of state in resultatives. As analysed in (Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 2001), there do exist
subject-oriented resultatives (They followed the star out of Bethlehem). We shall ignore these,
along with sentences of the form, John drove the car drunk, which are not resultative at all, but
merely adjectival predications of the subject at the time of the event . For an analysis of these,
see (Rothstein, 2004).
80The river froze is identical in structure.
81We take (transitive) resultatives to be basically accomplishments, leaving us with only the
options of a punctual event and result state ﬂuent to link ‘itself’ to. Neither option makes a bit
of sense.5.4. Resultatives 225
conceived, then it should be as felicitous as (83-b). Indeed, this is exactly what
happens (from an example taken from Google):82
(84) A bottle of country club soda froze itself and exploded in my fridge
tonight in a violent act of protest.
A bottle of soda is probably as capable of being causally freezing as a river, yet
with the right context, can sound perfectly felicitous. Note that the speaker,
metaphorically notes that the soda was making an act of protest, something
normally conﬁned to agentive beings.
The contrast in
(85) a. John sang himself hoarse.
b. *John sang hoarse.
sheds light on event structure in a slightly diﬀerent way. Sang typically carries
no hint of force transmission, but the result XP, hoarse implies the existence of
a‘ b e c o m i n gh o a r s e ’e v e n t . 83 As sing is typically associated with an f1 ﬂuent,
the link to a canonical e (to give the change of state) requires the existence of a
dynamics that includes an f2 ﬂuent as well. This subevent then requires an argu-
ment XP in the syntax to correspond to the parameterized ﬂuent, which is exactly
the purpose of the ‘himself’ in the reﬂexive resultative in the grammatical (85-a).
Thus, we then end up (after the coercion) with a garden-variety accomplishment,
where John’s singing over time, eventually makes him hoarse.84
There is The gate rumbled shut which is durative, has a change of state, but
no object. Here is an example of how many motion verbs with inanimate subjects
can be conceived as either externally caused or the cause can be ignored and the
inanimate object seen as the source of movement.85 In this case the former view
is taken, and as with The ice melted into a puddle, the dynamics86 is already
given by the verb, with the result XP contributing the telic endpoint.
82Note that there is no result XP in the example. But if the reader should accept it, adding a
result state like solid changes nothing. Also, this point is not speciﬁc to resultatives, but these
sorts of causatives in general.
83We are following in spirit the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition as stated in (Levin &
Rappaport-Hovav, 2004) which states that ‘There must be at least one argument XP in the
syntax per subevent in the event structure. In event calculus terms, f1, f2 and canonical e’s are
considered subevents. The possible exception is when dealing with intransitive S=P verbs such
as ‘The ice melted.’ We postulate the existence of an f1 linked dynamics, but this sub-event is
an unrealised, abstract cause, and should be seen slightly diﬀerently.
84This needn’t be only the case for reﬂexive resultatives, but works the same for ‘John sang
the baby asleep’, though the participant corresponding with the f2 ﬂuent is now a baby whose
wakefulness is changing.
85The latter view is taken with such examples as in (10) and (13).
86The scenario statements involving both f1 and f2 ﬂuents and their interactions. Ifroll or
rumble are conceived as self-contained with inaminates, their modelling will be the same as for
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Finally, (Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 2001) note that certain verbs can appear
in either the transitive or intransitive resultative construction, but with diﬀerent
temporal implications.
(86) a. She kicked free.
b. She kicked herself free.
The result is the same, but the temporal proﬁles are diﬀerent. In sentence (86-a),
the situation is instantaneous, while the in (86-b), the situation is understood
to take some time. Happily, this emerges eﬀortlessly in the event calculus. In
both sentences, the result XP implies that there is a ‘become free’ event, which
requires a canonical e, by itself, or a dynamics that results in such an e.T h e
ﬁrst sentence can be modelled as an achievement, which consists of a punctual
event kick and the resulting state, free. As achievements are instantaneous, the
temporal proﬁle of (86-a) follows directly. Unlike, sang in *He sang horse, kick
is interpretable as a instantaneous event (a single kick), which is exactly what we
need to get the achievement-like structure).
Sentence (86-b) contains two arguments, leading us to model it along the lines
of He yelled himself hoarse. The presence of the reﬂexive leads us to postulate a
dynamics that leads to an event of becoming free. As kick can be construed as
an iterative activity, it is this that drives the dynamics that drives the process of
becoming free. As dynamics take time (as opposed to canonical e’s), the event
as a whole takes time.
Further complications
In (Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 2001), a number of ungrammatical non-subcategorised
transitive resultatives that are ruled out due to an already saturated event struc-
ture.
(87) a. *The bomb exploded the watermelons into the air.
b. *The ice melted the ﬂoor clean.
c. *The water evaporated the pot dry.
We shall pay the most attention to the ﬁrst example as it is so cleverly constructed.
Their explanation is that since the above verbs are externally caused (S=P), which
means that while there is no expressed cause, it nevertheless uses the same event
structure. The addition of the result (watermelons into the air) requires the
addition of another subevent that is not available. But this is where things get
interesting. The ostensibly similar
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is perfectly grammatical.87 We can see the diﬀerence by teasing out the implica-
tions. Certainly an implication of (88) is that
(89) The watermelons exploded.
meaning that exploded can be construed as either externally or internally caused.
In the latter it is a simple, internally caused S=A verb, that can have causal
eﬃcacy such as having a bomb explode watermelons. (88-b) can be modelled
along the lines of a simple resultative, meaning that the event structure is not
over-saturated.
But if explode were considered to be an S=A verb in (87)(a), it would also have
the implication that the watermelons exploded. But this is not the case. As far
as I can tell, the result XP ‘into the air’ is more associated with the watermelons
ﬂying whole and undamaged into the air. In other words, the bomb explodes, and
the watermelons ﬂy into the air from the blast of air created by the explosion.
This is too much structure to put into a single resultative, even when explodes
functions as a transitive. The latter two examples of (87) are clearly internally
caused.88
5.4.3 Causality
While the resultative structures we have been look at in this section are consid-
ered to have causality as part of their meaning, (Rothstein, 2004) begs to diﬀers
slightly. While she agrees that a sentence like John sang the baby asleep is inter-
preted causatively, it is more of a pragmatic inference than part of the semantics.
Her natural language version of the formalism goes as follows
The singing event e1 was assigned a telic point e
1 and the telic
point of the singing event was time-participant connected to the event
e2 of the baby being asleep.
That is, the semantics only says that the singing coincides in a certain way
with the baby going to sleep.89 The causal ‘meaning’ is then inferred in a sort of
Humean way from the coincidence. While this well may the way we infer causality
in situations, this is not to say that the construction we use shows whether we
view a given set of situations as causal or not. To explore this point, we will look
at a number of examples from Rothstein that she says are resultative, but are to
be interpreted non-causally.
87This is not addressed by (Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 2001).
88It takes much more context to have melt or explode be S=A intransitives, and they are
clearly not in these examples.
89It actually needn’t be the case that there is such a tight temporal connexion between the
activity and the result achieved. In their exhaustive typology of resultatives (Rappaport-Hovav
& Levin, 2001, p.775) note examples such as Sam sang enthusiastically during the class play.
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(90) a. The crowd cheered the gates open.
b. Every night the neighbour’s dog barks me asleep.
c. On May 5, 1945, the people of Amsterdam danced the Canadians to
Dam Square.
d. Mary drank John under the table.
For (90-a), she allows that the situation could be causal if there was some eﬀect
of the shouting directly upon the gate (a voice activated lock, e.g.). In other
circumstance it is just a situation of the crowd shout and the gates opening, which
we may take as causal, but really isn’t. However, we have seen that such a direct
notion of causality is but one of the many ways cause can happen. For example,
a journalist would use (90-a) in a situation of political revolution, where a crowds
demands eﬀects the guards so much that they change their political allegiance
and open the gate to the palace. Such a situation would still be considered causal
in terms that were explored at the beginning of this chapter.
But more importantly, using the resultative construction rather than a diﬀer-
ent paraphrase does express some form of causality. Imagine the scenario above,
but this time the gates are always set to open at 10:00 a.m. But the crowd is
also screaming at 10:00 a.m., which could give one the impression of causality. If
the journalists doesn’t know this fact, he may indeed use (90-a), in order convey
people power. But examine the incongruence if he does know the truth.
(91) a. #The crowd cheered the gates open, but it was only a coincidence.
The gates always open at that time.
b. The crowd appeared to cheer the gates open, but it was only a coin-
cidence. The gates always open at that time.
This discourse makes little sense to me – explicitly denying the causal link renders
the ﬁrst sentence a bit odd. In contrast, had he merely said tha the crowd
cheered and the gates opened, but it was only a coincidence, he would be denying
a possible inference one could make, but is not expressly part of the meaning.
Causality can also be denied within the construction as in (91-b), by explicitly
doubting the resultative.
Sentence (90-b) is not causal, but it is ironic, and what is ironic is that the
dog’s barking does not stop the man from falling asleep. The irony only works
because the ordinary use of such a resultative is causal. Sentences (91-b) and (c)
are still causal, but, again, most likely not directly causal. It is doubtful that the
people of Amsterdam physically forced the Canadians to dance, but using this
construction conveys that the gratitude and enthusiasm of the newly liberated
peoples was the cause of the mutual celebration.90 Similarly, while one does not
need to have alcohol poured down one’s throat in order to be drunk under the
table, the expression does put a bit of responsibility (or blame) on the part of
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the subject. The causality, while not direct, can be seen as someone trying to
keep up with another’s drinking and failing. The causality is perhaps the most
metaphorical here, but would belong to the realm of social causality.91
However, this is not to say that all types of resultatives are necessarily causal.
It may be the case that ordinary ‘change of location’ resultatives may not be
causal. Rothstein gives the example
(92) The crowd applauded him oﬀ the stage.
which, while having a causal interpretation92, can also be interpreted as simply
meaning that while he left the stage, the crowd applauded. I have no explanation
why this type of resultative should not have as core a causal meaning as the others,
but the culprit cannot be said to lie with the choice of verb as the following is
certainly causative.
(93) The crowd applauded him into glowing reviews.
91I have been in this exact situation. Not wanting to be out-drunk by a woman, I would
stupidly try to keep up the pace. The next day, in my agony, she would always get the blame.
In general this idiom is used not merely to imply that two people drank alot together, but that
there was some kind of contest or competition going on.
92This is easier to see with The crowd booed him of the stage.Chapter 6
Nominalization
Nominalisation is, in general, the process of turning verb phrases into eventuality
denoting nouns. While the previous chapters involved using event-types and
ﬂuents for formalisation of single sentences or multi-sentence discourses, with
nominalisation, these entities are denoted by a special type of noun phrase, which
can then be embedded in a larger structure.
This chapter will speciﬁcally look at (Ing) nominalisation in English, begin-
ning with the received wisdom about the basic facts of their syntax and semantics.
An excursion into the past is then made, examining its history and development.
With that background in mind, a closer look at the received wisdom is made, in
both the areas of the nominalisation’s syntax and categorical status, as well as a
broadened view of their semantics and interpretation. The chapter will conclude
with some of the more ‘novel’ readings formalised in the Event Calculus.
6.1 The Standard Story
6.1.1 Syntax
(Abney, 1987) distinguishes between four diﬀerent classes of gerunds:1
a) Acc-ing: John singing the aria.
b) PRO-ing: singing the aria
c) Poss-ing: John’s singing the aria.2
d) Ing-of: John’s singing of the aria.
1It should be noted that there are numerous other uses of V + ing, including the progressive
(John is crossing the street), participle (John, being late for work, decided to take a cab)a n da s
a nominal modiﬁer (That was a shocking ﬁlm). The ﬁrst two of these constructions will come
back to haunt later.
2This is not meant to imply that the possessive in Poss-ing gerunds is a ‘real genitive’ like
John in John’s car.
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The origins of the names are fairly obvious given that the subject of the gerund
receives accusative case in Acc-ing and possessive in Poss-ing . PRO-ing, as the
gerund has no overt subject and receives obligatory control, as in John1 enjoyed
PRO1 reading the book. The name Ing-of seems to speak for itself.
First oﬀ, we shall see the distributional properties that all four have in com-
mon – a distribution that is characteristic of NP’s i.e. any distributional slot that
an NP can appear in, a gerund can appear as well. All four gerunds occur as
subjects, direct objects, and prepositional objects.3
As subject:
(1) a. Your having broken the record was a surprise.
b. Them trying to sing a song was just too horrible.
c. Singing arias properly is diﬃcult.
d. John’s singing of the aria is not to be missed.
As object:
(2) a. The hunchback hated a nice lady being hanged.
b. John enjoyed reading the book.
c. I disregarded this insulting his opponent.
d. We deplore the killing of innocents.
As object of preposition:
(3) a. Michael counted on them ﬁnishing the book soon.
b. Mary was obsessively afraid of being ill.
c. They didn’t approve of my leaving without a word.
d. The football match ended with the sending oﬀ of two players.
As far as their syntactic distribution goes, all four gerund types behave more
or less the same;4 however, types (a)-(c) do diﬀer rather dramatically to (d) in
3Abney also gives other distribution positions such as topic position, cleft position, and
subject of a sentence following a sentence-initial adverb such as perhaps; however the above
examples should suﬃce to illustrate the “NP-like” qualities of the various gerunds. Note that
for and that clauses cannot appear as objects of preposition nor any of the other positions just
mentioned. From Abney:
(i) a. I learned about John(’s) smoking stogies. (Acc-ing and Poss-ing)
b. *I learned about that John smokes stogies. (that-clause)
c. *I learned about for John to smoke stogies. (for-clause).
.
4Distribution is not the only feature of external syntax. Variance also occurs among the four
gerunds in regards to agreement, pied-piping and scope. In these cases, Poss-ing and Acc-ing
part company. Also note that there is a small class of (semantic) verbal contexts in which only
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regards to internal syntax, the former possessing internal syntactic properties of
a verb phrase, and the latter possessing those of a noun phrase.5 Therefore, when
convenient, I will refer to Acc-ing, Poss-ing and PRO-ing as verbal gerunds, and
Ing-of as the nominal gerund.
Verbal gerunds (if transitive) take a bare NP object, do not allow determiners
or quantiﬁers, can be modiﬁed by not, allow auxiliaries for tense and voice, are
modiﬁed by adverbs (not adjectives), and in the case of PRO-ing, a PRO subject
is obligatory.
(4) a. John’s ﬁnishing the book was surprising.
b. *The/Every/No reading the book was amusing.
c. Not reading the manual properly was the reason John lost a ﬁnger.
d. We were all thankful for John’s having left the room.
e. John was unhappy with being so hated.
f. John’s singing the song loudly oﬀended many an eardrum.
g. *John’s loud singing the song...
h. John enjoyed PRO reading the book.
On the other hand, Ing-of gerunds take PP complements (never bare direct ob-
jects), take any determiner or quantiﬁer, do not take auxiliaries for tense and
voice, take preposed adjectives (not adverbs), and do not have a PRO subject.
(5) a. John’s reading of the book was splendid.
b. The/Every/No reading of the book is followed by a drinks reception.
c. *The not reading of the book.
d. *The having read of the book.
e. *The being certain of the answer.
f. John’s loud singing of the song.
g. *John’s loudly singing of the song.
h. John enjoyed a reading of the book.
It also seems to be the case, in general, that not only do Ing-of nominals allow
determiners or quantiﬁers, they, in fact, require them – Hence
(6) ?John enjoyed reading of the book.
where the book in question is the object and not subject of John’s reading (i.e.
John is not reading a book review). However, this form still remains somewhat
productive as can be seen from a quote from a recent L.A. Times article , which
quotes a judge as saying:
(7) “There has been intentional withholding of documents and evidence in
5Internal syntax is the ability to be modiﬁed by adverbs or adjectives, to take determiners
or quantiﬁers, control properties, etc. This contrasts with external syntax, which includes
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this case and . . . there’s been intentional destruction of documents.”6
The above sentence actually seems better than it would be with the deﬁnite
article and this might have to do with it being a ‘there’ construction – later it
will be shown that the quantiﬁer ‘no’ can also occur with verbal gerunds in a
‘there’ construction. But in normal circumstances, this form does seem to be
rather ungrammatical. Imagine the judge had expressed his personal reaction to
the situation:
(8) a. ?I am utterly shocked by intentional withholding of documents in this
case.
b. I am utterly shocked by the intentional withholding of documents in
this case.
I bring this seemingly marginal example up because these structures (that I will
refer to for convenience as [DET-] Ing-of) play an important role in upcoming
sections, when it is shown that historically, things were very diﬀerent.
Syntactic Analysis
So we are left with a rather strange situation as to the syntactic status of the
various nominals. Ing-of nominals are perhaps the most clear, given that both
externally and internally they behave exactly like NP’s, and the construction ap-
parently involves a straightforward deverbal noun, akin to derived nominals in
phrases like the destruction of the city. But the verbal gerunds are certainly more
puzzling. They have the external distribution of a noun phrase, but internally
they behave like verb phrases (or clauses). However, it should be noted that even
within the class of verbal gerunds, there are degrees of diﬀerence. Indeed, aside
from the distribution facts, Acc-ing gerunds behave almost exactly like clauses
(i.e. that-clauses, etc.), while Poss-ing gerunds are more of a mixed bag. This
leads (Reuland, 1983) to classify the Acc-ing as a clause, while for Abney, its
external distribution is enough for it to count as an NP (DP), with the clausal
properties taken care of in the structure (more about this later). Anyway, it
should be useful to point out a few diﬀerences between the Acc-ing and Poss-ing
gerunds.7 These examples all come from Abney.
Agreement: With Poss-ing, two conjoined gerunds trigger plural agreement
on the verb (like NP’s), but this is not so for conjoined clauses or Acc-ing.
6L.A. Times 11 July 2001,“Judge Rules Against MTA Contractor”.
7Their seems to be no settled position on the status of PRO-ing, i.e. is it a derivative of
Poss-ing, Acc-ing or both, depending on context? Abney also suggests it may have a diﬀerent
structure altogether (but leaves it at that). I will take the standard view and consider them to
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(9) a. That John came and that Mary left bothers/*bother me.
b. John coming (so often) and Mary leaving (so often) bothers/*bother
me.
c. John’s coming and Mary’s leaving *bothers/bother me.
Long Distance Binding: Long-distance binding of subjects is possible in noun
phrases and Poss-ing gerunds, but not with clauses and Acc-ing gerunds.8
(10) a. they thought that each other’s giving up the ship was forgivable.
b. ?*they thought that each other giving up the ship was forgivable.
c. they thought that each other’s desertion was forgivable.
d. ?*they thought that for each other to desert would be forgivable.
Pied-Piping: Again, where the gerunds contain wh subjects, whether or not they
can front under pied-piping depends whether the gerund is Acc-ing or Poss-ing.
And, of course, Poss-ing patterns with noun phrases, and Acc-ing with clauses.
(11) a. the man [whose ﬂirting with your wife] you took such exception to
b. *the man [who ﬂirting with you wife] you took such exception to
c. the man [whose opinions] you took such exception to
d. the man [(for) who to leave early] you would have preferred
Abney gives a number of other syntactic diﬀerences (some of which are rather
tenuous), but this should be enough to see that they need to be given slightly
diﬀerent syntactic structures to account for their slightly diﬀerent properties.
However, (Hamm & Lambalgen, 2003), in giving a semantic account of nominal-
ization claim that these syntactic diﬀerences have little impact on the semantics,
and that there seems little semantic diﬀerence between the two types.9 And
indeed, it is quite plausible since John’s singing the song bothers me and John
singing the song bothers me seem to be synonymous. But it should be noted that
there is an area in which there does seem to be a semantic diﬀerence – scope.
8I insert this bit for a bit of completeness in showing the diﬀerences between Poss-ing and
Acc-ing. For myself, I am unsure of the grammaticality of either sentence in (10)-(a) and (b).
9They do bring up Reuland’s example regarding distributional properties of gerunds with
sentential adverbs (like probably) vs. VP-adverbs. Reuland’s claim is that Acc-ing can take
sentential adverbs, whereas Poss-ing cannot (this would be a diﬀerence in a semantic analysis).
(i) a. John probably being a spy, Bill though it wise to avoid him.
b. *John’s probably being a spy made Bill think it wise to avoid him.
However, Abney points that Acc-ing gerunds do not take sentence adverbials when in
argument position:
c. *I was grateful for John fortunately knowing the answer.
And as this data seems rather unclear, (a) and (b) are certainly not a big justiﬁcation to
treat the Poss-ing and Acc-ing gerunds diﬀerent semantically.236 Chapter 6. Nominalization
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As with the above examples, Poss-ing gerunds (like noun phrases) can take
wide scope, while Acc-ing gerunds strongly prefer narrow scope:
(12) a. John disapproves of everyone’s taking a day oﬀ (wide scope OK)
b. John disapproves of everyone taking a day oﬀ (*wide scope)
c. John disapproves of everyone’s happiness (wide scope OK)
d. John prefers everyone to take a day oﬀ (*wide scope)
In (12-a) there is the reading where for anyone John disapproves of them taking a
day oﬀ individually. Semi-formally we can see the wide scope as ∀x[Disapprove(John,
take a day oﬀ(x))]. However, with (12-b), only narrow scope is possible, that is
John disapproves of everyone taking a day oﬀ at the same time (a much more
reasonable desire) – Disapprove(John, that ∀x(take a day oﬀ(x))).
It is now time to brieﬂy examine some theoretical accounts (structures) of
the various nominals. Abney accounts for the structure of all four gerunds in a
modiﬁed version of X-Bar theory similar to (Jackendoﬀ, 1977)’s
Deverbalizing Rule Structure: Xi → af – Vi
where Poss-ing gerunds are instantiated with X=N (category), i = 2 (bar level)
and af = -ing (ing aﬃx). This yields the following structure (for his performing
the song) as can be seen in Figure 1:
For the Poss-ing gerund, this manages to account for the occurrence of a6.1. The Standard Story 237
DP
    

John’s D’
     

 D
NP

 
			 	
N





 

V ing
sing
PP










of the Marseillaise
Figure 6.2: Ing–of
genitive, the presence of a VP (which is needed for the internal verbal properties
– V” is a VP), the absence of a nominative subject, modals (*John’s canning ﬁx
the boat), and sentence adverbials like probably and perhaps, which are daughters
of V”’(S) – which is not present in the structure.
Abney’s version fully generalises to all the gerunds and he adopts a DP struc-
ture for the noun phrase. Again, it is the spot where the -ing is aﬃxed that
determines the internal syntactic diﬀerences noted above (as all structures are
DP’s, the external distribution is taken care of). In all cases, the -ing aﬃx con-
verts a verbal projection into a nominal one, but has no syntax of its own. For
example, in the Acc-ing example, the -ing aﬃxes to the IP and turns it into a
DP, thus substituting its [+N] into the IP, converting it into a DP. Now as there
is no D’ or D, there are no nominal features to the structure other that its ex-
ternal distribution. As the -ing attaches lower (ﬁrst Poss-ing, then Ing-of), there
are increasingly more nominal features. For example, the Poss-ing structure has
a D (determiner) position. According to Abney, the determiner position is the
site of person, number and gender features, and so this accounts for the diﬀer-
ences between Poss-ing and Acc-ing in terms of agreement as seen in (10). Note
that in the Ing-of structure the -ing attaches to V0, yielding an ordinary noun
that takes determiner, quantiﬁers, etc. The Ing-of version can be seen in Figure 2.
(Pullum, 1991) gives a rather simple structure in GPSG for the Poss-ing
gerund (simple in the sense that no recourse to ‘aﬃx hopping’ or morphologi-
cal transformation is called upon). He gives the following rule:238 Chapter 6. Nominalization
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(14) N[BAR:2] → (N[BAR:2], POSS:+]), H[VFORM:prp]
This is GPSG notation for indicating an NP structure that has a verbal (in
this case participial) head, which is to account for the POSS-ing’s external dis-
tribution as a noun phrase, and internal syntax behaving verbally. Note that bar
level is treated as a feature of a category, and that H[VFORM:prp] (prp=present
participle) means that the head of the noun phrase is [V:+, N:-], a violation of
the head-feature convention (HFC) in which the features of the head daughter
are inherited from the features of its mother (in this case NP and so [V:-, N:+).
However, as this is a default, and not a hard constraint, a VP as head of an NP
is allowed.10 Also note that in Pullum’s analysis both the feature [VFORM: prp]
and [POSS:+] (indicating that the subject of the gerund (NP) is possessive) are
not the result of some sort of transformation or aﬃx, but assumed to come out of
the morphology of the grammar itself. Pullum’s structure is illustrated in Figure
3.
10Indeed it seems that one of Pullum’s primary motivations in writing the paper was to show
the usefulness of have the convention as a default (while still remaining meaningful). It should
be noted that while there is a feature diﬀerence in [V:-, N:+] to [V:+, N-] from mother to
head daughter, the bar level, amongst other features, is passed down to the head [Bar:2], in
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6.1.2 Semantics
(Vendler, 1968) distinguishes between two types of nominalization – Perfect and
Imperfect nominals. Perfect nominals are a rather homogeneous semantic class
that contain just the Ing-of nominals and semantically appropriate derived nom-
inals such as “the destruction of the city.”11 On the other hand, Imperfect nomi-
nals contain the rest of our four gerunds (Poss-ing, PRO-ing, Acc-ing) as well as
a host of other syntactic constructions like that-clauses, inﬁnitival complements,
and a few others.
The diﬀerent distribution patterns of Perfect and Imperfect nominals can be
seen by their occurrence or lack thereof in what Vendler calls Narrow and Wide
containers. Narrow containers are verbal contexts, which accept only Perfect
nominals, whilst Wide containers can accept either. Wide containers are contexts
such as is unlikely, disturbed us, predicted; Narrow containers include occurred,
was slow, was skilful. (13) and (14) give examples of nominals in Wide and
Narrow containers, respectively:
(13) a. John singing Karaoke surprised us.
b. The performance of the play was surprising.
c. The collapse of the Mid-East peace talks is depressing.
d. Reading War and Peace made John feel like an intellectual.
e. The singing of an encore is unlikely.
(14) a. The destruction of the bridge occurred last week.
b. The soprano’s singing of the aria was too slow.
c *The soprano’s singing the aria was too slow.
d. John’s ﬁxing of the sink was skilful.
e. *John’s ﬁxing the sink was skilful.
While Perfect nominals are felicitous in either type of container, Imperfect nom-
inals are only grammatical in a narrow container context. From this, it is quite
easy to see a broad category distinction between the two types of nominals –
events can be taken as the meaning of Perfect nominals, whilst facts or proposi-
tions can be taken as the meaning of Imperfect nominals.12
Indeed, for the most part, the gerundive Imperfect can be seen as more or less
synonymous with that-clauses13 or inﬁnitival complements. Thus “John singing
Karaoke surprised us” basically means “That John sang Karaoke surprised us.”,
and “Singing the song is fun” just means “To sing the song is fun”. And we can
11Semantically appropriate in the sense the derived noun is ‘close enough’ in meaning to the
corresponding verb. For instance, a performance is an event where someone performs something;
however, an encumbrance is no an event where someone encumbers something – it is a thing
which encumbers.
12Abney calls these ‘act’ and ‘fact’ readings respectively.
13Or often, clause that begin, ‘the fact that’.240 Chapter 6. Nominalization
clearly see the event readings in (14), where, for example, in (14-a) there is a read-
ing as to when the event of the destruction of the bridge occurred. And of course,
That the bridge was destroyed occurred last week is pure nonsense. In (14-d) it is
the way in which John ﬁxed the sink that was skilful, and so a reference to the
event of John’s ﬁxing of the sink. (14-e) could be felicitous if ‘was skilful’ refers
to a strategy John has, for example, to avoid his wife becoming angry and ﬁxing
it before she found out. But in this case, it is the fact that he ﬁxed the sink that
was skilful.
But then what of the situation where a Perfect nominal (something that de-
notes an event) occurs in a Wide container? According to Vendler, Perfect nom-
inals in wide containers can be interpreted as imperfect. Thus:
(15) The collapse of the Germans is unlikely.
is taken to mean
(16) That the Germans will collapse is unlikely.
In some cases the Perfect nominal is coerced into having an imperfect reading in
the context of a Wide container. But it should be noted that some containers are
wider than others. In the case of Wide containers like is unlikely,a n dpredicted (as
in “Nostradamus predicted the collapse of the Germans”) there is only a factive
reading allowed. But take:
(17) The Soprano’s performance of the aria was surprising.
Here, there are two possible readings. One is the imperfect reading which is more
or less equivalent to That the Soprano performed the aria was surprising, perhaps
in a case where she had previously swore never to sing it again. The second is
where it is something about the performance itself that is surprising – perhaps
she sang it while simultaneously riding a unicycle and juggling. Indeed, it seems
that context will help determine whether we get an ‘act’ or ‘fact’ reading (or
possibly both) in these extra-wide containers. For example, look at:
(18) a. The anti-globalisation demonstrations in Seattle, 1999 were surprising.
b. The anti-globalisation demonstrations in Genoa, 2001 were surprising.
With (18-a) it is quite easy to get a ‘fact’ reading, because that there were large-
scale demonstrations was quite surprising to most people. But by Genoa in 2001,
one would have to be doing their best ostrich imitation to be surprised by the fact
that there were large protests. Instead, it was the event itself that was surprising,
(i.e. the scale of violence, police brutality, etc.) at least to some people.
Another interesting example of how context can aﬀect readings comes from
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notes:
(19) a. *John’s ﬁxing the sink was surprising, and Bill’s [e] was more so.
b. John’s ﬁxing of the sink was skilful, and Bill’s [e] was more so.
(20) a. John’s ﬁxing of the sink was skilful, and Bill’s [e] was more so.
b. *John’s ﬁxing of the sink was surprising, and Bill’s [e] was more so.
In (19) both sentences involve the ellipsis of an NP, but only the (b) sentence
is grammatical. Abney contends that NP-deletion is possible only under ‘act’
readings. And since the Poss-ing gerund can only have a ‘fact’ reading, (19-a)
is predicted to be ungrammatical. But then what about (20-b)? While it is
an Ing-of nominal, it is ambiguous as to whether it has an ‘act’ or ‘fact’ read-
ing. Since (19-b) is a Narrow container context, the nominal must have an ‘act’
reading, and NP deletion is possible with ‘act’ readings. In (20-b), the default
reading does seem to be for a ‘fact’ reading, as one is more likely to assume that
it was the fact that John did ﬁx the sink was surprising. According to Abney,
NP deletion is not possible with ‘fact’ readings, and so the lack of ellipsis is in
fact unsurprising. But, an ‘act’ reading, where it would be the way the sink
was ﬁxed was surprising is possible with a little imagination. However, I invite
the reader to imagine the admittedly bizarre situation, where John ﬁxes the sink
merely by putting all the parts on the ﬂoor and uttering ‘Abracadabra’. Bill
does this as well, but also conjures the plumbing parts out of midair. Now with
this in mind, (20-b) seems perfectly ﬁne, there is now an ‘act’ or ‘manner’ reading.
The lesson here is that it is a combination of context and lexical mean-
ing/world knowledge that determines whether a Perfect nominal in an extra-wide
container like is surprising gets either an ‘act’ or ‘fact’ reading. While the ‘act’
reading in (18) comes out quite naturally (because the manner of demonstrations
or performances and the like are often surprising), John’s ﬁxing of the sink is, by
default, probably unremarkable in the way it is done. Indeed, a rather ridiculous
context needs to be constructed in order to make (20-b) sound reasonable.
Before concluding, one last diﬀerence between Perfect and Imperfect nominals
should be noted – intensionality vs. extensionality. Take the following examples
from (Parsons, 1990):
(21) The beheading of the tallest spy occurred at noon.
(22) Mary predicted the beheading of the tallest spy.
Now assume it just so happens that the tallest spy is actually the king. Then
(21) implies:
(23) The beheading of the king occurred at noon,
but, (22) does not imply242 Chapter 6. Nominalization
(24) Mary predicted the beheading of the king.14
At ﬁrst glance it appears that Narrow containers enforce extensionality, but wide
containers do not; however, it seems more likely the case that it is the ‘act’ reading
that forces extensionality and not the container per se. Narrow containers, only
allowing ‘act’ readings, would then be a special case. Now in the case of the
sentences with ‘predicted’, we have a container that, as noted earlier, only allows
for ‘fact’ readings. But with a container like ‘shocked the world’, which allows
both readings, extensionality is enforced for ‘act’/event readings. Consider:
(25) The bombing of Hiroshima shocked the world.
Presumably, the default reading here is the event reading, it being the ﬁrst use
of an atomic bomb that was most shocking (i.e. not just that Hiroshima was
bombed). Now, assume that Hiroshima was the fourth largest city in Japan at
the time. Then certainly (25) implies
(26) The bombing of the fourth largest city in Japan shocked the world.
As far as the ‘event’ reading goes, an event by any other name will still shock as
much. Of course the ‘fact’ reading of (26) does not go through on either reading
of (25). So perhaps it is whether the interpretation of the Perfect nominal is as an
event or propositional entity that determines the extensionality. If it is an event,
then extensionality is enforced, if it is a fact, then the context is intensional.
Generic Nominals
There is one class of verbal gerunds that are commonly held to have an activity
reading, and are a variant of the PRO-Ing gerund, where the subject of the
gerund is no speciﬁc subject for the determinerless gerund. (Lees, 1960) called
these action-referent gerundives,examples of which are
(27) a. Eating vegetables is healthy.
b. Dressing oneself is fun.
These generic nominals diﬀer from the types discussed above in that they are not
paraphrased by a that-clause, but rather an inﬁnitival.15
(28) a. To eat vegetables is healthy.
14It is interesting to imagine the situation where Mary knows that the king is the tallest
spy. With this added assumption, does the implication of (24) go through? Suppose Mary
utters something along the lines of I foresee that the tallest spy will be beheaded tomorrow,
but purposely leaves her secret information out. For herself, at least, (24) may be the case.
Substitute ‘believed’ for ‘predicted’ and it certainly seems to go through.
15The use of an Ing-of gerund is also allowed, with no interpretational diﬀerence, i.e. The
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b. To dress oneself is fun.
When these determinerless gerunds have an understood, speciﬁc subject, the
interpretation supposedly reverts to a ‘factive’ reading, with the paraphrase being
a possibly a that-clause, and sometimes equivalent to a (tensed or untensed)
inﬁnitival.
(29) a. I regret dressing myself.
b. I regret having dressed myself.
c. I regret that I (have) dressed myself.
d. *I regret to dress myself.
e. *I regret to have dressed myself.
(30) a. Climbing the mountain was quite satisfying.
b. ??That I climbed the mountain was quite satisfying.
c. To climb the mountain was quite satisfying.
d. To have climbed the mountain was quite satisfying.
The context in (29) is undoubtedly factive and its corresponding paraphrases do
not seem to allow an inﬁnitival. However, while the context in (30) is both a
speciﬁc event and the subject of the gerund is the speaker, there is certainly an
interpretation that it was the action of climbing and not merely the result that is
satisfying. It is also much more amenable to an ‘actional’, inﬁnitival paraphrase.
Conclusion
In this introductory section, we have seen some basic syntactic and semantic
properties of gerunds. Syntactically, all four types of gerunds can be taken to be
NP’s because of their distribution. However, only the Ing-of gerunds can be fully
nominal, as the other three gerunds possess internal syntactic properties of verb
phrases in their ability to be modiﬁed by adverbs, their lack of ability to take
quantiﬁers and determiners, and the control properties for PRO-ing.
The syntactic diﬀerences between the verbal and nominal gerund seem to be
exhibited semantically since the verbal and nominal gerunds belong to the classes
of Imperfect and Perfect Nominals respectively. The ‘fact’ and ‘act’ readings that
characterise the semantic diﬀerences between the Imperfect and Perfect Nominals
can be taken to denote propositions/states of aﬀairs and events.16 Many syntactic
and semantic subtleties have been excluded here, but I think this provides a ﬁrm
foundation on which to examine the diachronic status of nominalization. We
shall see a rather strange evolution of the gerund from its origins as a simple
16The relation between ‘event’ and ‘act’ is fairly tricky. As seen above, events can have ‘act’
readings in wide container contexts and certain narrow containers like ‘is slow’. But how does
this relate to the habitual ‘act’ readings such as in John’s singing of arias is invariably out
of tune? No speciﬁc event is implied here, but perhaps the John’s quantiﬁes over singing-aria
events of John’s and states something of them in a default way.244 Chapter 6. Nominalization
deverbalized noun with a resultative, concrete interpretation, such as clothing or
building.
6.2 Origins (and present-day consequences)
In the previous section, a categorical diﬀerence between the nominal and verbal
gerund was shown. The nominal types allow determiners and mark their direct
object periphrastically with of. The verbal gerunds17 allow modiﬁcation of aspect
and voice, and take a direct object without any recourse to periphrasis. Finally,
it was observed that the semantic objects the nominal and verbal gerund denote
also diﬀer.18
This section examines the history of the nominal, as it is important to recog-
nise that the diﬀerences between the nominal and verbal gerund were not always
so clear. Indeed, -ing forms used regularly as late as the end of the 19th Century
are startlingly ungrammatical today.19 Following our historical excursion, we
shall see that even in PDE,20 the discrete categorisation given in the last section
proves wanting. Moreover, the standard mapping between syntax and semantics,
as well as the standard typology of nominal types needs to be revised slightly.
6.2.1 Old English and early Middle English
Until 130021 verbal gerunds were yet to exist, but there was a productive deriva-
tional process that turned a verb into an abstract action noun22, via the addition
of the suﬃxes of -ing or -ung.23 Here are some common examples of Old English
verbs and their corresponding verbal noun.
(31) a. gieddean to speak formally, with alliteration
17Recall that (Abney, 1987)’s typology includes three verbal gerunds that do diﬀer slightly
in their syntactic behaviour with respect to each other.
18Excluding, of course, the coercion of perfect nominals to a factive reading in the proper
context. In later sections, we shall see that this is certainly not the only type of coercion
possible for gerunds. Indeed, while a less regular phenomenon, a type of coercion is possible,
where verbal gerunds have a perfect nominal reading, and often some nominal syntax to go
along with it.
19Though (Pullum, 1991) contends quite reasonably that latter examples of bewildering
gerunds may be an instance of deliberate archaisms by late 19th and early 20th century authors.
20This is often dialect dependent.
21The standard division of periods of English is usually divided into
Old English 500-1100
Middle English 1100-1500
Early Modern English 1500-1800
Modern English 1800-Present
22Or a concrete noun such as still exist in PDE, i.e., I love the clothing she wears.
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b. gieddung saying
c. luﬁanto love
d. lufung act of loving
e. geladian invite, summon
f. geladung congregation24
These early -ing forms had only nominal properties, needing a periphrastic di-
rect object, and not exhibiting tense or voice distinctions. (Tajima, 1985) has a
typology of gerunds of Old and Middle English25
(32) I objective genitive + gerund: (the kinges couroning; Bevis, c1300)
II object + gerund: (be other pennaunce doynge; Rolle)
III gerund + of-adjunct: (the beginning of wysdome is dredyng of our
Lord; Midland Prose Psalter, c1300)
IV determiner + gerund + of-adjunct: (Ye han wel herd of Theseus
devyse in the betraysynge of fayre Adrayne; Chaucer, c. 1380)
V gerund + object: (In baptising bath yong and ald Men soght til him
(Cursor Mundi, 1348)
VI determiner + gerund + object: (The wythholding you from it can doo
yow no good; Caxton, c1481)
The focus shall be on types III to VI.26 Notice that Types III and IV diﬀer
from types V and VI only in the presence or absence of an of -adjunct. Type
VI is considered rather ungrammatical today27 but for several hundred years
was a rather common before being dying out for a combination of prescriptive
and, according to (Fanego, 2004), language internal reasons. Type V is an early
example of an ancestor of the PRO-ing gerund, which was the ﬁrst type of verbal
gerund to emerge. The earliest extant example of this is
(33) Sain John was...bisi in ordaing of priestes, and clerkes, And in casting
kirc werkes (English Homilies, ca. 1300)
24This last one from (Houston, 1989, p.174).
25His types III and IV are the most relevant for the development of V and VI. Note at the
time of his study, ACC-ing gerunds were yet to exist.
26See (Tajima, 1985) for greater detail on the ﬁrst two types, which are interesting in their
own right.
27It combines a determiner with a non-periphrastic direct object, giving a nominal/verbal
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which is a coordination of two type III gerunds and the then novel Type V.28 It
took several centuries for the various modern verbal types to completely develop,
and along the way some (from our perspective) rather odd forms can be found.
This brings up the questions as to how it happened and why the process was so
gradual. In fact, it may not yet be complete.
The table below29 is taken from (Tajima, 1985) and is a compilation of gerund
type and percentage over 50 year periods. He has a few counts for some very
early appearances of the verbal gerund’s ancestors. This is not uncontroversial.
For example, many of his examples include ing forms with certain adverbial
modiﬁcations that could also modify nouns.30 Nevertheless, the table does show
a gradual expansion of the ‘verbal gerund’ both in frequency and variety of types.
Apparently, the Acc-ing gerund really doesn’t appear much until the late 16th
century and not with regularity until the late 18th century, and is well beyond
the time period covered by Tajima.
I II III IV V VI Total
1100-1200 12 9 23 8 0 0 52
1200-1250 22 9 3 9 0 0 43
1250-1300 17 22 19 5 1 0 64
1300-1350 82 51 160 103 23 2 421
1350-1400 35 60 595 250 59 4 1003
1400-1450 82 227 717 414 253 7 1700
1450-1500 74 102 562 594 328 17 1677
Total 324 480 2079 1383 664 30 4960
6.2.2 The OE participle and its role
The standard view of the development of the verbal gerund is that a confusion
developed between the Middle English present participle and the verbal noun. As
the endings of OE verbal nouns coalesced from ung and yng to ing, participial
endings underwent a similar phonetic change. Depending on the dialect,31 the
28Tajima has some examples of what appear to be earlier verbal gerunds – mainly to do
with diﬀerent types of adverbial modiﬁcation such as place or time, i.e. of thy comyng at
domesday (1280), at his coming there. (Fanego, 2004) notes that prepositional phrases and
phrasal adverbs could also occur with nouns at the time (and still can), thus making their status
unclear. However, she does acknowledge that the increasing use of certain types of adverbial
usage expanded in Middle English may have contributed to a categorial indeterminacy that is
central to her thesis.
29Given the relative poverty of data from the 1100-1300 time period, it is probably unwise to
draw any conclusions regarding trends in frequency for that period.
30See (Fanego, 2004) for more details.
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present participle had an ending of inde,o rende or ande.
fremmann to perform
fremmende performing
nerian to save
neriende saving
(34) He
He
waes
was
ehtende
persecuting
cristenra
Christian
mona
men
(35) Tha
Those[senators]
waeron
were
simbe
always
binan
within
Romebyrg
Rome
wuniende.
dwelling.
Those [senators] were always dwelling within Rome.32
(36) Swete
Sweet
lord...
lord...
Ich
I
am
am
cominde
coming
to
to
thine
thine
feste.
feast.
(c1280)
(Poutsma, 1923) then describes a process of the levelling of the participle in South
and Midlands dialects (which had the inde ending) ﬁrst to inne. It is then claimed
that this became conﬂated with the verbal noun ending in inge . And indeed,
in the South and Midlands dialects the participial and verbal noun endings were
identical by 1450 (Poutsma estimates the beginning of this process to be around
1200). Here are two examples of early examples of participles ending in ynge/inge.
(37) And
And
how
how
louynge
loving
he
he
is
is
to
to
ech
each
lif
living-thing
on
on
londe
land
and
and
on
on
water
water
(c1400, Piers Plowman)
(38) Jhon
John
was
was
in
in
desert
the
baptisynge
desert
and
baptising,
prechinge
and
the
preaching
baptym
the
of
baptism
penaunce.
of
(1380,
penance.
Wyclif)
There is now a verbal noun and participle that sound indistinguishable (in the
South, at least). The conﬂation theory then goes on to postulate that it was
this phonetic formal identity between the participle and the gerund that caused
the gerund to acquire verbal properties. The participle is verbal, and takes bare
direct objects, passivizes, governs a predicative complement, etc:
(39) I recommand me hartly onto yow, thankyng yow of aull good brother-
32This and (35) taken from (Denison, 1983) in the context of analysing the OE progressive.
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hood. (Cely Papers, late 1400’s)
(40) Unto my brother George Cely merhcande of the estapell being at Calles.
(Cely Papers)
And apparently, speakers of English got confused by phonetic identity, and the
gerund started to take on the verbal properties of the present participle. Of
course, the timing of the formal identity (ca. 1450) does ﬁt in nicely with estimates
of the beginning of the verbal gerund (ca 1350-1450),33 but some questions do
remain.
First, while there was the formal identity of the present participle in the
South and Midlands, even Poutsma admits that in the North and in Scotland,
the distinction still remained. In fact, it is beyond dispute that Scottish English
had a verbal gerund by 1560, but still kept the old participle ending. These
examples come from St. Andrews, Scotland court records involving accusations
of blasphemy:34
(41) Margaret murdow delatate for blashphemous sayings against the Sacra-
ment of the body and Blude of Christ sayand thir wordes in the oppin
ﬁsche mercat...
(42) William petillok dwelland be este Thomas martynes Said the divell ane
kirk will I gang to and the devil burn up the kirk...
(Labov, 1989) notes that the formal identity may never have taken place in
some dialects. In examining the socio-linguistic variable in PDE dialects between
workin’ and working he notes that where the former is spoken (weakened ending),
it is used most in progressives and participles, rarely in gerunds, and least of all
in deverbal nouns like ceiling. He takes this as evidence that the workin’/working
alternation is not the result of the deletion of the underlying /g/, but rather a
continuation of the distinction in some dialects between the participle and the
gerund. The workin’ form comes from a reduction in the inde participle.
So, if the formal identity of the participle and gerund was responsible for
the split of the gerund into a verbal and nominal one, then how did this hap-
pen in regions where the identity never actually occurred? Furthermore, if we
grant a formal phonetic identity, as Houston wonders, is it suﬃcient for “confu-
sion between two grammatical categories, unless there were already some shared
grammatical properties”?
6.2.3 Houston
(Houston, 1989), came up with a novel proposal for the origin of the verbal gerund.
33The ﬁrst example of an unequivocal verbal gerund is from 1300, but no great category
change happened immediately. It is over the next 100-200 that they become more frequent.
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She begins by questioning the standard theories that rely on formal phonetic
identity, noting ﬁrst that the change in the participle ending form nde to ing was
only completed by 1450 in the south of England and the Midlands.35 Moreover,
she questions the possibility of a ‘confusion’ between two diﬀerent grammatical
categories, unless there were also some shared grammatical/syntactic properties.
She cites data from (Irwin, 1967) that shows that verbal nouns occurred primarily
as subjects, objects, objects of prepositions, and genitive complements to a lesser
extent. Participles occurred mainly as nominal modiﬁers and marginally as parts
of phrasal verbs. So as far as external syntactic distribution, there were only a
few similarities between verbal nouns and present participles (and this remains
so in PDE).
But Houston does not abandon the idea of the participles involvement in the
evolution of the verbal noun altogether. Instead, she looks at the possibility of
a shared discourse function between the two, and theorises that it is this shared
communicative function that caused the gerund to split into a nominal and verbal
gerund.36 Her data does contrast rather sharply with Tajima’s, as she only ﬁnds
gerunds taking bare direct objects in any frequency by 1550, about 150 years later
than Tajima, and 100 years after we see gerunds with direct objects appearing
in letters and original English prose. I have no explanation for this rather large
discrepancy,37 but as we shall see, a key part of her data (the percentage of these
direct object gerunds that appear as objects of preposition) is consistent with
Tajima.
She ﬁrst divides up the occurrence of verbal nouns by syntactic position and
contrasts whether they are found as subjects/direct objects or objects of prepo-
sitions. Her data ranging from the 10th to 17th centuries shows that from the
14th century on, at least 60% of all verbal nouns are found in oblique position.
This does agree with Tajima, as his examples in all of his types have the gerund
in oblique position in a fairly large majority of the instances. Houston then looks
at what happened when the verbal noun began to take bare direct objects. It
turns out that the ﬁrst appearance of bare direct objects is with verbal nouns in
the oblique position.
35As already discussed in the last section.
36Houston labels these ‘oblique’ and I will continue this trend as it is briefer than ‘object of
preposition’. I am using the term ‘verbal noun’ to mean any gerund. ‘Direct object gerunds’
are gerunds that take a bare direct object (Type V) and are of course looked at as being the
ﬁrst hints of the development of the verbal gerund.
37Indeed Tajima’s timing of the beginning of the change is probably more accurate. But,
while there are unequivocal examples of verbal nouns with direct objects as far back as 1300,
there are a very rare occurrence (as far as what is extant) for over a century.250 Chapter 6. Nominalization
c1550 4% of sub/obj position w/ direct object
c1600 54% of sub/obj position w/ direct object
c1650 38% of sub/obj position w/ direct object
c1550 31% of oblique position w/ direct object
c1600 64% of oblique position w/ direct object
c1650 60% of oblique position w/ direct object
The ﬁrst thing to note is the 50-year gap between when direct objects ﬁrst
appear in oblique contexts and when they really begin to appear in subject or ob-
ject position.38 While Tajima does claim there to be direct object verbal nouns39
in rather high frequency appearing from 1400, it seems that every one of them
he gives as examples also occur in oblique position. For example, he lists at least
25 examples for the 1450-1500 time period. None of them are in either subject or
object position. So despite the disparities in the data, it does seem that indeed
the ﬁrst occurrences of verbal nouns taking bare direct objects did occur with the
verbal noun in the oblique position.
The dominance of verbal nouns in oblique position at this time is important;
Houston claims that there are shared discourse functions between the oblique
position verbal noun and the appositive participle. Then it might be the case that
the shared discourse functions caused the gerund to acquire verbal properties. If
this did happen, one would expect to ﬁnd bare direct objects with verbal nouns
in oblique position before they appeared in subject or object position. And this
is indeed the case. So we shall now have a brief look at the appositive participles
and the shared discourse function between them and oblique verbal nouns.
According to Houston,40 appositive participles appear either before or after
the matrix clause, or in clause-ﬁnal position:
(43) a. Going to preach, H. Morley of my parish deliv’d mee a note of receipt
of my procuration (Diary of Ralph Josselin) b. I recommand me hartly
onto yow, thankyng yow of aull good brotherhood.41 (Cely Papers)
Like verbal gerunds the subject of the appositive participle exhibit the same sort
of control properties. The subject of thankyng yow in (43) (b) is the subject of the
38Unfortunately her data is not quite as copious as Tajima’s; for example the 4% for the time
period 1550-1600 represents but one instance out of a total of just 24 verbal nouns found in
sub/obj position at all. This may be the reason for the peak at 1600. For the 1650 time period,
there are but 13 examples of verbal nouns in sub/obj context and 76 verbal nouns in total.
39The unwieldy term ‘direct object verbal noun’ is used to classify examples such as (56).
Certainly at this earliest date they cannot yet be called verbal gerunds, but rather the beginning
of the transition stage that saw verbal nouns begin to acquire internal verbal syntax.
40Appositives, in general, are clauses that re-identify the subject of the matrix clause such as
That man, the president of the corporation, is out to sack me. For example, the participle in
Feeling tired, I went to bed would be appositive.
41Note that all data in this section is taken from Houston.6.2. Origins (and present-day consequences) 251
matrix clause (‘I’), and in (43-a), the subject of ‘going to preach’ is the speaker,
presumably Ralph Josselin.42 And as far as taking bare direct objects goes, she
cites (Callaway, 1901) in noting that at least in Old English texts the appositives
took direct objects in 56% of their instances in prose and 13% in poetry.43
She also draws on Callaway for her theory of similarity of discourse function.
According to Callaway, appositive participles serve three diﬀerent functions, at-
tributive, adverbial and coordinate:
(44) Unto my brother George Cely merchande of the estapell beyng at Calles
(Cely Papers – attributive use)
(45) that lewide men (laymen), seyinge akynge & swellynge in a lyme that is
wounded, leie therto a potage in maner maad of eerbis & Wynes...(Science
of Cirurgie – adverbial44 )
That laymen, seeing aching and swelling in a limb that is wounded,l a y
thereto a potage in manner made of herbs and wines...
(46) The Quene removed on Wensday toward Norfolk, taking Dr. Cesars in
her way. (Letters of John Chamberlain – coordinate)
Houston focuses on the adverbial function of participles, as this is the function
shared by verbal nouns in oblique position (there was no adverbial function with
verbal nouns in either subject or object position). Following Calloway, she dis-
tinguishes between several types of adverbial functions including manner/means,
temporal, causal, and goal. Here are a few examples of participles and verbal
nouns in some of the functions:
(47) Sir Samuel Baguel is lately slain there, being stabd by Sir Laurence (Let-
ters of John Chamberlain – appositive, causal function
(48) God zelde yow for zoure labore for me for gaderyng of my mony (Paston
Letters, verbal noun – causal function)
(49) (He) set upon him as he was coming out of his coach, wounding him in
three or four places (John Chamberlain – appositive, manner function)
(50) Wee are very vigerous in asserting our Religion (Essex Papers, late 1600’s
42It is a rather odd sentence indeed. The main clue that equates mee with the subject of
going to preach is my parish. Nonetheless, the participle is controlled by the matrix clause.
43Once again Latin rears its imperial head. In the OE period, according to Callaway, most
writing that is in original English is poetry. Most of the prose consists in Latin translations.
And again a Latin inﬂuence is cited for the reason that appositive participles taking direct
objects. Callaway also notes that the strictly the Latin translation the higher the frequency of
appositives taking direct objects.
44This is adverbial in the sense that the participle bears a temporal/causal relation to the
matrix clause. That is, it is upon and because of seeing the wounded limb that the laymen
decide to do their attempt at surgery. I assume, since this is a treatise on surgery and laymen
are the subject, that it all goes drastically wrong.252 Chapter 6. Nominalization
– verbal noun, manner)
Finally, data is presented showing a fair amount of similarity in the percent-
age of both appositives and verbal nouns in an adverbial function. For all but
the period 1650-1700 the percentage of oblique verbal nouns with an adverbial
function is well over 70%. Aside from a strange dip in the period 1450-1500, the
percentage of appositive participles with adverbial function is at least 50%. In
all time periods, the percentage of subject or object verbal nouns with adverbial
function is 0.
Summing up, there exists a similarity in discourse function between appositive
participles and oblique verbal nouns, and evidence that when verbal nouns began
taking direct objects, it was the oblique ones that took them ﬁrst. Houston
speculates that the common usage, some syntactic similarity (ability to appear
clause-initial and clause-ﬁnal), and functional similarity between the appositive
participle and verbal noun could have contributed to increasing similarity between
the participle and gerund, to the point where the gerund began to acquire verbal
properties.45 And while this certainly has a good deal of intuitive plausibility,
there is no broader theoretical mechanism to show how this would actually work.
In the next section (Fanego, 2004) attempts to give a mechanism that could
account for the glacial pace changes that happened to the development of ing.
There is also the discrepancy in data to take into account. But assume
Tajima’s data is correct and that verbal nouns began taking direct objects in
meaningful frequency by the period 1400-1450. This is not enough to show that
a verbal gerund was necessarily in English by that time – at least not the verbal
gerund as we know it. It is a gerund generally without a subject,46 that only has
an external distribution in oblique position. There are also only a few examples of
the gerund with a predicative complement, and one or two odd cases of any voice
distinction. There is certainly no verbal gerund as it exists today. So perhaps
the end of the time period that Houston looks at (ca. 1500-1600) is actually the
time when a real split does occur, and the previous 150 years or so only some
kind of transitional stage. By 1600, the verbal noun begins to take direct objects
in subject and object position. Moreover, we also now start seeing in much larger
frequency what look to be Poss-ing and Acc-ing gerunds, and distinctions for
tense and voice also become established.
Before the late 16th century, the gerund was neutral as to voice:
(51) a. A shootynge Gloue is chieﬂye for to save a mannes ﬁngers from hur-
tynge (Aschams, 1545, = a man’s ﬁngers from getting hurt)
45Houston does not hold that this was the sole reason, just that it was a contributing factor.
In a footnote she also draw attention to the fact that issues of control may be involved. Given
the odd status of the [Det-] Ing-of gerunds, there is most likely something to this.
46Tajima’s examples of gerunds with subject seem mainly nominal, and there are no examples
of an Acc-ing like gerund, i.e. with both subject and direct object.6.2. Origins (and present-day consequences) 253
b. The witnesses said they dared not to present the truth for drede of
murdrying, and to myscheved in their own houses (Rolls of Parit, 1475,
= being murdered)
c. It please you to remember (remind) my maister at your best leiser,
wheder his old promise shall stande as touching my preferrying to the
Boreshed (Paston Letters, 1458, = being preferred)
But around the latter half of the 16th century the distinctions start appearing:
(52) a. Cloth’d with a pitchy cloud for being seen (Marlowe, 1587)
b. to be styled the underhangman of his kingdom and hated for being
preferr’d so well (Shakespeare, 1591)
and distinction for tense also came in:
(53) a. Want of consideration in not having demanded thus much (Sidney,
1580)
b. Mine ears ... Do burn themselves for having so oﬀended (Shakespeare,
1592)
but nevertheless the voice-neutral construction seems to be variable well until the
19th century, and was even used in the same dialect as the passive form
(54) a. Excuse his throwing into the water (Shakespeare, 1598)
b. devoting all His soul’s strength to their winning back to peace. (Brown-
ing, 1833)
Perhaps then, the period in question, 1500-1600, is not the time that verbal nouns
began to acquire direct objects, as that seems to have started well before, but
instead is the time there began to be a regular, productive construction of a
verbal gerund, with the majority of features that are found in the verbal gerunds
in Present Day English.
6.2.4 Fanego
Indeed, recent work by (Fanego, 2004) pinpoints the beginnings of the verbal
gerund slightly further back than Houston, but later than believed by Tajima.
Many of Tajima’s earliest examples involve types of adverbial modiﬁcation that
was common to both verbs and nouns in early Middle English and therefore his
earliest examples cannot be seen as deﬁnitively verbal. For example, Tajima
considers this example from 1280 an example of a verbal gerund.
(55) Vnder the
￿eM o n u m e n t
￿eo stod wi
￿oute wepyng sore. (Southern Pas-
sion)
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weeping.
Citing (Jack, 1988), Fanego notes that sore at this time in history was (due to
phonological and morphological processes) both an adjective and adverb, and
thus could have an adjectival (and thus nominal) reading in the above example.
In PDE, words such as fast still have this ambiguity.
The safest way of determining the verbalisation of the gerund is in its gover-
nance of direct objects,47 which Tajima also has very early examples of:48
(56) a. Saint Jon was...bisi In ordaining of Priests and clerics, and in casting
kirc werkes (1300, English Metrical Homilies).
Saint John was ...busy ordaining priests, and in planning church works.
b. yn feblyng
￿eb o d ywith moche fastyng (1303, Handlyng Synne)
in weakening the body by too much abstinence.
These two examples are probably the earliest clear examples of a gerund with
verbal properties. Note that in the (56-a), there is a combination of the nominal
Type III (ordaining of priests) with the then novel Type V (casting kirc werkes).
Moreover, there is support of Houston’s chronology in that both of these earlier
examples are gerunds as objects of preposition.
Fanego’s work diﬀers from Houston not so much in the account of the chronol-
ogy and development of the verbal gerund, but rather in the mechanism. She
points out that while Houston is perfectly accurate in attributing the beginning
of the process to oblique gerunds, the connection with appositive participles,
though plausible, gives no mechanism to account for the process that takes sev-
eral centuries to unfold.49 (Fanego, 2004) does exactly this in terms of reanalysis
and actualisation, and examines a piecemeal process that begins with the early
Type V’s seen above and gradually develops into the typology of verbal gerunds
in PDE.
Reanalysis and Actualisation
The basis of Fanego’s use of the term ‘reanalysis’ comes from seminal work by
(Timberlake, 1977) and (Langacker, 1977). The simplest deﬁnition she gives
comes from (Timberlake, 1977) that deﬁnes reanalysis as “the formulation of a
novel set of underlying relationships and rules” (p.141) and a fuller quote from
(Langacker, 1977) as
47i.e. sans an of marker.
48The ﬁrst of these has already been seen in the section on Houston.
49Moreover, Fanego even dismisses Houston’s attempted semantic and discourse link to ac-
count for the verbalisation process beginning with the oblique gerunds. Instead, more syntactic
factors are relied upon. Later on, we shall see that Houston may indeed have a point; however,
Fanego is correct in asserting that a mechanism to account for the rather complicated history
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change in the structure of an expression or class of expressions
that does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modiﬁcation of its
surface manifestation. Reanalysis may lead to changes at the surface
level, ...but these surface changes can be viewed as the natural and ex-
pected result of functionally prior modiﬁcation in rules and underlying
representations.
She further reﬁnes this with reference to (Harris & Campbell, 1995) and
(Croft, 2000a) noting that the major prerequisite for reanalysis involves a given
form having the possibility of more than one analysis. Moreover, it is not the case
that every example of a particular type is a candidate for reanalysis, a subset of
tokens is enough to begin the reanalysis process. As Croft notes, a construction
need not be formally ambiguous in order for there to be a remapping between
form and function.
(Fanego, 2004) then postulates that the ﬁrst candidate for reanalysis were
Tajima’s Type III gerunds50 as indeed the earliest examples of gerunds with
direct objects are also lacking a determiner. She notes that in general, ing nouns
were a favoured candidate for a reanalysis into something more verbal due to
a variety of factors. First of all, by Middle English, ing nouns have unlimited
productivity and consistently having a meaning, ‘act/process of doing X’ as well
as preserving the argument structure of the base verb.51
At the time, Type III nominal gerunds were far more common than in PDE,
and that they were lacking a determiner means that they were not less-marked
as overtly nominal than those gerunds that did have a determiner.52 In her view
it was all of these factors that allowed speakers to reanalyse the Type III gerund
as something more verbal. Once it is analysed as verbal, the ing form taking a
direct object follows immediately.
Note that this sort of reanalysis can happen even when the old analysis is
perfectly unambiguous. There need only be a possibility of multiple analyses –
old and new analyses can happily coexist. As seen in (56)(a), the writer had no
problem using a typical nominal gerund alongside the innovative verbal gerund.
Finally, her explanation for the reason that the ﬁrst nominal gerunds to be
reanalysed were Type III in a prepositional context does not have to do with the
discourse reasons. It is rather the more prosaic reasons that prepositional gerunds
were the most common at the time,53 as well as inﬂuences from the French ‘en
plus g´ erondif ’,54 coupled with the resistance of the use of inﬁnitives as objects
50Fanego calls these Type I (Ing-of with no determiner).
51She also cites various factors discussed earlier such as inﬂuence from other languages, ad-
verb/adjective ambiguity, etc.
52Nominal gerunds were not alone amongst nouns in having a zero article – this was much
more common in the grammar of middle English than today.
53Something that has already been noted.
54An old French prepositional construction that entered Middle English.256 Chapter 6. Nominalization
of prepositions, thus removing one alternate form that may have been used.55
However, what neither of the authors have pointed out is that the verbal gerunds
in (56)-(a) and (b) have a meaning that is in no way ‘factive’, but is exactly the
same as its Type III counterpart – an act or process.56
Actualization and grammatical gradation
At this point, the story is that the Type III nominal gerund construction had
enough syntactic properties that allowed it to be interpreted as verbal as well as
nominal. But, we have seen in the history that the early examples from the 14th
century did not immediately beget a PDE type verbal gerund. Instead, there was
a gradual working out of various constructions, most of which are ungrammatical
today.
So, instead of viewing grammatical categories as discrete, Fanego calls upon
work of (Haspelmath, 1998) as well as (Heine, Ulrike, & Hunnemeyer, 1991) that
views language change as a gradual process. They note that in many language
change processes57 there are often stages where a particular entity cannot be de-
scribed as, say either a verb or noun, but a hybrid of both, as it retains properties
of both categories. Over time the process works itself out, and the given entity or
construction gradually becomes an archetypical member of the target category.58
Viewing word classes in a more dynamic way makes the strange, hybrid anoma-
lies that occur over the gerunds history seem not so odd at all, but something
perfectly expected.59
In Fanego’s account the early examples of gerunds taking a direct object are
only the beginning of a process that then extended to other types of nominal
gerunds in further extensions, called the actualization process. Extension is “the
analogical transference of a pattern to further related cases.” This idea is rather
similar to many other author’s conceptions of language change, including (Hop-
per & Traugott, 1993)’s rule generalisation and (Croft, 2000a)’s intraference.F o r
Croft, intraference is the “extension of a form to a function not previously associ-
ated with that form” (p.154) on the proviso that there is enough meaning overlap
between the form’s original meaning and the new function it becomes associated
55As seen in the ﬁrst section, some uses of gerunds, especially those without a subject can be
paraphrased as inﬁnitivals.
56Appositive participles also often have an action reading that serves as a background for the
main clause.
57This is often typical in grammaticalisation processes where a verb becomes a preposition
over a long period of time.
58(Haspelmath, 1998) goes as far to say that even in formal syntactic representation it is
probably correct to allow for word class gradience. At any point in time a word or construction
could be categorised as, e.g., V.2/P.8 for a word that is basically a preposition, but retains some
properties of a verb.
59Though, verbal gerunds are in general much more worked out and standardised in this
point in time, a following section will show that the transition from noun to verb still has yet
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with. In PDE, it is often the case that using a verbal or nominal gerund (or even
derived nominal) is merely a matter of style,60, and we have also seen that in the
earliest examples of verbal gerunds the meaning is just the actional reading that
is shared both by Type III gerunds and appositive participles.61
Further extensions
The next two stages in the development of the gerund involve the development
of verbal features in Tajima’s Type IV gerunds (the/my writing of the book)a n d
the extension of Type V gerunds (in casting kirc wirkes) to non-propositional
contexts.
The Type IV gerunds, especially those with a determiner are certainly more
nominal and are, as Fanego claims, a less natural candidate for acquiring verbal
properties. Fanego notes that even by the late 16th century, these type remained
primarily nominal whereas those without a determiner or possessive were primar-
ily verbal62 by 1640.
Note that Tajima’s Type IV include nominal gerunds with both a determiner
and a possessive. The second type, which would develop into the modern POSS-
ing gerund verbalised comparatively quickly, given their more clause-like nature.
Astoundingly, Fanego does a sample of 400,000 words for the ﬁrst half of the 18th
century and found 290 POSS-Ing gerunds and only 2 that were nominal, one of
which is the following from 1714
(57) I do most solemnly declare,...that my writing of these ‘memoirs’ did
not proceed from any desire of being an author...(Lockhart, Memoirs of
Scotland)
While I have no doubt as to the accuracy regarding the development of the verbal
POSS-ing gerund, it is unclear as to whether Fanego is claiming that there was
full scale replacement of the nominal form by a verbal one.63 While the style of
(57) could be considered a bit archaic or stuﬀy, the use of a nominal or verbal
form in these contexts is usually one of dialect and style and if Fanego takes her
data to argue that these forms have disappeared altogether, it is a leap too far.
What did disappear (or rather fall into conventional disfavour) were some of
the forms that began to verbalise in the 17th and 18th century,64 such as Tajima’s
Type VI (e.g., this from 1673)
60Witness the various examples of coercion in the earlier semantics section.
61(Fanego, 2004) makes much of the need for semantic closeness, but does not elaborate
further focussing more on the commonality of syntactic properties. It is here that I think that
while (Fanego, 2004) dismisses (Houston, 1989) out of hand, there is room for both in the overall
historical process.
62i.e. took a bare direct object.
63This is also the case with the determinerless Type III gerund. We have seen that it is alive
and well in PDE, especially in presentation there-insertion contexts.
64Though one can ﬁnd much earlier examples, this is their time in the sun, frequency-wise.258 Chapter 6. Nominalization
(58) the noblest End is the multiplying children (Taylor, Sermons)
This type, along with some of the mixed verbal/nominal types types including:65
(59) a. The quickly doing of it is the grace. (Ben Johnson, The Alchemist,
1610)
b. I began now seriously to reﬂect upon ... how justly I was overtaken by
the Judgment of Heaven for my wicked leaving my Father’s House,a n d
abandoning my Duty (Defoe, 1719)
c. The Gentleman who writ this Play...appears to have been mis-led by
an unwary following the inimitable Shakespeare (Steele, 1711)
Indeed, for a long period of history the gerund remained a hybrid form, whose
mixed verbal and nominal properties allowed for examples such as the above. In
Fanego’s view it was both language internal matters as well as normative pressure
that regularised the gerund and eliminated what was a very common form – the
Type VI.66
Regardless of the speciﬁc details as to whether some forms were replaced com-
pletely by a verbal gerund or both a nominal and verbal form survive today, what
is important is that in Fanego’s chronology, the extension of verbal properties be-
gins along a hierarchy of relative nominality. The ﬁrst to verbalise were those
without a determiner, the second the ancestor of the POSS-ing, and ﬁnally the
rise and fall of the Type VI. As Fanego writes, “the more noun-phrase-like a
sequence was, the slower it was to acquire verbal traits.” (p.38)
The spread of the Type V to non-oblique positions
Thus far in history, the ing nominal has developed verbal properties, mostly in an
oblique context. This is especially the case for the trajectory of the development
of the PRO-Ing gerund. However, it did gradually develop external nominal
syntax, that is it could appear in any position that a noun could, i.e. also in
subject and object position. The regular use of PRO-Ing gerunds in subject and
object position did not occur until the 19th century though a few examples are
seen as early as the 16th century.67
Fanego traces the beginning of the spread with a change in some three-place68
65This includes the Type VI, as well as adjectives used with bare direct objects gerunds and
other mixed forms.
66The instances of adjectives with otherwise verbal gerunds are far less frequent, and it is
unclear as to whether only language internal factors lead to their downfall or that these were
always marginal examples. As for the Type VI, the reader is directed to (Hindsill, 2001) for
lengthy quotes from prescriptive grammarians condemning such ‘illogical’ uses as seen in (58).
67One of Fanego’s samples of the 1500-1570 period found only 5% of of determinerless (verbal
or nominal) gerunds in non-prepositional position. This contrasts with gerunds containing
possessives or determiners that have a 30% non-prepositional use.
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negative implicative verbs, all have a basic meaning of prevent or refrain. One of
the earliest examples (with a nominal, determinerless gerund) comes from Wyclif
(c.1400).69
(60) lette men fro doing of iuil.
prevent men from doing evil.
She then speculates that two place verbs, often with the same sort of meaning, ex-
panded from taking on a purposive to inﬁnitive to also taking a gerund. Compare
the following, separated by two centuries.
(61) a. Ye wol forbere now to do vengeance. (Chaucer, 1386)
b. They come so to purpose, that hee can not refraine telling them.( T .
Hoby, 1561)
The type of gerund use seen in (61-b) then spread to similar verbs, such as avoid,
decline and shun, and eventually to broader classes of verbs, eventually replacing
partly or completely the use of the to inﬁnitive in emotive verbs, remember type
verbs and verbs of intention.
The use of the PRO-Ing gerund as a subject came last, an early example being
the following
(62) a profane idolatry of kings,...as if being born of a certain race could entitle
any family to a right of violating with impunity all laws, both human and
divine. (Walpole, 1778)
Fanego argues that the reason for such a slow spread had to with subjects being a
special type of core complement.70 In this view, there is a grammatical relations
hierarchy, following along the lines of oblique, internal core complements (objects)
and, ﬁnally external core complements (subjects), and that the spread of the
PRO-Ing gerund followed the direction of this hierarchy, following (Timberlake,
1977)’s views on the directionality of actualisation.
Development of the ACC-ing gerund
The ACC-ing gerund is considered as a separate case of reanalysis, this time of a
participial origin. Fanego notes that gerunds with accusative case never appeared
in either pure nominal form or hybrid from.71 For this reason, she views them as
being unambiguously clauses. This then gives the suggestion that the ACC-Ing
type did not result from the nominal gerund slowly taking on verbal properties,
but a series of abrupt reanalyses of certain types of participial constructions.
preposition is considered a place.
69Cited by (Visser, 1963-1973).
70See (Valin & La Polla, 1997) for an in depth description of core and peripheral complements.
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However, the main culprit for the development of the ACC-Ing gerund is taken
to be a certain type of participle, which precedes its main clause and controls the
subject of the main clause.72
(63) a. And so Vaughan’s Testimonie being credited, ∅ may be the material
Cause of my Condemnation... (Throckmorton, 1554)
b. At last they found that which they expected, which was Sea-cole, they
following the veine of the Mine, ∅ did dig forward still. (Taylor, Pennyles
Pilgrimage, 1630)
It is a reanalysis of these sorts of constructions, which are preverbal, that explains
the appearance of over 50% of the early ACC-Ing gerunds to appear in subject
position, at a time when the other types of gerunds were still appearing mostly
as objects of prepositions and to a lesser extent as objects. Note that the deleted
subject in the main clause is only the subject of the participle. In contrast, the
reanalysis is that the entire ing clause is the subject of the main clause. Moreover,
these early examples of ACC-Ing as subject also display a factive reading of the
gerund, which was far rarer among the early examples of PRO-ing in oblique
position. Here is an early-ish example:
(64) It not being the Time of the Day in which Company usually walk,m a d e
the Place they were in extremely retir’d, and they had the good Fortune
of meeting no Interruption. (Haywood, The Fatal Secret, 1725).
The subject of made the Place is not the expletive it, but that the time of day
of walking is diﬀerent.73 Interestingly, what is not lacking is semantic closeness.
The participle in sentence (63-b) clearly has an actional reading that moves the
scene along the vein of the mine, while the examples given for the early ACC-Ing
examples are clear factive. No explanation is given for this, and while Fanego
does note that the factive reading (for gerunds) did emerge much later than the
actional reading that it began with, she never explains how this meaning extension
came about.
Unanswered questions
Keeping to the subject of participles, we will end the history section by looking
at a phenomenon that is mentioned by neither Houston or Fanego. The contem-
porarily odd construction had a brief ﬂowering in the 16th and 17th century.74
72The use of the emptyset by Fanego in the following examples is to indicate that the subject
of the clause is identical to the subject of the participle that precedes it.
73I ﬁnd the subject in (63-a) to be a bit ambiguous. Is it that the testimony was credited
or the testimony itself that is clause for condemnation. Sentence (63-b) is much more clearly a
participle.
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(65) a. The rosis yong, new spreding of their knopsis. (Dunbar, 1520)
b. Each one...Chas’d us away, till, raising of more aid, We came again to
bind them. (Shakespeare, 1590)
c. Wenches sitt in the shade...singing of ballads. (1648, Letters of Dor.
O s b o r n et oW .T e m p l e )
Visser notes that while instances appear as far back as the 14th century, it is not
frequent until the 16th century and then falling into disuse by the 18th century.
His suspicion is “that in the course of time the semantic diﬀerence between the
purely verbal and mixed verbal + nominal forms in ing was so vaguely realised
that the use of of after what was originally a participle...was no longer felt to
be solecistic.” (p.1204) As this time period coincides with the greatest amount
of changes in the gerund,75 Visser seems to be getting at this being an example
of Croft’s Intraference. At the time the semantic diﬀerence between appositive
participles, the progressive76 and the gerund were all rather close in that they
all denoted actions, rather than something factive. While, Fanego is absolutely
correct in her demands on Houston to have a syntactic (along with a discourse
functional) mechanism for change,77 it may nevertheless be the case that the
various ing forms did have a sort of conspiratorial inﬂuence on each other. I ﬁnd
it rather hard to believe that the brief ﬂowering of the examples in (65) are a
mere coincidence, but may be a sort of blow-back phenomenon.
Indeed, it has been questioned as to how categorically the diﬀerent ing forms
can be diﬀered in contemporary grammar,78 and shall be explored in the next
section. Concomitantly, the more gradient rather than categorial division is sup-
ported in that the supposed clear-cut division between verbal and nominal gerund
still does not exist in ordinary speech, as hybrid forms still abound.
75Including very bizarre hybrid forms.
76A now obsolete form of the progressive, but common at the time.
(i) in the meane time I am building of A house toe put my head in. (Calvert Papers, 1638)
77Interestingly, Houston, notes the similarity of discourse function between the use of appos-
itive participles and the early oblique verbal(and nominal) gerund. It is closer than that. For
example, the earliest verbal gerund example (was bisi...in casting kirc wirkes.) has a quasi-
progressive reading, where the gerund certainly denotes an action. As factive readings did not
arrive for some time, the semantic closeness between appositive participles and early verbal
gerunds is much closer than she intimates.
78That is to say it ultimately may be hard to make a categorial distinction between verbal
and nominal gerunds and participles. Deverbal nouns that denote a physical object such as
clothing or building are a diﬀerent matter altogether.262 Chapter 6. Nominalization
6.2.5 PDE and the Gradience that dares not speak its
name
In both the account of gerunds in PDE (Section 1) and the history of its develop-
ment (most of section 2), we have seen a strict grammatical distinction between
(present) participles and gerunds, both of which belong to the verbal category. In
contrast, the Ing-of nominals are considered to belong to the nominal category.
It is only when examining Fanego, that an idea emerges of a gradient relation
between the two categories, and while she uses this notion in order to account
for the change in the gerund historically, it is seems to be the case that the split
verb and noun in the gerund is not complete.
In both (Quirk, Greenbaum, & Svarvik, 1985) and (Huddleston, 2002b), there
are intimations of this. While (Huddleston, 2002b) certainly makes a distinc-
tion between the Ing-of gerund and what we have been calling a verbal gerund,
the distinction ends there. Instead, in a section aptly called ‘The distinction
between gerund and present participle can’t be sustained’ (p.82), non-deverbal
ing forms are given a tripartite distinction between gerundial noun (ing-of), the
gerund-participle form of verb (including the verbal gerund, present participle and
its use in the progressive), and the participial adjective (an entertaining show).
While granting that historically the present participle and gerund have diﬀerent
sources,79 in PDE the forms are identical as far as internal syntax goes. That is
when looking at modiﬁcation by adverbs, the taking of determiners,80 and plural
inﬂection.81
(Quirk et al., 1985) goes a step farther. While they concur that there is
no useful reason to distinguish between a gerund and a participle, they also
describe a rather ‘complex gradience’ (p.1290-1292) from deverbal nouns to par-
ticiples/gerunds with Ing-of.82 Sadly, they do not go into too much detail other
than a comprehensive analysis of some fourteen examples on this cline. However,
the inference seems to be both in (sometimes) syntactic ambiguity, syntactic
gerundial oddities, as well as a few novel (noun-like) interpretations of verbal
79Especially if we follow Fanego and view the primary source of the verbal gerund as changes
emerging from the nominal gerund.
80But some doubts will follow soon in this matter.
81Only gerundial nouns can take plural inﬂection.
(i) a. The killings of the birds must stop.
b. *Killings the birds must stop.
c. *Killings the birds, he stalked the meadow ferociously.
d. *The nasty hunter is killings the birds.
This syntactic distinction between gerundial nouns and participles is the only one I have never
seen exception to, either historically or in PDE.
82(Quirk et al., 1985) use the more apt term verbal noun, as the of -marked object is optional.
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gerunds83 suggesting that the verbal/nominal distinction is far from categorical.
Indeed, taking a closer look at people’s everyday speech shows that the ‘verbal
gerund’ is not quite so restrictive when it comes to taking determiners. Moreover,
while (Pullum, 1991) dismissed some of the more modern examples as deliberate
archaisms,84 the use of the with verbal forms remains alive and well.
First oﬀ, impressionistically, at least, it may be the case that cognitive verbs
are most felicitous (when negated) in a hybrid form. Recall that modiﬁcation by
not rather than non or no is a hallmark of the verbal ing form. Nevertheless,
they have little trouble in also being modiﬁed by the.
(66) a. The worst is the not knowing. I think everybody holds out hope that
their child will come back alive.85
b. No one knows for sure and it is the not knowing that has the Gonzalez
family troubled.86
c. Congratulations! I know exactly how you feel: the shaking, the not
believing you’re actually there, the continental breakfast.87
d. But there are two ways in which I could sin here, ﬁrstly the not believ-
i n gi tp o s s i b l eat all under any circumstances, and secondly continuing
to think ...88
With both know and believe,89 people will often more explicitly say, The not-
believing bit (or part, or thing).90 Indeed this is the strategy which (Pullum,
1991) tries to explain away some of (Schachter, 1976)’s PDE examples. The
examples are Any talking loudly on your point will be punished and This burning
the midnight oil has got to stop. He says that they do need a special mention in
the grammar of English, but only goes so far as to suggest that they should be
compared to the ‘hyphenated-compound-adjective’ construction seen in phrases
like the easy-to-please image he has adopted. This is a sort of the use of the
Ing for as modiﬁcation of a noun, which Pullum says are verb phrases used as if
they were nouns denoting an activity. However, while he claims that Schacter’s
example represent non-productive constructions, those with knowing and believing
are quite common.91 Furthermore, the use of the with a verbal gerund/participle
83Which we shall look at in the next section.
84Examples from Dickens and Somerset Maugham.
85Taken from http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0202/27/ltm.13.html, a reporter
being interviewed about a kidnapping in San Diego.
86http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/10/16/a street of lost dreams new hopes,
article in the Boston Globe.
87A commenter on a blog re: the nervousness of being in Seattle for an interview with
microsoft. http://tejas.wordpress.com/2005/11/30/microsoft-interview
88www.anglicanrenewalministries-wales.org.uk/main/magazine/issue32/MNewsom.htm
89And much more generally.
90In the examples above, it is the case that some the hybrid nominals are a sort of list of
activities that are parts of something else. These speciﬁc activities are the parts.
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is not restricted to these cognitive verbs, but is used much more widely. This
even is the case with tense-modiﬁed gerunds and being.
(67) a. Even the little original bits like Honey’s fake illness and pregnancy
aren’t enough to cover the fact that he’s done all this before, the romance,
the trying to impress the father in law, the being generally aimless.92
b .B u ti ti s n ’ tthe being nervous that causes the problems, but the wor-
rying about what being nervous might lead to.93
c. The being nervous about it before hand, and taking those laxatives was
by far the worst part.
d. I’m done with the feeling sorry for myself, with the pity parties, with
the being sad all the time.
e. In its defense, the having been recorded live (and not very well) to
begin with, we probably couldn’t have hoped for more.94
f. I’m working on the twirling, and the catching it in the air.D o y o u
guys know SteveO, he’s the master of broomtricks!95
In all of these examples, it is certainly the case the hybrid nominal is some sort of
activity, but these are not special or unique constructions that can be explained
separately from gerund/participles in general, but rather need to be taken into
account for any adequate syntactic description.96 However, the notion of a verbal
nominal being construed as an activity is not a special case of coercion, but rather
the a standard interpretation of verbal nominals. Indeed, the ‘act/fact’ distinc-
tion discussed in (Abney, 1987) has to be modiﬁed. We shall see in the next
section that the interpretation of verbal nominals is far more ﬂexible than typi-
cally thought to be. But ﬁrst, a ﬁnal look at a PDE oddity involving modiﬁcation
by no.
6.2.6 A non-archaism
Another typical example in the literature of past-historical oddities is the follow-
ing that has a verbal gerund with a determiner.
(68) There is no enjoying life without thee. (Ben Johnson).
do also exist, but to my ears sound much worse.
92Someone on an Eastenders message board complaining about character development.
93The following examples found on various message boards and blogs.
94Interview with one of the people who worked on a live Monty Python DVD.
95A janitor in Los Angeles talking about what he does when he’s bored.
http://www.xanga.com/BohoRoohaha
96These are the times when I am quite glad not to be a syntactician. My experience is that
if once one is aware of the supposed syntactic ‘facts’ of verbal nominalisation, these sorts of
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(Pullum, 1991), when going through a list of oddities classiﬁes this along with
my wicked leaving my father’s house and constant handling the rod and gun as a
vestige of history.97 (Denison, 1983) refers to a variant,98 and groups it among
‘rare’ examples. (Abney, 1987), however, does acknowledge its use, but dismisses
it from his analysis as it is an idiomatic construction. This seems no good reason
for such as dismissal, especially as it is incredibly productive and common. To my
knowledge, it is only (Quirk et al., 1985) who note the ubiquity of it. Furthermore,
the determiner may also be any. Here are their examples.
(69) a. There’s no mistaking that voice.
b. There was no lighting ﬁreworks that day.
c. There isn’t any telling what they will do.
d. There must be no standing beyond the yellow line.
They do not mention it, but aspectual verbs also work rather nicely
(70) a. Once he gets a haircut, there’ll be no keeping the girls away.
b. There’s no stopping us.99
This construction often has a modal interpretation. For example, sentence (69-b)
could be said if there was a deontic proscription on lighting ﬁreworks,100 or that
excessive wetness made it impossible to light ﬁreworks – dynamic modality.101
The deontic versions needn’t even be in an existential there-construction, but
a simple imperative:
(71) No hitting your sister in MY house, young man!
When we examine the more ‘ﬂexible’ readings of verbal nominals, we shall see that
the modal readings are not the result of participating in the negative existential
construction, or an imperative, but are actually a quite common reading.
97Though he only says that these last two are ‘shockingly ungrammatical’.
98There’s no making you serious a moment(Sheridan, 1777).
99Common expression, and also the title of a Supremes song.
100To a Dutch audience, this may be hard to imagine. But coming from California, I can
testify that it is the case there that the ﬁre danger makes certain there generally is no lighting
ﬁreworks.
101(Quirk et al., 1985) notes that generally the Ing-of nominal is best to express cases of no
modality, such as There was no shooting of prisoners, which can have the interpretation that
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6.3 A second look: The semantics and mappings
of verbal Ing forms
This penultimate section of the chapter looks at the interpretation of verbal
gerunds.102 For example, the some rather unexpected readings of verbal gerunds
are to be shown – where ‘manner’ readings do exist, as well as the readings with
predication of time. More broadly, it shall be shown that the ‘act/fact’ distinc-
tion does not exist at all. Rather, verbal gerunds have a an incredibly wide range
of interpretations. Some of this ﬂexibility, is already attested, as can be seen
in what immediately follows. However, empirical evidence will demonstrate that
even these broader viewpoints do not go far enough. After these are discussed,
the sections leading into the formalisation, do contain some speculation as to the
basic denotation common to all of them, and what could account for some of the
rather surprising examples.
6.3.1 A revised typology
In a recent book, (Heyvaert, 2003) has a typology of what she calls ‘nominal
strategies adopted by gerundive nominalisations’. There is a cognitive grammar
theory behind how the nominals are derived, that at most a passing mention shall
be made. However, the resulting typology is quite useful, as with (Quirk et al.,
1985) and others, she makes the distinction between action gerundives and factive
gerundives. To summarise:103
• Generic reference, proper name strategy:104 Eating vegetables is healthy
This has an action reference, but is generic or habitual. This is the classic,
third type of ing nominal.
• Individual situation, but proper name strategy. There is both an action
type and a factive type:
(72) a. Adjourning at 4:00 was impossible.
b. I resent being tagged a problem boy.
• Individual situation, deﬁnite, speciﬁc common noun strategy. Both action
and factive:
102At this point, it should be clear that the verbal gerund is a use of a more general verbal
ing-form, for example, called the gerund-participle in (Huddleston, 2002b).
103A summary of her typology can be found in (Heyvaert, 2003, p.240).
104The notion of a ‘proper name’ and ‘common noun’ strategy originally comes from
(Schachter, 1976). Simply put, determinerless nominals are said to function analogously to
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(73) a. his job involves my answering the phone on his behalf.
b. the country’s making a statement is a lot bigger than partisan
politics.
• Individual situation, deﬁnite or indeﬁnite, speciﬁc. Common noun strategy.
Only action reading here.
(74) a. This burning the midnight oil of yours has got to stop.
b. Some reporting from you would be welcome.
The proper name vs. common noun distinction has to do with whether the
gerund is subjectless or not. Deﬁnite or indeﬁnite has to do with what sort of
determiners can be used and the interactions with these that are found with
ordinary common nouns depending on whether it is generic or not, count or
not. Speciﬁc can be contrasted with generic, but still may be habitual. The
major diﬀerence between speciﬁc and generic has to do whether it is a speciﬁc
participant involved, rather than a generic use that applies to any participant
who could be involved in the activity. While sentence (74-a) is speciﬁc in this
sense, as it refers to a repeated activity that must stop, it is also habitual.
But perhaps what is most interesting here is that some of the speciﬁc, action
nominals can (with a bit of rewording) be paraphrased as that-clauses.105
(75) a. That we should adjourn at 4:00 was impossible.
b. His job involves that I answer the phones...
c. That you keep burning the midnight oil has got to stop.
None of the above can be paraphrased by ‘the fact that’, and cannot easily be
interpreted as facts, but rather events or habitual activities that have occurred,
will occur (or are occurring), or activities that are part of a larger activity. In
contrast, the examples that Heyvaert labels as factive can be replaced with either
a that-clause or fact that-clause, such as
(76) a. I resent the fact that I am called a problem boy.
b. I resent that I am called a problem boy.
c. The fact that the country has made a statement is a lot bigger than
partisan politics.
d. That the country has made a statement is a lot bigger than partisan
politics.
Thus far, it appears that gerunds can usually be paraphrased as a that-clause,
but only sometimes by ‘the fact that’. That is, both a gerund and that-clause
105The following examples also come from (Heyvaert, 2003). But, alas, many of her interesting
ideas regarding factivity cannot be included here. The reader is encouraged to see Chapters 8
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can refer to an action/event or the proposition that it happened. It is only in the
last instance that a ‘fact that’ paraphrase is allowed. But, when there is a factive
reading in an oblique position something else happens.
(77) a. We are pleased by the fact that you work so hard.
b. *We are pleased by that you work so hard.
c. We are pleased by your working so hard.
The last example shows that a garden-variety that-clause is not always factive.
They often have such exclusively activity interpretations. Heyvaert calls the dif-
ferent readings nominalising strategies. In fact, there are a variety of other inter-
pretations of ‘verbal gerunds’, including some that are very close to the ‘eventive’
readings, usually considered the province of nominal gerunds only. These shall be
explored in the following sections. The following will show that gerunds have not
only an action interpretation, but the action can be predicated of in certain ways
not noted by the above typology – for example, an internal perspective on the
action. Furthermore, there exist as well ‘event’ readings that should theoretically
only be possible with nominal gerunds. Some of these are taken from (Quirk et
al., 1985), while others are, to my knowledge, previously not mentioned in the
literature. Importantly, few of the examples are idiosyncratic and exceptional,
but rather perfectly normal uses in modern English.
6.3.2 Manner, reason and beyond: Toward a uniﬁed in-
terpretation of verbal gerunds
While Section 1.2 gives the standard view that manner readings are the exclusive
province of nominal gerunds, it is not always so restricted, as should be clear
from the following examples. The ﬁrst is from (Quirk et al., 1985, p.1291), and
the second was overheard on BBC, Radio 4.
(78) a. I dislike Brown’s painting his daughter.
b. Michael Vaughn’s ingenuity and his moving the ﬁelders around was
light years ahead. (of Australian cricket captain Ricky Ponting)
For sentence (78-a), Quirk, et. al. claim that there are two readings for the
sentence. The ﬁrst is that the subject dislikes the fact that Brown paints his
daughter. This much is uncontroversial. However, they give a second reading,
which sounds suspiciously like a manner reading – ‘I dislike...the way he does
it.’ (emphasis mine). (78-b) was overheard on Test Match Special, the BBC
cricket program, and was said by ex-batsman, now summariser, Geoﬀrey Boy-
cott, retrospectively comparing the captains of England and Australia in terms
of performance during the last (2005) Ashes tests. The comparison is not that
Vaughan moved his ﬁelders around and Ponting didn’t. It is rather that the way
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While it should be clear that verbal gerunds can have a process or action
reading,106 temporal duration can also be predicated of them.107
(79) Your driving a car to New York took longer than I expected.
More generally, (Quirk et al., 1985) hold that verbal gerunds can have an action or
process meaning (as well as a factive reading). If this is the case, there is certainly
nothing odd about then predicating temporal duration of them, as processes and
actions take time.
The existence of ‘reason’ nominals in English
To my knowledge, the ﬁnal reading has never been cited for English, but is not
unique in the pantheon of the world’s languages. Reason nominals do exist (Com-
rie & Thompson, 1985, p. 357), and, given the proper matrix verb also exist for
English.
(80) a. I understand Mary(’s) leaving town suddenly.
b. I understand that Mary left town suddenly.
Sentence (80-b) is not a paraphrase of (80-a). Rather the ﬁrst sentence has as a
paraphrase
(81) I understand why Mary left town suddenly.
While I have yet to see a semantics for why questions, and have no deep explana-
tion for this phenomenon, it seems clear that some sort of modality is involved.
We have also seen with the There’s no construction’ in section 2.6 that there are
modal interpretations for verbal gerunds. Notice that with one or more modals,
the ‘reason why’ reading can be gotten from a that-clause complement. Take the
following sentences involving someone musing on being left out of a will.
(82) a. I understand [no complementiser] he would leave me out of his will
(but why leave you out?).
b. I can understand that he would leave me out of his will.
c. I understand why he left me...
d. I understand his leaving me out...
e. I can understand that he left me...
f. I understand that he left me out of his will. (factive)108
106Rather than merely a that-clause, or a ‘fact’ that reading.
107From (Quirk et al., 1985) (p. 1064).
108Only the last has only a factive reading, but perhaps with a lot of intonation on ‘ME’, the
‘reason why’ reading can be obtained.270 Chapter 6. Nominalization
Processes in Inaction
(Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, p. 222) correctly notes that “facts, results, proposi-
tions cannot be interrupted, but events or actions can”, and goes on to formalise
the notion of interruption for nominal gerunds (i.e. perfect nominals) only. While
we certainly agree with the quote, the above discussion should convince one that
verbal gerunds, when given a process interpretation, should also be able to be
interrupted. This is indeed the case.
(83) a. The bum, while dressed nicely, with a clear impression, interrupted
my taking pictures and asked if I had a buck to spare for his bus fare.
b. Yellow Cake interrupted my watching 24 to talk to me.It o l dh e rt o
call back after 24.109
Certainly, when verbal gerunds denote results they are able to be prevented, but
it is also the case that activity denoting verbal gerunds can be prevented,110 as
the following examples demonstrate.
(84) a. He claimed at the time that the injury prevented his driving a patrol
car, using his gun or even working behind a desk.
b. Beginning in 1947 Hayward suﬀered from a paralysis of his hands
that precluded his playing the piano, but by 1950, he was able to play
again.111
Steps toward a broader viewpoint
With these ‘exceptional’ readings in mind it is time for a wider look at the in-
terpretation of verbal Ing forms, which shall be the subject of the remaining few
sections. Moreover, if one accepts the categorisation of (Huddleston, 2002b) and
(Quirk et al., 1985) in regard to complements of verbs of perception and recol-
lection,112 which are exclusively ‘eventive’, the need for a broader interpretation
becomes clear.
The following are yet more examples, all of which are perfectly ﬁne for my ears
that have non-factive readings, all POSS-ing. Some of them are quite astonishing,
but in context are perfectly felicitous. Also, while the following examples have
109Example (a) from voluntaryconfinement.blogspot.com/2005 11 01 voluntaryconfinement archive.html.
Example (b) from www.thebachelorblog.com/lexview.aspx?dart = 2473.
110And allowed to resume after the prevention no longer is the case.
111Example (a) from www.officer.com/article/article.jsp?siteSection =5 & id = 27451. Ex-
ample (b) from nfo.net/calendar/dec04.htm.
112E.g. I remember travelling to New York is the memory of the event, not merely a memory
that it happened. For a comprehensive look at verbs of recollection, as well as both linguistic
and philosophical implications, see (Higginbotham, 2003). Higginbotham considers the com-
plements to verbs of recollection to be gerunds. In Chapter 4 it was shown that complements
of perceptions are not gerunds, but ‘aspectual phrases’. However, I think in the terms of
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actional or sometimes even manner readings, most of them are not paraphrasable
as a that-clause either.
(85) a. You worked out a nice way of telling the story – which was you not
looking at the camera.
b. Still hard to say with my numbers since I’ve not fully broken in the car,
have yet to have an oil change, and my driving the car is pretty random.
c. He told us that the bird feeder got smashed in the process of his
painting the house this past summer.
d. His building the ark, which took him so long a time, and in which he
employed so many hands, was a standing warning to them.113
e. He wondered suddenly if his building the sewing cabinet had been
inspired by guilt.
f. Michio Kaku’s ability and passion for physics resulted in his building
an atom smasher in his parents’ garage when he was 17.
g. Peter Vanderwal documents his building an electric bike.
h. Even if he’s discussing his building an invention, his explanations are
as engaging as they are educational.
None of the above are factive, and some seem coerced into a manner reading
(e.g. (a) and (b)). (85-d) has a POSS-ing with a temporal restriction (but stated
in a roundabout way). What becomes evident here is that there can be coercion
when a gerund is embedded.
(86) a. had decided to boycott me for the mere fact of having written a book
on Franco that was not a denunciation.114
b. The act/process/way of his painting the house.
The ﬁrst is, indeed, factive, but is an event that has been turned into something
factive, while the second is an act or process.
As far as ‘facts’ are concerned, generally they are neither causative or caused.
Facts can signify or mean something, be surprising or annoying, but as can be
seen in (86-e) and (f), it wasn’t facts that were inspired or caused, but the event
itself. There is a subtle distinction, however. One could say that the fact that
Michio Kaku built an atom smasher at 17 indicates that he was passionate about
physics at a very young age.
As the above examples show, verbal gerunds can often be causative – which
would restrict the meaning to events, actions, or emotional states, but certainly
not facts. They also show that the default denotation of the verbal gerund is not
113This comes from a strange Christian website. The quote sounds archaic, but is just a bad
attempt at a certain type of style.
114This is from (Heyvaert, 2003)’s corpus. I would say it is not the fact that caused the boycott,
but rather the knowledge (and the concomitant political beliefs) that caused the boycott. The
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a fact or proposition, or even that something happened, but perhaps something
closer to the activity or event itself.
Indeed, the speciﬁc interpretation of the gerund is quite ﬂexible, and can
be inﬂuenced by the discourse context or the linguistic context surrounding it.
Taking Pullum’s notion of modiﬁcation of a noun seriously, it is clear that Ing
forms have diﬀerent readings when they are a prepositional object of a noun,
taking on the noun’s meaning. Restated now more generally, the following are
only a few ways this can be done.
(87) a. the fact of Ving OBJ.
b. the act/process of Ving OBJ
c. the way of Ving OBJ is to Ving OBJ
d. the goal of Ving OBJ
As Pullum’s recourse is to the adjectival modiﬁcation version of the above115
in order to account for certain hybrid nominals (Section 2.6), a return to history
may show some justiﬁcation.
(88) The having been concerned in these practices abstractedly, was a cir-
cumstance which, according to his opinion... (Sir Walter Scott, Guy
Mannering)
The hybrid nominal in (88) is actually a description of a circumstance. In many
of the examples in (85), this is contextual from other parts of the discourse, and if
it is not explicit, it can certainly be inferred. But, this is no diﬀerent for ordinary
nouns. The following is from someone commenting on their bi-polar disorder.
(89) a. The depression part of it kept getting worse, particularly in the winter
and spring.
Had they not used the word part, the reader would still infer that the depression
is that part or aspect of the disorder that would worsen, depending on the season.
This could just as easily have been written as the being depressed part of it.B u t
facts are just as easily described in the same way. Staying in a historical mood,
the following is a 1662 entry from Pepys’ diary.
(90) a. read the phrase about Mr C as that Sam thought Mr C *had* seen
him and this fact (the having been seen) troubled him.
The last sections show that having a ﬂexible interpretation of verbal gerunds is
certainly necessarily, given the extant data. Next, we will see formalisation of
some of the more ‘heretical’ readings. What is important to realise is that there
needs to be no additional ontology. The interpretations acknowledged, facts,
events, actions already exist in our formal ontology. What needs to be done is to
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show how they can be constructed out of the basics.
Finally, it should be noted that this is not to say that there is no diﬀerence
(in denotation or interpretation) between a verbal and nominal gerund. While we
have seen both manner readings and temporal modiﬁcation of verbal gerunds, a
few things are not possible for verbal gerunds. These are plural inﬂection and such
temporal predication as happened at noon.116 I have no conclusive explanation
for why this so, but it could be that nominal gerunds denote ‘events’ in the
more ordinary language use of the word.117 They are things that happen at
speciﬁc times, and can happen repeatedly. They are also things that one speaks
of conventionally as a generic event, i.e. I hate going to a wedding/christening,
etc. For this reason, it could also be why it is normally only nominal gerunds
can take such determiners as every or deﬁnite numbers such as There were three
shootings last night.118
However, there is one rather exceptional construction with passive gerunds
that deﬁes any strict division between the interpretation of verbal gerunds as
processes and of nominal gerunds as events. Superﬁcially, at least, it appears
that even verbal gerunds can have event readings. This is the subject of the
following section.
What’s happening here?
While the above section revises much of the standard interpretation of verbal
gerunds given in section 1.2, a major restriction has remained. Perhaps connected
with the inability of verbal gerunds to be pluralised, they also cannot be said to
occur or happen in a speciﬁc time and space. Despite the existence of manner and
action/activity readings for verbal gerunds to be fairly common, there remains
the restriction on such predications as
(91) a. *Killing innocent civilians occurred/happened yesterday.
b. *Innocent civilians being killed occurred/happened yesterday.
c. The/A/Yet another killing of innocent civilians occurred/happened
yesterday.
116But see section 3.1.1 for an interesting exception.
117A common English language expression is That’s a process, not an event.
118However, a lot of is possible with verbal gerunds. This is an example of someone talking
about continually watching a tape, in order to be believe that the university basketball team
played so well. (www.cantonrep.com/index.php?Category=26&Reporter=Todd)
(i) There was a lot of hitting stop, rewind, pause. I wanted to make sure I was seeing what
I was seeing...
In ordinary language terms, this seems to quantify activities that are part of a greater event,
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However, it is not only possible, but fairly common to use a passive verbal
gerund119 with happens, but in a generic or habitual context.
(92) a. Civilians being killed happens in war. It’s unfortunate, and no wants
to see it.
b. Being killed happens in an accident when a car veers oﬀ the road, being
killed happens when a tornado slams into your house in the middle of the
night. Murder is diﬀerent, murder happens when a person or persons
gleefully take the life of an innocent person.120
Both of these examples are perfectly ﬁne to my ears, and would be completely
perplexing if not for them being habitual or in the second case, deﬁnitional. Nev-
ertheless, the modiﬁcation of temporal frequency of these passive verbal gerunds
is also possible.
(93) a. Getting caught happens more regularly than you might think, too.
Professors read hundreds of papers, and they are attuned to the general
level of writing...121
b. Working on a submarine, getting caught happens constantly.122
But if the last two habitual readings are built up from a frequency of individual
events, it is rather curious that the individual events cannot be said to happen
using a passive verbal gerund. Presumably, solving this puzzle would take a
greater understanding of the interaction of nominalised events with generic and
habitual readings, and how the latter readings are constructed. The other matter
of interest is that while I have found numerous such examples with the passive,
I have found none using an active version. Given that the wide range of usage
of verbal gerunds is rather astonishing, it is unwise to rule the possibility out
completely, even though trying to formulate them sounds decidedly awful to my
ears. The least anomalous possibility would involve a forced use in a deﬁnitional
c o n t e x tl i k e( 9 2 - b ) ,s u c ha sac o n t e x tw h e r eo n ei ss t a t i n gr u l e so fag a m e .
Conclusion
This section has moved the denotational split between nominal and verbal gerunds
much farther beyond an event/result diﬀerentiation or Abney’s act/fact distinc-
tion. It is now clear that verbal gerunds have uses that have manner readings,
causal powers, processes that can be interrupted or prevented, and be temporally
119Of the type seen in (91-b).
120First example from http://forums.thesmartmarks.com/, second from
http://www.bittersweetme.net/blog/?p=1152.
121From www.easternecho.com/cgi-bin/story.cgi?4570, a newspaper story about the prevalence
of plagiarism.
122From http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/archive/index.php/t-1551.html, about the dif-
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predicated regarding the length of the process or activity. The one remaining
distinction is that nominal gerunds can denote events in a way that they can be
counted discretely and be speciﬁed as happening in certain time or place. Indeed,
Vendler’s terms of Perfect and Imperfect nominal are certainly prescient seen in
this light.
In the ﬁnal section of this chapter, some of the process and causal uses of verbal
gerunds are formalised in the event calculus. Felicitously, while (Lambalgen &
Hamm, 2005) does not recognise many of these possibilities, the denotation of
verbal gerunds as a type of ﬂuent (whose factive or result reading is further
derived) means that the basic formalisation can remain untouched. What is
needed then are ways of using the pre-existing nominalised ﬂuents to construct
scenarios that can account for phenomena demonstrated in this section, barring
the still baﬄing use of a passive gerund that can co-exist with natural language
happens predication.
6.4 Formalisation
Space does not permit a full explanation of the way nominalisation is formalised in
the event calculus. For this the reader is referred to (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005,
Chapter 12). But, we shall give a sketch in what follows. There are two basic
denotation types of nominals – perfect and imperfect, corresponding to nominal
and verbal gerunds, respectively. A perfect nominal is denoted by an event type
and an imperfect nominal denoted by a ﬂuent. Thus, only perfect nominals are
allowed to be arguments of the Happens predicate.123 As imperfect nominals are
ﬂuents, they are allowed as arguments of the HoldsAt predicate.
The basic process of making VP denoting predicates is the same as the reiﬁca-
tion of predicates to produce terms of the language noted in the Interlude.124 The
perfect nominal is derived by suppressing the temporal parameter by existential
quantiﬁcation before turning it into an object.125 For example, if the predicate
burn(x,y,t)m e a n st h a tx burns y at t, the perfect nominal John’s burning of the
house will be:
(94) ∃t.burn(x,y,t)[j,h]
which can then be an argument of the Happens predicate, i.e. Happens(∃t.burn(x,y,t)[j,h],s).
The imperfect nominal for John’s burning the house is obtained by reifying
the predicate as a ﬂuent in the following manner.
123But recall section 3.1 for a natural language exception.
124Where e and the various f ’s are also products of nominalisation.
125Concrete scenario information can also be taken into account. See (Lambalgen & Hamm,
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(95) burn(x,y,t)[j,h,ˆ t]126
Importantly this ﬂuent is not a proposition, but can be related to a proposition
via the HoldsAt predicate.
HoldsAt(burn(x,y,t)[j,h,ˆ t],s) ↔ burn(j,h,s)
That it isn’t a proposition is quite important as formalisation of the deviant
verbal gerunds does not need a change of ontology, merely constructions that use
scenario information in a proper way to get process and causal readings.127
Finally, (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 12) demonstrates in detail diﬀer-
ent constructions in which perfect nominals can be coerced into facts and results,
and the past perfect for imperfect nominals128 can be treated as facts or results.129
With that said, we can move on to discussing some of the examples described in
the previous sections.
6.4.1 Cause
Recall the previous examples
(96) a. Michio Kaku’s ability and passion for physics resulted in his building
an atom smasher in his parents garage when he was 17.130
b. He wondered if his building the sewing cabinet has been inspired by
guilt.
c. His building an atom smasher in his parents garage resulted in the
vapourisation of their neighbourhood.
The ﬁrst example describes an inner state that results in the building of an
atom smasher. But as seen in Chapter 2, certain types of states can be seen
as a gradual process. This is what is going on here. Imagine, that ability and
passion gradually build up until Michio Kaku has no choice but to engage in
dangerous experiments. This calls for a telic dynamics as one would ﬁnd in
an accomplishment. For example, passion could be an activity ﬂuent driving a
trajectory with the parameterised ﬂuent impulse(x) which when the culminating
126We shall henceforth write burn[j,h,ˆ t] to abbreviate such terms.
127We are not formalising the manner readings and the use of ‘happens’ with verbal gerunds.
My suspicion is that matters could be much more complex in these cases.
128Having won the race was gratifying.
129The intensional diﬀerences between the two types of nominals described in Section 1.2 are
also covered.
130This is a rather hard to believe example, especially as Michio Kaku is now a theoretical
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point is reached (impulse(x)), the imperfect nominal build[mk,a,ˆ t] is initiated,
i.e. Initiates(e,build[mk,a,ˆ t],s).131
The reverse causal direction seen in (96-c) implies that once the atom smasher
is completed, then a ﬂuent danger is started that eventually culminates in the
vapourisation of the neighbourhood. Again there is a dynamics, this time leading
to an event vapourise. The relation between the imperfect nominal and the ﬂuent
danger can be represented as
HoldsAt(build[mk,a,ˆ t],s) → Initiates(e,danger,s), where e is the ﬁnish event
taken from the scenario of build an atom smasher.
6.4.2 Processes and Temporal Duration
Observe the following examples
(97) a. Taking the train to Nijmegen took three hours because of the NS’
incompetence.
b. John’s driving the car to New York took longer than expected.
The temporal predication is a bit subtle. The time proﬁled is not just the time
proﬁled by the basic activity ﬂuent of the scenario, but rather the entire ‘event’.
Example (97-a) has happened to me on more than one occasion. The ‘three’ hours
mentioned is not merely time spent on the time, but encompassed to include the
time waiting in the Central Station for the delayed train, and being kicked out of
the train in Arnhem due to some problem or other and having to wait for another
train to reach the ﬁnal distance. Similarly, John’s driving the car took may have
taken longer than expected because of mechanical problems and having to get
the car ﬁxed, etc. For longs parts of the journey, no driving is going on at all, yet
it is still conceived broadly as part of the driving the car to New York.
The question then is how to derive a temporal proﬁle. The suggestion in
(Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 12) for obtaining the temporal proﬁle of
Deborah’s singing a Poultry’s tale is to use the parameterised ﬂuent p(y)a n d
deﬁne a ﬂuent increasing that captures the time-points when the parameterised
ﬂuent is increasing. As can be seen in the above discussion, using this technique
to deﬁne a ﬂuent based on increasing distance will not do. In the context given for
the above examples, distance covered remains unchanged for long periods of time,
and this is why the trips take such a long time. In fact, the only usable measure
is in fact, the time between beginning the journey and reaching the destination.
It is the time in between these points, whether one is moving or at the mechanics,
that proﬁles the journey.
131By using the imperfect nominal rather than an ordinary building ﬂuent that is part of the
scenario, the atom smasher is built, not just started.278 Chapter 6. Nominalization
Assume the scenario for John’s driving the car to New York includes two
punctual events – that of leave and arrive. For the process, we then create a
nominalised ﬂuent derived from (drive,j,c), i.e. drive[j,c,ˆ t]. From these132 we
can proﬁle the time. For this ﬂuents clockd and timed(x) are needed. Intuitively,
the clock begins once the journey is started and terminated when it ends. Once
the ﬂuent clockd starts ticking, it drives the ﬂuent timed(x) by a linear dynamics.
The following scenario then emerges:
132Using a variation of a scenario in (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, p. 92).6.4. Formalisation 279
1. Initially(timed(0))
2. Releases(leave,timed(0),s)
3. Initiates(leave,drive[j,c,ˆ t],s)
4. Initiates(leave,clockd,s)
5. HoldsAt(timed(x),s) → Trajectory(clockd,s,timed(x + d),d)
6. Terminates(arrive,drive[j,c,ˆ t],s)
7. Terminates(arrive,clockd,s)
Thus, the leaving and arrival events proﬁle the time of the journey, and this
information can be used to say that the time taken was, e.g. longer than expected.
6.4.3 Interruptions and Preventions
Recall the examples in (84), repeated here
(98) a. He claimed at the time that the injury prevented his driving a patrol
car, using his gun or even working behind a desk.
b. The bum, while dressed nicely, with a clear impression, interrupted
my taking pictures and asked if I had a buck to spare for his bus fare.
Sentence (98-a) can be interpreted to mean that once the injury happened,
the nominalised ﬂuent of his driving a patrol car cannot hold. If we let injury be
the event that represents the injury and drive[h,car,ˆ t] be the imperfect nominal
corresponding to the verbal gerund, (98-b) can be captured by the following in-
tegrity constraints:
?Happens(injury,R),R < now, succeeds,? HoldsAt(drive[h,car,ˆ t],s),s > R,
fails
Sentence (98-b) describes an event of a homeless person interrupting someone
in the middle of an activity – the imperfect nominal, my taking pictures.T h e
interruption event is quite simple to characterise, it is merely a terminating event
of a ﬂuent, in this case take[m,p,ˆ t]. The relevant addition to the scenario is
an event beg that denotes the asking for money, which stops the taking pictures
activity. It can then be resumed by a (re)initiating event, which continues the
picture-taking from where it has left oﬀ.133 Thus, the following is added to an
existing, picture taking scenario:
133Although nothing is said about this possibility in the above example.280 Chapter 6. Nominalization
Terminates(beg,take[m,p,ˆ t],t)
which is the interrupting event. The dynamics of the scenario ensure that the pic-
ture taking continues where it was temporarily abandoned. For simplicity, and as
the sentence makes no explicit mention of a resumption, the integrity constraint
for sentence (98-b) is
?Happens(beg,R),R<now, succeeds,
meaning that after R any picture-taking has stopped. But it is possible that a
resume event can come at a point after R, allowing the activity to resume.
6.4.4 There’s no ...
In Section 2.6 we saw a peculiar construction with examples like:
(99) a. There’s no mistaking that voice.
b. There was no lighting ﬁreworks that day.
c. There isn’t any telling what they will do.
d. There must be no standing beyond the yellow line.
e. There’s no pleasing some people.
There are numerous senses to this construction, including diﬀerent types of modal
senses, most of this that are beyond the scope here. However, there is one mean-
ing that can be captured. A way of looking at example (99-e),134 is that no matter
what is done, some people are not pleased (by it). In terms of the Event Calculus,
it is simply that no matter what event happens, the imperfect nominal denoting
by the verbal gerund does not hold. Let pleasing be the imperfect nominal for
pleasing some people, essentially the state of ‘being pleased’. An integrity con-
straint is then added to the scenario that states:
?Happens(e,t), succeeds, Initiates(e,pleasing,t) fails
134Ignoring the generic part of it.Chapter 7
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7.1 Conclusion so far
Before closing with some concluding thoughts, a brief summary of what has come
before is necessary. Chapters 2 and 3 are foundational, and thus necessary for
understanding the following three chapters. The Interlude (along with the ap-
pendix) shows more precisely how this can be done. This includes a computa-
tional system that shows how, inferentially, the ﬂexible nature of aktionsart can
be treated properly, and also accounts for the complications of tense and aspect
comprehension discussed in the second half of Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 on perception verbs and their complements uses ideas discussed in
the earlier chapters to give a comprehensive semantic account of their workings.
After a discussion of perceptual reports’ logical properties, concluding that they
are a strong default, rather than a strict implication, the discussion moved on to
the syntactic and aspectual properties of the complement. Here, the discussion
in the earlier two chapters comes to the fore, as a good deal of empirical data is
brought out to show that many of the supposed syntactic constraints advocated
by (Felser, 1999) really lie in the realms of interpretation, such as the possibility
of stative verbs being used in the complement. Ironically, one of Felser’s major
contributions – the revival of the Progressive Hypothesis – had been rejected for
decades due to an over-reliance upon standard English to determine syntactic
structure. (Akmajian, 1977) discusses just such a possibility and then rejects it
on the grounds that corresponding sentences in the progressive are ungrammat-
ical. For example on p.446 he notes that while PVC’s with needing, weighing or
knowing are allowed as complements of imagine (and equivalents) or see in the
imagination sense, there are not allowed to appear in the progressive. Thus the
PVC Ing complement cannot be a true progressive:
(1) a. John is pretty hard to picture weighing 300 lbs.
b. I just can’t picture John knowing the answer.
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c. I just can’t see myself needing any more drugs.
d. *John is weighing 300 lbs.
e. *John is knowing the answer.
f. *I am needing more drugs.
Enough has been said about the status of sentences like (1-e), but it is also the
case both need and even weigh can be felicitous in the progressive. Since both
need and want are incredibly common in the progressive, I am quite mystiﬁed at
Akmajian’s assertion. Weigh is a rather special case, but is, for example, used by
boxers in training, a context where a small variation of weight can mean being
able to ﬁght or not.
(2) I am weighing 155, so I am going to have to weigh in with rocks in my
pockets, but I am going to do it.1
Next, empirical evidence is brought in to show the claim that the temporal si-
multaneity between the matrix perception and complement cannot be syntactic,
at least in the form of an aspectual phrase as it stands presently. Instead, a move
is made to a semantic treatment of tense, allowing varying temporal interpreta-
tions of complements of aspectual verbs and verbs of intention, with a suggestion
that the variation parallels the use of a ‘real’ present progressive and the futurate
version.
That done, the ﬁnal piece of the puzzle is to determine the aktionsarten as-
sociated with see and watch. While see has been noticed to be anomalous by
previous authors (e.g. the quote from (Huddleston, 2002b)), to my knowledge, it
has never been worked out in depth. Using the techniques exhibited in Chapter
2, this is successfully done, showing a wide variety of event types for see,a n d
exposing a rather unexpected interaction between a progressive watch and a sim-
ple aspect complementing, that while making sense semantically, is still slightly
baﬄing.
Finally, the logical properties and event-type, tense and aspect variants are
all brought together in the ﬁnal section of the chapter – the formalisation. There
it is shown how the Event Calculus can be extended to account for complements
giving rise to multiple event semantic structures. All of the varying aktionsarten
are developed in diﬀering constructions, with the predictions made as to the
temporal proﬁles and implications emerging as desired. Furthermore, both with
watch and certain event pairs such as steal/borrow, we have managed to account
for extensionally equivalent, but intensionally diﬀerent events, reinforcing the
point of (Zacks & Tversky, 2001) about the importance of intention to a deﬁnition
of event.
Chapter 5 is an exploration of causatives, with the culmination being an in-
1Interview with Oscar de la Hoya from http://www.ﬁghtnews.com/trillo56.htm. This use of
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tegration of various types of causative types into the Event Calculus. While the
semantics literature has certainly noted that lexical English causatives cannot be
reduced to one type of event structure (e.g. (Levin, 2000)), it is only by examining
literature in the typological ﬁeld that the full range of possibilities of causation
types and participant roles becomes clear. While English tends not to have the
same range of syntactic and morphological coding options as some languages, all
of the semantic types and variations are shown to exist, if only by integration in
context.
Continuing the investigation into English causatives, it was shown that both
the causative alternation is actually more ﬂexible than previously realised and
that construal plays a large role in showing that certain lexical causatives, resul-
tatives and ‘way’-constructions with certain verbs or participants can be perfectly
felicitous. Concomitantly, the brief look at the diachrony of a few typical causative
verbs shows how the notion of participant and causation type can widen over time
in a well-known pragmatic extension process, giving any synchronic, strict gram-
matical judgment (based on semantic grounds) a weak foundation.
Finally, the various causation types and participant roles were investigated in
their various tense and aspectual guises, working out a variety of diﬀerent tempo-
ral proﬁles and implicational paradigms that are associated with diﬀerent forms
of causation. Formally, diﬀerent scenario templates were developed, that success-
fully accounted for the above, giving a formal analogue to such notions as direct
and indirect causation along with the participant variants of manipulative and
directive causation. Moreover, this continues the work of the formal section of
Chapter 4 by extending the Event Calculus formalism to the coordination of mul-
tiple events, and the various temporal and telicity variations that exist. Showing
formally the full range of possibilities reinforces the notion that construal, more
than any other factor, plays a dominant role in acknowledging a loosening of re-
strictions restriction in a causative’s natural language expression. That is, many
example deemed ungrammatical in the literature were found to have numerous
naturally occurring examples. While they may not be acceptable to all speakers
of English, they certainly show that, in context, certain perspectives allow hereto-
fore ungrammatical utterances to be utterly felicitous. Why certain speakers (and
authors) do not realise the full realm of possibility is touched upon brieﬂy in the
next section.
Chapter 6 on English ing nominalisation returns to complexity of ing-forms,
ﬁrst touched upon in Chapter 4. However, the major contributions are mostly of
an empirical nature. After examining the ‘common knowledge’ of the syntactic
and semantic properties of nominalisation, the history and development of the
various constructions are examined. Taking the notion used by (Fanego, 2004)
seriously, of a non-categorial class membership to account for the development of
the gerund, it is then shown than even synchronically it is premature to promote a
strict diﬀerentiation between verbal and nominal structures. Indeed many of the
examples that confound any strict categorisation cannot be considered ‘one-oﬀs’284 Chapter 7. Endnote
or mistakes as often a general and common patterning is demonstrated.
In parallel, the interpretation of verbal gerunds (or ing-participles if that is
preferred) is seen to lie in the same murky territory. While it is established that
verbal gerunds should be interpreted ﬁrst as eventualities, rather a derivative
result or factive reading. This contrasts with an ordinary language notion of
event, that can be said to be the default interpretation of a nominal gerund.
Nevertheless, while verbal gerunds cannot be predicated to happen at a speciﬁc
place and time or treated as individuals via quantiﬁcation, many other readings
that previously thought impossible turn out to be rather common. Temporal
duration, manner and even generic/habitual happening can easily be predicated
of them.
As their default denotation is as a ﬂuent in the event calculus, the eventuality
interpretation has already been constructed. As an extension to the scenarios
found in (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, Chapter 12), many of the readings such as
temporal duration and interruption are integrated into the formal system. How-
ever, not all interpretations found (such as ‘happens’ with a passive gerund) are at
this point completely understood. Indeed, while there is a degree of speculation
on this construction as well as others such as the previously unattested existence
of reason nominals in English, it is clear that there is still much work to be done
on the matter.
7.2 Found in the stars
One of the major themes that runs throughout this thesis is that there needs
to be a perspectival reversal when it comes to distinctions of ungrammatical-
ity, especially when it is (lexical) semantics that is at issue. Too often, what is
captured is only the default reading, with deviant readings ruled out by the gram-
matical theory in question. Worse yet, a grammatical distinction can sometimes
be little more than that of a distinction in dialect. This is a point that doesn’t
only refer to the grammaticality status of sentences where a semantic shift is ig-
nored. Often, arguments concerned with morpho-syntax and word-formation to
support the poverty of the stimulus argument are grounded upon a shaky em-
piricism. (Pullum & Scholz, 2002) have numerous examples where a supposedly
ungrammatical construction that is meant to illuminate certain facts about our
innate knowledge of language is little more than conventional dialectical diﬀer-
ence.2 For example they examine a claim made on supposedly innate constraints
on noun-noun plurals. The proposed constraints do correctly describe the stan-
dard American dialect; however, the standard British dialect does the opposite for
some compounds (typical example: drug problem vs. drugs problem). However,
this is certainly not to say that there should be an ‘anything goes’ approach to
2This is not in any way to say that the reasons for these diﬀerences (be they syntactic or
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language.3 Nevertheless, the methodological point is that when one is trying to
make a point regarding a universal constraint based upon, say, one particular ac-
cident of a standard English dialect, one needs to make sure that the grammatical
constraint in question is indeed ‘universally’ or ‘innately’ ungrammatical.4
Despite the appearance of a wealth of ‘deviant’ actual examples that are nor-
mally ruled out for reasons of a semantic mismatch, I would also not want to
claim that anything goes in lexical meaning.5 Were this the case, not only would
there be no particular purpose in studying language, but communication itself
would be a rather random and hopeless task. Instead, the view advocated is
that there is a great deal of structure and systematicity in semantics, and these
anomalous examples only serve to support this notion. and are used to discover
where the structure is and how it works. In Chapter 3, while it was shown that
stereotypical scripts on events will often have a cultural side, world knowledge,
causal knowledge and conceptions of time do go a long way in restricting our
construals, and they way we build up structure for speciﬁc events.
As noted in Chapter 2, it is not the case that any eventuality type cannot
be coerced into another one. Perhaps the clearest example is to expand on some
thoughts of (Comrie, 1976a). While the verb cough can be used6 in an activity
construction, the interpretation will always be of a series of coughs, not a single
one. Yet in ‘objective reality’, a single cough takes time and has some structure
such as a beginning, middle and end. But on the human scale, we perceive such
an event as instantaneous, and it is hard to imagine situations where an activity
view of a single cough could be conventionalised as an activity or accomplishment.
Were our perceptual system to work something like a super slow motion camera,
conceptions could be very diﬀerent.7
That said, a great deal is still possible. The notion of intention and its impor-
tance has been given a great deal of prominence. Normally, it is animate agents
that have intention. But it is also the case that humans are also gifted at imbuing
intentions to anything. Stories and myths are a prime example of this, but it can
also emerge in ordinary language use.
To repeat an example from Chapter 6, it is common in the literature that
3This applies to event structure and perspectival shifts that make up the bulk of this thesis,
and syntax even more so. I have seen no syntactic theory of any theoretical persuasion that
does not involve a good deal of structure.
4Whatever this might mean.
5The same claim would be made for morpho-syntax as well. Despite my scepticism of some
of the supposed examples that are said to support one ﬂavour or another of syntactic theory, it
would be absurd to claim that there is no systematicity and structure in language use. Leaving
all cognitive issues aside, from a purely communicative perspective, an unsystematic language
could never be successful.
6In some languages.
7It could be the case that in a class on the respiratory system, such a construal could be
made, with the help of modern video technology. But it does seem inconceivable that it could
be a conventional part of language use.286 Chapter 7. Endnote
such sentences such as
(3) *The river froze itself (solid).
are ungrammatical. Certainly, looked at out of context, sentence (3) really makes
no sense. But an examination of the family of causative and resultative con-
structions in English show that (with a transitive) the subject is a causal agent
in the process.8 While rivers can normally be causal agents of ﬂooding, decay
or humidity, simple world knowledge tells us that they are normally victims of
freezing and not a cause of it. Nevertheless, examples were found from science
ﬁction stories9 where rivers can indeed freeze themselves. So then the methodol-
ogy is reversed from banning certain examples as ungrammatical to deﬁning the
meaning of the construction. Sentence (3) is then not ruled to be ungrammatical,
but predicted to have a certain meaning. The oddity (and common attribution
of ungrammaticality) then resolves to whether or not this meaning is conceivable.
Normally, due to the nature of the world, rivers and soda bottles do not have the
power to freeze themselves. But to repeat an example from the Chapter 5:
(4) a bottle of country club strawberry soda froze itself and exploded in my
fridge tonight in a violent act of protest.
But given the right context, a diﬀerent world physics in the river case, or the
attribution of agency in the soda bottle example (what is more intentional and
agentive than a act of protest?), the stars can be removed, and the constraints
are then interpretative rather than expressions of impossibility.
In the Preamble, we suggested that a goal of the semanticist should be to
predict what kind of meaning a construction should have, if it is felicitous, rather
than being too inﬂexible and predict them impossible. The formalisations pre-
sented in various sections are examples of this. By taking coercion seriously in
a formal way and allowing shifts between aktionsarten and changes brought in
by context, we show how these apparent semantic oddities can be accounted for
in a systematic way. The new event-type and aspectual proﬁle will then have a
predictable meaning.10 Of course, the mere possibility of an instance of coercion
(formally) is not enough to guarantee that a speaker will ﬁnd its natural language
instance felicitous. This is discussed in the following sections.
7.2.1 Construal and perspective
Given that it is now clear that there is certainly more ﬂexibility in usage than is
often admitted to, the question then arises as to how this comes about. In the
8In a transitive construction.
9Where we can suspend our disbelief regarding ordinary causality.
10There is also the computational machinery meant to account for tense and aspect interpre-
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cases that are the domain of this thesis, the answer is: construal. At the end of
the last section, we were reminded that in the proper context a soda bottle can
be said to freeze itself. This is because the speaker is construing (for discourse
purposes and not making a metaphysical claim, presumably) that the soda bottle
is a causative agent. Causative agents can freeze things including themselves,
thus the construal allows its use in an otherwise banned causal construction.
In general, it is probably the human capacity for perspectival shifts that brings
about diﬀerent ways of conceiving the same ‘event’. This could involve a ﬁner or
coarser grained view of speciﬁc spatio-temporal phenomena, attributing agency
in non-standard ways, or taking additional ‘cultural’ facts, that come up in the
stealing/borrowing examples.
So far these are very speciﬁc and rather idiosyncratic examples, and it is
perhaps more important that these are examples of more general semantic phe-
nomena where perspective and construal can lead to violations of a language’s
defaults. In the ﬁrst chapter, we saw not only examples of coercion in English
tense-aspect constructions, but also that certain verb classes may be conceived as
states in one language, but activities in another. For example,11 in English, dry
is typically either an inherent (Death Valley is dry) or transitory state (The shirt
is dry), where a bit of rainfall in the former is does not make it untrue, but would
the latter. While English also has a causative use of dry (The shirt is drying),
(Foley, 2005) points out that in some Australasian languages whose speakers live
in a rain-forest, dry is never an inherent state, but rather the consequence of an
activity.
(Croft, 2000b) makes the distinction between aspectual type and aspectual
class. Aspectual types are the universal semantic structures12 that we have seen
in various forms, both semantically ((Moens & Steedman, 1988), (Lambalgen &
Hamm, 2005), etc.) and psychologically in the work of (Zacks & Tversky, 2001).13
Aspectual classes are language speciﬁc and there is no direct universal mapping
between a verb in a particular language and an aspectual type.
Moreover, even within a language a particular verb can map to more than
one aspectual type depending upon context, and the construction that the verb
appears in. (Croft, 2000b) labels what we have been calling coercion as construal
operations, i.e. ‘a reconceptualisation of the situation’s aspectual structure.’(p.
4) There are two basic types – the ﬁrst is when there is simply a shift on what part
of the event is proﬁled (inchoatives, run-up achievements, etc.), but there is also
the more substantial shift that ‘involves a more substantial restructuring of the
aspectual contour of the situation, using a combination of encyclopedic knowledge
11The transitory/inherent distinction is taken from (Croft, 2000b). To remind the reader
of a distinction made in the ﬁrst chapter, this is a sort of stative analogue of the single in-
stance/habitual distinction that can be made for activities and accomplishments.
12These are more commonly called event-types.
13Various authors diﬀer in their typology and granularity. For example, (Croft, 2000b) cites
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about the situation, context-speciﬁc knowledge of that particular instance...and
general cognitive operations such as shift of attention.’(p. 4)
That is, a default mapping can be made between aspectual class and aspectual
types. Generally, verbs such as sit, know, hope are classiﬁed as statives. But
it is better to look at this class as having prototypical statives such as know,
where conventionally there is no activity construal allowed and more peripheral
cases such as sit, where both stative and activity uses coexist happily in standard
English. Nevertheless, we have found examples where know c a nbeu s e di na c t i v i t y
sense14, showing that construal from state to activity is even possible with a core
member of the stative aspectual class.
Lurking behind this is an idea of some sort of way of measuring what might
be seen as, say, a prototypical or peripheral stative.15 I have no simple formula
to do this, but certainly a variety of factors contribute to this categorisation.
Doubtless the way humans perceive the world and speciﬁc environmental factors
(as seen with dry) will have a role to play. Moreover there is no reason why in
a particular language group particular concepts are not conventionalised to be
one type of eventuality rather than another. Ultimately, one person’s intuitions
are not enough, instead there would be a need to do a mass of empirical studies
of speaker’s judgements about characteristics of particular events (and contexts
to play with). Even then, there is little doubt in my mind that even within a
particular linguistic and cultural group, response would diﬀer dependent upon the
normal sociolinguistic factors of class, education, age, sex, etc. However, we have
seen enough to know that while our shared human abilities and shared world will
give rise to a great deal of cross-linguistic commonality, this sort of classiﬁcation
will not be universal.
7.2.2 Impact
In fact, taking the possibility of a construal shift from state to activity seriously
can lead to a clariﬁed view of supposed problems. As seen in Chapter 4, it is
often held that a lexical stative16 complement is ungrammatical in a perception
verb construction.17 As demonstrated, this is absolutely not the case. But what
is the case is that in this type of perception verb construction the complement is
interpreted as an activity.
Making the distinction between aspectual type and aspectual class causes this
14And indeed in some dialects it may be as conventional as sit, which is a paradigm of an
English verb that straddles the state/activity border.
15Alas, these concepts will have to remained vague and undeﬁned. However, think of it along
the lines of class membership discussed in Chapter 3.
16Remember, stative here means a member of the stative aspectual class.
17A recent volume (31) of Theoretical Linguistics explores the issue of the Davidsonian event
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debate to vanish.18 The constraint should be that the aspectual type of the com-
plement cannot be a state. However, as we have seen that in the progressive
construction, verbs that are normally classiﬁed in the stative aspectual class can
be construed as activities, and must be if they are used in the progressive con-
struction. Similarly, when the message board poster said that he saw a particular
talk show host ‘be intelligent’,19 he meant that the host’s behaviour was indicative
of intelligence (and he saw that). Like it or not, Bill Clinton can feel our pain,
but this is more an indication of him being empathic enough to infer this from
someone’s behaviour, not because of the emotional equivalent of mind-reading.
As already noted, by taking seriously construal operations and the meaning
that emerges from combining a lexical item (that has a default aspectual class)
with the construction it appears in, a diﬀerent view on what the goal of (event)
semantics emerges. This is now clear for many of the examples in this thesis,
especially those of causative/resultative constructions and the many diﬀerent ex-
amples of coercion seen in Chapter 2.
The analysis of the usage of nominalisation is much more complex, as so
much variance has been uncovered. Certainly, it has been shown that the simple
Act/Fact division between nominal and verbal gerund is completely inadequate.
While there are certainly contexts that do require a nominal gerund, they are
more infrequent than often is thought to be the case. Nevertheless, it is certainly
possible to have even manner readings for verbal gerunds. My guess is that this is
possible because of construal, of course in a more broad sense than aspectual shift.
Take Geoﬀrey Boycotts comment about the England cricket captain’s ‘moving
the ﬁelders around’ better than the Australian’s. I think what is key to this
case is that we have already seen that even as a default, verbal gerunds do have
an ‘action’ denotation ((Heyvaert, 2003), (Quirk et al., 1985)), and not merely
a factive interpretation. Once this is allowed for, then it is no great leap for
a speaker then to be able to use a verbal gerund in a context of evaluating the
action. In this case, this is not in reference to one event (conventionally speaking)
but rather a habit of behaviour over two months. The example that includes ‘my
driving the car is random’ (to mean the manner and frequency of driving the car)
example works upon the same lines.20
18Not the debate over Davidsonian event variables, but the usefulness of the supposedly
ungrammatical examples.
19(Higginbotham, 2005) agrees that ‘states’ can be used in perception construction when
construed as activities he claims that for unrelated syntactic reasons, the copula is banned.
Thus ‘I saw Mary happy’ is allowed, but not ‘I saw Mary be happy.’ This may be a dialectical
variation, as there are plenty of examples of ’be’ with perception constructions and in general
with small clauses ‘He made me be happy.
20In general, the fact that the syntactic diﬀerences between a nominal and verbal gerund are
not quite as clear cut as often assumed may also have something to do with the more complex
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7.2.3 Convention
Of course, this is not to say that any of the above examples will be accepted (or
used) by a majority of English speakers. Certainly the use of gerunds is a very
complex process that varies over dialect, register, style, and the linguistic material
that surrounds it.21 That Geoﬀrey Boycott comes from a part of England,22 where
ing is used in many more contexts than, say, standard American or British English
probably has a role to play.
While this is not the place to explore the general impact of convention on
language and language change, we can restrict our focus to its interaction with
lexical aspect. (Croft & Cruse, 2003, p. 102) identify two kinds of convention
involved. The ﬁrst is the language speciﬁc mapping between verbs and aspectual
class, which will (in the particular language) constrain the possibilities of con-
strual.23 But within an aspectual class some exemplars are more ﬂexible than
others. This can be because of the nature of reality or human cognitive capaci-
ties.24 But once an novel interpretation is made and expressed it, the construal
made can be viewed as natural and be made a default. For example, (Croft,
2000b) cites the example, She is being tall as a non-conventionalised construal
(in a situation where a girl gets up on a box to be taller than her friends). This
is a fanciful example, though interpretable, that would not be accepted by many
English speakers. The same type (state —> activity) coercion is seen in She is
being silly, but this example (unlike the former) would probably be accepted by
the majority of English speakers and is very commonly used. My guess is that
be tall is much more of a core, inherent state, that the subject cannot turn on
and oﬀ at will.25 With be silly this is much easier seen as a temporary state that
can come and go quite easily, making the construal much easier, and most likely
more frequently used. Of course, it could be the case that in the future, a sort
of fashion comes in where one wears platform shoes to signify sexual availability.
The expression He is being tall, tonight could then be conventionalised to not
only express a temporary state of tallness, but also to mean that someone is out
‘on the pull’.
21Context and argument structure may also play a role. For example, an opinion piece
by Norman Solomon is entitled ‘How long will Moveon.org fail to oppose bombing Iran?’
(http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/35072/). While Bombing Iran is a ‘Pro-Ing’ nomi-
nal, context tells that the agent of Bombing is not the subject of the interrogative (an anti-Iraq
war online activist group), but the U.S. government. Were confusion a possibility, then using
the bombing of Iran would be used to separate any possible link between the matrix subject
and the agent of bombing.
22He is from Yorkshire, and unlike the majority of his colleagues is not middle class.
23For example, the language have the capacity to allow shifts to be made between diﬀerent
aspectual classes.
24In (Croft & Cruse, 2003), these two are other constraints that are involved in the construal
of interpretations, along withe ubiquitous contextual constraints.
25Though viewed over a longer temporal perspective, getting taller is a conventionalised
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Moreover, some examples of conventionalised construal are of such a default
status that they hardly seem like coercion at all. For example, drink wine is an
atelic activity and drink a glass of wine can26 be a telic activity. This observation
is stating the obvious, but this too is an example of coercion,27 but so common and
ingrained in the language that calling it ‘coercion’ seems to do an injustice to its
normality. But it is coercion, nonetheless.28 Finally, in the previous chapter, we
saw how the argument structure and participant conditions of various causatives
have evolved over time. Kill was initially quite restrictive, but has evolved to be
conventionally applied in a variety of direct and indirect contexts. Others, such as
disappear, while used by some speakers as a transitive causative29 is undoubtedly
still strange and unacceptable for many speakers.30
Bringing matters back to the beginning, the example of is knowing is a prime
example of the interaction of construal and convention. In standard English, it
is certainly unconventional, but can be used, whereas it seems that it certain
dialects it is a rather common construction. This diﬀerence and acceptance of its
usage is something best answered by socio-linguistics, but I will end with a little
speculation on how the innovation could come about.
As we saw, a common use of progressive know follows the line of the structural-
phenomenal distinction, where knowledge is construed not as something eternal,
but as the impact of having that knowledge. For example, in the interview with
the comic book creator, he notes “Meanwhile, I’m knowing they’re probably
going to bump me and go get Ridley Scott” (to direct). Having this knowledge
causes Mark Steven Johnson not only to write the script, but make storyboards,
drawings, music, etc. to bring a vision of how the movie should be along with
the script. If he did this, then the producers would have no choice but to let him
direct.
In other words, in the interview, Johnson is saying that what he knew at the
time had an impact on his behaviour and strategy. This is the construal of pure
knowledge into something more of the moment. Furthermore, the construal of I
know to that I know it is no stretch whatsoever. It exists grammatically in the
form of the verbal gerund. In more ‘proper’ English, he could have expressed
26But recall that drinking and eating predicates are rather tricky.
27In (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, p. 172-173) the transition from the accomplishment to the
activity is an example of subtractive coercion, i.e. removing the goal-related information.
28This ‘feeling’ that no coercion is going on in the last example has implications for analysis.
From (Croft & Cruse, 2003, p. 72): “The nature of our experience in many instances favors
certain construals over others. It is these widespread typical or default construals that have led
semanticists to posit a more rigid model of the mapping from linguistic meaning to experience.”
Note that then this is not purely a matter of convention but the cognitive ease in which certain
construals can be made. However, it seems likely to be the case, that the ‘easier’ construals are
much more amenable to be conventionalised.
29And even having its own OED entry.
30My personal aesthetic taste hopes that the causative use of nervous is conﬁned to Big
Brother viewers and vanishes along with the program.292 Chapter 7. Endnote
himself along the lines, “Knowing they were going to hire Ridley Scott to direct,
I not only wrote the script, but also mapped out the direction of the movie so
that they had no choice but to hire me.”
This construal of know already exists and is a common construction, but, I
would imagine, that in the progressive construction the construal is much less
readily accepted, and in standard English is certainly not acceptable. Neverthe-
less, I should hope that, by now, the reader’s intuition about such examples have
changed a bit, along with their notions about the status of interpretation. Mine
certainly have.Appendix
This appendix is unfortunately not a full introduction to the technical aspects
of the event calculus,31 but rather, when combined with the Interlude, enough
for the reader to get a feel and basic understanding of the formalisms used in
this thesis. The ﬁrst section shall list and also informally explain the axioms in
detail. The second will demonstrate how these are not suﬃcient and shall sketch
the computational system needed.
The Axioms
In the following, all variables are assumed to be universally quantiﬁed.32
Axiom 1. Initially(f) ∧¬ Clipped(0,f,t) → HoldsAt(f,t)
Axiom 2. Happens(e,t) ∧ Initiates(e,f,t) ∧ t<t
 ∧¬ Clipped(t,f,t
) →
HoldsAt(f,t
)
Axiom 3. Happens(e,t)∧Initiates(e,f1,t)∧ t<t
 ∧ t
 = t+d ∧Trajectory(f1,t,f 2,d)∧
¬Clipped(t,f1,t
) → HoldsAt(f2,t
)
Axiom 4. Happens(e,s) ∧ t<s<t
∧ (Terminates(e,f,s) ∨ Releases(e,f,s)) →
Clipped(t,f,t
)
Axiom 2 is really the embodiment of the principle of inertia. Suppose that a
ﬂuent f is initiated at time t1 ¿ 0, and that no ‘f-relevant’ event occurs between
times t1 and t2.33 Axiom 2 then says that f still holds at t2.N o t et h a ts i n c et h e
predicate Clipped is deﬁned both in terms of terminating and releasing events,
31The reader is recommended (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005) for all of the gory details.
32Unless explicitly mentioned.
33‘f-relevant’ can be seen formally in Axiom 4, which deﬁnes the predicate Clipped.A n
‘f-relevant’ event is one that either terminates or releases a particular ﬂuent f.
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both the notions of instantaneous and continuous change are covered. For the
former, the principle of inertia merely says that in the absences of relevant events
no changes occur. But continuous change occurs due to force, not an instanta-
neous event, meaning that the absence of one of these events should not necessary
imply the absence of change. The Releases predicate allows this to happen.34
Axiom 1 handles the analogous case where ﬂuent holds initially. It implies
that if a ﬂuent holds at time 0 and no event has either terminated or released
i tb e f o r eo ra tat i m et>0, it still holds at t. For Axiom 3, it is best to refer
once again to our paradigm continuous change example. Let f1 be instantiated
by ﬁlling,a n df1 by height(x). Should ﬁlling hold uninterrupted between from
t until t, then for a certain x, height(x) with be true at t, with the value of x
determined by the Trajectory predicate.
The completion
While the axioms listed and described above are a general account of inertia and
change, they alone are not enough to enforce the concept of minimality discussed
in the Interlude. This is best explained by using a simple scenario of turning a
light on and oﬀ. For this, two events are needed – switch-on and switch-oﬀ,t h e
ﬂuents light-on and light-oﬀ, with the causal links being
- ¬HoldsAt(light-on, t) → Initiates(switch-on, light-on, t)
- ¬HoldsAt(light-oﬀ, t) → Terminates(switch-oﬀ, light-on, t)
Stated plainly, these mean that if the light is oﬀ, then turning the switch on
initiates the light being on, and turning the switch oﬀ terminates the light being
on (if the light is oﬀ). Now suppose we have a scenario that contains only the
above causal information about light switches, plus the speciﬁc information
(5) 1. Happens(switch-on,5)
2. Happens(switch-oﬀ,10)
In a minimal model, only two events occur – that of the light turned on at
time 5 and oﬀ at time 10. Intuitively, then it is the case that the light is shining
34For example, in the bucket-ﬁlling example given in the Interlude, the event is that of turning
the tap on. This event, by itself, does not change the state of the bucket, but instead begins
the continuous force of water ﬁlling the bucket, as well as (via Releases) clips the parameterized
bucket ﬂuent, and thus allowing it to change. Without the releases predicate, if the height of
the bucket was initially height(0) and the tap was turned on, the height of the water would
remain 0 no matter how much water was poured into it. This is a circumstance that would only
happen in an early Bu˜ nuel movie or if there was a hole in the bucket.Appendix 295
between times 5 and 10 and at no other times. Moreover, we have no information
that anything holds initially. For example, suppose we want to check whether
?HoldsAt(light-on,8). To do this we can apply Axiom 2, yielding
Happens(switch-on,t)∧Initiates(switch-on,light-on,t)∧ t<8 ∧¬Clipped(t,light-on,8)
→
HoldsAt(light-on,8)
The scenario information says that the light is switched on at time 5, and since
we know nothing about the light being on initially, we can assume that the event
at time 5 does initiate the light being on. Moreover, no ‘f-relevant’ terminating
events happen between time 5 and time 8 – we have to wait until time 10 for that
to happen. By Axiom 2, then, the light is on at time 8,35 and remains on until it
is switched oﬀ at time 10.
But, there exist non-minimal models of the above scenario that can defy the
above conclusion. For example, a non-minimal model of this scenario would add
the events
- Happens(switch-oﬀ,7)
- Happens(switch-on,9)
In this extended model the light is no longer on at time 8, as the light has now
been switched oﬀ at 7, and hence clipped between times 5 and 7. This is exactly
what we don’t want.36 It could also be the case that a non-minimal model has
information about Initially,e . g .Initially(light-on), which would mean that the
light is on from time 0 and on continuously until turned oﬀ.37
Luckily, there is a method that will ensure that the only events listed in (5)
are they only events that will occur in minimal models of this simple scenario.
Moreover, the minimal model will also contain no Initially c l a u s e sa sw e l l .
This is done by a method called the completion of a predicate. Eliding the
diﬃcult to read formal deﬁnition, the idea is to circumscribe each predicate in
the scenario (occurring as a the head of a clause)38 that then allows for the most
minimal conclusions that can be derived from the scenario information and the
35It is actually switched on at time 5.
36Instead, the scenario is expanded and one looks at minimal models of the expanded scenario.
37Note from the scenario that the switch-on event would have no eﬀect at time ﬁve because
light-oﬀ does not hold.
38The head of a clause is the consequent of a condition or an atomic scenario statement such
as Happens(Switch-on,5).296 Appendix
axioms.39 Practically, this is done by deﬁning every predicate40 in terms of a
biconditional that describes, via a series of disjunctions, every scenario relevant
fact about the predicate. The syntactic deﬁnition is incredibly complex,41 but
can be easily illustrated with the Happens predicated in this scenario as they are
only atomic statements. The general recipe is to start by gathering all clauses in
which our predicate appears as a consequent. In this case it is just
- Happens(switch-on,5)
- Happens(switch-oﬀ,10)
We then turn the time parameter into a constraint, by turning the above into
conditionals,42
t =5→ Happens(switch-on,t)
t =1 0→ Happens(switch-oﬀ,t)
The next step is to replace the terms in ti
43 by a new set of variables and add
the conjunct
x = ti → pi(x) to the body (antecedent) of each clause containing the predicate.44
In this case the body is only the time constraint. So, these equalities are added
to the antecedents of the ‘variablised’ above clauses, e.g. x = switch-on ∧ t =5
→ Happens(x,t).
Then (via further syntactic processes) a biconditional45 is formed with one
end being the a predicate and the other being the disjunctions of the bodies of
the clauses (with added conjunct) in question. In this case, the process yields
Happens(x,t) ↔ (x = switch-on ∧ t =5 )∨ (x = switch-oﬀ ∧ t = 10)
which means that Happens(switch-oﬀ,7) and Happens(switch-oﬀ,9) do not hap-
pen, as the above formula says that the only two events that occur are the ones
in (5).
But the analogous procedure needs to be done on the predicate Initially.T h i s
39We did this above in a rather informal manner. In general, using the notion of reasoning
backwards from initial query to sub-goals until we can’t go any further, we can determine the
times the derivable times that the various predicates are true.
40That exists as the head (atomic predicate of consequent) of a scenario clause.
41For those with a strong stomach, see (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005, p.55).
42This is serendipity. The clauses could already have antecedents.
43These are terms in the language, such as switch-on.
44Each p is an instance of the predicate we are completing. Here, e.g. p1(x)i s
Happens(switch-on,t)a n dt1 is switch-on. Also, technically, x is really x (same for t) which rep-
resents a possible string of variables that replace terms t in those predicates with arity greater
than one (e.g. Trajectory or Initiates). Thankfully, this doesn’t apply here.
45We will ignore the quantiﬁers here.Appendix 297
completion works at bit more simply as we have no information whatsoever about
the predicate in the above scenario. The ﬁrst step, then, here is to make a con-
ditional with falsum as the antecedent:46
⊥→Initially(light− on)
The biconditional for the completion is then
⊥↔Initially(light− on)
coupled with a clause that states ¬HoldsAt(light−on,t) → HoldsAt(light−off,t)
it is ensured that the light is oﬀ initially.
The two completions, taken together, ensure that the temporal proﬁle of the
light’s state is exactly the desired one sketched above.
46As the Initially predicate has no explicit time parameter, we only need to worry about the
terms that could occur as arguments of the predicate in the scenario.Bibliography
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Dit proefschrift bevat een onderzoeking van enkele onderwerpen over de semantiek
van gebeurtenissen met als doel een uitbreiding van het formele systeem genoemd
Event Calculus (Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005), een computationele behandeling van
tijd en aspect. Ik bespreek werkwoorden van perceptie en causatieve constructies
en bepaal hun temporele en implicationele eigenschappen.
Ik geef een nieuwe behandeling van de mogelijke Aktionsarten voor see and
watch en de vele bestaande causatieve conﬁguraties. Zij worden geformaliseerd en
breiden de scope van de Event Calculus uit met de structuren van co¨ ordinatie van
veelvoudige gebeurtenissen. Het Engels Ing nominalisatie wordt ook grondig be-
sproken en ik geef een formalisatie van de vele interpretaties van verbale gerundia
als processen.
Het bovenste gaat gepaard met een empirisch ´ en theoretisch onderzoek van de
verschuiving van perspectief in uitingen die de bovengenoemde onderwerpen be-
vatten. Ik laat zien dat zinnen die in de literatuur als niet grammaticale worden
bestempeld eigenlijk vaak worden gebruikt door eerste taal sprekers van het En-
gels. De door mij ontwikkelde formele scenario’s met de gegeven computationele
gereedschap van de Event Calculus tonen aan hoe de ‘nieuwe’ betekenissen (dat
is, de nieuwe Aktionsart, aspectuele eigenschappen en logische implicaties) voor-
speld kunnen worden.
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een algemene inleiding, leesgids en plan van de dissertatie.
Hoofdstuk 2 is een overzicht van Aktionsart,h i ¨ erarchische structuur van gebeurtenis-
sen en de verschillenden soorten van coercie.
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een overzicht van de relevante psycho-linguistieke literatuur ver-
bonden met de discussie in hoofdstuk 2. De eerste helft bespreekt de cognitieve
grondslagen van de structuur van gebeurtenissen en hi¨ erarchische organisatie die
de conceptuele typologie van hoofdstuk 2 weerspiegelt. De tweede helft onder-
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zoekt vele resultaten die de acquisitie van tijd en aspect van kinderen betreﬀen.
Dit culmineert in een verband tot het werven van de structuur van gebeurtenissen.
Deze twee gedeelte fungeren/dienen als psychologische grondslag van de for-
malisatie van de Event Calculus. Het eerste gedeelte geeft argumenten voor de
notie van default scenarios en het tweede gedeelte voor de computationele gereed-
schap die de interpretatie van tijd en aspect berekent.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de syntaxis, semantiek en logische eigenschappen van de
twee klassen van perceptie-werkwoorden, namelijk die van see en watch.V o o r
beide klassen worden verschillende soorten van Aktionsarten en temporele proﬁe-
len bepaald. Ik stel dan enkele ‘templates’ voor om de tijd en aspectuele inter-
acties te formaliseren. De in de template gedeﬁnieerde semantische ‘constraints’
laten zien hoe vermoedelijke ongrammaticale perceptie zinnen een juiste interpre-
tatie kunnen krijgen.
Hoofdstuk 5 is een studie van causatieve constructies. Het begint met een cross-
tallige onderzoek om de relevante semantische eigenschappen te bepalen (inclusief
verschillende causale niveaus en rollen van de participanten). Met deze inzichten
worden vele engelse causatieve constructies bekeken; daaruit komen verrassende
resultaten wat betreft de causatieve ‘alternation’ en de perifrastische causatieven.
Deze resultaten worden dan gebruikt voor het formaliseren van de causatieve tem-
plates. De templates voorspellen ´ en de standaard interpretatie ´ en de voorbeelden
veroorzaakt door de verschuiving van perspectief.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de engelse Ing nominalisatie vanuit een synchronisch en
een diachronisch perspectief. Ik bespreek eerst de voorafgaande analysen en dan
de geschiedenis van deze vorm. Dit leidt tot vragen over haar synchronische
analyse (syntactisch en semantisch). Ik presenteer empirische voorbeelden van
vermoedelijke syntactische onmogelijkheden en semantische anomalie¨ en. Ik con-
cludeer dan dat de oorspronkelijke formalisatie van de Event Calculus makkelijk
uitgebreid kan worden door eenvoudige modiﬁcaties van de scenario’s. Uitein-
delijk formaliseer ik verschillende processen en gebeurtenis-achtige lezingen van
verbale nominalen.
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat tenslotte een samenvatting van de belangrijke resultaten en
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